

**The development of Russian nationalism
under Gorbachev (1985-91)**

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Abstract

This thesis examines the development of Russian nationalism under Gorbachev, with special reference to new political organisations.

Nationalism is defined as a combination of sentiment, political principle and movement. The political principle 'holds that the political and national unit should be congruent'. For Russia, this was not a straightforward matter: some considered the political unit to be a greater (imperial) Russian state; whilst others considered it to be a Russian national state (based on the RSFSR). In addition, the Russian language has two terms to define the national unit: *russkii* and *rossiiskii narod*.

Russian nationalism existed to a limited degree in the Soviet Union before 1985. Glasnost and perestroika reduced the limitations on expressions of Russian nationalism and provided an opportunity for opinions to coalesce, resulting in the appearance of organised movements. At first, most Russian nationalists welcomed this change, although some soon started to display elements of caution - they were worried about possible threats to their conceptions of the Russian state. This work aims to show that Russian nationalism under Gorbachev was not a unified movement, but a collage of opinions attempting to define the Russian state and its national values.

The thesis examines: the development of new groups connected with Russian nationalism; the relationship between Russian nationalism and the centre; the issues which became Russian nationalist causes; and the tendencies which became apparent in Russian nationalism.

The thesis contends that Russian nationalism can be divided into three tendencies: imperialist nationalism, concerned with the maintenance of a greater Russian/Soviet state; isolationist nationalism, which sought to establish a specifically 'Russian' state, untainted by foreign influence and separated from the non-Russian Union republics; and liberal nationalism, which respected other republics' independence, was receptive to foreign influence and, yet, was concerned with the Russian national identity of a new Russian state.

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Introduction

The aim of this work is to show how Russian nationalism manifested itself in Russia during the Gorbachev period (1985-91) with particular reference to the groups which adopted it as a political cause.

I believe that there are three tendencies within Russian nationalism which were given the opportunity to express themselves clearly under the influence of glasnost and perestroika: imperialist, isolationist and liberal Russian nationalism.

One or two texts have referred to the terms 'imperialism', 'isolationism', 'separatism' and 'liberal democracy' in relation to Russian nationalism, but no one has made this exact distinction between the tendencies in Russian nationalism.

I start with a discussion of nationalism, which seems to be frequently ignored when Russian (or any) nationalism is discussed. There is no agreement as to what constitutes nationalism, but Gellner's idea that it is a political principle uniting a political and national unit seems to be popular. Examining the various ideas on the subject, I agree with Gellner's definition, but also believe that a definition should mention the sentiment and the movement which pursue the principle. It is upon these three elements that I base my examination of Russian nationalism.

The second chapter looks at the work of other scholars on the subject and enumerates some of the terms which they have used. It concludes with the three divisions of Russian nationalism.

The third section of the thesis describes the development of Russian nationalism from 1985-1991, with an emphasis on the organisations and parties which arose. It divides the Gorbachev years into four different time periods, representing: the initial intellectual debate and the appearance of *Pamiat'*; the emergence of new organisations connected with Russian nationalism; the combination of Russian nationalism with both democratic and conservative forces in opposition to the centre; and Russian nationalism in the aftermath of the attempted coup of August 1991.

The issues listed in Chapter 4 represent a fairly broad look at the variety of concerns affecting Russian nationalism. The chapter by no means goes

into each issue in great depth, for each issue might merit the examination of a thesis. Some issues might be subject to a deeper analysis than others, but the work only wishes to illustrate the variety of ways in which nationalism was expressed. The section on 'national character and identity' may seem to cover many of the other issues in the chapter, but I have tried to avoid repetition. The search for national identity does link many of the issues, but it also presents some new information. I therefore felt it necessary to include it as a separate category in the middle of the chapter.

The last three chapters introduce the reader to a number of groups which expressed or used Russian nationalism as a conviction or a political tool. Chapter 5 deals with the organisations which are connected with imperialist Russian nationalism. This tendency represents the largest area of activity in Russian nationalism and encompasses the largest number of groups, some of which were fairly significant in size and some of which were very small. The groups represent a variety of political views, including: support for Marxism-Leninism; reintroduction of the monarchy; increasing the importance of Russian Orthodoxy in Russian life; and extreme right-wing views. However, all the organisations are guided by their desire to maintain or re-institute the greater Russian state/Soviet Union.

Chapter 6 examines briefly the organisations which were most closely linked to liberal Russian nationalism. This includes groups which pursued liberal democracy and a civil society, whilst trying to establish specific Russian features within that society. It also includes the umbrella movement, Democratic Russia, and constituent members, which fought for the institution of a Russian [*rossiiskii*] national identity through the establishment of Russian state structures.

Chapter 7 looks at the most marginal tendency, isolationist Russian nationalism. This tendency combined both separatism and isolationism to create the idea of a specific Russian path untainted by foreign influence and the concerns/burdens of the non-Russian(/Slavic) periphery. It gives a summary of Solzhenitsyn's programme for Russian recovery in isolation from the rest of the world and lists three organisations for whom a belief in the innate qualities of the Russian people was paramount.

Chapter 1: The Meaning of Nationalism

Nation and Nationality

It is impossible to discuss nationalism without having a vague idea about what constitutes a 'nation' or a 'nationality'. Many nationalists believe that humanity is naturally divided into nations, whose peculiar characteristics can be readily identified. However, there are problems with this approach: firstly, today's studies of nationalism indicate that the emergence of nations is a relatively recent political phenomenon and discredit the idea that they might be 'natural' or 'preordained'; secondly, it is difficult to distinguish the unique, collective characteristics of a particular nation or nationality - one cannot imagine a situation in which every member of a nation conforms to a strict set of characteristics (it is quite possible that elements within a nation have more in common with elements of other nations than with all the members of their own nation). It is wiser to assume that nations form over time by the actions of men and through the mechanism of consensus. Man's communicative and gregarious nature has led to a tendency to identify with a group, be it the family, clan or tribe. As the media of communication have grown and developed, so too has man's capacity to identify with a larger group. Affiliation to a group identity requires the recognition of shared similarities and common values. When a number of peoples can be convinced that they share common values, which are perceived to be distinct from another/other groups, there is a basis for the nation/nationality to exist and develop. Membership depends very much upon subjective affiliation to the nationality and the reciprocal acknowledgement of membership by others within it.

Usage of terms 'nation' and 'nationality'

I should point out here that the terms 'nation' and 'nationality' are frequently used synonymously. However, the usual difference between the terms is that 'nation' refers to a group which possesses, or seeks to possess, a more or less defined territory and government, whereas

‘nationality’ refers to an ethnic group within a larger (political) unit. For instance, the Oxford English Dictionary describes a nationality as:

A nation; freq. a people potentially, but not actually, a nation¹

and the Longmans dictionary gives:

a NATION... b an ethnic group within a larger unit.²

As both ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ refer to groups which are recognized as identifiable groups with common characteristics, we can, at this stage, speak of them in the same breath. Therefore, it would be reasonable to refer to either the ‘Russian nationality’ or the ‘Russian nation’.

In 1939 the Royal Institute of International Affairs conducted a study on nationalism, which began by trying to define the usage of terms such as ‘nation’, ‘people’, ‘national’ and ‘nationalism’. The study group immediately pointed out the difference between the English terms, their various and changing uses, and their counterparts in other languages. The term ‘nation’ was given two usages in English:

(i) synonymously with ‘State’ or ‘country’ to mean society united under one government... But the implications of ‘nation’ are never precisely those of ‘State’, since ‘nation’ calls to the those persons who compose a political community, ‘State’ to the sovereign power to which they owe an allegiance and which holds sway over the territory which they inhabit.

(ii) ‘Nation’ is also used to denote an aggregation of individuals united by other, as well as political, ties - ties commonly of race, religion, language, or tradition.³

It was pointed out that the English usages did not completely coincide with *nation* and *Nation* in French and German or *nazione* and *nación* in Italian and Spanish. The RIIA believed that:

In French, *nation* does possess the same two meanings as in English, but tends to be used rather more frequently in the purely political sense. Whereas *peuple* means either the masses of the population, as distinct from the middle and upper classes, or else a community united by a common origin, and *patrie* signifies the territory inhabited by the nation, *nation* signifies the community of men linked in the present by the tie of a will to live together.⁴

This illustrates how language itself can confuse common understandings of terms such as ‘nation’ and ‘people’. However, ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ are relatively new terms in the international vocabulary and have developed with greater common usage and examination over this century. With the changing nature of language it has become possible to

translate many of these terms and their equivalents in foreign languages synonymously. At the same time, we should not ignore the significance of different terms in different languages, and how they might be manipulated by those who use them. For example, I will explain later how terms such as '*narod*' and '*patriotizm*' have been used in Russian not to express 'people' or 'patriotism' in the English sense, but as subtle surrogates to promote a new 'nation' and 'nationalism'. I will also point out that the Russian word '*natsionalizm*' was normally only used in a pejorative sense.

Origins of nations

The most popular view amongst scholars of nationalism today is that the modern concept of a nation only started to develop with the advent of the French Revolution, when nation was taken to mean the country, people and the state as a moral and political unit - popular will organized in the state.

As Don Luigi Sturzo puts it:

the word *nation* became the assertion of a moral and political personality acquired by the people.⁵

Or, in the words of Hugh Seton-Watson:

from the Revolution of 1789... it was increasingly claimed that the interests of whole nations (interpreted of course by those who claimed to represent their will) should have first priority in political life, both domestic and international. Nationalism, in fact, provides a new principle of *legitimacy* for government, an alternative to the traditional legitimacy of monarch and religion.⁶

From this point on the 'nation' developed a collective interest and, yet, comprised a multiplicity of units working within the national framework. It would be difficult to believe that all Frenchmen were bonded together at this point by a system of values which were common to them only. The revolutionary values of liberty, equality and fraternity were only the first building blocks in constructing the edifice of the French nation.

I agree with the point of view that nations developed along with the advancement of communication and education. Ernest Gellner believes:

It is nationalism which engenders nations and not the other way round. Admittedly,

nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically.⁷

The French Revolution was followed by a programme of education which reached all the people within its national state. It instilled in those who had a new-found importance the idea that they shared common values and a shared destiny. To continue Gellner's observation:

Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine purities restored.... ...The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions.⁸

The idea that nationalists propagate myths and interpret reality in order to establish the nation is echoed by Shafer:

Nationalism is what the nationalists have made it; it is not a neat, fixed concept but a varying combination of beliefs and conditions. It may be in part founded on myth but myths like other errors have a way of perpetuating themselves and of becoming not true but real. The fact is that myth and actuality and truth and error are inextricably intermixed in modern nationalism.⁹

It was the bundle of new ideas and newly-packaged old ideas which transformed the French-speaking peoples into the new political we-group known as the *nation*. Similarly, the same principles were applied by movements trying to promote their conception of the Russian nation during the Gorbachev period.

Characteristics of nations

The main characteristics which seem to 'bond' nations or nationalities together are language, history and culture. At the same time, I must mention other common values which are contained within these three elements, namely, economic and political relationships, religion and the issue of territory.

Carlton Hayes describes a nationality as:

any group of persons who speak a common language, who cherish common historical traditions, and who constitute, or think they constitute, a distinct cultural society in which, among other factors, religion and politics may have played important though not necessarily continuous roles.¹⁰

Hayes puts quite an emphasis on language, but it cannot be regarded as a

constant yard-stick. It is true that for men to feel a degree of common ground, they must have the facility to communicate. Language is one of the first requirements of human communication, but it does not follow that all those who speak the same language belong to the same nationality (for example, Germans and Austrians, English and American, etc.). Some believe a language is also central to nurturing and expressing a particular culture - for instance, a language may contain certain words which can express rituals, customs, objects and, arguably, concepts, which are unique to a certain group of people. This reflects a view held by some nationalists, who believe that only they, as native speakers of their language, can understand the true uniqueness and essence of their own culture.

Kedourie describes language as:

the means through which a man becomes conscious of his personality. Language is not only a vehicle for rational propositions, it is the outer expression of an inner experience, the outcome of a particular history, the legacy of a distinctive tradition.¹¹

The German philosopher, Johann Fichte, believed:

The test, then, by which a nation is known to exist is that of language. A group speaking the same language is known as a nation, and a nation ought to constitute a state.¹²

This observation is not true, but it dates back to the early nineteenth century when nationalist thought was beginning to develop and it illustrates the important consideration which must be given to language when examining nationalities and nations. Its role can be central, but language is not equated with nationality.

The second distinguishing element of nationality referred to by Hayes, and mentioned also by Kedourie, is that of common historical tradition. Language brings with it the ability to pass on memories and record outstanding events of the past. The result is that the 'we-group' can trace what is perceived to be a common experience dating back many years. Solidarity within the group and explanations for the group's present situation can be established by delving into history and selecting those elements or events which suit their interpreters. In this way, a common history and national identity can be constructed and passed as a continuous process related to the present. As Hayes puts it:

there is a tendency to personify the group, to view the nationality as an historic

personage.¹³

This process of personification may highlight historical figures whose actions may well have had some influence or bearing upon the current situation of many of the individuals of a nation or nationality, but it would be wrong to suggest that the actions of historical heroes and figures were committed in the interests of the nation.

Nationalists take outstanding figures and events from history and apply to them a national role. Thus the suffering and victory of Russians over the Tartar-Mongols become relevant to the Russian of today and the *bogatyri* of Russian legend became an inspiring national symbol for Russians during the Second World War. Under Gorbachev, various pre-revolutionary Russian heroes and figures, from St. Sergii of Radonezh to Aleksandr Nevskii and even Petr Stolypin, were used as symbols of the Russian national renaissance.¹⁴

Common history must be considered not only from the legacy of heroes and events (or myths) that it has provided, but also from the territorial, political and economic legacy. Nationalities tend to inhabit a certain area which they consider to be theirs by historical right. It was a place in which their forefathers lived and becomes a vital issue to nationalists when trying to establish the nation-state. Boundaries become a topic of contention, for the nation cannot exist without its sovereign territory, and territory will depend upon which groups are united under the banner of the 'nation'.

The political authority of the past can provide a basis upon which both territory and nationality will be considered. Certain ethnic groups in the past were brought together as political units as a result of conflict. These groups could later become parts of one nation, despite the fact that they were once distinct and independent. For example, the RIIA gives three ways in which conflict managed to extend the range of political units:

1. The government of one group conquers another group or groups, as the Norman King conquered the Anglo-Saxons.
2. Several groups are united under the leadership of one government in a war of aggression, as the German States were united under the King of Prussia in 1870.
3. Several groups, moved by a common fear, unite to resist attack or constraint, as in 1526 fear of the Turks caused the union of Hungary with the lands already possessed by Ferdinand Habsburg.¹⁵

Once these groups were united under one political authority, there was an opportunity for them to assimilate. Unification was not always a permanent feature, but, where it was, it served as a basis upon which nationalists could 'justify' the existence of (and forge) a nation or nationality.

Economic and commercial differentiations are also a possible factor affecting the make-up of a nationality. Economic undertakings had been conducted at one time by cities, but the Middle Ages witnessed the practice of 'national mercantilism', in which 'the government of every national state sought to make it a self-sufficing economic entity'.¹⁶ Even before commerce was conducted on a national scale, there was a social and economic relationship between people with similar values and needs which fostered a sense of community and group, particularly between people who lived in close proximity to one another and who spoke the same or similar tongue.

Economic life could also affect the third characteristic mentioned by Hayes, that of culture. A distinct cultural society could be characterized by a number of different elements - its institutions, its customs and habits, its art and other forms of expression. Every group has its own ways of doing things which, individually, may be indistinguishable from the ways of other groups, but, collectively, form something very distinctive. A nationality is a group which shares perceived common cultural characteristics. The larger the body of people, the less likely it is that they will all share these common cultural characteristics, unless they have a system of communication which enables the culture to be absorbed or adopted by others. Nationalism seeks to assert a recognized uniform culture (identified or constructed by nationalists themselves) as that of the nation or nationality, which ought to be upheld within an independent political framework. But not every perceived nationality will be able to assert itself to the point when it will become a self-governing 'nation':

Most potential nationalisms must either fail, or, more commonly, will refrain from even trying to find political expression...

... most of them go meekly to their doom, to see their culture (though not themselves as individuals) slowly disappear, dissolving into the wider culture of some new national state. Most cultures are led to the dustheap of history by industrial civilization without

offering any resistance.¹⁷

Gellner analyses what constitutes culture and how it is affected by nationalism. He explains that he uses the term 'culture' in an anthropological and not a normative sense:

...what is meant by the term is the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a given community. The term 'culture' on its own is never used in this discussion in its other sense, as *Kultur*, high culture or great tradition, a style of conduct and communication endorsed by the speaker as superior...¹⁸

Gellner talks about high and low forms of culture. He points out that, in an industrialized society, diversified, locality-tied low cultures are replaced by standardized, formalized and codified, literacy-carried high culture:

...nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority.¹⁹

For Gellner, the culture of a nation is the culture of a mass society, which in many cases, has been imposed upon society by an educated, literate minority. Nationalism actually creates a new culture, albeit based upon elements of the plethora of existing local 'folk' cultures:

It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves.²⁰

Culture, as a characteristic of a nation or nationality, is closely related to all the other characteristics listed, for there is no society or group without communication and forms of conduct. It has an interlinked relationship with politics and religion, with all three elements affecting each other's development through history.

Having mentioned the influence of political authority upon the formation of a we-group, I must mention the all-important influence of religion, which has interacted with the political process and become a very significant factor affecting the formation of nations and nationalities.

Religion is not always an attribute of nationality, for world religions such as Buddhism, Christianity and Islam have overlapped national borders and modern nations have been able to establish themselves on a secular basis. However, this does not negate the fact that religion has been a common factor around which some nationalities have congregated.

In ancient times, many tribal groups had their own personal gods, about which they created their own value systems and developed their own political and social customs. These mystical 'possessions' strengthened group sense and religion has been used by nationalists to strengthen the group sense of the nation or nationality. Religion is not necessarily a characteristic which distinguishes nationalities, but it can be used thus by nationalists who perceive it to be. It is possible for nations to manufacture or rally around national religions. The Russian Orthodox Church (the patriarchate of Moscow was established in 1589) played a significant role in influencing the development of Russian national consciousness and leaves its legacy today to those wishing to define Russia's national future.

Definition of nationalism

Nationalism is a phenomenon which is referred to in a variety of senses. Upon examination of the various analyses of nationalism and its origins, I can detect two major ways in which the term is used: as a generic term which examines nationality, the origins of the nation, self-determination and the nation state, tribalism, patriotism, regionalism and a host of other issues; and in its narrower sense, as a term reflecting a political phenomenon with its origins in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century.

I intend my analysis of Russian nationalism to look at all the issues involved under a generic umbrella, but any reference to the term will be made in its narrower sense which I will outline below.

There can be no simple basic definition of the term 'nationalism'. It is difficult to confine it to one sentence, for even the 'narrowest' definition requires the fusion of different elements. In my opinion, there are three elements which seem to be central to the definition of nationalism: a particular condition of mind or sentiment; the political principle which links nation and state; and the movement which espouses the political principle.

The first element is referred to by a number of analysts, although some separate sentiment from nationalism. However, the condition of mind or sentiment is essential to forming the belief and is an integral part of the

meaning of nationalism. The historian, Carlton J. H. Hayes gives four uses of the term 'nationalism' one of which is:

a condition of mind among members of a nationality, in which loyalty to the ideal or to the fact of one's national state becomes superior to all other loyalties, and of which pride in one's nationality and belief in its intrinsic excellence and in its 'mission' are integral parts.²¹

Similarly, Hans Kohn describes nationalism as:

a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being.²²

Kohn's description does not stress the belief in national 'excellence' or of the existence of a 'mission', but it reflects Hayes' contention that the condition of mind expresses the idealization of nation or nationality as a political and cultural unit. Kohn added that nationalism also contained the belief that one's 'supreme loyalty' was to one's nationality. However, I would argue whether a majority of a people with like beliefs is required to produce nationalism. It may be true that a majority of a people is required to subjectively affiliate themselves to the idea that they constitute a nationality, in order to establish a nationality, but it does not necessarily follow that the nationality wishes to form a nation-state or believes in an essential 'creative cultural energy'. It would be truer to suggest that nationalism can come from a group (or 'movement') of any size within a nationality. Kohn's description almost suggests that the belief in the existence of one's nationality is itself an expression of nationalism.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs (in 1939) described nationalism as:

a consciousness, on the part of individuals or groups, of membership in a nation, or of a desire to forward the strength, liberty, or prosperity of a nation.²³

This, once again, refers to the condition of mind, but fails to pinpoint the political principle or mention the involvement of any particular movement.

Louis L. Snyder, reluctant to give a brief definition of nationalism, gave us this 'least objectionable' offering:

a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the aspirations of the nation have been expressed, attached to common traditions and common customs, venerating its own heroes, and, in some cases, having a common religion.²⁴

Snyder concedes that there are exceptions to nearly all the terms used in his definition, and discusses other aspects and consequences of nationalism, but asserts that it:

should be considered first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness, a psychological fact.²⁵

In all the above definitions, the 'condition of mind' appears to be the primary factor. There is little doubt that nationalists consider their national group to be of unique importance and can envisage themselves as a distinct political unit, because the nation is believed to have common values, aspirations and a common system of communication and comprehension. The political principle, however, receives almost secondary importance. Snyder talks of 'the aspirations of the nation'; the RIIA of a 'desire to forward the strength, liberty, or prosperity of a nation'; Kohn mentions the recognition of 'the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization'; and Hayes refers to 'loyalty... to the fact of one's national state'. According to Ernest Gellner, this aspect is of greater significance:

Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.²⁶

This idea does not exclude the possibility of nations or nationalities, being included within the political unit of a dominant nation. Imperial nationalism may incorporate the lands and peoples of other nationalities, seeking to impose its power and values on others, or to carry out a policy of national integration or assimilation.

Although primary importance is given to this political principle, Gellner also acknowledges the contribution of both sentiment and movement to the meaning of nationalism, suggesting that the elements might be separate, but are inextricably linked:

Nationalism as a sentiment may be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind.²⁷

Gellner qualifies his definition as:

a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut

across political ones, and , in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state... should not separate the power-holders from the rest.²⁸

The fact that the political principle involves some kind of power-relationship implicates the fact of a movement, which (inspired by the sentiment or condition of mind) expresses and organizes the aspirations and aims of this principle. Anthony Smith divorces nationalism from the concept of national sentiment, although he concedes that they are 'often closely related'.²⁹ Smith pays greatest attention to the organised body which espouses nationalist views. For him nationalism is:

an ideological movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' like others.³⁰

Smith is right in pointing out that nationalism cannot exist without the presence of a movement, but I do not think that even a narrow definition of nationalism can be based upon this alone. It would be fairer to say that such a concept requires a definition which involves all three of the elements mentioned above, with none taking primary importance. The three elements are interlinked and are all vital in explaining the constitution of this particular 'ism'. Like other analysts, I am reluctant to give a brief description of nationalism, for a great deal of significant points would be omitted. However, if I were pressed to give a definition, it would be one which equally included all three of the forementioned elements. I, therefore, offer three crudely-phrased definitions, which, together, illustrate the equal importance of the elements. Nationalism is:

A condition of mind fostering beliefs in the uniqueness of a nation and expressed by a movement, which, in the pursuit of political independence, holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.

An ideological movement, permeated by a condition of mind fostering beliefs in the uniqueness of a nation and holding that the political and national unit should be congruent.

A political principle pursued by an ideological movement, permeated by a condition of mind fostering beliefs in the uniqueness of the nation, and holding that the political and national unit should be congruent.

A Russian/Soviet Understanding of 'Nationalism'

Throughout the Gorbachev period, those of a nationalist persuasion, or those who adopted the politics of nationalism in order to achieve their aims rarely used the terms '*natsionalizm*', '*natsionalist*', or '*natsionalisticheskii*'.³¹ These were (and still are) negative terms which resulted from the Soviet understanding of nationalism, influenced by Marxist-Leninist thought. Marx had claimed in *The Communist Manifesto* that 'the working men have no country'³², whilst Lenin had written that 'bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism' were 'two irreconcilably hostile slogans'.³³ These attitudes led to a villification of 'nationalism' in Soviet ideology.

The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia describes nationalism as:

A bourgeois ideology and policy, as well as the outlook that raises the national question. Nationalism views the nation as a supreme non-historical and supraclass form of social unity and as a harmonious whole, all of whose social strata have identical fundamental interests...³⁴

The Encyclopaedia later states that the proletarian, communist world view is incompatible with any nationalist ideology. However, it does support the Leninist 'progressive' aspects of nationalism during the struggle against feudalism and as a liberation ideology in the former colonial and semi-colonial world.³⁵

According to Soviet theory, nationalism was progressive whilst it was:

the ideological standard of the rising bourgeoisie in the struggle against feudalism and national oppression

for

under this standard the popular masses were summoned to the struggle against feudalism.³⁶

Nationalism becomes a progressive force as a liberation ideology in opposition to imperialism:

In the contemporary period nationalism has a different character in countries fighting for political and economic independence against imperialism... Under such circumstances nationalism reflects, to a certain degree, democratism and protest against the imperialist

oppression of that part of the masses in which class consciousness has not yet been aroused. For considerable strata of peasantry, nationalism is a rudimentary form of anti-imperialist consciousness.³⁷

With the development of capitalism and imperialism 'the character of nationalism in Western Europe and the USA changed.' It became a:

weapon of imperialist and colonial politics, closely allying itself with racism.³⁸

It continues:

the imperialist bourgeoisie strives to impart to nationalism a strongly anti-communist and anti-Soviet tendency. Imperialism is banking on the revival of nationalist tendencies in the socialist countries.³⁹

To summarize, nationalism is condemned when it is conducted by capitalists and imperialists, and when it is conducted by 'bourgeois' elements within a socialist society. On the other hand, it is considered progressive as a liberation policy in feudal societies and when conducted by 'oppressed' parties in the colonial world. Nationalism, then, was neither desirable nor appropriate in the Soviet Union and the negative associations with the term remained throughout the Gorbachev period. However, the negative associations do not stem from this alone - there were words in the Soviet Russian lexicon which could be used to describe nation and nationalism in a more positive light: *narod* and *patriotizm*.

Patriotism or nationalism?

In a system where nationalism was denounced, but national groups were recognized and self-determination was espoused as the right of all peoples, the establishment of a centralized state required that all these peoples somehow regarded themselves as one. 'Patriotism' was the device used to integrate the Soviet nationalities. In essence, it differed little from the processes of nationalism described earlier, but in contrast to 'nationalism', it was viewed positively. An illustration of the typical, crude Soviet understanding of the difference between patriotism and nationalism can be summed up by the words of Dmitrii Likhachev:

For me, patriotism is love of one's country, while nationalism is the hatred of other peoples'.⁴⁰

This understanding - patriotism is good, nationalism is bad - influenced not only Likhachev, but many others during the Gorbachev period. Unfortunately, all it really explains is a subjective value judgement. Soviet and Russian 'patriotism' could most frequently be described as 'nationalism' in the Western sense.⁴¹

Soviet patriotism

The idea of 'patriotism' to the Bolsheviks was, at first, anathema. Allegiance was to a social class rather than to a state. The mood before the thirties was summed up thus:

in our times patriotism plays the role of the most reactionary ideology, whose function is to justify imperialist bestiality and to deaden the class consciousness of the proletariat, by setting impassable boundaries to its struggle for liberation.⁴²

However, at this time, books already spoke of a socialist fatherland (*otechestvo*) and this concept was consolidated by the introduction of the policy of 'socialism in one country'. On 9 July 1934, the term *rodina* was revived in a *Pravda* editorial entitled 'For the Motherland!' It extolled the virtue of 'creative and self-sacrificing patriotism' and condemned any man who betrayed the motherland.

A political dictionary from 1940 gives the following entry for 'patriotism':

Love for the fatherland, 'one of the deepest sentiments, strengthened over the centuries and millennia' (Lenin). Love for one's motherland, the feeling of patriotism has been inherent in the masses from time immemorial. Patriotism draws people to the struggle against national and class oppression.⁴³

(This is a distortion of Lenin, who recognized that the bourgeoisie were also 'patriotic'.)⁴⁴

The dictionary entry refers to Lenin's view that there is nothing wrong with 'national pride', a quality which is not only connected with one's language and motherland, but with being a good socialist. In fact, patriotism and socialism are more or less equated:

Only toilers can be genuine patriots... ...Soviet patriotism is the toilers' love for their socialist homeland and the deepest hate of enemies of the people. The feeling of Soviet patriotism is penetrated throughout the whole population, all peoples of the USSR... ...To be a Soviet patriot is... to serve one's socialist motherland.⁴⁵

The Soviet promotion of patriotism had very great nationalistic overtones in its integrationalist policy and rhetoric. Anthony H. Birch names two categories of steps taken to promote nation-building:

On the one hand, there are direct initiatives taken to foster integration and a sense of national identity and pride. On the other hand, there are reactive measures taken by governments to minimize the political effects of ethnic and cultural cleavages within society.⁴⁶

The Soviet government followed both of these categories in an attempt to integrate the Soviet people. The first category was taken to such an extent that the Soviet people was eventually referred to as a 'historical community of people'. In 1971, Brezhnev addressed the Central Committee of the CPSU with the following words:

Over the years of socialist construction in our country, a new historical community of people has arisen - the Soviet people. In its joint labour efforts, in the struggle for socialism, and the battles for its defence, new harmonious relations have been born between classes and social groups, nations and nationalities - relations of friendship and cooperation.⁴⁷

The second category mentioned by Birch - to minimize the political effects of ethnic and cultural cleavages within society - was pursued by a nationalities policy (which not only sought to integrate the different nationalities economically, but gave them token political representation in Moscow etc.); the identification of an enemy common to all Soviet peoples (first the capitalist West, later the national communism of China, etc.); and, over the latter half of the Soviet era, by the introduction and promotion of new, standardized rituals.⁴⁸

The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia reinforces the idea of a new historical community, with talk of 'all-Union' values and 'national pride':

Under the conditions of the consolidation and development of a new historical community of people - the Soviet people - all-Union political and sociopsychological values are being established. There appears in the Soviet man a national pride that covers the Soviet Union as a whole; such pride is an important element of socialist patriotism...
...The CPSU consider the education of the Soviet people in the spirit of a union of socialist patriotism and internationalism to be one of its most important tasks.⁴⁹

The rhetoric here mentions some of the characteristics which we earlier attributed to the nation, but their propagation and manifestation is referred to in Soviet parlance as 'patriotism'. Furthermore, Gellner's interpretation of nationalism as the imposition of a 'high' culture on a

mass society is echoed by the process of Soviet 'patriotic education' - the 'high' culture imposed by the educated élite (the CPSU) on this 'new historical community' is Soviet socialism:

CPSU activity in patriotic and internationalist education relies on the objective normality of developed socialism; the socio-economic, ideological-political, cultural and moral community of Soviet peoples; and the unity of all sides of life of a developed socialist society.⁵⁰

The above indicates that the propagation of Soviet patriotism has a great deal in common with my analysis of nations and nationalism. One might argue that Soviet patriotic education was an attempt to create a Soviet nation. Of course, with all the recognized nationalities of the Soviet Union, it would be difficult and seem wrong semantically to call this community a 'nation', and, so, the surrogate *narod* is used, a word fairly synonymous with the German *Volk*. However, *narod* was applied not only to the Soviet people, but to the Russian people and all other nationalities of the Soviet Union. *Narod* thus became the acceptable surrogate for 'nation' - it did not create the negative associations or ideological difficulties conjured up by *natsiia*. When Russian nationalist-oriented groups surfaced under Gorbachev, they referred to themselves as 'patriots' and to the Russian nation as *russskii narod*. The term *rusaskaia natsiia* scarcely, if ever, arose.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have given a brief definition of the process of nationalism; enumerated the characteristics attributed to the nation in this process; and outlined the Russian understanding of the term during the Soviet period. I have pointed out that the Russian understanding of my definition of 'nationalism' would sometimes be better conveyed by the Russian '*patriotizm*'.

The aforementioned criteria defining nationalism will be those used to examine the development of Russian nationalism - the use of the term *patriotizm* in the Russian sense is, at the very least, ambiguous and unhelpful. However, whenever I use the term 'patriot' in the text of this thesis, it is a reflection of the term which nationalist-orientated people and groups applied to themselves.

The discussion about the characteristics of a nation helps to highlight some of the issues and views involved in the process of nationalism - these issues and views determine both the essence of the nation and how the state should be organised to suit that nation best. Russian nationalism was concerned with defining the nation by: establishing common values; developing myths by the selective interpretation of history; personification of the nation; establishing its territorial boundaries.⁵¹ Different interpretations of these questions lead to differing tendencies within Russian nationalism.

The Russian national identity and the composition of the Russian state were relatively hard questions to deal with. Individuals were able to say: 'I am Russian', but were divided or uncertain as to what this meant. Indeed, in one survey, unskilled and lower-skilled groups often had difficulty giving an answer to what connected them with the Russian nation.⁵² There were also different views as to the origins of the Russian nation: some opinions reflected the idea that nations are inherent, referring to the existence of a Russian national soul;⁵³ others believed that the Russian nation was a consequence of historical circumstances.⁵⁴

The composition of the Russian state confused this issue even further. Russia had never existed as a nation-state - it had been an empire under the Tsar and had transformed into the Soviet Union shortly afterwards - this meant that Russians not only had to identify themselves within a multiethnic environment, but also had to define their political unit.

Russian nationalism represents those efforts which attempted to define or assert the fact of a Russian nation and identify it with a conception of a Russian state. Under Gorbachev, this phenomenon touched a large number of Russians, but that does not mean to say that all of them were 'Russian nationalists' - the Russian nationalists were those who attempted to propagate their idea of a unique Russian nation and justify its link with a political-territorial unit.

- ¹ *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p.1898.
- ² *The Longman Pocket English Dictionary*. Longman, Harlow, Essex, 1986, p.574.
- ³ Royal Institute of International Affairs *Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Institute*. London, 1939, p.xvii.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p.xviii.
- ⁵ Don Luigi Sturzo, *Nationalism and Internationalism*. Roy Publishers, New York, 1946, p.10.
- ⁶ Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nationalism and Communism*. Methuen, London, 1964, p.4.
- ⁷ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*. Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. p.55.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹ Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*. Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1955, p.7.
- ¹⁰ Hayes, *op.cit.*, p.21.
- ¹¹ Elie Kedourie, *op. cit.*, p.62.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p.68.
- ¹³ Hayes, *op.cit.*, p.17.
- ¹⁴ Even Soviet Russian heroes were used to this effect. See Chapter 5 "Russian Nationalist Issues"
- ¹⁵ RIIA, *op. cit.*, p.2.
- ¹⁶ Hayes, *op. cit.*, p.36.
- ¹⁷ Gellner, *op. cit.*, p.47.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.92.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.57.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ Hayes, *op. cit.*, p.6.
- ²² Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*. Collier, Toronto, 1969. p.16.
- ²³ RIIA, *op. cit.*
- ²⁴ Snyder, *op. cit.*, p.196.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.* p.197.
- ²⁶ Gellner, *op. cit.*, p.1.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*. Harper and Row, New York, 1971. p.169.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.* p.171.
- ³¹ None of the new Russian groups or parties used 'natsionalisticheskii' in their titles. Some used 'narodnyi' or 'patrioticheskii', while at least two used 'natsional'nyi': *Natsional'no demokraticheskaia partiia*, formed 3 September 1989; and *Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo*, formed on 20 October 1990.
- ³² K. Marx & F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*. Penguin, Middx., p.102.
- ³³ V.I. Lenin in Louis Snyder (ed.), *The Dynamics of Nationalism*, D. Van Nordstrand, Princeton, N.J., 1964, p.13.
- ³⁴ *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 17, ref. 365b, Collier /Macmillan, London, 1983.
- ³⁵ V.I. Lenin, *Sochinenie*. Moscow, 1965, 5th ed., vol. 24, pp.131-2.
- ³⁶ *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 17, *op. cit.*
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Cited in J. Dunlop, 'The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum', in *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*. Special Edition, 19 December 1988, p.4.

⁴¹ Here I must give a brief description of the term 'patriotism'. At its simplest level, patriotism is an affection for, or contentment with one's familiar home environment - the physical features of the land, the characteristic speech and customs etc. of one's people. Patriotism is very closely related to nationalism. Indeed, patriotism is an element of nationalism (and not the other way round) and can give rise to nationalism when it is 'strong'. The transformation of patriotism into nationalism is all the more likely in modern society, where communication can create a greater national awareness and absorb people from different groups into the modern 'nation'.

⁴² Cited in Frederick C. Baarghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism*. Oxford University Press, 1956, p.12.

⁴³ G. Aleksandrov, *Politicheskii slovar'*. Moscow, 1940, p.410.

⁴⁴ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Volume 28, 4th ed. Moscow, 1965, p.187.

⁴⁵ G. Aleksandrov, op. cit.

⁴⁶ Anthony H. Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*. Unwin Hyman, London, 1989, p.40.

⁴⁷ L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskii kursom*, Moscow, 1972.

⁴⁸ For the introduction of new, standardised rituals, see Natalia Sadomskaya, "New Soviet Rituals and National Integration in the USSR" in Henry R. Huttenbach (ed.), *Soviet Nationality Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR*, Mansell, London, 1990.

⁴⁹ *Great Soviet Enc.* Vol.18, op. cit.

⁵⁰ A. V. Likholat, *Natsionalizm - vrag trudiashchikhsia*. Mysl', Moscow, 1986, p.314.

⁵¹ For a discussion of these see chapter on Russian nationalist issues.

⁵² Iu. V. Arutiunian et al. (eds.), *Russkie: etno-sotsiologicheskie ocherki*, Nauka, Moscow, 1992, p. 380.

⁵³ *Veche*, July 1990, p.3.

⁵⁴ D.S. Likhachev, "Rossiia", *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 12/10/88, p.6.

Chapter 2: A classification of Russian nationalism

Introduction

In order to distinguish the tendencies which exist within Russian nationalism, it is first necessary to look at the categories which have been established both before and during perestroika. First, I will allude to one or two terms which arose in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and are sometimes referred to by those attempting to label new tendencies. I will then refer to terms which arose in the Brezhnev era and influenced the categories which developed during perestroika.

Russian nationalism is usually split into two categories: one which is more concerned with the maintenance of state; and another which identifies with Russian ethnicity and Russian 'cultural' values - values which are perceived as having been sacrificed to the state or to a non-Russian ideology. I believe that under perestroika it is possible to divide Russian nationalism into three tendencies which acknowledge not only the maintenance of the state and the resurrection of supposedly lost ethnic Russian values, but also account for other ideas which seek to establish a new national system in a changing political environment. For instance, the boundaries of the Russian state were always coterminous with those of first the Russian empire and then the Soviet Union, heavily centralised from Moscow, but under perestroika it became possible for the concept of the Russian state to be considered in isolation from certain Soviet territories which were seeking greater autonomy and possible independence from Moscow. This affected not only those who rejected an imperialist statist view and wished to institute 'traditional' ethnic Russian values, but also those who wished to come to practical terms with a new Russian entity separated from her former satellite possessions.

The three tendencies are labelled 'imperialist', 'isolationist' and 'liberal' Russian nationalism. Imperialist nationalism seeks to maintain or preserve the *status quo*, viewing the whole of the Soviet Union as the unitary Russian state; isolationist nationalism is essentially one of renewal, which seeks to establish an autonomous Russian state based

upon what its adherents consider to be unique, peculiar Russian values; and liberal nationalism is spawned by opportunism or adaptation within a changing environment - its main source are practical solutions to a Russia reestablishing itself within a changing and disintegrating political structure. Liberal Russian nationalism pays attention to Russian cultural values and traditions, although it is receptive to foreign ideas. It also respects the national aspirations of other Union republics and does not insist upon the maintenance of the Soviet/Russian empire.

19th century - Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism

The first most notable expression of Russian nationalism occurred in the 1830s in the years following the Decembrist revolt of 1825. It was coined in 1832 by Count Uvarov's formulation of the slogan 'Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality (*Narodnost'*)', which was designed to put a nationalist slant on the education process in Russia, thus serving as a device to maintain the integrity and strength of the Russian state.¹ This trinitarian doctrine was later adopted by the establishment in response to accusations by scholars such as Piotr Chaadaev that Russia had reached a state of political decay and that her salvation lay in the adoption of Western systems and values. Uvarov's trinity rejected any kind of Western political institution such as parliamentarianism, it cast doubt upon the possibility of a sectarian Russia or one which might move closer to Rome, and it proffered higher status to those of Russian nationality.

The non-government (although not strictly non-establishment) response to 'Westernisers' such as Chaadaev was expressed by the 'Slavophiles' (most notably Kireevskii, the Aksakovs, Khomiakov and Samarin). These consisted overwhelmingly of nobility who rejected Chaadaev's criticisms of Russia, but also rejected the autocratic rule of the Tsar. Although they were monarchists, the Slavophiles believed that Peter I had introduced a style of government which was Western in character and alien to the Russian way of life. Slavophiles stressed the originality (*samobytnost'*) of the Russian people, idealising Russian history and advocating Russian principles of social organisation - the peasant commune and the boyar

domain (*obshchina* and *zemshchina*). The Slavophiles valued Orthodox culture and managed to distinguish Russia from the West in theological and cultural terms. According to Kireevskii:

Three elements in the West: The Roman Church, ancient Roman development and the statehood which arose out of the violence of conquest are completely foreign to Rus'²

The Slavophiles emphasised the principles of unity and faith, condemning the West for its lack of conciliarism (*sobornost'*) and for having substituted rationalism for faith.

However, according to Nikolai Berdiaev, the early Slavophiles:

...were not enemies or haters of Western Europe, like obscurantist Russian nationalists were. They were enlightened Europeans. They believed in the great vocation of Russia and the Russian people, in the truth hidden within and they tried to characterise certain original features of this vocation³

Berdiaev describes the Slavophiles as:

...our first populists (*narodniki*), although populists on religious soil⁴

whilst Kohn referred to them as:

...religious anarchists who deeply disliked the state and above all the bureaucracy, an element which they regarded as of Byzantine or Germanic in origin, and which interfered with the organic life of the people's community.⁵

Pan-Slavism was a movement which initially developed amongst the Slav peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and whose first major event took place in 1848 at a Congress in Prague. The goal of the Congress was to unite all Slavs, but consisted primarily of Slavs from the Austro-Hungarian empire. Russian representation was conspicuously absent from the Prague Congress, except for the presence of the Mikhail Bakunin. One of the issues discussed was that of Russian universalism which was received in a somewhat negative light. The Russian response to the Prague Congress was equally as negative:

Russians looked at the Prague Congress of 1848 with undisguised hostility. Palacky had confined its membership to representatives of Slavs inside the Austrian monarchy... But there were others who believed that Pan-Slavism should extend beyond a call for cultural union and should be politically unified under Russian leadership. From this point of view, the movement needed the support of a state power and the natural choice, geographically

and power-wise, was Tsarist Russia. It was an attitude thoroughly understood and favoured in Moscow.⁶

The Russian idea of Pan-Slavism is something which grew out of and followed Slavophilism:

After Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56), a vague Slavophilism was transformed into a militant and nationalistic Pan-Slavism. What had started out as a cultural movement led by a Czech historian inside the Austrian Empire and subsequently politicized at Prague, was now appropriated by the Russians as an ideology dedicated to their mission. Pan-Slavism would be run from Moscow, not from Prague or the minor Slavic states... What had originally been a shadowy dream was thus transformed into a new aggressive, expansionist Pan-Slavism.⁷

Although Russia had not really participated in the Prague Congress of 1848, the centre of the Pan-Slav movement gradually moved from Prague to Moscow, illustrated by the Second Pan-Slav Congress held in Moscow in 1867. The Congress witnessed a degree of discomfort between the Russians and their fellow Slavs:

To them [the visiting Slavs] Pan-Slavism meant the equality of all Slavs. Their Russian hosts, on the other hand, saw the movement as dedicated to supremacy of the Russian language, the Orthodox faith, and the Russification of all Slavs even in the Balkans.⁸

According to Kohn, the 'earliest concise formulation of Russian Pan-Slavism' was contained in a letter from Mikhail Pogodin to the future Alexander II in 1838.⁹ However, one of the most articulate proponents of Pan-Slavism was the scientist Danilevskii. Danilevskii's major work favouring Pan-Slavism was *Russia and Europe, an Inquiry into the Cultural and Political Relations of the Slav to the Germano-Latin World*, published in 1869, which viewed Slavic civilisation as superior to Western civilisation and regarded the Russians as leaders of the Slavic world. Danilevskii suggested that under Russian leadership, a Pan-Slav Union should be achieved which would include not only the territory of the Russian empire as it then was, but much of Eastern Europe, including Hungary, Albania, Romania, Greece and most significantly, Constantinople.¹⁰ Danilevskii's Pan-Slavism seemed less concerned with the unification of Slavs, and more concerned with an ideology of Russian expansionism. Danilevskii idealised Russian history and considered

Russia to be separate from Europe. He believed that Russia's expanded influence would bring the peoples of a Pan-Slav Union benefits which they would be denied by a decaying imperialist Europe.

Twentieth century - National Bolshevism

National Bolshevism was a term originally coined in 1921, when defeated White Russians and emigres tried to rationalize the Bolshevik victory and eventually declared their support for Bolshevism and Soviet Russia.¹¹ These former opponents of the Bolsheviks were influenced by the publications *Nakanune* and *Smena vekh*, the latter of which claimed in 1921 that the Soviet state was now the only Russian national power in spite of its ostensible internationalism. According to M. Agursky, the converted Whites considered:

...it [Bolshevism] was not even a lesser evil; in specific historical conditions, only the Bolsheviks would be able to restore the Russian national state, the Russian state power. Bolshevism was the Russian national phenomenon; the Russian revolution was a popular mutiny in the style of Stepan Razin... and Pugachev.¹²

Thus former right-wingers and nationalists came to regard Bolshevism not as Russia's destroyer, but as its saviour, uniting the country and restoring to it a strong army. Agursky gives his definition of the term:

National Bolshevism is the Russian etatist ideology that legitimizes the Soviet political system from the Russian etatist point of view, contrary to its exclusive Marxist legitimacy. Etatism can be distinguished from cultural nationalism... Nevertheless, I would like to define etatism as a powerful form of nationalism... National Bolshevism does not reject Communist ideology, though it strives to minimize its importance to the level necessary for legitimacy. However, its objectives are different from those of Communist ideology. National Bolshevism in its original form strove for world domination, conceived as the universal Russian empire cemented by Communist ideology. It is not excluded that in some circumstances National Bolshevism might limit itself to the etatist concept of a Russian superpower.¹³

National Bolshevism was, then, an imperialist/statist ideology whose adherents compromised or rationalised their beliefs with the prevailing situation in order to preserve what they considered to be the Russian empire.

From Brezhnev to Perestroika

Two of the foremost scholars on the subject of Russian nationalism in recent years are John Dunlop and Alexander Yanov. In 1976, Dunlop published *The New Russian Revolutionaries*, which highlighted the activities of Russian nationalists (VSKhSON) who had surfaced over the Brezhnev period in opposition to the state.¹⁴ A subsequent classification of Russian nationalism appeared in his 1983 book *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, which divided Russian nationalists into 'vozrozhdentsy' and 'National Bolsheviks', its 'good' and 'bad' varieties.¹⁵ Yanov, on the other hand, believed that all varieties would degenerate into something which is 'bad' - an extreme right-wing variety.¹⁶ Both men distinguished between varieties which existed within and outside the Soviet system. Dunlop referred to:

...two basic types or categories of nationalists: (1) those who seek to work *within* the Soviet 'system' to achieve their ends (and who may even regard the system as in some sense *theirs*), and (2) those who cannot work within the system or refuse to do so.¹⁷

Yanov's classification divided Russian nationalists into the 'Establishment' and 'Dissident' Right. This method bypassed the idea of 'good' and 'bad' varieties and facilitated the presentation of his hypothesis that nationalism both within and outside the system would eventually degenerate and blend into a nationalism of counter-reform.¹⁸

Vozrozhdentsy and National Bolsheviks

John Dunlop believed Russian nationalism had the potential to command a sizeable support.¹⁹ The two main manifestations of Russian nationalism, *vozrozhdenstvo* and National Bolshevism, may have had different agenda, but they shared areas of common concern:

Both tendencies are preservationist, seeking to safeguard Russian historical monuments and the environment from defilement and destruction; both deplore present demographic and social trends that are seen as unfavorable to the well-being of the Russian people; both are 'polycentric' nationalists, desiring, at least explicitly, the cultural flourishing of all nationalities. In addition, both tendencies exhibit a keen interest in Russian conservative and patriotic thought of the past, though, as a rule, *vozrozhdentsy* are likely to align themselves with the Early Slavophiles and Dostoevskii, and the *Vekhi* authors, while

National Bolsheviks are drawn to such 'realistic' thinkers as Danilevskii and Leont'ev.²⁰

Dunlop's *vozhrozhentsy* were adherents to a Russian national and religious renaissance. Most of them opposed the authorities from outside the system, but not exclusively so:

Virtually all dissenting nationalists should be counted among the ranks of the *vozhrozhentsy*, and many 'official nationalists', who attempt to air their views in the Soviet media... could be considered partisans or at least 'fellow travellers' of this tendency.²¹

Dunlop divided this group into a liberal wing (*VSKhSON*, Solzhenitsyn, Agursky) - many of whom had suffered for their opposition to the regime - and a right wing who were more conservative and advocated greater caution towards the extent of change. The liberal wing stood for broad and sweeping changes, focusing principally on changing the state structure, whilst the right wing's minimum programme advocated the freedom of the Church and freedom of all peoples to live and realize their indigenous traditions and cultures.²² The different wings are by no means uniform in their views, but Dunlop sums up the *vozhrozhentsy* thus: Russian Orthodoxy occupies a central position in their thought and they are anti-communist; they are concerned with the moral and demographic disintegration of their country; they favour a system of checks and balances; economically (and, therefore, I would say, politically), they favour a 'third way', which avoids the excesses of communism and capitalism; they seek to support the legitimate ethnic strivings of ethnic minorities in the USSR, not ruling out secession from a future Russian Federation; they tend to be anti-urban, favouring peasant traditions; they lean towards isolationism in foreign policy matters; they tend to be anti-Western, but in a 'restrained' manner and do not adhere to ideas of 'Judeo-masonic' conspiracies.²³

In contrast to *vozhrozhentstvo*, National Bolshevism was a tendency which was entrenched more within the Soviet establishment, although not exclusively so:

National Bolshevism... is a more elusive tendency of thought and sentiment currently enjoying popularity among certain segments of the Soviet intelligentsia and ruling Party-

state *apparatus*. A number of 'official' nationalists, including many of the *derevenshchiki*, are 'closet' *vozhdenetsy* rather than National Bolsheviks.²⁴

He suggested that there was no direct continuity between the National Bolsheviks of the twenties and the National Bolsheviks in his analysis:

What is happening, rather, is that present-day Soviet intellectuals are rediscovering on their own the ideas of a previous generation of thinkers.²⁵

Dunlop also compared National Bolshevism to fascism:

The similarities between National Bolshevism and fascism are striking; a strong impulse toward deification of the nation; the desire for a strong totalitarian state; a powerful leadership impulse (contemporary National Bolsheviks speak of a yearning for a *krepkii chelovek*, or strong man); a belief in the necessity of the existence of an elite; a cult of discipline, particularly discipline of the youth; heroic vitalism; an advocacy of industrial and military might, combined at times with ecological concerns; a celebration of the glories of the past; and a militant, expansionist dynamic.²⁶

The National Bolsheviks were statist and, although espousing extreme right-wing ideas, adhered nominally to a radical left ideology. Dunlop's definition of National Bolshevism is summarized by the following distinguishing factors: a neo-pagan, militaristic cult of strength and invincibility of the Russian people; a militant and aggressive stance towards Russia's perceived enemies; strongly anti-Western, usually with a belief in a Judeo-masonic conspiracy; awareness of social and demographic problems, but a stubborn 'can-do' mentality; tendency to advocate racial purity; a 'single stream' view of Russian history; a non-religious, but not anti-religious posture; and a cult of heroism and discipline.²⁷

Marginal Tendencies

Besides the two major tendencies, Dunlop listed what he called 'marginal tendencies': 'Semi-official Russophilism', neo-Stalinism and neo-Naziism.²⁸

'Semi-official Russophilism' is a term coined by the *vozhdenets* Evgenii Vagin. It referred to the Russian nationalism pursued by opportunists at the centre of power who had no real nationalist ideological conviction and who used Russian nationalism purely as a manipulative tool. The terms 'Russian' and 'Soviet' were used interchangeably and

reference to Russia and its past smacked of tokenism.

Dunlop described neo-Stalinism as 'a surprisingly weak current' and distinguishes it from National Bolshevism. Neo-Stalinists were supporters of forced industrialisation and collectivisation, who is 'virulently anti-kulak'. Dunlop believes that 'no National Bolshevik would subscribe to such sentiments' and maintains, in contradiction to Agursky, that Stalin was not a National Bolshevik.²⁹

Neo-Naziism is anti-communist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Christian, pursuing the idea of racial distinction and gravitating towards the worship of pagan Slavic gods 'as an outlet for religious impulses'.³⁰

Dunlop dismisses these 'marginal tendencies' as views which were held by insufficient numbers of Soviet society at that time (early eighties) for them to have been of any significance or have any plausible future.

Yanov

Besides Dunlop, Alexander Yanov is the only other person to have made a detailed analysis of Russian nationalism during and after the Brezhnev era and published it in book form.³¹

In the first of two books on the subject, *The Russian New Right* (1978), Yanov concentrated on the development of Russian nationalism from its 'renaissance' in the 1960s and 70s (*VSKhSON*, *Veche*, Solzhenitsyn, etc.), whereas in *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000* (1987), he paid more attention to the earlier historical development of Russian nationalist thought. This is significant, because Yanov tended to subscribe to the idea that, particularly in the case of Russia, history repeats itself. Yanov constantly drew parallels between the Russian nationalism of today and the right-wing ideology of Russian nationalists in the late nineteenth century. Yanov believed that Russian history shows a pattern alternating between 'soft' ('Brezhnevist') and 'rigid' ('Stalinist') phases, and that the Soviet Union was expecting another 'Stalinist' phase:

...from a historical point of view the restoration of Stalinism in the USSR cannot in principle be excluded from consideration and - further - that because of the absence in the contemporary USSR (in contrast to pre-revolutionary Russia) of a mass 'left-revolutionary' movement, a new cataclysm (if it occurs) has a significantly greater chance of occurring under the banner of 'right-wing' Russian nationalism than under that of a democratic

movement.³²

Yanov believed that this 'right-wing' nationalism would not come from the Dissident Right or Establishment Right alone, but from a synthesis of the two. The Dissident Right were the inheritors of the 'Russian Idea':

The Russian Idea emerged in the early 19th C., out of noble aspiration to liberate Russia from 'soul-destroying despotism' and a 'police-state', and Europe from 'parliamentarianism, anarchism, unbelief and dynamite'. Russia was to be saved from too little freedom and Europe from too much thereof.³³

This critical situation could only be solved in a uniquely Russian way:

The Russian Idea pointed to the providential role of Orthodoxy, as uniquely capable of pulling back the world from the brink of the abyss, and to Russia as the instrument of this great mission. While the Russian Idea rejected the 'government's interference in the moral life of the people' (the police state), it also denounced the 'people's interference in state power' (democracy). To both of these it opposed the 'principle of AUTHORITARIAN power'. The people must concentrate on a moral-social life (*nравstvenno-obshchestvennaia zhizn'*), on the drive for spiritual freedom.³⁴

Yanov wrote that the 'Russian Idea' originally grew out of hatred for Russia's native despotism and that the Slavophile movement to which it gave birth was 'essentially... an opposition movement.' However, this 'Idea' degenerated into a highly xenophobic one, which manifested itself in anti-Semitism, and the Slavophile movement developed dreams of a Russia dominating Europe and liberating it from 'complete subordination to the Jews'.³⁵

Yanov's hypothesis was established in 1976 and, although modified in his book 'The Russian Challenge', it remained basically the same. There are four major points to be observed:

I. Nationalistic ideologies under the conditions of autocratic government arise in pairs - one 'upstairs' and the other 'downstairs' (the Establishment Right and the Dissident Right).

II. The two begin in confrontation with each other and then, eventually, mutually adapt.

III. The motives and mechanisms of this adaptation differ for either side:

For the Establishment Right there is: an intensification of political struggle within the leadership due to the gradual degradation of the system and the threat of an approaching crisis; gradual loss by USSR of its leading role in the world communist movement, alienation of non-

Soviet Marxists from Russia and of Russian public opinion from Marxism; the necessity of working out a general crisis of the system - a strategy permitting the restoration to the system of its mobilizational character and assuring to it the active support of the masses and part of the intelligentsia; the awareness that it has no other intellectual resources at its disposal capable of working out such a strategy except the Dissident Right.

For the Dissident Right: an intensification of the ideological struggle within the dissident movement; an inability to deal, using its own forces, with its main adversary - 'Westernism' ; a lack of effective instruments of ideological influence on the masses; a willingness to sacrifice, for the sake of 'national' interests, political and intellectual freedom as a goal for the nation - this removes the emotional barrier, the feeling of political incompatibility with autocratic government.

IV. Finally if the Dissident Right develops in the direction of a merger with the autocratic regime, it becomes possible to describe the movement of ideas in more precise terms.³⁶

Yanov points out that his scheme is very crude, but he highlights how the two sides might degenerate and then very feasibly, in a time of crisis, find mutual needs. He summarizes the evolution of the 'Russian Idea' in three main stages:

i) From liberal nationalism confronting the regime (Nationalism A) to (ii) isolationist-totalitarian nationalism striving for collaboration with the regime (Nationalism B) and thence to (iii) military-imperialist nationalism merging with the regime (Nationalism C).³⁷

This formula is again slightly modified in 'The Russian Challenge' :

From a liberal nationalism that confronts the regime (L-Nationalism), to an isolationist nationalism that strives for co-operation with the nationalist faction within the establishment (I-Nationalism), and thence to a militaristic-imperial, Black Hundreds, fascist-style nationalism that blends with the official ideology in the process of counter-reform (F-Nationalism).³⁸

It is clear from this that only the phraseology and labels changed. What is most significant is that Yanov referred both times to three different types of nationalism: 'liberal', 'isolationist' and 'military-imperialist'.

Three tendencies

Two other classifications of Russian nationalism under Brezhnev appeared in the journal *Survey* in 1979: Roman Szporluk's 'statists' and 'culturalists' more or less reflected Dunlop's 'National Bolsheviks' and 'vozrozhdentsy'; whilst S. Enders Wimbush introduced three tendencies - 'liberal nationalists', 'neo-Slavophiles' and 'neo-Stalinists'.³⁹

Enders Wimbush's idea is more interesting, because it distinguishes the different conceptions of a Russian national unit or state:-

The liberal nationalists were:

in favour of accommodating minorities in a loose federation and for granting them those rights guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution. For these rights and for the privilege of participating in the federation, minorities would have to pay their fair share for development and defence.⁴⁰

The neo-Slavophiles, including Solzhenitsyn:

called for the consolidation of Russian lands into a unified Russian state, discarding forever the empty notion of a Russian-dominated federation.⁴¹

These people gravitated towards a more authoritarian solution, many advocating that the Orthodox Church would become a 'dominant social force in this state'.⁴²

The 'neo-Stalinists', who believed:

that Stalin's brand of strong, centralized, militarist leadership is what the Russian empire still requires, would prefer a greater Russian empire in which minority cultures could be exploited for the Russian state.⁴³

In short, Enders Wimbush's analysis presents three possible tendencies in Russian nationalism: one which sought to establish a Russian entity built on a more liberal model and which was prepared to recognise the rights of other non-Russian republics⁴⁴; another which sought to establish and isolate a specifically Russian state, guided, perhaps, by Russian Orthodoxy; and finally, one which aimed to maintain the Soviet Union as a Russian-dominated state/empire.

Classifications of Russian nationalism under Gorbachev

John Dunlop wrote a number of pieces about Russian nationalism during the Gorbachev period and used a number of different terms to describe the different tendencies.⁴⁵ His analyses generally refer to two major groups: one which supports the maintenance of the larger (imperial) state; and another which supports the idea of a renewed Russian state, inclined to independence from other nationalities and national territories in the Russian/Soviet empire.

In a 1988 analysis, Dunlop divided Russian nationalism into three groups: 'liberal nationalists', 'centrists' and the 'nationalist right' or 'National Bolsheviks'.⁴⁶ Roughly speaking, liberal nationalists were concerned with such affairs as conservation, the environment and Russian Orthodoxy, whilst supporting Gorbachev's principle of reform. The 'centrist' nationalists represented those who held nationalist ideas, did not welcome the prospect of liberal reform (and were wary about the influence of Western models), but stood in opposition to the communist regime, particularly on the issue of what the 'internationalist' ideology had done to Russian life and culture. The National Bolsheviks consisted of people who shared similar views to the 'centrists', but were distinguished by the facts that they occupied influential positions in Soviet society and supported/accepted Marxism-Leninism as the buttress of a Russian imperial state. Dunlop also identified a group of 'neo-Stalinists' who 'should not be classified as Russian nationalists', but who were allied with the National Bolsheviks.⁴⁷

In subsequent analyses, Dunlop referred to 'liberal nationalists' and a 'conservative coalition' which consisted of 'National Bolsheviks', 'conservative nationalists' and 'neo-Stalinists'. The liberal nationalists championed:

... political democracy and a market economy; they also advocate peaceful relations with the minority peoples of the Soviet Union and with the West. They are distinguished from Western-style liberals, with whom they are frequently allied, by their often fervent attachment to Russian Orthodoxy and Russian national traditions and by their pronounced abhorrence of Marxism-Leninism...

The liberal nationalists are prepared to grant the non-Russian republics complete freedom... ..to secede from the Soviet Union.⁴⁸

The common bond drawing the conservative coalition together appeared to be the desire to maintain the geographical and political integrity of the Soviet Union, with centralized and authoritarian rule from Moscow. The neo-Stalinists were not Russian nationalists, but 'conservative Marxist-Leninists and 'Soviet Patriots', who like Stalin before them, are prepared to manipulate Russian nationalist sentiment to help prop up the party state.'⁴⁹ On the other hand, the conservative nationalists and National Bolsheviks were both Russian nationalist, but with different political outlooks. The values which united these 'two disparate tendencies' were:

...an ardent Russophilia, a deep suspicion of the market and of the capitalist West, anti-Semitism, and resentment of nationalist and separatist sentiments in the periphery.⁵⁰

Dunlop later used Szporluk's terms 'empire-saving' and 'nation-building' to describe political processes linked with the Russian national question.⁵¹ The empire-savers were the conservative coalition, whilst the 'nation-building' consisted of both democratic (Solzhenitsyn) and authoritarian varieties.⁵² El'tsin's identification with Russia and Russian issues was not classed as a manifestation of Russian nationalism: although he opted 'decisively for Russian nation-building',⁵³ he was labelled a 'Westernizer' who 'played the Russian card'.⁵⁴

Writing in 1988, Yanov remarked that:

Any single definition - fixed for all time- of a dynamic ideological movement in Russia, be it Russian nationalism or Russian communism, seems to me a contradiction in terms. Any political change in the system alters the function of the movement within the system as well as the balance of liberal and reactionary elements within the movement.⁵⁵

However, he believed that the prevailing stage of perestroika had turned Russian nationalism into 'an ideology and rallying point of counterreform'. The nationalism of the 'Russian New Right' was described as 'Russian imperial nationalism', where 'imperial' refers to the 'nationalism of the dominant nation of the empire as distinct from minority nationalism'. Yanov's narrow definition of Russian nationalism seems to stem from the fact that he adopts a Russian/Soviet understanding of the term 'nationalism', making a distinction between patriotism, chauvinism and nationalism (indeed, claiming that they are

different in the Russian context):

A patriot loves his country, but this does not prevent him from loving humanity.

A chauvinist loves his country but dislikes humanity, especially if it is of Jewish origin.

A nationalist loves his country but sees humanity as an invading force ready to conquer it - with the Jews in the vanguard.

The nationalist perceives everything foreign that appears in his country - from rock music to linguistic appropriations, from manners to politics - as a deliberate, cunning, treacherous, and insidious conquest of his country.⁵⁶

Yanov hereby limits certain aspects of nationalism by discounting actors as 'patriots' or 'chauvinists'. These labels are very much value judgements which seek to moralise over the nationalistic behaviour of groups and individuals: the 'patriots' represent the good, the 'nationalists' the bad, and the 'chauvinists' the ugly. It would be truer to suggest that nationalism is a much broader spectrum, which manifests itself in several ways and does not limit itself to the 'nationalists' described above.

There were a variety of other terms which were used to describe Russian nationalism under Gorbachev. Roman Szporluk believed that Russians were faced with two options: 'empire-saving' or 'nation-building'. He considered it necessary to establish what Russians meant by 'Russia' - whether it was a renewed empire or the establishment of a Russian nation-state. The empire-savers were those who regarded the Soviet Union:

in its current boundaries as the proper and legitimate national 'space' of the Russian nation,⁵⁷

whilst the nation-builders represented those who thought of Russia:

as something very different from the USSR - as a geographical, historical, and cultural entity that does not encompass what they themselves recognize to be non-Russian lands and nations, even if these are part of the USSR. The geographical extent of Russia is not identical for all 'nation-builders.' ... What unifies them is a basically national position and the political goal of establishing a Russia that is a *nation-state*.⁵⁸

Szporluk points out that it would be much easier to call the empire-savers 'imperialists', although he refrains from that because he considered the term had become one of abuse. Those who constituted the empire-savers

(in 1989) included:

the military and the police, the state and party bureaucracies, members of other 'all-Union' structures and apparatuses, such as foreign ministry or cultural officials engaged in foreign relations.⁵⁹

Politically, the empire-savers included Marxist-Leninists, right-wing extremists, and 'Westernizers' who favoured liberal democratic and constitutional institutions for a state on the territory of the Soviet Union where all citizens would be subject to decisions made in Moscow.

Szporluk explains that the liberal Westernizers favoured a 'Russian' state in place of the Soviet Union, because of residual Russian imperial thinking. Quoting comments by the ethnographer Iulian Bromlei, he highlighted the Soviet-wide dominance of Russian language and culture, which were attributed with 'general' and 'international' qualities.

The nation-builders consisted of Russians who wished to define themselves as 'a nation that exists independently of the state, which in this case means the empire.' They are further reduced into three different categories:

First there are those Russians who reject communism and Sovietism and who look for an alternative in a nationalism rooted in culture, especially in religion. The second model of Russia proposes a democratic, liberal, Western-style modern nation-state. A third model is advanced by those who are critical of the imperial structure of the Soviet Union and expect a change for the better if the RSFSR were to become a full-fledged republic.... They seem to believe that the national needs of Russia might be addressed and met if the RSFSR acquired an identity that was separate from the USSR and its governmental, party, and other organizations.⁶⁰

It should be noted that Szporluk's model embraces the whole of the Russian political spectrum including 'Soviet nationalists', who wished to maintain the Soviet Union as a unitary socialist state or reconstruct it as a unitary state resembling the USA, and 'democrats' for whom the establishment of a liberal-democratic state was paramount and Russian nationalism was of little or secondary importance.

Several other labels are used to describe the major divide expressed by Dunlop and Szporluk (the imperial/statist v. nation-building/cultural divide).

Dmitri Pospelovsky's discussion of Russian 'neonationalism' and the 'Russian Idea' prefers the term 'nativists' or *pochvenniki* when describing those reviving the cultural idea. Referring to differing interpretations of the terms 'nationalism' and 'patriotism' by Yanov and Likhachev, Pospelovsky concludes:

The terminology of the various types of national orientation remains as subjective and undefined as ever. Perhaps the distinction between cultural nationalism and state nationalism, or between nativism (*pochvennichestvo*) and nationalism, should be preferred because of its greater clarity.⁶¹

Interestingly, Pospelovsky develops the view that nationalism describes 'many shades of *Weltanschauung*' by adding two basic varieties - Christian nationalism and atheistic nationalism:

The conflict between a Christian nationalist's convictions and his nationalism tends to make him less tolerant of other nations. Christian nationalism therefore constitutes a sort of 'halfway house' between the aggressive great-power chauvinism of an out-and-out state nationalist and the consistently Christian love for his people and its culture of a nativist. Atheistic nationalism, characteristic of the Nazis, the National Bolsheviks, and consistent Fascists, knows no such 'soft spots'; an adherent of this type of nationalism believes that whatever is good for the glory of his state, or for the dissemination of his state's ideology, is fine and moral.⁶²

Aleksei Shmelev referred to 'liberal nationalism', such as that expressed by Solzhenitsyn, describing it as a 'variety of classical liberalism', whose *Weltanschauung* consisted of a:

striving for spiritual freedom, an orientation towards the traditional values of Russian culture.⁶³

Shmelev's second tendency or 'direction' of Russian nationalism described the activities of those who congregated about such journals as *Nash sovremennik* and those in the bloc of 'patriotic forces', the followers of 'national etatism' (*natsionalisticheskii etatism*).

Shmelev also observes that:

certain public figures occupy intermediate positions between 'liberal nationalism' and 'national etatism' or simply cross over from one to the other. In the first instance we should name Igor Shafarevich - the outstanding mathematician and former prominent defender of human rights.⁶⁴

The special edition of *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* on Russian

nationalism which featured Dunlop and Yanov, also featured Ronald Grigor Suny, Darrell Hammer and Andrei Sinyavsky.

Suny declared:

By its very nature nationalism defies precise categorization... All the more difficult to pinpoint are the evident Russophilism and Slavic nationalism that permeate the dominant discourse among both official spokesmen and ordinary people in the Soviet Union.⁶⁵

Suny gives credit to Dunlop's and Yanovs' analyses and refers to Szporluk's 1979 distinction between 'cultural or spiritual' and 'political or statist' nationalism, adding that:

Statist nationalism may be subdivided into 'National Bolshevism'... and the more anti-Bolshevik, religious, or even neofascist varieties.⁶⁶

Suny shares Yanov's view, that 'rightist nationalism is allied ideologically with Stalinism' and he predicted (in 1988) that 'if Western governments respond to the Gorbachev initiatives... both Russian nationalist and Communist attentions are more likely to turn inward to the development of national life rather than outward in search of foreign adventures'.

Hammer referred to the 'National Bolsheviks' and the 'Russophiles', both of which could 'be called traditionalist' but representing different traditions.⁶⁷ The National Bolsheviks looked back to the tradition of imperial Russia and the ideology of the Pan-Slavs, whilst the Russophiles looked back to Holy Rus' and the ideology of the Slavophiles. Basically Hammer was presenting a culturalist-statist model. However, his use of the term 'Russophile' clashes with that used by others.

Aron J. Katsenelinboigen used 'Russophilism' almost synonymously with 'Russian nationalism',⁶⁸ whilst Vladimir Shlapentokh divided Russian nationalists between 'Russophile patriots' (statists) and 'Russophile traditionalists' (culturalists). Shlapentokh also concluded that there were 'mild' and 'harsh' Russophiles:

Russophiles, whether patriots or (especially) traditionalists, disagree strongly about the degree and character of the exclusiveness they attribute to Russia, the contraposition of Russians to other peoples, their degree of respect for other cultures, and their attitudes toward democratic institutions.

While recognising Russia's uniqueness, culture, and religion, mild or liberal Russophiles tend to respect other peoples, particularly 'the West'...

The division between the mild and harsh Russophiles was relatively strong in the early

70s, but lost its primary significance by the early 1980s. Given the strong polarization of the intellectual community in the period of glasnost, the unity of the majority of the Russophiles served to push the few liberals (such as Likhachev) towards the Westernizers' camp and made them the target of insidious attacks on the part of the mainstream.⁶⁹

This last comment is significant because it suggests that Russian nationalism has a much broader constituency than merely the division between culturalists and statist. The inclusion of 'liberal' nationalists, suggest that there is a different political mood between and within the cultural nationalists.

Yitzhak Brudny introduced four categories into his spectrum of Russian nationalism: 'liberal nationalists', 'conservative nationalists', 'radical Slavophiles', 'neo-Stalinists'.

His study of Russian nationalism from 1985-88 observed three stages of development, the first of which united Russian nationalist agreement on the river diversion project. Later, the liberal nationalists voiced their support for perestroika, whilst the the radical Slavophiles and neo-Stalinists expressed opposition. The conservative nationalists sat on the fence.

Brudny's liberal nationalists supported a modern, urban society; the neo-Stalinists emphasised Stalin's revival of the military and state-building traditions; Radical Slavophilism represented anti-urban/anti-intellectual rhetoric and attacked pro-Western liberalism; the conservative Russian nationalists represented those who had started on the liberal wing of nationalism, but who soon began to express more hardline, anti-Western/xenophobic attitudes.⁷⁰

Like Brudny, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse distinguished four 'main branches of Russian nationalism: liberal nationalism, radical nationalism 'of both the left and right' and conservative nationalism.⁷¹ The factors which distinguished them were 'the choice between Western model development or the Russian socioeconomic system, the place of religion in the political system and relations with other nations'. The 'liberal nationalists' wished to preserve Russian culture and the national heritage whilst attempting to keep the various forms of nationalism from degenerating to extremism. Carrère d'Encausse adds that liberal nationalism used the philosophy of Berdiaev, Bulgakov and Franck 'as a

reference point'. The 'radical nationalists' of the right were National Bolsheviks who rejected Marxism-Leninism, but implicitly accept a Russian variant of it. The 'radical nationalists' on the left were reformers of the 'social democrat and Westernizing type', for whom 'nationalism counts less than their attachment to the old Soviet desire for modernization'. Finally, the conservative nationalists wished to restore to Russia its past. They rejected Marxism-Leninism as a Western ideology and feel that Russia has been defomed by an imported foreign system.

Andrei Sinyavsky, perhaps, has more in common with Alexander Yanov. Deeply distrustful of Russian nationalism, he makes a distinction between Russian patriotism and Russian nationalism:

Russian patriotism is ready to attach itself to anything as long as the Motherland is implied by that thing or shines through it. ..

Russian patriotism is by no means always reduced to nationalism, although, equally, nationalism quite often gives rise to it and feeds on it.... Furthermore, in something akin to religion, Russian patriotism not infrequently borders on the messianic...

Here is another, more precise definition. Although patriotism binds Russians into a kind of family, like family relations these are far from ideal and are accompanied by bitter feuds and strife not characteristic to such a degree of other peoples inspired by nationalism or patriotism.⁷²

It appears that Sinyavsky is referring to national/nationalist sentiment. However, when national sentiment is expressed through political action, it should be analysed as a manifestation of nationalism.

Sinyavsky does reveal three extremes of Russian nationalism: National Bolshevism, which had its 'core in the Soviet state system'; outright fascism, which was totally stripped of Marxism and believed in Russian racial supremacy; and Orthodox fascism, which believes in the theocratic authority of the church. Like Yanov, Sinyavsky views Russian nationalism in purely negative terms.

In 1989, Walter Laqueur referred to the rise of Russian nationalism under glasnost as the 'reemergence of a 'Russian party'' inspired by the 'Slavophiles and their nineteenth-century rejection of Western ideas and modernism.' Those who extolled old Russian culture and condemned Western values, such as writers in *Nash sovremennik*, *Molodaia gvardiia* and *Moskva* were dubbed 'new Slavophiles', some of whom defended the Bolshevik era, others who did not.⁷³

Although this particular analysis did not provide a precise scheme for classifying Russian nationalism - suggesting, perhaps, that it was still evolving - Laqueur later (1992) declared that:

today the whole spectrum of Russian politics has moved to the right and become more nationalist.⁷⁴

He referred to a 'national liberal camp' and to nationalists of the "extreme right. Among the national liberals he listed Likhachev, Averintsev, Tsipko, Latynina, Igor Vinogradov and Solzhenitsyn and, in addition, politicians like El'tsin, Sobchak, Stankevich who:

following the downfall of the Soviet Union, insisted with increasing frequency and intensity on Russian concerns and interests.⁷⁵

The extreme right's ideas included Russian exclusiveness, belief in the existence of 'anti-Russian intrigues' and a 'deep enmity against cosmopolitans and cultural nihilists.'

Nicolai Petro referred to three informal 'Russian nationalist associations' - leftist-radicals, conservatives and Christian Democrats. He outlined a minimal agenda common to the three groupings: land for peasants; restoration of pre-revolutionary city and street names; church independence from the state; and independent government and economic institutions in various regions within Russia that would strengthen their political and economic autonomy. The 'conservatives':

advocate a five point agenda consisting of moral revival; skepticism of Western intellectual imports, especially Marxism-Leninism; fear of market competition and opposition to 'windfall profits'; return of peasants' land; and a sense of honoring military service. Unlike the left-radicals and Christian Democrats, however, the conservatives rely on the Communist Party to reform itself...⁷⁶

The left radicals were anti-Stalinists who favoured social democracy and Western democratic processes. The Christian Democrats advocated the rule of law, the separation of church from state, and the institution of private markets, but wished 'to return to the intellectual heritage of early twentieth-century Russian religious philosophers who rejected Marxism in favour of a non-materialist, religious orientation to life'.

Finally, in 1991, Viktor Zaslavsky referred to 'imperialists' and 'national-separatists':

Recent years have witnessed a deepening polarization of the [Russian] nationalist ideologists into imperialist and national-separatist camps. Imperialist nationalism has been losing ground, and many ideologues of the imperialist persuasion have promptly changed their allegiance. The turn from imperialist nationalism to separatism has been promoted by changes in Russian mass consciousness on the one hand and by the growing influence of liberal nationalists and the dissemination of nationalist ideas among the Russian liberal-democratic intelligentsia on the other.⁷⁷

Zaslavsky observed that a 'drift towards isolationism and a separate Russian consciousness' that had started with perestroika had intensified towards the end of the Gorbachev era. Thus, following the publication of Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet, *Kak nam obustroit' Rossiю?*:

Isolationism and separatism were emerging as the one platform unifying all the major strands of Russian nationalism.⁷⁸

Although I do not agree with Zaslavsky's idea that isolationism and separatism 'unified all the major strands of Russian nationalism', it is true that the idea of isolationism was evident amongst defenders of the unitary empire-state and amongst those who advocated a new Russian nation-state.

The abovementioned classifications provide a variety of labels which illustrate the divide between: statist or 'empire-builders' and nation-builders; statist and 'culturalists'; Westernizers and anti-Westernizers; acceptance of Bolshevism/Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism-Leninism. The terms 'statism' and 'nation-building' do not necessarily imply the presence of Russian nationalism: 'statists' might have been Soviet nationalists who believed in the 'new historical community of peoples' espoused by Brezhnev; and nation-builders might have been democrats who accepted the wishes of non-Russian republics to secede and were concerned with nothing other than establishing a civil society on the territory of the Russian Federation that remained after republican secession from the Union.

The idea of Russian exclusiveness is reflected by Laqueur's 'extreme right', Brudny's 'radical Slavophiles', Carrère d'Encausse's 'conservatives' and Sinyavsky's 'fascists', but what they do not indicate is that this anti-

Western exclusiveness is sometimes subsumed by the desire to maintain a unitary state/empire. Imperialist Russian nationalism put the unitary state before all else. In contrast to these nationalists, there was a small number of people who considered that Russian exclusiveness was undermined by an association with non-Russian/non-Slavic territories. Their priority was to break away from the republics.

Taking these points into consideration, I aim to define three tendencies of Russian nationalism which are influenced by: the existence of a very strong imperial mentality; the idea of building a state distinct from empire; the idea of Russian exclusiveness.

Three tendencies

Pospelovsky and Suny probably sum up the difficulty of classifying Russian nationalism by declaring that nationalism 'defies precise categorization' and that the terminology of different types of nationalism remained 'subjective and undefined'. Ideally, I wish to avoid the use of terms such as 'nativist', 'culturalist', 'Russophile' or 'neo-Slavophile' and wish to concentrate on tendencies which linked the concept of a Russian state with the Russian nation and its ideal. Matters are complicated by different interpretations of the Russian state and confused by the use of the terms *russkii* and *rossiiskii* for 'Russian'. The tendencies should also reflect the major alliances or incongruities of groups espousing Russian nationalist ideas.

The definition of the Russian state is a major factor in determining the different tendencies in Russian nationalism. The overwhelming majority of Russian nationalist-orientated groups supported the reconstitution of the Soviet Union as the 'historical Russian state'. This number included the Association of Russian Artists (and other groups inspired by the RSFSR Writers' Union), *Pamiat'*, *Otechestvo*, *SDVO*, the Liberal Democratic Party, *RNE* and others. In addition, there were groups which supported the maintenance of a centralised Soviet Union, but which displayed a heavy pro-Russian bias: the 'international' movements, *OFT*, and, to some extent, *Edinstvo* 'for Leninism and Communist Ideals'. There was a variety of political views amongst these groups - for example,

some advocated Marxism-Leninism, others advocated Orthodoxy and Zhirinovskii advocated, at first, a democratic model and then a 'Russia-first' authoritarian system. However, it appears that, despite political differences, the strongest influence guiding these groups' ideas was the imperative to maintain a unitary state, with the Russians as the dominant or core community. This is illustrated by the alliances which arose, e.g. the United Council of Russia, the Bloc of Public-Patriotic Movements, *Slavianskii sobor*, Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia. The (albeit precarious) unity of purpose shared by adherents to imperialist Russian nationalism was not shared by those who wished to reconstitute a new Russian nation-state. On the one hand, there were liberal nationalists who existed within, or allied to the democratic movement: 'liberal nationalists' supported the idea of a civil society, multi-party democracy and a market economy, but could be distinguished from the majority of the 'democrats' by their attachment to Russian cultural values, traditions, Russian Orthodoxy. Many of their ambitions were fulfilled by the achievements of the democrats in establishing Russian sovereignty, statehood and challenging the Communist Party monopoly on power. On the other hand, 'isolationist nationalists' were anti-communist, rejected any association with the democrats and believed that the maintenance of empire or adoption of Western values were detrimental to the Russian nation's development. The liberal Russian nationalists appeared to gravitate towards the West, viewing Russia as unique, but essentially European, whilst the isolationist Russian nationalists believed more in the *samobytnost'* of the Russian people, in a similar way to the Slavophiles of the nineteenth century.

The use of the terms *rossiiskii* and *russkii* can sometimes cause confusion. The adjective *rossiiskii* means 'of Russia' or 'of the Russian state' and *rossiiane* are the peoples who inhabit Russia. In many instances, Russia [*Rossia*] is taken to be the Russian Federation or RSFSR. However, in the view of some imperialist Russian nationalists, *Rossia* corresponded with the whole of the 'historical Russian state' or the Soviet Union. For instance, the Bloc of Public-Patriotic Movements declared that 'Russia' always was and always would remain a 'great power' and that:

She will do everything to ensure that this is and shall remain the Soviet Union.⁷⁹

However, at the same time, the Bloc spoke of 'Russian [*rossisskoe*] revival', referring to the revival of Soviet Russia or the RSFSR. In this case, there was a dual use of *Rossia*, but *rossiiskii* tended to refer to the RSFSR.

The 'democrats' sought 'Russian' [*rossiiskii*] sovereignty and independence, with 'Russian' relating to the Russian Federation. Hence the *rossisskii narod* were all those who lived within the territory of the Russian Federation - their membership was defined by citizenship rather than by ethnic nationality.

The RNPR wished to create a 'Russian Union' [*Rossiiskii Soiuz*] or Russian Federal Republic [*Rossiiskaia Federativnaia Respublika*] consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan, suggesting that *Rossiiskii* referred to the fraternity of Eastern Slavs⁸⁰ (Kazakhstan was included, because it had such a large ethnic Russian population). Once again, *rossiiskii* conveys the idea of the state.

Russkii denoted 'ethnic Russian' and *russkie* were the ethnic Russians who constituted the majority of the Russian Federation's population. To a large extent, Russian nationalism was concerned with *russkii* nationalism rather than *rossiiskii* nationalism and related to the national values and issues of ethnic Russians. However, owing to the fact that ethnic Russians had never lived in an ethnic Russian nation-state, it was very difficult to separate the idea of *russkii* from *rossiiskii*. Thus, when the democratic movement identified itself with a *rossiiskii* nationalism in opposition to the Soviet centre, it occasionally paid attention to ethnic Russian specific features. Conversely, the Association of Russian Artists, a supporter of imperialist Russian nationalism, sought *rossiiskie* national aims in pursuing a Russian ethnic nationalism - it spoke of saving the 'ethnic Russian land' [*russkaia zemlia*] and the 'ethnic Russian soul' [*russkaia dusha*] by way of establishing institutions for the territory of *Rossia*,⁸¹ which clearly denoted the Russian [*rossiiskaia*] republic.

The small Russian Party of National Rebirth (RPNV) put forward yet another interpretation of *russkii*.⁸² It declared that any 'Great Russian' [*velikoross*], Ukrainian or Belorussian was a 'Russian by birth' [*prirodnyi*

russskii], reflecting the view held by some Russian nationalists that the Eastern Slavs belonged to one 'Russian' family.⁸³

The fundamental difference between these two terms is that *russskii* denotes the ethnic Russian nation, whilst *rossiiskii* relates to the Russian state. This means that the English 'Russian nationalism' could refer to either *rossiiskii* or *russskii* nationalism. Whilst the two terms were frequently used in tandem, one important point remains - *rossiiskii* conveyed the multiethnic nature of the Russian state/Russian Federation. *Russkie* accounted for 81.5% of the RSFSR population.⁸⁴

My original definition of nationalism included three elements: a particular condition of mind or sentiment; the political principle which links nation and state; and the movement which espouses the political principle. I will now relate these elements to my tendencies

Liberal nationalism. For want of a better term, this conveys the idea of a fairly tolerant nationalism accepting liberal democratic values.

The particular condition of mind is that which identifies people with a Russian [*russskii* or *rossiiskii*] nation. Liberal nationalism recognises a national identity which is characteristically Russian (no matter how vague or abstract that might be), but which is tolerant and responsive to outside ideas. Whilst focussing on the development of a Russian national state, it accepts and supports the autonomy and self-determination of other (Soviet) nations.

The political principle is one which concerns the establishment and development of a Russian national state and economy (on the territory of the Russian Federation), where the idea of a Russian 'people' is based upon citizenship rather than ethnicity. However, there is an interest in ethnic Russian 'specific characteristics' and concern may be extended to those who could be identified with a Russian state, but live beyond its borders, such as ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in the Union republics.

The movement represents those who worked with or within the democratic movement, encouraging it to adopt Russian [*rossiiskii*] national institutions and symbols, whilst propagating ideas of Russian

[*rusaskaia*] national culture. Liberal Russian nationalists assumed that a democratic, civil Russian society would allow Russian values to flourish freely.

Isolationist nationalism is that which seeks to establish something uniquely Russian and rejects foreign influences. It does not need Russian dominance in the non-Russian republics - it advocates isolated development untainted by the burdens and infectious ideas/traditions of other nations.

The sentiment is one which considers the ethnic Russians to be a people apart with a unique culture rooted in such things as, perhaps, Orthodoxy and the Russian village etc.

The nation consists of ethnic Russians first and foremost. Non-Russians within the Russian state would have to share the same (Russian) fate. The state is the RSFSR/Russian Federation (or, sometimes, the Russian Federation *and* the territories in the non-Russian periphery where ethnic Russians predominate). In some instances the Russian state is considered to be Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia. The state would be run according to a specific Russian (possibly authoritarian) menu.

The movement is represented by those expressions and manifestations of Russian nationalism which reject the influence of foreign culture and provide 'Russian' programmes/solutions for a 'Russian' society unshackled from the burdens of the greater empire. Some of Solzhenitsyn's ideas would be classified under isolationist nationalism.

Imperialist nationalism aims, above all, to maintain an empire/multinational state in which the Russians are the dominant nationality and Moscow is the centre of power. It does not tolerate independence from the centre.

The sentiment is one which regards ethnic Russians to be the dominant nationality group, or first among equals in a Russian/Soviet empire or great power.

Imperialist Russian nationalism advocates that the whole of the Soviet Union/Russian empire is the Russian's home. The empire must be run from Moscow and the non-Russian nationalities will receive the 'benefits'

of paternal or fraternal Russian influence.

The movement is represented by efforts both within and outside the establishment to keep the USSR together as the historical Russian state and deny other republics sovereignty. It involves: the efforts of those in the 'international movements' to deny indigenous nationalities the chance to express independence; new groups from outside the establishment who are willing to ally themselves with others of a different political hue in order to achieve the greater goal of unity of the state. It is even represented by some of the attempts of so-called 'neo-Stalinists' to keep the Union intact.

Conclusion

The effects of glasnost and perestroika meant that Russian nationalism should be viewed in a way other than that which made the distinction between establishment and dissident circles. Of course, certain expressions of Russian nationalism were spawned within sections of the existing establishment and these had greater access to public outlets than those expressed by new groups formed by non-establishment figures. For example, the RSFSR Writers' Union had the greater wherewithal to disseminate ideas to a broad audience than *Pamiat'* did: throughout most of the Gorbachev period, members of the Writers' Union had access to organs such as newspapers, thick journals and widely-publicised conferences, etc., whilst the members of *Pamiat'* were restricted to crude samizdat publications, demonstrations and marches.

The dichotomy between empire-saving and nation-building appears sensible, but there is a broad gulf between potential nation-builders: some wished to pursue an essentially *rossiiskoe* state built upon liberal democratic values with a reference to ethnic Russian specific features; whilst a minority wished to build a state based upon the peculiarity of the Russian [*russkii*] people, isolated from potentially harmful foreign influences. One may argue that the empire-savers were equally divided and point to the differences between, for example, *OFT*, which supported the maintenance of Marxism-Leninism and *RNE*, which was anti-communist. However, there seemed to be many expressions of imperialist

Russian nationalism, all of which seemed to have the overriding goal of preserving the greater Russian state. Under these circumstances, barriers were lowered and differences dissolved. The tendency was far from unified in certain political views and in joint political action, but it would be far too crude to divide the tendency into pro-Marxist-Leninist and anti-Marxist-Leninist tendencies. In many instances, pro-communists and others co-operated or worked together in the interests of preserving the greater Russian state.

- ¹ Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology*, 2nd Ed., Vintage, New York, 1960. p.136.
- ² Cited in Nikolai Berdiaev, *Russkaia ideia*, YMCA Press, Paris, 1971. p.44.
- ³ Ibid. p.45.
- ⁴ Ibid. p.43.
- ⁵ Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*, op. cit. pp.149-50.
- ⁶ Louis L. Snyder, *Macro-nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Movements*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1984. p.25.
- ⁷ Ibid. pp.26-27.
- ⁸ Ibid. p.40.
- ⁹ Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*. op. cit. p.141.
- ¹⁰ Ibid. p.200.
- ¹¹ However, it could be argued that the thousands of former tsarist officers and generals who joined the Red Army soon after the October Revolution were the first National Bolsheviks. Mikhail Agursky described them as 'an important source of National Bolshevism'. For further details see M. Agursky, *The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR*, Westview 1987. pp. 195-99.
- ¹² M. Agursky, op. cit. p.248
- ¹³ Ibid., p.xv.
- ¹⁴ John B. Dunlop, *The New Russian Revolutionaries*, Nordland, Belmont, Mass., 1976.
- ¹⁵ John B. Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton U.P. 1983.
- ¹⁶ Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right. Right-Wing Ideologies in Contemporary USSR*, Institute of Int. Studies, University of California, 1978; A. Yanov, *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000*, Blackwell, Oxford 1987.
- ¹⁷ John B. Dunlop, "The Many Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism", *Survey*, vol.24, no.3, 1979, p.18.
- ¹⁸ A. Yanov, *The Russian New Right*, op.cit., p.18.
- ¹⁹ Prior to the Gorbachev period, Dunlop listed the Russian 'nationalist constituents' within USSR: approximately fifty million Russian Orthodox believers, including prominent religious dissidents, figures within the establishment such as the village prose writers [*derevenshchiki*], certain contributors to nationalist-influenced journals and the artist Il'ia Glazunov; the military establishment, DOSAAF (the voluntary paramilitary society), the Komsomol and the All-Russian Society for the preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, which all 'require[d] Russian nationalism for mobilizational purposes, particularly in light of the populace's indifference to Marxist -Leninist slogans'; and others within the establishment with nationalist convictions such as writers and their protectors within the political leadership. Those listed represent a potentially sizeable proportion of the population. See J.B. Dunlop, "The Russian Nationalist Spectrum Today: Trends and Movements", vol. XI, no.1, Spring 1984, p.67.
- ²⁰ J.B. Dunlop, *Faces*, op.cit., pp.263-4.
- ²¹ Ibid., p.243
- ²² Ibid., p.243.
- ²³ Ibid., pp.253-4.
- ²⁴ J.B. Dunlop, "The Russian Nationalist Spectrum Today: Trends and Movements", *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, op. cit.
- ²⁵ J.B. Dunlop, *Faces*, op.cit., p.256.
- ²⁶ Ibid., pp.256-7.
- ²⁷ Ibid., p.263.
- ²⁸ J.B. Dunlop, *Faces*, op.cit., pp.266-8.
- ²⁹ Ibid., p.256.

³⁰ Ibid., p.267.

³¹ Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right*, op. cit., and *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000*, op.cit.

³² Yanov, *The Russian New Right*, op. cit., pp.8-9.

³³ Yanov, *The Russian Challenge*, op.cit., p.20.

³⁴ Ibid., pp.24-5.

³⁵ This anti-Semitism, which has both latent and overt forms, is perhaps one of the main factors governing Yanov's sensitivity to the degeneration of Russian nationalism, for he himself is a Jew who grew up in Soviet Russia. One could accuse Yanov of paranoia, but events subsequent to the publication of his hypothesis have indicated that he might yet (if only in part) be justified.

³⁶ Yanov, *The Russian New Right*, op. cit., pp.18-19.

³⁷ Ibid., p.19.

³⁸ Yanov, *The Russian Challenge*, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

³⁹ Roman Szporluk, 'History and Russian Nationalism', *Survey*, vol. 24, no. 3, Summer, 1979, pp.1-17; S. Enders Wimbush, "The Russian Nationalist Backlash", *Survey*, vol. 24, no.3, Summer 1979, pp.44-45.

⁴⁰ S. Enders Wimbush, "The Russian Nationalist Backlash", *Survey*, vol.24, no.3, Summer 1979, pp.44-45.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.44.

⁴² Some 'neo-Slavophiles' were unwilling to dismiss the idea of a larger Russian state incorporating ethnically Russian-dominated areas of other republics. *ibid.*

⁴³ Ibid., p.45.

⁴⁴ I should point out that Enders Wimbush was somewhat scathing about the liberal nationalists' intentions, suggesting that they were either naïve, or just trying to impress the West.

⁴⁵ John Dunlop, 'The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum', *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* Special Edition, 19 December 1988; J.B. Dunlop, "The Return of Russian Nationalism", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, no. 3, Summer 1990; J. B. Dunlop, "The Russian Orthodox Church and Nationalism after 1988", *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol.18, no.4, Winter 1990; J.B. Dunlop, "Russian Nationalism Today: Organizations and Programs", *Nationalities Papers*, (Special Issue) Pamyat, Vol.XIX, no.2. Fall 1991; J.B. Dunlop, "Russia: Confronting a Loss of Empire", in *Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, Ian Bremmer & Ray Taras (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1993; J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, Princeton University Press, 1993.

⁴⁶ John Dunlop, 'The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum', *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* op. cit., pp.5-8.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.8. Dunlop's reluctance to classify this tendency as 'nationalist' stems from the fact that the neo-Stalinists criticised the behaviour of some nationalists and that the 'principled internationalism' contained in such declarations as Nina Andreeva's infamous neo-Stalinist letter of March 1988 had, in his opinion, 'little to offer contemporary Russian nationalists.'

⁴⁸ J.B. Dunlop, "The Return of Russian Nationalism", *Journal of Democracy*, op. cit., p.115.

⁴⁹ J.B. Dunlop, "Russian Nationalism Today: Organizations and Programs", op. cit., p.150.

⁵⁰ J.B. Dunlop, "The Return of Russian Nationalism", op. cit., p.118.

⁵¹ Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism", *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1989, pp.17.

⁵² J.B. Dunlop, "Russia: Confronting a Loss of Empire", in Bremmer & Taras (eds.), op. cit. pp.58-61.

⁵³ *ibid.*, p.54.

⁵⁴ J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, pp.54-59.

- ⁵⁵ A. Yanov, "Russian Nationalism as the Ideology of Counterreform", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, Special Edition, 19 December 1988, pp.43-52.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.49.
- ⁵⁷ Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism", *op. cit.*, p.17.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.18.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.21.
- ⁶¹ Dimitry Pospelovsky, "Russian Nationalism: An Update", *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, 9 February 1990, p.10.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, p.11.
- ⁶³ Aleksei Shmelev, "Paradoksy nashego natsionalisma", *Znamia*, August 1991, p.207.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.210.
- ⁶⁵ Ronald Grigor Suny, "Russian Nationalism in the Era of *Glasnost*' and *Perestroika*", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* Special Edition, 19 December 1988, p.37.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.38.
- ⁶⁷ Darrell P. Hammer, "Glasnost' and the Russian Idea", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* Special Edition, 19 December 1988, pp.11-24.
- ⁶⁸ Aron J. Katsenelinboigen, *The Soviet Union: Empire Nation and System*, [Chapter 7 - "Russophilism"], Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J., 1990, pp.149-167.
- ⁶⁹ Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: The Post-Stalin Era*, [Chapter 7], Princeton Univ. Press, 1990, pp.203-223.
- ⁷⁰ Yitzhak Brudny, "Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State Under Gorbachev 1985-88" in S. F. Cohn + M. Kraus (eds.), *The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Change and Opposition to Change*.
- ⁷¹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *The End of the Soviet Empire: the Triumph of the Nations*, Basic Books, New York, 1993, pp. 180-185.
- ⁷² Andrei Sinyavsky, "Russian Nationalism", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* Special Edition, 19 December 1988, p.29. [This article also appeared in *Sintaksis*, vol.26, (1989), pp.91-110 and *Massachusetts Review*, vol.31., no.4, Winter 1990, pp.475-494.]
- ⁷³ Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road To Freedom: Russia and Glasnost*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1989.
- ⁷⁴ Walter Laqueur, "Russian Nationalism", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.71, no.5, Winter 1992/3, p.103.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 104.
- ⁷⁶ Stephen E. Deane, "Russian Nationalism as a Political Force", *Meeting Report*, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, vol.VII, no.13. [Report of talk given by N. Petro to the Kennan Institute on 2 April 1990].
- ⁷⁷ Victor Zaslavsky, "The evolution of separatism in Soviet society under Gorbachev", in G.W. Lapidus, V. Zaslavsky & P. Goldman (eds.), *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism & Separatism in the Soviet Republics*, CUP, 1992, pp.82-83.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.3.
- ⁸⁰ V. N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov, V.V. Cherviakov, V. D. Solovei, *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 6., Rau-Press, Moscow, 1992, p. 150.
- ⁸¹ *Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov (osnovnye dokumenty)*, typescript dated 17 November 1988, Moscow, pp.5&10. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁸² V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby...*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 8, p. 55.
- ⁸³ Solzhenitsyn, who wished to create a *Rossiiskii Soiuz*, held a similar view: he declared that, as a result of history, 'our people split into three branches', *velikorossy, malorossy* and *belorussy*. However, he did not refer to them all as 'russkie'.

⁸⁴ According to the 1989 census. Source: A. I. Vdovin, *Rossiiskaia natsiia: Natsional'no-politicheskie problemy XX veka i obshchenatsional'naia rossiiskaia ideia*, 2nd ed., Klub "Realisty", Moscow, 1996, p. 10.

Chapter 3: The Development of Russian nationalism

Introduction

In this chapter, I will outline the development of Russian nationalism from March 1985 to the end of December 1991, paying particular attention to the groups (associated with Russian nationalism) which appeared over this period. I aim to establish some of the possible influences on this process and to identify possible stages of development.

Gorbachev's policy of reform was the factor which initially encouraged greater discussion of the Russian national question - glasnost gave greater exposure to existing streams of Russian nationalist sentiment. However, perestroika and glasnost led to consequences which transformed the path and character of Russian nationalism. Several new phenomena had a bearing on Russian national consciousness and the ways in which Russian nationalist ideas coalesced, including: the development of new political movements; the possibility of the break-up of the USSR; the possibility of the break-up of the RSFSR; and Russian resentment of the fact that Russians were identified with the centre by minority nationalities of the USSR.

The first part of this chapter looks at the development of Russian nationalism in the Gorbachev era and can be roughly divided into four periods:

Spring 1985 - late 1988, when Russian nationalism was more or less limited to an intellectual debate of the Russian national question in newspapers and journals. The one notable exception was the curious emergence of *Pamiat'*, which became one of the first politicised movements in 1986 and then attempted to heighten its profile and attract greater support in 1987.

Late 1988 - Spring 1990 witnessed the emergence of groups and parties for whom the Russian national question and the composition of the Russian state were of prime concern.

Spring 1990 - August 1991 was a period of consolidation against the centre. Russian nationalism was adopted by members of the democratic

movement; democratic parties with a Russian nationalist inclination appeared; and the Russian Communist Party (RCP) was established.

August 1991 - December 1991: the post-putsch period witnessed the strengthening of an independent Russia. This was viewed with hostility by pro-Union forces, including imperialist Russian nationalist forces whose ranks began to grow towards the end of the year.

In the second part of this chapter, I will briefly summarize some of the chief developments reflecting Gorbachev's/the centre's relationship with Russian nationalism. This illustrates that Gorbachev was always aware of the Russian dimension and attempted to control or influence its power and direction through a series of measures.

Part I: The evolution of Russian nationalism

Before 1985

In the twenty years prior to 1985 there was no organised expression of Russian nationalism other than by the dissident All-Russian Social Christian Union (VSKhSON) in the 60s and the output of the journals *Veche*, *Zemlia* and *Moskovskii sbornik* in the 70s. The only other expression of Russian nationalism was conducted by individuals such as Solzhenitsyn in samizdat publications and others through officially-sanctioned organs. Without doubt, there was an element within the establishment which supported a degree of Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union. Whether this resulted from deep-rooted Russian nationalist convictions or whether it resulted from the functional need to maintain the Russian as the 'elder brother' within a multinational Soviet society is hard to determine. The significant factor is that a certain amount of Russian nationalist expression was able to function through the journal *Molodaia gvardiia* and the publishing house *Sovremennik*.

In 1970, Brezhnev made a personal attack on *Molodaia gvardiia*, which had published articles on the 'Russian national spirit' and identified the Soviet state as a Soviet 'Russian' state. Although this tendency supported

the idea of a Soviet empire with a Russian national face, Brezhnev recognised it as open opposition to Soviet ideology and rebuked the editorship for its behaviour. However, despite its dissenting voice *Molodaia gvardiia* was not closed down and was able to continue. Russian nationalist expression was allowed to exist as long as it was controlled by the leadership and did not pose a threat to existing structures.

1985-1988: Searching for a Cause

When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985 Russian nationalism had no particular focus, no officially -recognised group furthering its interests. John Dunlop described the 'Russian nationalists' of 1985 as 'a loose cluster of individuals sharing certain fervent concerns'.¹ Certainly, Russian nationalism represented a loose collection of ideas and those who were orientated towards it were united by a common concern - the fate and position of Russians and Russia. This Russian national sentiment was expressed in the pages of *Molodaia gvardiia*, *Nash sovremennik* and in a number of novels, many of which lamented the demise of rural Russia and its values. It was also centred around *VOOPlik* and other small groups concerned with Russian culture and the preservation of Russian historical monuments. The chief concerns expressed by writers and commentators involved: the environment; the destruction of rural Russia; the discussion of Russian culture, heritage and identity.

Although Gorbachev promoted the idea of glasnost in party and state organs in his very first speech as leader in March 1985, a more significant breakthrough for glasnost in society came with the abolition of the censorship functions of *Glavlit*, in June 1986.² This did not guarantee complete freedom of speech, but it provided a foundation for development.³ Russian nationalist expression did not reflect any immediate change, but the Russian national question gradually became a topic of greater discussion, mainly in the form of an intellectual debate by members of Russia's literary elite. Well-known authors, such as Rasputin and Belov, voiced Russian national issues in literary form in some of the thick journals in 1985 and 1986,⁴ but a broader discussion of Russian

national issues emerged in 1987-8 when glasnost began to wield a greater influence. Some of the articles which emerged focussed upon an evaluation of history, reassessing the relationship between the Russian past/Russian culture and the post-1917 period. As glasnost presented the opportunity to examine such issues as Stalinism, it also gave scope to the those who championed the Russian dimension in history to express themselves.

There is little doubt that Russian writers and literary commentators were at the forefront of this discussion. At the end of 1985/beginning of 1986, the RSFSR Writers' Union was prominent in voicing opposition to the 'river-diversion project' - one of the first environmental concerns of Russian nationalist-orientated figures. By 1987, the work of writers covering Russian national themes was very popular. A survey by I. A. Snezhkova of the demand for books in five Moscow libraries at the beginning of 1987 showed that the most popular book was Viktor Astaf'ev's *Pechal'nyi detektiv*, with an average waiting list of 111 people. Other popular books from authors with a Russian national agenda included V. Pikul's *Favorit* (average waiting list of 106.77 people), Iurii Bondarev's *Igra* (50 people) and V. Rasputin's *Pozhar* (31).⁵

Another study of the Russian press in 1986-7 by Snezhkova indicated that, in 1986, on average every fourth copy of *Pravda* contained an article dedicated to Russian culture. Around half of the authors were members of the 'creative and artistic' intelligentsia. In 1987, the number of articles on Russian cultural matters increased slightly to one in every three.⁶ Although these articles were presented as part of the life of Soviet peoples and was not subject to any specific focus, there is some significance in the small increase of Russian material between 1986 and 1987 and the fact that many of the authors were from the creative arts.

Russian writers were vocal at the USSR Writers' Union congress in April 1987, when some used the opportunity to criticise 'mass culture' and 'rock music' - these could be seen as alternative terms for 'Western' cultural influences, which had appeared as a result of glasnost and perestroika. In addition to condemning Western influences, Stanislav Kuniaev, the editor of *Nash sovremennik*, stood up for colleagues who dealt with the Russian national question.⁷ Much of what some of the writers had to say

could be regarded as conservative opposition to perestroika, but part of this comment also revealed support for Russian national values.

The anti-Western offensive continued at the beginning of 1988 through articles in Russian nationalist-orientated publications from A. Prokhanov, M. Dunaev and A. Trofimov. Prokhanov's January article criticised perestroika's 'Westernizers', who had turned to the West for ideas of development which were alien to the 'mass of the people'. He also criticised those who wished to return to a pre-socialist 'Russian idea', recognising the de-stablising effect it might have on the unitary state.⁸ Prokhanov's ideal recognised socialism and the continuation of the historical Russian state. It was as if he considered socialism to be an innate Russian national value. Dunaev suggested that the Russian people could be destroyed neither by weapons nor war, but could be broken if it were to be 'deprived of its culture'.⁹ 'Rock-culture' and consumerism were Western influences which posed a threat to such qualities as 'historical memory' and the 'ideals of the nation'. Trofimov lamented the fact that national culture was being uprooted and replaced by the 'dregs of Western mass culture'.¹⁰ These comments were all part of the debate to define Russian national values. The clearest message which can be drawn from these commentators is that Russian national values were at odds with Western values - a message which might have supported socialism as a Russian national value, but was vague enough to provoke the thoughts and sympathies of opponents to socialism.

In the same year (1988), the activity of *Memorial*, the informal group formed to commemorate the victims of Stalinism, was a reflection that glasnost was beginning to examine the Soviet past in more detail. Writers and critics joined in the debate. For example, Vadim Kozhinov suggested that the Russian people or, more precisely, the Russian peasantry was the greatest victim of the formation of the Soviet state and Stalinism; whilst the historian, Apollon Kuz'min, appeared critical of 'European' or anti-Russian paths of development which might have been imposed on Russia following the October Revolution - he suggested that figures such as Trotsky were 'Europeanists' and had neither time for, nor understanding of (Russian) 'patriotism'.¹¹

Another significant event for the development of Russian nationalism in

1988 was the decision by the Politburo on 12 May 'to authorize the publication of works of pre-revolutionary and emigré Russian philosophers'.¹² Although, it did not have any immediate noticeable effect, it meant that the ideas of Solov'ev, Berdiaev and others could be introduced into the debate on the Russian national question.

During this period, there was a gradual effort to define Russian culture and values. This was conducted by members of the cultural élite and there was relatively little input from other sections of society. It is impossible to draw a uniform picture of these 'Russian national values' from the intellectual debate - nationalism was being promoted by a vague movement attempting to define its ideology.

Pamiat'

Besides the intellectual debate, Russian nationalism was represented by the emergence of one of the first 'informal' groups, *Pamiat'*. This group started as a cultural society or club before Gorbachev came to power, but, in the latter half of 1985, became the first politicised group with a Russian nationalist viewpoint. In 1987, *Pamiat'* raised its profile through active campaigning over preservation issues, conducting demonstrations in Moscow and, later, in Leningrad. Its major areas of concern appeared to be environmental, preservationist and other cultural issues, but *Pamiat'* was also characterised by anti-Semitism and anti-Westernism. Owing to the latter characteristics, the group drew criticism from some quarters, but, nevertheless, drew support from prominent figures in the literary world such as Kozhinov, Rasputin and Belov. In autumn 1987, Kozhinov defended *Pamiat'* by declaring that the group had positive features which should not be ignored, whilst Rasputin also defended certain aspects of the group's activity; Belov spoke up for forces in *Pamiat'*, which were for 'the rebirth of national culture'.¹³ Even the liberal Gavriil Popov, stating that 'the main weight of the administrative system had fallen on the Russians and that the Russian past had suffered the most', declared that there were reasons for the development of a group like *Pamiat'*, whose ranks contained many 'sincere patriots'.¹⁴ Despite some of its less attractive features, *Pamiat'* probably did attract the interest or support of some

nationalist-orientated Russians, precisely because it was the only movement putting forward such a strong Russian message (the *Spasenie* group in Leningrad also sought to protect historical and cultural monuments, but did not have the same Russian orientation as *Pamiat'*).¹⁵ Like members of the literary élite, *Pamiat'* displayed a passion and interest for something 'Russian', but did not share a uniform view on the Russian national question. A combination of disagreement and personal rivalries led to splits in the organisation in 1987 and 1988.¹⁶ The splits showed that *Pamiat'*, reflecting Russian nationalism as a whole, represented an unorganised mass of various views, advocating, for example, paganism, Orthodoxy, Marxism-Leninism, monarchy, pro-market economics, anti-Westernism, anti-Semitism.

The effects of glasnost

Perestroika could not be carried out without questioning the existing structures - glasnost allowed questions to be asked. This played a significant role in the development of Russian nationalism.

First, glasnost stimulated intellectual thought, allowing freer discussions of the 'historical past' and introducing the ideas of previously banned thinkers. For Russian nationalism, this meant the introduction of pre-revolutionary and emigré thought such as Solov'ev and Solzhenitsyn. Glasnost intensified the activity of those who were already involved in the intellectual discussion on Russian national values and broadened their opportunities to express their ideas. It also gave thinkers outside the literary community to join in the intellectual debate.

At the same time, glasnost relaxed certain ideological taboos, including the discussion of Russian national issues. The principle of internationalism was no longer as sacred as it had been and Russians, long promoted as the core of Soviet internationalism, were able to focus on and define their own issues. This became more apparent in 1988 when democratisation in political life led to national movements in the republics and some Russians sought to review, rationalise or justify their position in the internationalist community of the Soviet Union.

The discussion of Russian national values in the open arena of the media

was presented as a literary discussion, but it was an attempt to present more serious political views to the public. The earliest standard bearers of these views on behalf of the intelligentsia included the RSFSR Writers' Union, *Nash Sovremennik*, *Molodaia gvardiia*, *Moskva*, *Literaturnaia Rossiia* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, whilst the non-intellectual, more active expression of Russian nationalism was offered by *Pamiat'*.

1988-1990: Organised movements

In 1988, certain tendencies of intellectual thought encouraged by glasnost began to merge and materialise into political programmes. The movements which voiced these programmes were at first unofficial, or 'informal' (*neformal'nye*), but some soon developed into something more significant. The emergence of organisations with a Russian nationalist orientation resulted, to some extent, from a coalescence of intellectual trends, but also as a reaction to the development of independence-minded movements in the republics. One of the most significant factors drawing intellectual trends together was change in the electoral system and the subsequent electoral campaigns of 1989 and 1990. The March 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies allowed two thirds of the seats to be chosen by secret ballot - members of public organisations could be nominated as long as they did not 'contradict the constitution or the laws of the Soviet Union'.¹⁷ The 1990 elections to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, which were free of quotas, such as those appointed to 1989 USSR Congress, witnessed a greater participation of new informal movements, representing a broader range of views than in 1989. It became more apparent towards the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 that Russian nationalism was focussing less on ecological and conservationist issues and shifting towards ideas of, for example, Russian sovereignty and economic independence.

This period can be seen as a time during which Russian nationalism in its various manifestations tried to mobilize popular support, which was reflected by: the growth in the number of organisations with a Russian nationalist focus; the broadening of the political issues they addressed; and, to some extent, the broadening of activity beyond the centres of

Moscow and Leningrad.

'Cultural' groups

One of the first notable Russian nationalist-orientated movements to appear at the end of 1988 was the Association of Russian Artists (*Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov*). The founders of this group included several members of the creative intelligentsia who had been involved in the intellectual debate on the Russian national question in the media. It was one of the first initiatives of the Russian literary élite to form a political movement centred around 'Russian' values, although the Association claimed that it had 'cultural' and 'educational' priorities.¹⁸ Its political concerns were reflected by its support for the maintenance of the Soviet/historical Russian state, but it sought to influence rather than to transform itself into a political group.

Other 'informal' groups attempted to propagate their views under a 'cultural' banner. *Rossia molodaia* was a small group which formed in March 1987 to teach people (mainly children) about Russian military history. It contributed to the Russian nationalist debate by attempting to personify the Russian nation through historical figures.¹⁹ The Leningrad group *Russkoe znamia* (March 1989) also presented itself as a cultural group interested in Russian history, calling for the return of Russian historical symbols and for the 'truth' to be told about the 'Fatherland's heroes'.²⁰

Around and following the March 1989 elections, members of the 'creative' intelligentsia were instrumental in forming the Foundation of Slavonic Literature and Slavic Cultures (March 1989), the Moscow group *Otechestvo* (May 1989),²¹ the Movement of Lovers of Russian Letters and Culture *Edinstvo* (latter half 1989), the Union for the Spiritual Rebirth of Russia [*SDVO*] (March 1989). The first three groups here emphasised their 'cultural' orientation in their official titles,²² whilst *SVDO* placed its accent on a broader 'spiritual rebirth' - in addition to promoting and discussing Russian culture, it sought to 'unite the country's patriotic organisations'.²³

'Cultural' groups were not limited to Moscow and Leningrad. In June 1988 a Union of Patriotic Associations of the Urals and Siberia announced that,

among other things, it would act to 'resurrect the interest in Russia's spiritual heritage, protect historical and cultural monuments and conserve nature'.²⁴ The group (which included *Otechestvo* from Sverdlovsk, *Rodina* from Cheliabinsk, *Pamiat'* from Novosibirsk and others) indicated that it was concerned with ecological and cultural matters, but also declared that it supported perestroika and was interested in seeing a 'real participation of the people in solving society's most important problems'.²⁵

In addition to cultural groups, there were also single-issue conservation groups such as the Public Committee for Saving the Volga (*Obshchestvennyi komitet spaseniia Volgi* - OKSV) and the Foundation for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour (*Fond vosstanovleniia Khrama Khrista Spasitelia*). These organisations contained familiar faces from the literary world - writer Vasilii Belov was one of the leading members of OKSV (formed January 1989) and writer Vladimir Soloukhin was chairman of the board of the Foundation (formed September 89).²⁶ The issues championed by such groups were not just conservation issues, but national symbols. This is illustrated by a 'message' sent by the Foundation for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour to the people of Russia:

The whole nation created this church in honour of the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 and in memory of the fighters who were killed for the freedom and independence of Russia...

We are calling every citizen of Russia to stand together with us in order to restore this national place of worship...²⁷

The reason for the emergence of 'cultural' groups is that it was a safe option - they did not send out the message of a direct challenge to the centre by claiming that they were pursuing cultural interests. At the same time there seemed to be no general consensus on the Russian national question and it was as if the creative intelligentsia and others had formed organisations to promote Russian national consciousness and reach a more uniform view on the Russian national question. However, a significant proportion of these groups subsequently took part in the political process, joining political and electoral alliances etc.

The 'international' movements

It is no coincidence that the first movements (besides *Pamiat'*) arose at the end of 1988. Besides the new electoral law which applied to the March 1989 elections,²⁸ Russian nationalism was sparked by events in the republics, most notably in the Baltic republics. The earliest republican movement, the Estonian Popular Front for the Support of Perestroika, appeared in Spring 1988 - this had the broad support of the democratic movement, the local Party and the authorities.²⁹ By August, there were demands in the Baltic for economic and political sovereignty and, by October, Popular Fronts were established in all three republics.

In its programme document, the Association of Russian Artists had called for unity from Soviet citizens to maintain the 'historically state-formed brotherhood'.³⁰ This reflected the concern which some Russians had about the possible break-up of the historical Russian state. However, the problem was more pressing for some of the Russian citizens who lived in the Baltic republics. Within a short time after the formation of the Popular Fronts, the 'internationalist' movements appeared: *Edinstvo* in Lithuania, *Interfront* in Latvia and *Interdvizhenie* in Estonia. Although these organisations held their founding conferences at the beginning of 1989 (January and March), they were formed around November/December - little more than a month after the Popular Fronts were established. The 'intermovements' claimed to be internationalist in their outlook and spoke in Marxist-Leninist terms, but there was a strong Russian-nationalist current running through the movements. For example, they spoke up, more or less, for the Russian/Russian speaking community; resisted the idea of having to learn the titular language of the republic they lived in; opposed the renaming of streets which had had Russian names imposed upon them; opposed the break-up of the unitary state.

Other 'internationalist' movements appeared with a somewhat Russian-orientated agenda. Nina Andreeva's '*Edinstvo* for Leninism and Communist Ideals' appeared in May 1989, two months after her letter appeared in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, berating the forces of change in the Soviet Union.³¹ It is no coincidence that this letter appeared around the time of

the March elections. Although Andreeva's letter had criticized certain aspects of Russian nationalism (for example, 'neo-Slavophiles' who sought to return to the social forms of 'pre-socialist Russia'), this ought to be seen as a condemnation of anti-communist trends in political life, rather than a blanket condemnation of all forms of Russian nationalism. Andreeva also supported some of the activities of Russian nationalist-orientated groups.

The United Workers' Front (*OFT*) was formed in June 1989³² and became an active supporter of Russian interests and preserving the Union. *OFT* eventually became one of the prime movers behind the formation of the Russian Communist Party.

Although these 'internationalist' groups used a great deal of internationalist rhetoric, they should be considered supporters of imperialist Russian nationalism: their association with Marxism-Leninism does not rule out nationalist tendencies. There were, no doubt, genuine internationalists within the ranks of these organisations, particularly in Andreeva's *Edinstvo*, but this group was very ready to use Russian sentiments to its own ends - which does not conjure up the picture of principled Marxism-Leninism which it claimed to represent. The timing of the formation of these groups is very revealing: republican politics were changing; Russian minorities were worried about their status within the republics; Russian pride risked being wounded. To some extent, they were an expression of conservatism, but they were also an expression of Russian conservatism. It was fairly safe and acceptable to establish groups which operated within a Marxist-Leninist framework: they could pose opposition to the politics of change without formally opposing the CPSU and its ideology. It should also be assumed that these organisations believed in a 'Marxist-Leninist' Soviet system where Russians constituted the 'elder brother'. However, Gorbachev and some of his reform-minded Communists would represent a truer picture of internationalism.

Other early 'informals'

In addition to a proliferation of small *Pamiat'* groups, there were a

handful of other organisations of a Russian nationalist orientation which formed before 1990. These organisations were committed to a more active participation in political life than the 'cultural' groups and include: the *Rossy Civic Association*, the Russian [*Rossiiskii*] Popular Front (*RNF*), the Christian Patriotic Union (*KhPS*), *Otechestvo* in Leningrad, the National Democratic Party, the Orthodox Constitutional-Monarchist Party of Russia and the Russian Communal Union.

Rossy, or the 'Civil Association for a Sovereign Republic of Rus'', formed in Leningrad at the end of 1988 from a club of philosophy and religion.³³ *Rossy* was also dedicated to the development of Russian culture and the renaissance of Russian national consciousness. However, throughout 1989 it developed a more political posture and became one of the first groups to suggest the establishment of a sovereign Russia on the territory of the RSFSR.³⁴ It even suggested that in the future, a 'National Popular Front' might be set up to achieve this³⁵ - a suggestion inspired, no doubt, by the Popular Fronts in the Baltic republics.

The Russian [*Rossiiskii*] Popular Front (December 1988) pictured itself as the Russian equivalent of the Baltic Popular Fronts.³⁶ Curiously, the Front's formation was announced in the Russian nationalist-orientated newspaper *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, which stated that the *RNF* supported perestroika and sought to 'strengthen the integrity of the country'.³⁷ Some of its founder members were linked to *Pamiat'* and to other 'patriots' - it is even claimed that one of them, Iurii Demin, tried to attract the Russian nationalist writer Iurii Bondarev to stand as an *RNF* candidate to the USSR Congress of Deputies.³⁸ Its main programme was described as 'the material, spiritual, national and democratic resurrection of Russia'.³⁹ However, unlike the cultural groups or international groups, the *RNF* presented ideas which clearly challenged the CPSU - a programme document in May 1989 declared that the *RNF* supported political plurality (including a multi-party system), rejected communism and stood for maximum independence for the Union republics, 'including Russia'.⁴⁰

The Christian Patriotic Union (*KhPS*) was founded in December 1988 under the leadership of former Russian nationalist dissident Vladimir Osipov. One of the Union's main tasks was to 'bring about the spiritual

and moral renewal of society and to resurrect the national-patriotic consciousness of the peoples of Russia'.⁴¹ Russia's 'spiritual and biological salvation' would be achieved through the adoption of Russian Orthodoxy, the introduction of Russian republican institutions (Academy of Sciences, own capital city etc.), the resurrection of old Russian names, symbols traditions, the purity of the language, etc. By the end of 1989, in preparation for the 1990 elections, the *KhPS* declared that it supported neither capitalism, nor communism, but 'Russia', and its motto was 'Orthodoxy, Patriotism, Conciliarism [*sobornost'*]'.⁴² The Union attempted to suggest that it had no political ideology, but it clearly had a list of national political demands - the complexion of the political system was secondary, as long as the Russian national priorities were fulfilled. Therefore, the *KhPS* was willing to back any party or tendency which would most likely introduce its conception of a greater Russian national state guided by the Orthodox religion.

The Leningrad group *Otechestvo* (*Leningradskoe russkoe patrioticheskoe dvizhenie* 'Otechestvo') formed in late March 1989 with the aim of uniting the city's 'patriotic' forces to 'resurrect Leningrad and Russia'. *Otechestvo* supported the CPSU's path of perestroika and democratisation. Its interests included the ecology, Russian culture and language, but there were other political aims: to return the land to the peasantry; to introduce regional self-government and *khozrashchet*; to return to the Russian people their 'well-being'; and to reverse the low Russian birth-rate through social policy (thus preventing the threat of Russians 'dying-out'). All this was to be achieved by observing the importance of the unitary Russian/Soviet state, Russian Orthodoxy, the importance of the Army and security organs, and a better Russian national education programme.

The National Democratic Party (*NDP*) formed in Leningrad in September 1989. By this time the first democratic opposition movement, Democratic Union, had been established for over a year and Leningrad had its own democratic movement, the Leningrad Popular Front (June 89). The National Democratic Party opposed not only the CPSU and its past record, but also the nascent democratic opposition - both were considered to be manifestations of 'Zionism'. Some of the *NDP*'s proposals included: removing Article 6 (the leading role of the CPSU) from the Constitution;

the institution of a presidency leading to the possible restoration of a monarchy; and the transformation of a unitary state into a confederation in which republican legislation had priority over all-Union legislation. One of its main tasks was 'the creation of a political party which stands up for the interests of the indigenous population of the Russian Federation'. This appeared to be 'first and foremost, the Russian [*russkii*] people'.⁴³ In addition to some of the *Pamiat'* groups, Osipov's *KhPS* and possibly the *NDP*, the Orthodox Constitutional-Monarchist Party of Russia (*PKMPR*) was one of the first openly monarchist organisations. Formed in autumn 1989,⁴⁴ it supported the restoration of a monarchy under Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich, the would-be first-in-line to the Romanov throne.⁴⁵ *PKMPR* declared that it would support any party or public organisation which shared its views, linking Russian imperial statehood with the monarchy and reviving Russian Orthodoxy. The Party's manifesto stated that it would fight for the restoration of 'trampled' national traditions - first and foremost, the national traditions of the Russians [*russkie*]. Its political aims included land reform, the 'strengthening' of the armed forces and the restoration of property rights to dispossessed members of the nobility and their descendants.⁴⁶

The Russian Communal Union [*Russkii obshchinyi soiuz* - *ROS*], which formed in August 1989, advocated an imperialist Russian nationalism by which ethnic Russians [*russkie*] were considered to be the inheritors and rulers of the greater Russian state (the Soviet Union). Its programme opposed the introduction of capitalism and gave only partial support to the Communist Party, although it rejected a multi-party system. *ROS* sought to maintain a 'One and Indivisible' Russia through 'communal order', Orthodoxy and the Russian Army. 'Communal order' would serve to 'maintain Russian interests, language, way of life and traditions' and would 'develop communal forms of politics and economics'. Basically, *ROS* aimed to establish a unified Russian empire on the perceived 'Russian' value of communality, which would be employed through the Russian institutions of the *Veche*, the *Duma* and the *Sobor*. This was an attempt to devise a 'Russian' solution, almost a Russian 'third way', for the Soviet Union.⁴⁷

There is one factor which seems to unite these different groups: a revival

of Russian culture, traditions and values. However, opinions differed on the constitution of the Russian state, the political system and Russian national values. *Rossy* seemed to be the only group which advocated the idea of a Russian state independent of other republics - the others ultimately viewed the Russian state as the Soviet Union. Some opposed the CPSU and the communist system, whilst *Otechestvo*, *KhPS* and, perhaps, *ROS*, showed tolerance towards the idea of a reformed CPSU. *NDP* and *Otechestvo* expressed a distrust of the democratic movement and appeared to support some sort of authoritarian rule. Three of the above-mentioned organisations supported the restoration of the monarchy, whilst five supported the restoration of Russian Orthodoxy as one of the cornerstones of Russian national values. The variety of opinion was a distinguishing factor not only between these organisations, but within them. Like *Pamiat'*, they were subsequently liable to splits and none of them managed to develop mass support. The *RNF* gained a sizeable support in Moscow for a short time, but splits within the party and the leadership style of Skurlatov led to a decline in appeal. Of these earlier groups, *Otechestvo* gained a notoriety which was second only to *Pamiat'*. However, despite the fact that *Otechestvo* appeared as a signatory or participant in many of the initiatives produced by 'patriotic forces', its activity and support should not be overestimated.

Alliances and the 1990 elections

The 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies were not contested by any particular organised Russian nationalist platform. However, there was evidence of the Russian national dimension in campaigning, as illustrated by reports of the use of the slogan: 'Vote for him, he is Russian'.⁴⁸ Attempts to organise a united campaign of Russian nationalist views appeared in the run up to the 1990 elections.

The first significant alliance of nationalist forces took place in September 1989 with the formation of the United Council of Russia (*Ob"edinennyi sovet Rossii* or *OSR*). This association was formed on the initiative of the Association of Russian Artists and brought together imperialist Russian nationalist forces of various descriptions: Russian 'cultural' societies,

'international' movements and self-styled 'patriotic' groups such as *Otechestvo*.⁴⁹ Their main concerns included the integrity of the Soviet state, the development of RSFSR sovereignty and the affairs of ethnic Russians throughout the Union. All the organisations had something else in common - they recognised the role of socialism and the CPSU in maintaining the 'fatherland'. To a large extent, they represented pro-Russian conservative forces within the establishment who were opposed to some of the changes brought about by perestroika. They were particularly agitated by the appearance of independence movements in the republics - it is probably no coincidence that OSR formed shortly after the formal founding congress of the Ukrainian independence movement *Rukh*, which took place on 8-11 September 1989.

OSR left no doubt that it was forming with the aim of attracting broader support and achieving representation on the political stage. Its 'immediate task' was to 'prepare and conduct an election campaign for the elections of Deputies to the RSFSR Congress and local soviets'.⁵⁰

The call for RSFSR sovereignty is a significant development. Whilst the OSR spoke of the importance of maintaining the 'unitary state of the peoples of the USSR within its historically formed borders', it also spoke of 'equality of the RSFSR and the Russian people with other Union republics and peoples'. In the past, this demand had expressed itself as a call for institutions such as an Russian Academy of Sciences⁵¹ or Russian national mass media,⁵² but the idea of Russian sovereignty was altogether new from such conservative imperialist Russian nationalists. It was, in part, a reaction to declarations of sovereignty in Estonia (Nov 88), Lithuania (May 89), Latvia (July 89) and Azerbaijan (September 89), not to mention the demonstrations and calls for independence in Georgia from autumn 1988 to summer 1989 - the achievement of Russian sovereignty would, thereby, give the Russians the 'equality' or parity they sought. Another factor affecting a call for sovereignty was that OSR wished to identify itself more clearly with the RSFSR in the run up to the RSFSR elections.

OSR identified itself with Russian national renaissance in other ways. For example, in November, it participated in a 'round table' session with two of its constituent members, the Association of Russian Artists and the Foundation for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour, to

discuss a forthcoming celebration of St. Sergii of Radonezh. The participants issued a statement which extolled the national virtues of the saint and, referring to his legacy of religious buildings and institutions, called for 'all that was illegally taken from the people and the Russian Orthodox Church to be returned to its original owner and inheritor'.⁵³

Despite the fact that OSR had declared its formation with the intention of contesting the March 1990 elections, it was aware that it should fight its campaign on a broader, more prominent platform. It was competing in opposition not only to reform-minded communists, but also to the Interregional Group of Deputies (officially formed July 1989), which was in December discussing the formation of its own electoral platform.⁵⁴ Consequently, on 15 December an announcement appeared of an initiative to create an 'electoral platform of Russia'.⁵⁵ The initiative group was held in the RSFSR Writers' Union building and included members of OSR, the *Edinstvo* Movement for Lovers of Russian Literature and Culture, the *Rossii* Club of Electors⁵⁶ and representatives of 'other Moscow patriotic movements'. Those who gave speeches included OSR's V. Skripko, RSFSR Writers' Union Secretary Iu. Prokushev, A. Prokhanov, M. Lemashev and E. Volodin. It was decided that the 'bloc's' concerns would include, among other things, the sovereignty of the RSFSR and the strengthening of Russian statehood [*gosudarstvennost' Rossii*]. This meeting was followed by the announcement at the end of the month of the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements of Russia.⁵⁷

The Bloc was a coalition of imperialist Russian nationalists and resembled a roll-call of the OSR and other organisations inspired by Russian nationalist writers. In its address, the Bloc stated that the RSFSR and local elections would 'predetermine much in the fate of Russia and its peoples' adding that the political crisis in progress put into doubt the existence of the 'thousand-year' (Russian) great power. Whilst supporting the continuation of an integrated Union, the Bloc sought to establish a greater identity for Russia through the establishment of Russian sovereignty, the resurrection of a Russian Communist Party and a Russian Academy of Sciences. It also demanded greater republican control over Russia's economic resources. The call for a Russian Communist Party was very significant. In principle, Russia would achieve 'equality' [*ravnopravie*]

with other Union republics which had their own republican Communist Party structures - however, it would also provide an opportunity to push forward a more pro-Russian agenda and provide a platform of challenge to reform-minded elements within the CPSU. The Bloc's priority was, supposedly, to achieve structural parity with the other Union republics and to minimise Russia's perceived close association with the centre, but one cannot rule out the other motives.

The Bloc's concern for the integrity of the Soviet state might well have been a reaction to the independence movements/Popular Fronts in non-Russian republics. However, there were also concerns about the possibility of the RSFSR being carved up into separate states: in April, Democratic Union member, Vladimir Balakhanov, had suggested that Russia's future might be secured by shedding the empire and dividing Russia into three or four sovereign states - Russia, East Siberia, West Siberia and the (Russian) Far East.⁵⁸ In addition, members and sympathisers of the Bloc were reacting to the perceived anti-Russian feeling being generated outside Russia: in August 1989, Galina Litvinova labelled Russia's 'unequal' position in the Union as a source of 'Russophobia'; Arsenii Gulyga blamed 'Russophobes' for the disappearance of the 'proud name of the nation - Great Russians'.⁵⁹ This feeling of injured Russian national pride amongst the Bloc's sympathisers was intensified before the elections by events such as the protest against the (Russian) centre at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in December 1989 (Gorbachev was forced to call to order a group of deputies from several republics after they had blamed Russia/the centre for their misfortunes)⁶⁰ and the outbursts of anti-Russian feeling in Baku which had developed after the central authorities sent troops into the city in January 1990. There was also a degree of focus on events in Moldavia: in January, the Moldavian Russian nationalist-orientated 'international movement', *Edinstvo*, announced the secession of Tiraspol from the Moldavian SSR and its unification with Russia.⁶¹

In the same month (January), there were significant developments amongst potential opponents of Russian nationalist-orientated groups. Firstly, the electoral bloc, Democratic Russia, was formed to contest the

March elections and, secondly, the Democratic Platform was established within the CPSU. Aware of these developments, the 'patriots' campaigned actively. The Bloc's major campaign slogans called for 'popular accord' and 'for the rebirth of Russia' - one of the Bloc's candidates, OSR member Vladimir Bondarenko, called for the 'national-religious Rebirth of Russia'.⁶² A meeting of 'patriots' organised by the Bloc, which was held outside Ostankino television tower in Moscow, was also dubbed 'For the Rebirth of Russia'. It was the biggest pre-election meeting of Russian nationalists and was widely reported in the press.⁶³ The press also mentioned that members of *Pamiat'* were present, namely Sychev's *Pamiat'* group, which, like the Bloc, supported the idea of socialism as a basis for Russian national rebirth (according to Valerii Solovei, the Bloc was supported by certain sections of the CPSU and was actually given backing by the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU in Moscow).⁶⁴

Other nationalist-orientated groups held joint meetings around this time. Between 24-26 January, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Moscow Komsomol hosted a conference of 'patriotic and socialist movements'. Participants included the 'Intermovements' from Lithuania, Latvia and Moldavia, Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo*, Filimonov's National Patriotic Front *Pamiat'* and the Moscow *Otechestvo* Association.⁶⁵ Nina Andreeva declared in her speech that:

we must put all our arguments to one side: they are insignificant in face of the danger threatening socialism.⁶⁶

This illustrates Andreeva's desire to unite conservative socialist forces and nationalist forces to defeat the forces of reform. This picture very much describes Andreeva's own organisation *Edinstvo* - an alliance, or even synthesis, of conservative communism (with elements of 'Soviet' nationalism) and imperialist Russian nationalism. There was a great deal in common between the groups at the conference and the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements.

Despite representation at the abovementioned meetings, *Pamiat'*'s campaign was lifeless. In Moscow, it could not even attract a hundred participants to its election meetings and demonstrations.⁶⁷ For a movement which had received such attention in its earlier days, it was

clear that *Pamiat'* had lost its momentum.

It is difficult to say how many of the candidates for the RSFSR elections were of a Russian-nationalist orientation. In February, the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements produced a list of 61 candidates to contest the Moscow seats to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, but this is just a small representative sample of Russian nationalist activity.⁶⁸ One particular pre-election study of two Moscow regions divided candidates into six categories: 'Westerners', right-populists, statist, left-populists, ecologists and national-patriots.⁶⁹ The survey concluded that only 2% were 'national-patriots', while 17% were 'statists'. Further analysis showed that 40-45% of the statists were nationalist-orientated, suggesting that approximately 10% of all candidates were Russian nationalist-orientated. Of course, judging by the narrow Russian interpretation of 'nationalism', this figure is probably an underestimation and should be regarded as a minimum percentage.⁷⁰ The answers to other questions posed indicate that the figure may, indeed, have been higher: 8% of respondents said that 'Russia was only for Russians [*russkie*] and should be ruled by Russians', whilst 20% of the candidates said that the 'fact of a multinational Moscow was bad and the situation should be changed'.⁷¹

In February 1990, the liberal newspaper *Argumenty i fakty* warned that, in Moscow and Leningrad, the main challenge to democratic candidates would come not from CPSU candidates, but from Russian nationalists.⁷² However, this idea proved to be unfounded. In the two main Russian cities, the Bloc suffered a resounding defeat: for example, in Moscow it put up (an official list of) 61 candidates for seats in the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies - three candidates were successful, whereas the Democratic Russia bloc won 57 of the 65 Moscow seats.⁷³ *Pamiat'* fared even worse: in Leningrad, election candidates advocating *Pamiat'*'s ideas received only 2-3% of the vote.⁷⁴ Similarly, the other abovementioned Russian nationalist-orientated 'informal' groups failed to make an impact. The 'Patriotic' Bloc reacted with enmity towards the democrats. On 6 March, two days after the first round of voting, one of the Bloc's supporting newspapers, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, criticised the fact that rival candidates had formed a Democratic Russia electoral bloc, claiming that it

was a 'sly propaganda trick' - possibly, in an attempt to discourage people from voting for the democrats in the second round of voting. On 23 March, members of the 'patriotic' Bloc protested against the election results.⁷⁵ Thirty-six defeated candidates from Moscow who had run for the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies or Moscow City Soviet launched an appeal to the authorities calling for the elections to be declared null and void. They attacked signatories to the election platform of the Democratic Russia bloc, accusing them of slander and of using 'illegal' pressure on the electorate. However, despite their complaints and accusations, the election results stood.

It seems unlikely that the 'patriotic' Bloc was a victim of unfair practices (by the Democratic Russia bloc). It should be noted that the 'patriotic' Bloc received more media coverage than Democratic Russia - the former published its election manifesto in the press in December 1989, whilst the latter was allowed to publish extracts of its manifesto only after the elections.⁷⁶ In addition, the Bloc received on average 8-10% of the vote nationwide and many of their high-profile candidates failed to secure seats.⁷⁷ The reason for the Bloc's poor performance seemed to be its association with the Communist Party. Whilst many of the Bloc's candidates supported the leading role of the Party, many rival candidates wished to change this - one opinion poll of candidates to the RSFSR Congress (conducted in two areas of Moscow) showed that 88% of them wished to abolish Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution guaranteeing the Party's leading role.⁷⁸ 'Patriotic' candidates pushing a more Russian-nationalist message, in some cases, fared much better than some of their colleagues, suggesting that the electorate had some sympathy towards Russian nationalist ideas, but less enthusiasm for the Communist Party.⁷⁹

It is possible that the Bloc's message displayed inconsistencies which caused confusion: whilst supporting the transfer of land to the peasantry, it opposed many aspects of market reform; whilst insisting on strengthening the Soviet state, it promoted Russia's independence. Perhaps, the electorate were suspicious of its links with the establishment, including the military. One thing is certain - whilst the Bloc was suffering its crushing defeat, several 'democratic' candidates of a Russian nationalist-orientation, who opposed the CPSU, were successfully elected to the

RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, including, for example, Viktor Aksiuchits, who represented one of the short-lived Russian 'popular fronts'.⁸⁰ This might suggest that there was interest in the Russian national question, but not necessarily in alliance with conservative Soviet socialist values.

Spring 1990 - August 1991: Russian nationalism moves to centre stage

Following the March 1990 elections, a larger number of political movements began to identify themselves. This was encouraged by the rescinding of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution in February and its confirmation at the III Congress of USSR People's Deputies on 13 March. Some of these movements carried a Russian national message, but this message was allied to a broader spectrum of political views: not all of the new movements supported an 'indivisible' great Russian state (the Soviet Union); a number of them rejected communism; and some embraced the principle of democracy. For example, spring 1990 witnessed the formation of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement (*RKhDD*), the Republican Popular Party of Russia (*RNPR*), the Party of Russia's Rebirth and *Soiuz Venedov*, each representing a different interpretation of Russian nationalism: the *RKhDD* pursued liberal democracy with Russian institutions; the *RNPR* rejected both communism and liberal democracy, proposing a Russian 'democratic' solution for Russia alone (having shed the non-Russian republics); the Party of Russia's Rebirth supported the maintenance of the Russian empire and opposed the democrats; whilst the *Soiuz Venedov* represented an imperialist Russian nationalism which wished to build an empire based upon the reconstruction of the ancient Aryan Vedic religion whose 'highest stage of development was Russian Orthodoxy'.⁸¹

A handful of other movements appeared over the period until August 1991, but the most significant developments were the creation of the Russian Communist Party in June 1990, the Democratic Russia Movement in October 1990 and their subsequent political activities.

Democracy and Russian Nationalism

Following the success of the Democratic Russia electoral bloc in the elections, Russian democracy realised that it could not afford to ignore the Russian national question.⁸² Indeed, just before the elections, one of Leningrad's prominent democrats, Marina Sal'e, had published an article questioning why the democratic movement was ashamed of the Russian national idea.⁸³

Aksiuchits' *RKhDD* was the first prominent movement to make a link between liberal democracy and Russian national values. Part of Aksiuchits' identification with the democratic movement stemmed from the fact that he (and others in the movement) loathed communism so much.⁸⁴ The democratic movement seemed the most suitable counterpoise to the establishment and the CPSU. The *RKhDD* was committed to the creation of a civil society, in much the same way as Democratic Union, the Leningrad Popular Front or (later) the Social Democratic Party of Russia were, but it also wished to promote 'patriotism', to create a Christian Russian national identity (with the prominence of Russian Orthodoxy) and Russian governmental institutions (e.g. *Zemskii Sobor*).

Other parties appeared with democratic programmes displaying no particular inclination to the Russian national question. They would later reveal a significant interest in following Russian affairs. The Liberal Democratic Party (*LDP*) of Vladimir Zhirinovskii, which claimed to have been in existence since May 1988, held a congress in March 1990 which supported the principles of the rule of law, a multi-party system, a mixed economy, a presidency and 'de-ideologisation' of all public institutions.⁸⁵ The *LDP*'s inclination towards an imperialist Russian nationalism only became apparent in the latter half of 1990 with amendments to its programme in October and its participation in the 'centrist' bloc - a coalition of imperialist Russian nationalists, which produced a joint manifesto in November.⁸⁶

Parties such as the Democratic Party of Russia (*DPR*), formed May 1990, and the Republican Party of the Russian Federation (*RPRF*), formed

November 1990, linked the principles of democracy with the idea of Russian [*rossiiski*] statehood. The *DPR* stood for the 'democratic renewal of Russia' and spoke neither of the Christianity or 'patriotism' advocated by the *RKhDD*, but of 'spiritual renewal of the republic's peoples'.⁸⁷ Its message demanded the renewal of the republic and its statehood, but it also stressed the need for a civil society and rights of the individual. Similarly, the *RPRF* supported political plurality and a civil society, but stood for the 'restoration of genuine Russian [*rossiiskii*] sovereignty'.⁸⁸ No doubt the combination of democratic values and the Russian [*rossiiskii*] national idea attracted support. There were also indications that both of these parties contained elements for whom the Russian national idea was of considerable importance: a 'Russian fraction' formed within the *DPR* which, in March 1991, attended a congress of the Russian-nationalist orientated *RNPR*;⁸⁹ whilst a survey at the *RPRF*'s founding congress found that 24% of the delegates considered that Russia should have its 'own peculiar path, differing from the rest of progressive mankind'.⁹⁰ This suggests that the parties and their support were, to some extent, alliances of liberal democratic values and Russian nationalism.

The formation of the Democratic Russia Movement was a breakthrough for the democratic movement and for liberal Russian nationalism. The formation of its predecessor, the Democratic Russia electoral bloc, had laid the path for democrats to pursue specifically Russian politics, something which had previously been the concern of so-called 'patriots', such as some of those representing the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements and *Pamiat'*. The aims of the Democratic Russia electoral bloc had included the pursuit of sovereignty for the Russian Republic and a new RSFSR Constitution - both of which could be described as features of Russian national renewal. The founding congress of the Democratic Russia Movement continued this line: speaking of 'Russia's fate' and 'national salvation', it referred to an 'independent, free, democratic and flourishing Russia'.⁹¹ A. Murashev, Chairman of the Movement's Organisational Committee (*Orgkomitet*), declared that the Movement's most important tasks were: to hold a national referendum to accept a new Russian Constitution, which would provide the legal basis for the 'rebirth of Russian statehood'; and the direct election of a Russian president who could give Russia its own power and

‘neutralise the destructive activities of the communist imperial centre’.⁹²

The Movement was an alliance of a number of Russia’s democratic organisations including the *DPR*, the Social Democratic Party of Russia, Democratic Platform (later *RPRF*), *RKhDD*, *Memorial*, *Shchit*, *Aprél* and others. The question of uniting to form a single party was never on the agenda. This might stem from a number of factors: the movement wished to observe the principle of political plurality; there was rivalry between the ambitions of leading personalities in the constituent parties; and, although there was agreement on the principle of an independent, democratic, sovereign Russia, there were differing views on the importance of the Russian ‘national question’.⁹³

As a result of its broad alliance, Democratic Russia became the rallying point not only for Russia’s democrats, but also for liberal Russian nationalism which existed within democratic ranks. It also provided a unified opposition to the centre and to conservative imperialist Russian nationalist forces.

The ‘Patriotic’ Opposition

In the aftermath of their March 1990 defeat, conservative forces had to take action to secure an audible voice and a power-base in Russian politics. They represented a curious mix of views, but they were united by two things: the unitary state, whether it was the Soviet Union or the Russian empire; and an acknowledgement of the Russian factor, whether it meant the renaissance of perceived Russian values or the preservation of the Russians as the ‘elder brother’ in the unitary state. This recipe had been displayed by the alliances between so-called ‘patriots’ and ‘internationalists’ in the run up to the March elections.

Conservative resistance to change was represented in the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies by *Soiuz*, which was founded before the RSFSR elections in February 1990. However, its activity was not really prominent until the end of the year. In June 1990, the *Rossiiia* group of deputies formed in the RSFSR Congress which paralleled (and was allied to) *Soiuz* in the USSR Congress. These groups supported the integrity of the Soviet Union and opposed the democratic forces. However, in mid 1990 they did

not project a voice loud enough to oppose the reformist centre, the democratic movement and represent Russian interests. This was approached through the creation of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) in June.

Certain Russian nationalist-orientated groups had been demanding a Russian Communist Party for some time - as previously noted, it had been one of the demands of the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements. The elections had shown a decline in the popularity of the CPSU and a preference of the democrats over the 'patriots'. There were indications that a majority of Russians welcomed the idea of greater Russian independence and less central control.⁹⁴ Therefore, the idea of a Russian Communist Party might have appealed to the imagination of some sections of the Russian population as well as sections of the CPSU.

It should be noted that steps had already been taken before the elections to create a Russian Communist Party. There had been calls within the CPSU for a special party organisation for the RSFSR as early as July 1989. This idea was discussed and accepted at a Central Committee plenum in September 1989 and a 'Russian Bureau' of the Central Committee was formally established in December of the same year.⁹⁵ There had been support for a Russian party rather than a Russian Bureau around this time, particularly from the Leningrad *gorkom* (city committee) and *obkom* (provincial committee). Then, in February 1990, an 'Initiative Committee' for the formation of an RCP was created.⁹⁶

The impetus for the creation of the RCP came from the RSFSR United Workers' Front (OFT), in conjunction with the Leningrad *gorkom* and *obkom*. OFT had called for the establishment of an RCP as early as December 1989, following a defeat of its motion in the Leningrad City Soviet to base electoral constituencies on the work-place rather than the district.⁹⁷ This was followed by a resolution passed at the II Congress of OFT RSFSR in January 1990 calling for an Initiative Congress to re-establish an RCP within the framework of the CPSU.⁹⁸ As a movement independent of Communist Party structures, OFT probably realised that considerable support could be mobilised from within the Communist Party and was aware that there had already been moves to create a republican party - an alliance with Leningrad CP structures could achieve

this.⁹⁹

A draft programme for the creation of the RCP appeared in March 1990, followed by the first Initiative Congress for Reviving the RCP on 21-22 April.¹⁰⁰ *Izvestiia* reported that the delegates included representatives of *OFT* and of *LRPD Otechestvo*¹⁰¹ - two of the most prominent 'patriotic' groups in Leningrad. The Initiative Congress recognised that an RCP within the CPSU more or less existed and declared on 22 April that all members of the CPSU living on the territory of the RSFSR would automatically become members of the republican party.¹⁰² A second Initiative Congress was held in Leningrad in June, shortly before the Russian party conference (organised by the Russian Bureau of the CC CPSU) in Moscow:

It claimed to represent some 1,764,000 communists, called for more work to be done on the programmatic documents and nominated candidates for a CC [Central Committee] for the proposed Russian party. And in a scarcely veiled threat, it declared that if the Russian CP was not created at the forthcoming Russian conference, the organising committee and the CC nominees would take on the responsibility of the CC RCP.¹⁰³

The Russian party conference started on 19 June and, the following day, transformed itself into the Founding Congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR.¹⁰⁴

The new RCP was a victory for Russian nationalist-orientated communists - they had achieved 'equal rights' in CP terms, could focus upon Russian affairs more easily and pursue the idea of Russian sovereignty. Although they had the backing of conservative elements within the CPSU (who required a power-base from which they could oppose the Party reformers), the 'patriots' had played their part in the process - *OFT* had a considerable influence on the formation of the RCP and was not even a constituent part of the CPSU. Many of the resolutions passed by the Initiative Congress had coincided with *OFT*'s views - and the Organisational Bureau (*Orgbiuro*) of the new RCP included *OFT* theoreticians M. Popov and A. Sergeev.¹⁰⁵ The *Orgbiuro* also included other members well-known for their 'patriotic' views: Deputy Editor of *Molodaia gvardiia*, Viacheslav Gorbachev, and CC CPSU member, Dmitrii Barabashov.

The RCP did not immediately become the efficient and highly-organised

force that had been envisaged by its sponsors - it only developed its organisational structures towards the end of the year following internal disputes between various groups within the Party, who had been unable to agree upon a party programme of action.¹⁰⁶ Up until this time, the RCP was identified with the conservative views of its First Secretary, Ivan Polozkov. However, from the end of 1990, the RCP took a more Russian nationalist course, forging a new bloc of forces, united 'not under a red, Bolshevik banner, but under moderately nationalist, mainly statist slogans'.¹⁰⁷ The mastermind behind this move appeared to be Gennadii Ziuganov.¹⁰⁸

The first significant manifestation of this bloc emerged on 27 February with the staging of a Conference of Public-Political and National-Patriotic Movements 'For a Great and Unified Russia!'¹⁰⁹ The Conference came into being following significant developments.

Firstly, *Soiuz* group of Deputies had come to prominence in November/December as an influential parliamentary opposition to both El'tsin and the centre. It held its founding congress on 1-2 December and made it clear that its most important aim was to stop secession of (and further devolution of power to) the republics and to maintain the unity of the Soviet Union, proposing the imposition of direct presidential rule on those republics whose leaders refused to sign a new Union Agreement.¹¹⁰

Soiuz was not just a body of conservative communism - it also represented imperialist Russian nationalism and Soviet nationalism.¹¹¹

Although *Soiuz* included thirty-three different nationalities, there were indications that it was highly pro-Russian (it included many Russians from the periphery, members of the 'international movements' and representatives of the military-industrial complex).¹¹² The group of Deputies co-operated closely with the 'international movements' in the Baltic and Moldavia and backed the idea of so-called 'committees of national salvation' to restore order in the periphery.¹¹³

Secondly, a letter to Gorbachev in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* in December signalled the strength of feeling from conservative elements opposing the potential break-up of the Union.¹¹⁴ It called upon Gorbachev to take immediate measures against separatism and, if necessary, exercise direct

presidential rule. The letter was signed by literary figures such as Bondarev and Prokhanov, but also by prominent military figures such as Generals Moiseev and Varennikov.

Thirdly, the aftermath of events in Lithuania and Latvia in January provoked concern from adherents to imperialist Russian nationalism. On 13 January, the Lithuanian radio and television centre in Vilnius was attacked by *OMON* and *Spetsnaz* forces and announcements were made that power had been assumed by a Lithuanian 'National Salvation Committee'. A similar event occurred on 20 January in Riga, when an attack on the Latvian Interior Ministry building was followed by announcements that a Latvian 'National Salvation Committee' had taken control. It was unclear as to who was behind these 'salvation committees', but they were supported by members of the local Communist Parties, members of the military and KGB, hardliners from the *Soiuz* bloc and members of the small 'centrist' bloc of political parties and movements.¹¹⁵

The shadowy nature of the national salvation committees suggests that they never existed as such, but were smokescreens for the involvement of the central authorities. The failure of these actions in the Baltic to overthrow the local parliaments signalled to 'statists' that alternative political action had to be taken to secure the integrity of the Union.

The aim of the organisers of the Conference 'For a Great and Unified Russia!' was to bring together the broadest alliance of pro-Union forces. The device of Russian nationalism seemed to have broad appeal, because it could mobilise not only self-styled Russian 'patriots', but members of *Soiuz* and other 'internationalist' movements which had pro-Russian sympathies within their ranks. An article in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* following the Conference claimed that 26 parties, groups and movements of 'the most diverse orientations' took part:

from Communists of Russia to the descendants of the Russian nobility and monarchists, Orthodox and Muslim clergy.¹¹⁶

Nezavisimaia gazeta reported that around 60 public organisations and parties took part, including the Communist Party of the RSFSR, the *Soiuz* group of Deputies, *OFT*, *Edinstvo*, *Otechestvo*, the 'Centrist' bloc and a delegation from the RSFSR Writers' Union.¹¹⁷ There was, clearly, a very

broad range of statist groups uniting under an imperialist Russian nationalist banner. One journalist commented that :

in spite of a big difference in ideological outlooks, they found a common language... they all have one ideal today - Russia, because today they all have one faith- in her [Russia's] great fate.¹¹⁸

This comment is backed up by the words of one of the Conference participants, N. V. Vasil'ev:

The disintegration of Russia is terrible. It is not important that we are of different orientations, the main things are the renaissance of Russia and our unification.¹¹⁹

The strength of unity behind this Russian nationalist approach to the maintenance of the Union is illustrated by the words of *National Democratic Party* member, Evgenii Krylov, who declared that the delegates should 'use the structures' of the CP and 'join the RCP'¹²⁰ - the NDP had originally been formed as an anti-communist party.

The RCP stressed before 27 January that the Party itself was not conducting the Conference - CC spokesmen claimed that it was being run by an organisational committee headed by Aleksandr Prokhanov.¹²¹ However, one of the chief speakers was First Secretary of the RCP, Ivan Polozkov, and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* printed his speech alone the day after the Conference. He spoke of the 'great Russian [*russkii*] people', 'the renaissance and renewal of Russia', Russians becoming 'unnecessary people in their own country' and the tragedy of 'millions of Russians... living in other Union republics'.¹²² Polozkov's speech underlined the Russian orientation of the RCP. There is little doubt that the RCP had more than a convening role in the Conference.¹²³

As a result of the Conference, a Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia was formed. This was intended to be the co-ordinating body and mouthpiece for the 'patriotic bloc' which had supposedly been formed. In its sessions, the Council, chaired by Eduard Volodin, made pronouncements criticising both El'tsin and the centre and promoting the idea of a 'third force' (in opposition to El'tsin-Gorbachev or the democrats-communists) - the national-patriotic movement.¹²⁴ However, despite drawing representatives of 'over 40 public-political movements, parties and organisations of Russia' to a session at the end of March, the Co-

ordinating Council's activity was surprisingly quiet. It appeared that the RCP had decided to build its power-base in a parliamentary fashion by seeking to remove El'tsin from the post of Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Thus, its attentions were temporarily re-routed away from the Co-ordinating Council and the extra-parliamentary 'patriotic' bloc.¹²⁵ The efforts to remove El'tsin were foiled and the RCP failed to keep the question of a presidency off the agenda at the III RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies between 28 March - 5 April.

Members of the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia were involved in a further attempt before August to rally like-minded forces behind the Russian flag in order to maintain the integrity of the Union, with the formation of the *Otchizna* All-Russian Patriotic Movement in June 1991.¹²⁶ This Movement was formed five days after Boris El'tsin was directly elected President of the RSFSR. It resulted from an initiative by 140 People's Deputies of the RSFSR¹²⁷ in conjunction with representatives of 45 organisations and societies.¹²⁸ Support came from *Soiuz* and *Otechestvo*, amongst others. The significant difference about this Movement was that it had very close links with both the Army and the Navy. The Founding Congress of the Russian branch of *Otchizna* took place in an army club and the main speaker was RSFSR People's Deputy, Lieutenant General B. Tarasov, who subsequently became the Movement's leader. In his address to the Congress, the 'military patriot' underlined that the 'way out of the crisis' could only be achieved through 'patriotism' and 'spiritual and ethical [*nравstvennoe*] rebirth'. Tarasov added that:

We must restore the sovereignty and national honour of the Russian people, and repulse Russophobia.¹²⁹

One of the aims of the movement was to attract 'patriots of Russia, irrespective of their party affiliation and ideological convictions'.¹³⁰ The development of *Otchizna* was clearly an effort to unite and stimulate the pro-Russian and pro-Union forces targetted by the previous efforts of those who had participated in the Conference 'For a Great and Unified Russia! The close relationship with the Coordinating Council of Patriotic Movements of Russia was underlined when the Council passed a resolution at the end of July 1991 to hold a unifying congress with the

Otchizna Movement.¹³¹

Otchizna's open military-orientation was an indication that Russian 'patriotic' forces were attempting to identify and ally themselves with the armed forces. This might have been because the armed forces were seen as a potentially willing constituency of support or because RCP-backed Russian nationalists were preparing for a future seizure of power. Certainly, oblique warnings appeared in the press in July when *Otchizna* appealed to the Georgian public to reject the draft citizenship law, hinting that it 'discriminated' against the 'Russian population'.¹³² However, when the attempted coup occurred in August 1991, *Otchizna* was one of the organisations which condemned the actions of the Emergency Committee (GKChP). This suggests that the RCP-sponsored bloc did not support the coup attempt, which probably damaged the bloc's efforts to develop broader support both within the military and amongst the public. It does not rule out the possibility that *Otchizna* and other Russian nationalist forces were preparing their own future coup or were planning to flex their muscles to dissuade others from leaving the 'historically-formed, thousand-year statehood' of Russia.

Other New Developments

This period witnessed the formation of several other Russian nationalist-orientated organisations, which failed to capture the public's imagination. These organisations were, on the whole, limited in support and could sometimes be identified with specific agenda (e.g. monarchism). Most had links with other Russian nationalist organisations and a number of the leaders had been members of earlier organisations such as *Pamiat'*.

Soiuz Venedov was an example of a movement which had its origins in previous organisations. Founded in spring 1991, *Soiuz Venedov's* leader was former Leningrad *Pamiat'* member, Konstantin Sidaruk.¹³³ It resulted from the split of a fairly anonymous organisation (the Russian Popular Party) which had originally split from the National Democratic Party shortly after its formation in 1989. The group's activity appeared to be limited to the distribution of its Pan-Slavist, anti-Marxist-Leninist propaganda in the newspaper *Rodnye prostory*, which bore a swastika-like

symbol on the front page. This symbol reflected *Soiuz Venedov's* Nazi-like views which supported the expansion of a Russian Orthodox (representing the highest stage of development of an ancient pagan religion) empire stretching beyond the confines of Russia. The group did not really develop its programme after its inception, but it maintained links with a number of other groups including *Pamiat'*, *Otechestvo*, the Christian Patriotic Union and, more significantly, with two later groups, Russian National Unity and *Slavianskii Sobor*.

The Party of Russia's Rebirth (*Partiia vozrozhdeniia Rossii*, later the Union of the Rebirth of the Fatherland - *Soiuz vozrozhdeniia Otechestva*) formed in April 1990 and represented one of the 'patriotic' organisations wooed by the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia, *Otchizna* and *Soiuz*.¹³⁴ It was essentially a pro-socialist, anti-capitalist organisation (many members were also Communist Party members) whose organisational committee came into being following the publication of a letter of 74 Russian writers in February and another letter penned by writers, cultural figures and academics in *Nash sovremennik* in April¹³⁵ - this suggested that it had close links and sympathies with conservative Russian nationalist forces from within the establishment. However, the Party can be distinguished from groups such as the Association of Russian Artists by its open anti-Semitism (or, as it claimed, 'anti-Zionism') - it appeared that the Party's membership included former members of small 'patriotic' groups such as *Otechestvo* (Sverdlovsk, Tiumen'), *Rodina*, *Patriot* and pro-socialist members of *Pamiat'*.¹³⁶

Perhaps one of the most interesting developments concerned the *RNPR*, which also formed in April 1990. Unlike the Party of Russia's Rebirth, the *RNPR* grew out of a branch of *Pamiat'* which was opposed to communism.¹³⁷ Originating as the 'white' (anti-communist) wing of *Pamiat'* in Leningrad and progressing through a further stage as the Russian National-Patriotic Centre (*RNPTs*), *RNPR* called for 'democracy' [*narodovlastiie*], whilst criticising the activities of 'left-radicals' (democrats such as *Vybory - 90*, *LNF*, etc.) and 'Western' forms of democracy. Its platform document supported Russian 'rebirth', RSFSR sovereignty/statehood and the introduction of Russian institutions - all features shared with the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements. However,

RNPR did not lay any emphasis upon the integrity of the Soviet Union. In September, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn published his pamphlet in the Soviet press on his vision of a renewed Russia. This struck a chord with RNPR which produced a programme in October calling for a renewed Russia, separate from the non-Russian republics, but forming a federal/confederate Russian [*Rossiiskii*] Union with the Slavic republics and Kazakhstan. RNPR aimed to achieve this through a 'sensible combination of patriotism and democracy' where democracy was of a 'new national Russian' variety.¹³⁸ This was one of the first organisations to reject the idea of the empire and to advocate a 'third way' to achieve this. The Party even referred to itself as a 'third political force'.¹³⁹ However, this 'third way' was somewhat vague - it appeared to consist of the idea of Russian statehood, the guidance of Russian Orthodoxy and a principle of 'nation first'. The Party advocated a mixed economy with state ownership of, amongst other things, the military industrial complex, most of the available land and strategic raw materials, whilst protectionist measures would be introduced to prevent the purchase by foreigners of Russian-owned businesses, securities and inventions.¹⁴⁰ By November, the Party had dubbed itself, the 'Party of Solzhenitsyn's ideas'.¹⁴¹ However, although Solzhenitsyn's ideas were greeted with respect by Russians, they did not mobilise a mass political following. Similarly, the RNPR enjoyed only marginal support throughout this period.

From spring 1990, there was also a small burst of activity from monarchist groups. PRAMOS, RISO, the Petersburg Monarchist Centre (PMTs) and the Orthodox-Monarchist Accord (*Pravoslavno-Monarkhicheskoe soglasie*) all supported the restoration of Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich to a Russian throne - these groups were referred to as 'legitimists' - whilst others, the 'popular monarchists' were concerned with the restoration of a tsar, but wished to select somebody other than Vladimir Kirillovich.¹⁴² All the groups supported rule by monarchy and the restoration of Russian Orthodoxy as a guiding influence in Russian life. However, they differed on one other fundamental point - the 'legitimists' supported the restoration of a Russian nobility, whilst popular monarchists rejected this as a Western idea.

PRAMOS was founded in May 1990, having refashioned itself from the

previously mentioned *PKMPR*. It joined in alliances which supported a greater Russian state, but opposed communism and socialism. In 1990, it promoted a monarchist message which received some attention, due to public interest in the death of the Imperial family. However, by 1991, it was virtually inactive.¹⁴³ *RISO* was legalised in Russia in spring 1990, after having been an emigré movement. Throughout 1990-91 it propagated an anti-communist, monarchist idea through a substantial amount of literature and a newspaper called the *Dvuglavyi orel* (Double-Headed Eagle). *PMTs* (spring 1990) and *Pravoslavno-Monarkhicheskoe soglasie* (July 1990) were small organisations with a limited activity. Both included former members of *Pamiat'*.¹⁴⁴ *PMTs* campaigned for the restoration of former Russian symbols, including the Russian tricolour, the double-headed eagle, the tsarist national anthem, and spent much of its activity campaigning for the return of pre-revolutionary place-names, in particular, that of St. Petersburg.¹⁴⁵

The 'popular monarchists' also increased their activity following the 1990 elections. The Popular Orthodox Movement (*Narodno-pravoslavnoe dvizhenie*), which had formed in February and included E. Pashnin's *KhPS*¹⁴⁶ and a handful of other (mostly *Pamiat'*) groups,¹⁴⁷ started printing newspapers. However, its activity was short-lived and the movement died out by autumn of the same year. Another notable adherent to the popular monarchist idea was the "Christian Rebirth" Union of V. Osipov. Formerly part of the *KhPS*, this Union had competed in the March elections¹⁴⁸ and continued its political activity throughout 1990, producing a manifesto in May claiming that Russia's strength was in Orthodoxy, Patriotism and *Sobornost'* [conciliarism]. In September, the group organised a meeting which included a majority of the groups supporting a 'popular monarchy', who then formed an organ (*predsobornoe soveshchanie*) to prepare for a convocation of the *Zemskii Sobor* - the body which would elect a Tsar from the Romanov dynasty.¹⁴⁹

Most of the monarchist groups envisaged Russia's rebirth through features of pre-revolutionary Russia. Although there was public sympathy for the Royal family following revelations about their execution, the idea of an Orthodox monarchy in Russia did not spread. The strength of the monarchist message even waned in 1991, following the initial

mushrooming of groups in 1990.

In October 1990, a small, but significant group was established under the leadership of yet another former *Pamiat'* member, Aleksandr Barkashov. Under the slogan "With Faith in Russia, we shall win!",¹⁵⁰ Russian National Unity (*Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo* - RNE) took over from *Pamiat'* for its notoriety as one of the most extreme right-wing exponents of Russian nationalism.¹⁵¹ A month before it was founded, Barkashov had broken with Viktor Iakushev, who went on to found the fascist National-Social Union (NSS), whilst in December RNE formed an alliance with *Soiuz Venedov* - another group with an extreme right-wing ideology.¹⁵² The group was anti-communist, anti-Semitic, anti-Western, opposed Gorbachev and opposed the 'democrats'. It spoke of 'order' and 'discipline', supported a 'strong, indivisible, powerful Russia' in which the 'Russian [*ruskii*] nation/people should retain their 'historical place and role'.¹⁵³ In February 1991, it published an address to 'compatriots' in which it criticised 'separatist tendencies', which had grown into 'anti-Russian extremism'.¹⁵⁴ RNE declared that it could not forgive the spilling of 'fraternal Russian blood' and called upon the armed forces to maintain the territorial integrity (of the Union) and protect Russians [*russkie*]. It called for the mobilisation of reservists of Russian nationality in the Union republics to 'keep public order'. Finally, the address proposed the creation of a Temporary State Organ with emergency powers, consisting of representatives from the armed forces, the KGB, the MVD, Afghan veterans, 'patriotic' toilers and 'patriotic' specialists. Clearly, RNE aimed to hold the Russian empire together and uphold the primacy of ethnic Russians by authoritarian means.

In the same month (October), the Slavic Party¹⁵⁵ was founded by Fedor Moskalenko, who had previously been a member of Skurlatov's RNF and a member of the short-lived Popular Front of the RSFSR.¹⁵⁶ The Party had a pan-Slavist message, aiming to 'maintain and strengthen the Great Russian state [and] protect the interests of the indigenous population of the Slavic republics'.¹⁵⁷ The Party programme called for the stimulation of the birth-rate in the Slavic republics and the settlement of unpopulated areas of Russia with 'Slavs, refugees professing Orthodox Christianity and respecting Russian culture and folk traditions, patriotic-minded Russian

and Slavic emigrés and their descendants'.¹⁵⁸ Like some of the *Pamiat'* groups, Moskalenko's Party advocated the idea of national-proportional representation in the republics 'in all spheres and at all levels', including the organs of power. The Slavic Party was indicative of imperialist Russian nationalist efforts to maintain the greater Russian state through the nucleus of Slavic unity. This method had been employed by members of the Bloc for Public Patriotic Movements.

In October - November, there was an attempt by some of the smaller parties and movements to raise their profile and participation in political life. Having formed in June 1990, the 'Centrist Bloc'¹⁵⁹ was consulted in autumn by the Soviet leadership on the questions of the Union Agreement and the Constitution. It was reported that the Bloc's leader, V. Voronin had met with Council of Ministers Chairman, Nikolai Ryzhkov, on the question of forming a 'coalition government of national unity'.¹⁶⁰ In addition, representatives of the Bloc met with Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Anatolii Luk'ianov.¹⁶¹ The Bloc consisted of V. Voronin's Union of Democratic Forces, V. Zhirinovskii's *LDP*, Skurlatov's *RNF*, Iu. Bokan's 'Blue Movement' and others. Showing an increasing imperialist Russian nationalist tendency, the Bloc produced a 'manifesto' in December,¹⁶² declaring that the country could be saved with the help of the army.¹⁶³ It also called for the creation of 'national salvation committees - which inspired the idea of the so-called 'committees' announced in the Baltic in January of the following year. On 15 December, a group within the Bloc, calling itself the 'League of Independent Academics' worked out an alternative draft Union Agreement, in which the USSR would be renamed the Russian Republic and the country would be divided into provinces (*gubernii*).¹⁶⁴ By February, the Bloc was calling for presidential rule in the USSR, the dissolution of the Russian and Baltic parliaments and a ban on all political parties. The Centrist Bloc certainly managed to raise its profile, which was beneficial to Vladimir Zhirinovskii, who later contested the Russian presidential elections.

At the end of December, a new organisation appeared which supported the idea of a greater Russian state, but one which did not coincide with the boundaries of the Soviet Union. The Russian National Union (*Russkii obshchenatsional'nyi soiuz* - *RONS*) wished to reconstitute a Russian

[*Rossiiskii*] Union consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and areas of Kazakhstan and Kirgizia with a dense Slavic population, whilst allowing the peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Baltic and Moldavia to choose independence, if they so wished. One of RONS's aims was to restore to the Russian people¹⁶⁵ its 'national dignity and way of life' - the rebirth of the Russian people would be based upon the values of: God, the Fatherland, the Family and the Individual.¹⁶⁶ Opposing both the communists and the democrats, RONS proposed that the Russian economy should include heavy involvement of the state, taking into account moral and national interests. The guiding principle was: "Anything that is for the benefit of Russians and Russia is good". RONS was advocating a 'third way' characterised by 'Christian moral principles' and a 'Russia first' policy. In the approach to the March referendum on the maintenance of the USSR, RONS opposed the Union which 'subjected Russians to robbery by the southern republics'.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, it called for an alternative referendum on the unification of lands it considered to be the basis for a new independent state - the Russian Union.

At the beginning of 1991, there was another attempt to unite some of the newer and more established Russian nationalist-orientated organisations. *Slavianskii sobor* (Slavic Assembly) drew together some of the groups which had surfaced from within the establishment and some of the extreme right-wing groups spawned by *Pamiat'*. Thus, the United Council of Russia, *Edinenie* (formerly the Movement of Lovers of Russian Letters and Culture *Edinstvo*), *LRPD Otechestvo*, *OFT* and the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party (which had continued to function as an independent body) were linked with the likes of *RNE*, *Soiuz Venedov*, and the Slavic Party.¹⁶⁸ Members of the literary world such as Bondarev, Proskurin and Prokushev were united under the leadership of the extreme right-wing ex-*Pamiat'* member, Barkashov, i.e. those who had supported the maintenance of communism were prepared to share a forum with right-wing anti-communists, all in the name of 'protecting the honour, dignity rights and interests of the Slavic population'.¹⁶⁹ The aims of the Assembly included the strengthening of Slavic unity and 'maintaining the value system of Slavic civilisation'.¹⁷⁰ However, in reality, the greatest emphasis was focused upon the fate of

Russians/Russian-speakers and Russia. In all, 52 'patriotic' organisations took part in the Founding Congress in January - this number increased to 96 at the II Congress in May of the same year, when a 'Slavic Duma' was established to co-ordinate the organisation's activities.¹⁷¹ At this Second Congress, the '*Slavia-inform*' Association was formed to co-ordinate the activities of certain Russian nationalist publications in the interests of 'informing the population about the most important events'.¹⁷² *Slavianskii Sobor*'s activity continued throughout 1991, establishing links with a handful of parties from other Slavic countries and creating regional branches in the Soviet Slavic republics, but focusing mainly upon the integrity of the Union and opposing 'Zionism', separatism and 'anti-Russian extremism'.

There were very few new Russian nationalist-orientated organisations of any note founded during 1991 prior to the events of August. The Russian Party (*Rusaskaia partiia*) of Viktor Korchagin was founded in May 1991¹⁷³ and continued the idea of building a greater Russian state, based not upon the Soviet Union, but, in this case, upon the territory of the RSFSR and areas of the Soviet Union densely populated by Russians - Northern Kazakhstan, Northern Kirgizia, the left bank of the Dnieper and Crimea. The Russian Party was hostile to communism and the democrats, both of which were linked with 'Zionism'.¹⁷⁴ Korchagin's Russian solution involved a multi-party system (with the aim of removing the CPSU from power) preceded by an 'emergency' transitional period during which executive power would be handed to a Russian national government and officers of the armed forces. The Party opposed central planning and privatisation of state assets, but supported a mixed economy in which workers owned their own enterprises. The Party's Russian 'third way' rejected Christianity and seemed to think that self-rule by ethnic Russians ('a unique, great nation') was sufficient for the revival of the Russian state.

Many of the fringe groups which appeared during this period were linked to former members of *Pamiat'* (and other early 'patriotic' organisations), who, having developed their views, wished to establish their own, personal political soap-boxes. The development of these smaller parties illustrates a number of things: firstly, that the idea of a monarchy became

briefly fashionable in 1990, although not a serious prospect; secondly, that a Russian nationalism surfaced which advocated a Russian fundamentalism (i.e. a system distinct from communism and Western democracy, but with supposed Russian national characteristics), which was not linked to the idea of maintaining the whole of the Soviet Union as the Russian empire/state; and, thirdly, the alliances which were created (notably, *Slavianskii sobor*, in which supposed extremes of the political spectrum came together) proved that adherence to imperialist Russian nationalism was more important than paying attention to political differences.

The Presidential Election

A resolution to hold a referendum on the maintenance of the Soviet Union was passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on the 18 January 1991. When this was held on the 17 March, a supplementary question was asked in Russia: "Do you consider the post of an RSFSR President elected by universal suffrage to be necessary?" Almost 70% voted in favour of a directly-elected Russian presidency.¹⁷⁵ This made the creation of such a post almost inevitable.

Russian nationalist opposition to the idea of a Russian presidency materialised only in the form of parliamentary hindrance. This reflected opposition to El'tsin and E'ltsin's candidacy rather than opposition to the principle of a Russian president. During the Third Russian Congress of People's Deputies, the Communists of Russia bloc and the *Rossia* group of deputies had tried to keep the issue of a presidency off the agenda. When the question of approving the election came before the Fourth Russian Congress in May 1991, the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia issued an appeal to the Congress to delay the election, in order to give 'work-collectives and citizens' ample opportunity to put forward candidates.¹⁷⁶ However, these efforts failed and the election date was set for 12 June 1991.

The CC of the Russian Communist Party supported the candidacy of Nikolai Ryzhkov, a high-profile candidate who had already received the backing of many work collectives and regional Party organisations.¹⁷⁷

Ryzhkov represented Communist Party conservatism rather than Russian nationalism, but had the most promising chance of all the candidates standing against El'tsin - having been a former prime minister, he was known and could receive the backing of the establishment and its media - thus, the RCP supported him in the absence of more attractive candidates. Ryzhkov reciprocated their support by playing the Russian card: he vowed to help prevent the break-up of Russia; condemned the forcible resettlement of displaced Russians; pledged to look after Russians [rossiiane] outside the borders of the RSFSR, adding that all refugees should be given 'moral and material' support; he also promised to revive the Russian countryside and help purge society of mass culture - two areas of Russian nationalist concern from the early days of glasnost.¹⁷⁸ Despite Ryzhkov's statements, Russian nationalism was better represented by the candidacies of Vladimir Zhirinovskii and by the hardline General Al'bert Makashov. Zhirinovskii's campaign was characterised by a populist, Russian nationalist message - he promised to defend Russians and the Russian language, to rename the USSR 'Russia' and to eliminate the national territories of the USSR by introducing provinces or *gubernii* as administrative units.¹⁷⁹ Makashov was closer to the establishment, with a similar outlook to some of the aforementioned 'international' movements.¹⁸⁰ He had been active in the foundation of the Russian Communist Party and was backed, along with his running mate, Alexei Sergeev, by the Initiative movement of the RCP. In a televised presidential debate, Makashov gave a very inarticulate performance, but managed to stress that if El'tsin was voted into power, it would cause the disintegration of Russia.¹⁸¹ Like Zhirinovskii, Makashov was a pro-Union candidate, but drew respect as a Russian 'patriot' even from the RNE newspaper *Pul's Tushina*.¹⁸²

The election result gave El'tsin a convincing victory, with 57.3% of the vote.¹⁸³ However, it should be noted that El'tsin paid significant attention to the Russian national angle. Having already established himself as a champion of Russian sovereignty and Russian institutions, El'tsin appointed the former Moscow *Otechestvo* member, Aleksandr Rutskoi, as his presidential running-partner. At the beginning of 1991, he had suggested that a Russian [rossiiskaia] army might be necessary to protect

Russia's sovereignty¹⁸⁴ and also began to voice his support for Russians living in the periphery - something which Russian nationalist organisations (particularly the 'international' movements) had been doing fervently for some time.¹⁸⁵

It was no surprise that Nikolai Ryzhkov came second in the ballot (16.85%), but many were surprised by the third place success of Vladimir Zhirinovskii, who received 7.81% of the vote. The size of his support might reflect a number of things, for example: he was a non-Communist candidate, who, at the same time, opposed the democrats; he was new (i.e. did not represent one of the old high-ranking nomenklatura) and had managed to develop a sufficiently high profile in a short space of time; he had developed a populist programme which promised to make people rich and pledged to cut the price of vodka. However, one cannot ignore the strength of Zhirinovskii's (imperialist) Russian nationalist message, which struck a chord with a section of the electorate. General Makashov finished fifth out of six candidates with 3.74% of the vote - tainted, no doubt, by the fact that he was a little-known communist candidate representing conservative opinion.

'A Word to the People'

One of the most significant events connected with Russian nationalism before the attempted coup of August was the publication of a letter in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.¹⁸⁶ 'A Word to the People' was a passionate appeal to the nation to hold together the historical Russian state, i.e. the Soviet Union. Addressing 'Russians' and 'citizens of the USSR', the letter started with a warning:

There is great, unprecedented trouble. The Motherland, our country and great state, which were handed to us for protection by history, nature, and our glorious ancestors, are dying, breaking apart and sinking into shade and non-existence.¹⁸⁷

The thrust of this warning was that secessionists and democrats were leading the country to ruin. The letter spoke of 'the backbone of Russia breaking' and pointed to the skills of renewal which Russians could offer:

Amongst the Russians there are state-minded men prepared to lead the country to a sovereign future which is not degrading. There are experts in economics capable of reviving

production. There are thinkers, creators of spirit, who can clearly see the national [obshchenarodnyi] ideal.¹⁸⁸

The appeal called for the maintenance of the unitary Soviet state, whilst lauding the qualities of Russians and pursuing the idea of Russian national renewal. It closed with the following words:

The Soviet Union is our home and stronghold, built by the great efforts of all peoples and nations, it has saved us from shame and slavery over the years of dark invasions! Russia is wonderfully beautiful and unequalled! She is calling for help.¹⁸⁹

The signatories to the letter clearly considered the Soviet Union to be a Russian state, or, at least, a Russian-dominated state. They included the prominent Russian nationalists Prokhanov, Rasputin, Volodin, Bondarev and V. Klykov, instigator of the RCP-led 'Bloc of Patriotic Forces' Gennadii Ziuganov, *Soiuz* leader Iurii Blokhin, General Gromov of the MVD (Interior Ministry), General Valentin Varennikov, V. Starodubtsev and A. Tiziakov. The latter three were all participants in the failed coup attempt the following month.

The 'Word' was yet another attempt to rally Russian nationalist sympathies together to form a 'popular patriotic movement'. In August, *Sovetskaia Rossiia* published an article from the 'initiative group' of this 'movement' calling to action those who sympathised with the 'Word'.¹⁹⁰ The newspaper added that the Liberal Democratic Party and the USSR 'Intermovement' had both passed resolutions supporting the principles of the 'Word' and pledging to participate or work with a 'popular patriotic movement'.¹⁹¹ Three days after the initiative group's call to action, the attempted coup took place.

Following the coup attempt, there was speculation that the 'Word' had been a rallying cry for, or warning of, the forthcoming coup. However, despite the fact that three of the of the signatories to the 'Word' were involved in the coup attempt,¹⁹² there is evidence to suggest that the joint forces which formulated the 'Word' might well have been planning a seizure of power, but not the attempt that took place on 19-21 August. In an interview in *Moskovskie vedomosti* in 1992, one of the signatories to the 'Word', Eduard Volodin, declared that:

If it had not been for the August farce, it [the Word] would have helped to form a powerful patriotic movement all over the country.¹⁹³

Volodin claimed that the August events had seriously hindered the development of the 'patriotic movement' and the activity of the Coordinating Committee - he even suggested that the events were triggered by the democrats, in order to break up 'national forces'. The idea that the 'democrats' were responsible for the coup attempt is not very credible - the comment is more a reflection of Volodin's bitterness or regret about what happened to the 'patriotic movement' following August. However, it is feasible that the 'patriotic movement' was not planning an August coup, because although the action of the *GKChP* was backed by the Russian Communist Party, it was immediately condemned by the Moscow branch of *Otchizna*.¹⁹⁴ It is likely that only three of the 'Word's signatories knew about the coup attempt beforehand.

The August event may not have been inspired by Russian nationalism, but it did attract the sympathies of some imperialist Russian nationalists. The RCP and the *LDP* were amongst those who lent their support to the Emergency Committee, whilst others maintained a neutral silence.

The plotters were essentially conservative elements in the establishment who thought that reform had gone too far. Their message called for the maintenance of the Union, but used the motifs of Soviet nationalism, speaking of establishing the 'pride and honour of the Soviet person'.¹⁹⁵ The plotters did not refer to the special qualities of the Russian people or to the maintenance the historical Russian state. Their 'Address to the Soviet People' was formulated on a pro-Soviet and populist basis - it did not advocate a return to pre-perestroika communism, but preferred to highlight some of the more unpopular forms of business activity (and criminal activity) which had arisen. Perhaps, the plotters thought that they would attract the support of most statist-minded Soviet citizens. However, they could not count on the backing of pro-Union democrats and, significantly, it appears that imperialist Russian nationalism was divided in its attitude towards the coup.

August 1991 - December 1991: Reacting to the break-up of the Union

During this period, Russia managed to strengthen its independent identity.

Imperialist Russian nationalists who opposed the democratic idea of Russian statehood were hindered, at first, by a pre-emptive strike from El'tsin and then by the subsequent political developments in Russia and the republics. The number of pro-Union statistes began to grow during this period as people from the democratic camp and supporters of a liberal Russian nationalism reacted to the possible break-up of the Union. This increased the ranks of imperialist Russian nationalism, although its adherents were disorganised and lacked unity. A number of new Russian nationalist groups appeared, some of which supported the maintenance of the unitary Soviet/Russian state, but none of which carried the weight to oppose the break-up of the USSR. More significantly, there was an indication that a few of the groups which had advocated the maintenance of the greater Russian state within the borders of the Soviet Union, were beginning to accept the idea of the break-up of the USSR and to focus upon a different, more isolationist concept of Russia.

Russian nationalism's post-putsch potential

Over the course of the 1990-91, liberal Russian nationalism had achieved many of its aims. The 'democrats' gained the upper hand and Russia began to develop its own state identity and institutions. Russia also started to operate as an independent actor and focus on its own affairs. The country had not been taken over by a Russian fundamentalism which excluded anything associated with the West, but by a democratic movement which offered to establish a civil society in which Russian national values could flourish. For liberal Russian nationalists, this meant, among other things, the propagation of Russian history and culture, the freedom of Russian Orthodoxy, Russian national media of communication, Russian national institutions and Russian state symbols. Following August 1991, Russia consolidated upon its newly-found state identity, starting with the re-introduction of the traditional Russian tricolour. The flag not only represented the victory of the democrats over communism, but was also a symbol of the Russian national ideal - Russian statehood. It also signalled a possible confrontation with those who had a different conception of the Russian state.

Directly after the failed coup, El'tsin confronted imperialist Russian nationalism by suspending its mouthpieces *Sovetskaia Rossiia* and *Den'*. It was assumed that, due to their close links with some of the plotters, those involved with the newspapers had participated in the coup attempt. A second blow was directed against imperialist Russian nationalism when there was an attempt to confiscate the building belonging to the RSFSR Writers' Union, which had been a bastion of Russian nationalist thinking since the beginning of glasnost.¹⁹⁶ However, the Writers' Union retained its building and, after a few weeks, the two newspapers resumed publishing - for the remainder of the year *Den'* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* were at the forefront of airing imperialist Russian nationalist opinion. The reversal of these actions by El'tsin against the organisations may stem from several factors: firstly, there was no proof that the Writers Union or these publications had conspired in the attempted coup; secondly, the democrats did not want to develop an authoritarian image; thirdly, antagonising such groups might lead to a greater unity of opposition; and, fourthly, the democrats did not want the imperialist Russian nationalists to be the only ones associated with the Russian national idea. Russian nationalism was still a potentially strong mobilising force: it could serve as a replacement ideology for communism; with the collapse of communism and the centre, Russian politics could easily polarise between the 'patriotic' and the 'democratic' camps; the vast majority of the RSFSR population were ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers, who posed a potentially vast constituency of emotional support, particularly in the event of an ethnic Russian crisis outside the RSFSR's borders. Self-styled 'patriots' had for some time focused their opposition to the democrats and the centre around the Russian national idea - it was in their interests to maintain and develop this image.

Post-August Developments

Shortly after the August events, the *Rossiia* group of deputies joined with others to rally opposition to the democrats by forming the Russian Popular Union (*Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz* - ROS) under the leadership of RSFSR People's Deputy, Sergei Baburin. ROS held its Founding Congress

in October 1991 and included several members of the *Soiuz* group of deputies who joined ROS when the USSR Congress of People's Deputies effectively ceased to exist. Its sympathies lay in the maintenance of the Union,¹⁹⁷ but with the effective break-up of the Soviet Union, it concentrated on the ideas of the rebirth of Russia and the unity of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia. The group claimed that it aimed to 'unite Russians and Bashkirs, Iakuts and Ukrainians, Germans and Poles, the peoples of the Volga and the Northern Caucasus', whilst it also appealed to 'family' of the Eastern Slavs of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia to unite.¹⁹⁸ This emphasis is significant, because the group wished to act as an umbrella representing not only those 'patriotic' groups which aimed to maintain the Union, but also those which supported the idea of a fundamentally Russian state divorced from the non-Russian/non-Slavic republics.

ROS believed in the 'rebirth of Russia' based upon the principles of democracy [*narodovlastie*], patriotism and justice.¹⁹⁹ This involved the Russian people joining together to form a force of 'patriotic unity' to determine its 'historical fate', reflecting ROS's intention to form a unified Russian 'patriotic' alliance against the Western-influenced 'democrats'.

In December, one of ROS's rallying slogans was: "All who love Russia, unite!"²⁰⁰ People joined ROS on an individual basis from a number of different 'patriotic' organisations, including members of the isolationist Russian nationalist group RNPR (which by 31 October 1991 had been renamed the National Republican Party of Russia - NRPR), RNF, *Otechestvo* (Moscow) and the Rebirth Party. There was clearly a broad platform of opinion in the Union, but it failed to become an all-embracing 'patriotic' movement.

Towards the end of the year, another group emerged (it was founded 1-2 December) which became a member of ROS. The Russian Union (*Russkii soiuz*) was based in Ekaterinburg and represented several of the Russian nationalist-orientated movements which had surfaced in the Urals and other parts of the Soviet Union. It included *Otechestvo* of Sverdlovsk/Ekaterinburg - the first 'patriotic' movement to adopt the name *Otechestvo*. Previously, this group had supported the unitary Soviet state, but the Russian Union now advocated a more isolationist view,

calling for the establishment of a 'one and indivisible' Russian [*russkoe*] state, i.e. a state for the ethnic Russian people. This ethnic Russian state would comprise not only the '55 territories [*krai*] and provinces [*oblasti*] of the RSFSR 'inhabited mainly by Russians', but also the left bank of the Dnieper, Crimea, the 'Cossack districts [*okrugi*] of Kazakhstan and other regions' - i.e. areas where ethnic Russians constituted a majority.²⁰¹ Several figures had already called for the revision or review of internal Soviet borders, but only *Rossy* and, possibly, the Russian Party had previously called for an ethnic Russian state within the borders of the RSFSR. The Russian Union believed that 'national interests' were higher than 'class, party, group or individual interests' and based Russian 'rebirth' on 'national spirituality' - it did not advocate a theocratic state, but one in which Russian Orthodoxy bore a significant influence on Russian life. It added that spirituality could be restored 'only when politics and the economy are Russian' - this was a somewhat vague concept, but it involved Russian ownership of all land, power and large-scale property. The Russian Union displayed an isolationism which was anti-communist, anti-'democratic', anti-Western and anti-Semitic - it called for a vague third way for the Russian nation. Although this party was small, it was a further indication that, at the end of 1991, a number of people were beginning to accept the idea of a Russian state separate from the non-Russian (or, at least, non-Slavic) republics and run according to a supposed unique 'Russian' system.

At the end of October, another new party emerged uniting members of the *Soiuz* group of deputies, the declining *RNF* of Skurlatov and the leaders of the 'Christian Rebirth' Union, including Vladimir Osipov. The Party of Rebirth (*Partiia vozrozhdeniia*) wished to 'recreate and strengthen the centuries-old statehood of the fatherland'.²⁰² Its slogan was 'property, statehood, justice' - it wished to establish a market economy through the creation of a 'middle class'. Opposing the 'tyranny of the party apparatchiks' and the 'hegemony of the pseudo-democrats', the Party used a 'patriotic' platform. Vladimir Osipov even expressed the need for a 'patriotic' party at the Party's Founding Congress:

There are quite a few parties and movements of a patriotic orientation today. But, alas, nearly all of them pass themselves off as educational societies... We do not have a real

party, i.e. a political mechanism by which we could secure our participation in government or win power (by constitutional means). We need to create such a party.²⁰³

The Party wished to maintain the Soviet Union/historical Russian state on a federal basis and focused on the Russian people as the basis of this federal 'Eurasian' state:

We... hope to awaken the national consciousness of the Russians who should become the spiritual basis for the possible rebirth and strengthening of Russian Eurasian statehood within its NATURAL GEOPOLITICAL BORDERS.²⁰⁴

The Party of Rebirth appeared to be a movement for the rebirth of the declining political careers of Skurlatov, Osipov and members of the *Soiuz* group of deputies. It dubbed itself an 'inter-republican political organisation', but it was of little interest to the non-Russian republics (most of which had declared independence by this time). Despite its pledge to represent all people, irrespective of their nationality and faith, the inclusion alone of Osipov in its leadership cast considerable doubt on this - he was the same Osipov who supported the restoration of Orthodoxy and a Russian monarchy as the bases for national revival.

The Russian Party of National Rebirth (*Russkaia partiia natsional'nogo vozrozhdeniia* - RPNV) was initiated in September/October, although its Founding Congress was held at the end of the year (21 December), just before the break-up of the Soviet Union.²⁰⁵ Like the Party of Rebirth, RPNV aimed to stop the break-up of the USSR and the RSFSR and to 'revive a one and indivisible Russia'. It also focused heavily upon the 'Russian' people as the centre of this unitary state. The 'Russian' people constituted not only of Great Russians (*velikorossy*), but also of Ukrainians and Belorussians. The Party's plan for the re-integration of the state involved three stages: firstly, it would establish a Great Russian state (*Velikorossiiia*) within the structure of the RSFSR; secondly, it would unite the three Slavic states in a 'state-like formation'; and, thirdly, it would attempt to unite the other republics which might return to the Soviet fold. The Russian revival would involve, amongst other things: the influence of Russian Orthodoxy; the institution of 'Russian' communes (*obshchiny*) in every community (village, town, province, republic, etc.) in order to protect the 'dignity and rights of Russian people'; the establishment of Russian cultural institutions; Russia's income to be spent within Russia

(no subsidies to states outside Russia). Although the Party concentrated on the immediate revival of the 'Great Russian' state and 'Russian' state, the imperialist Russian nationalist idea was clear from the Party's call for national-proportional representation in all major organs of the Russian state, thus guaranteeing 'Russian' control over government, the army, law enforcement, science, culture, business and education.²⁰⁶ The *RPNV* advocated a 'Russia first' policy, aiming to develop first the revival of the Great Russians, then of the 'Russians' (Slavs) and to maintain them as the dominant force in the USSR (or its successor).

At the end of the year, *Nashi* formed with the aim of saving the 'historical Russian state'. Its appearance or activity was fuelled, no doubt, by the Ukrainian vote for independence on 1 December (which was a devastating blow to imperialist Russian nationalism) and the Belovezhskaia pushcha meeting on 7 December which resulted in the formation of a Commonwealth of Independent States (between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) and a condemnation of the 1922 Union Treaty.

Nashi ('Ours') derived its name from a television programme produced by Aleksandr Nevzorov.²⁰⁷ Formed on 13 December, *Nashi* was an outspoken group of prominent figures who supported the maintenance of the Soviet Union under Russian domination. In addition to supporting a strong, centralised Russian state, *Nashi* viewed themselves as defenders of 'minority rights, particularly those of ethnic Russians in the independent Baltic states'.²⁰⁸ Nevzorov was a well-known television reporter who had supported the suppression of separatism in the Baltic republics, portraying a distorted version of the January 1991 attack on the radio and television station in Vilnius and subsequent events in Riga. His pro-Russian, statist views can be summed up by his own words:

I believe in the Russian idea. It is alive, in spite of years of defamation. Russia will not die! I was on the side of 'ours' and I will continue to defend them wherever they live. I was a supporter of a unified Russian great power and I still am.²⁰⁹

Besides Nevzorov, *Nashi* included *Soiuz* colonels Viktor Alksnis and Nikolai Petrushenko, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, Al'bert Makashev, and editor of *Nash sovremennik*, Stanislav Kuniaev.²¹⁰ *Nashi* represented a coalition of high-profile imperialist nationalists attempting a last-ditch effort to maintain the Union, whilst bringing the public's attention to the

possible plight of Russians in the (non-Russian) periphery.

Democrats adopt imperialist Russian nationalism

Autumn 1991 witnessed splits within Democratic Russia, mainly over the question of the integrity of the Union. This resulted in Russian nationalist-orientated elements rejecting the break-up of the single state and changing from a liberal Russian nationalist viewpoint to an imperialist nationalist viewpoint.

The Popular Accord [*Narodnoe soglasie*] alliance had formed within Democratic Russia in April 1991 and had made it clear that it supported the idea of a Union state based upon 'the territories which support the maintenance of state unity'. These territories would all be voluntary signatories to a union treaty agreed upon by all parties.²¹¹ Popular Accord, which constituted a minority of Democratic Russia's members, included Travkin's DPR, Aksiuchits' RKhDD and the Constitutional Democratic Party (*Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskaia partiia* - KDP) of Mikhail Astaf'ev (KDP existed within the framework of Democratic Russia in April, but was not officially founded until mid-June 1991). By November 1991, this group was voicing a much stronger message against the break-up of the Union and also against the possible break-up of Russia.²¹² Travkin believed in a single democratic state and was less worried than his alliance partners about specific Russian issues, although voiced concern about the fate of Russians and Russian-speakers outside the Russian Federation. Aksiuchits and Astaf'ev, who had been two of Democratic Russia's greatest exponents of liberal Russian nationalism, opposed the break-up of the Russian great power (*derzhava*) and seemed concerned about the threat to Russian traditions and values which might occur as a result of that break-up. Consequently, *Narodnoe soglasie* left Democratic Russia and took up a position of opposition to El'tsin and the Democratic Russia. The following month (December), *Narodnoe soglasie* split through a lack of accord between its own leaders.

There were probably several issues which influenced these democrats to slide from a liberal Russian nationalist to an imperial Russian nationalist viewpoint. The first was concern about the consequences for Russia of the

break-up of the Soviet Union and the 'unconstitutional' Belovezhskaia Agreement. Secondly, they were worried about the rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in the Baltic states, particularly in view of what they considered to be discriminatory citizenship laws.²¹³ Thirdly, they were frustrated by the democrats' reluctance to act decisively on behalf of Russians in areas of dispute and conflict, such as the left bank of the Dniester in Moldavia. There were a host of other issues which led these Russian nationalist-orientated democrats to believe that their former colleagues in Democratic Russia were paying little attention to the needs of ordinary Russians and, thus, displaying themselves to be against the people (*antinarodnyi*) or anti-Russian. The attitude they displayed was similar to that of a number of the 'patriotic' groups which opposed the democrats. Aksiuchits and Il'ia Konstantinov of *RKhDD* and Mikhail Astaf'ev distanced themselves so far from the democratic movement that, shortly after the break-up of the Soviet Union, they joined in alliance with other 'patriotic' movements under the umbrella of the Russian Popular Assembly (*Rossiiskoe narodnoe sobranie*), a political bloc which included Baburin's *ROS* and *NRPR* (formerly *RNPR*).²¹⁴

This latter period from August to the end of December marked a difficult time for Russian nationalism as a whole. The victory of the 'democrats' was accompanied not only by a fall in the popularity of the Communist Party, but also by the disunity of 'patriotic' groups. The efforts of some imperialist Russian nationalists to unite around the RCP were dashed when decrees suspended the Communist Party's activity on 23 August and disbanded (both the CPSU and) the RCP on 6 November.²¹⁵

The 'patriotic' organisations which appeared during this time were a vague attempt to rally forces and unite them behind a Russian national idea. The organisers of these groups were already outspoken advocates of Russian nationalism who were attempting to draw other 'patriots' together to revive the flagging fortunes of their own parties/organisations. There was still a strong tendency towards the maintenance of the single Soviet Union/Russian state, which was reinforced by the addition of disillusioned Russian nationalist 'democrats' such as Viktor Aksiuchits. However, with the establishment of Baburin's *ROS*, there were indications

that 'patriots' of an isolationist persuasion and imperialist persuasion were beginning to come together under a general umbrella. The result of this was that imperialist Russian nationalists began to show a greater sympathy towards the idea of developing a greater 'Russian' (albeit Slavic - Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) state, separate from the non-Russian former republics.

Part II: Gorbachev/the Centre and Russian Nationalism

Prior to 1985, the relationship between the Soviet establishment and Russian nationalism had never been easy. Gorbachev must have known that embarking on reform might have far-reaching consequences and that nationalism was a force to be reckoned with all over the Soviet Union. His first taste of national unrest occurred in 1986 with clashes between young ethnic Russians and Yakut students during March/April in Yakutsk.²¹⁶ This was followed in December by demonstrations in Alma-Ata against the appointment of an ethnic Russian, Gennadii Kolbin, as republican Party leader in Kazakhstan. It was not only the nationalism of the non-Russians which the central leadership would have to balance - Russian nationalism was a potential force with which the centre needed to take great care.

Wooing Russian nationalism

Gorbachev, himself, was a convinced socialist and committed to the idea of the Soviet Union - in fact, he could even be described as a 'Soviet nationalist'. He made one or two references to Russia which might have suggested pro-Russian sympathies or preferences, but these were fairly insignificant. For example in May 1985, shortly after he came to power, he praised the 'leading' role the Russian people had played in the victory of World War II;²¹⁷ and, in 1986, he made an impromptu speech in Krasnodar in which he referred to Russia as 'the last haven, the last reservoir of

spirituality'.²¹⁸ Regardless of such comments, Gorbachev was a staunch supporter of the Soviet state, although he realised that he would have to reach a *modus vivendi* with Russian nationalism and keep it in check whenever it threatened the identity of the Soviet Union.

One of Gorbachev's first political acts was to introduce an anti-alcohol campaign in spring 1985, which was welcomed by a number of prominent figures with Russian nationalist sympathies, particularly those in the creative arts such as Valentin Rasputin, who had been critical of the effects of alcoholism on Russian life in his story *Pozhar*.²¹⁹ Another political gesture which pleased Russian nationalist-orientated figures in the world of the creative arts was the decision in August 1986 to shelve the river diversion project - an ecological issue which had become a focal point of Russian nationalist concern.²²⁰

There were a number of other gestures which indicated a more responsive attitude of the centre towards the Russian national question. In 1985, there were broad celebrations of the 800th anniversary of the Russian classic book *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (The Word on the Host of Igor) and a discussion of this treasure of Russian national heritage was published in the magazine *Kommunist*.²²¹ In 1986, Il'ia Glazunov, an artist whose canvasses focussed around Russian historical, religious and national themes, was granted an exhibition in the Manège exhibition hall next to the Kremlin - this was significant, for the Manège was the most prestigious exhibition hall in the country. Glazunov, who expressed outspoken Russian nationalist views had earlier (1985) been appointed director of the State Museum of Decorative and Applied Art.²²²

Gorbachev made other appointments in the arts world as a gesture of goodwill towards those who promoted the Russian national question. In 1986, the village-prose writer, Sergei Zalygin, was appointed chief editor of *Novyi mir*; Academician Dmitrii Likhachev was made head of the Soviet Cultural Foundation; and film director, Elem Klimov, became first secretary of the Cinematographers' Union.²²³

The pro-Russian lobby in the Soviet cultural establishment appeared happy at first with developments and, no doubt, hoped that the centre would ally itself further with Russian nationalism. However, there were also signs of opposition from the central authorities, suggesting that there

would always be a limit to the extent of influence that Russian nationalism would bring to bear upon the political system. For example, in 1985 and 1986, A. Kuz'min and V. Kozhinov published articles questioning the official conception of Lenin's theory of 'two cultures', suggesting that Lenin had supported the development of (aspects of) Russian culture after the revolution. Following a debate between orthodox Marxist-Leninists and the Kozhinov/Kuz'min side, Aleksandr Iakovlev, one of Gorbachev's closest allies at the centre, intervened in the debate by criticising certain historians and scholars for failing to use a class approach in their studies, for idealising pre-Revolutionary Russia and portraying Christianity as the basis of Russian culture.²²⁴

Pamiat' - a curiosity

The central authorities' attitude to the appearance of *Pamiat'* was very curious. Having made its mark in 1987, *Pamiat'* was a peculiar phenomenon in the Soviet Union - an independent organisation espousing Russian nationalist views and anti-Semitism. The organisation was not subject to any ban, but received plenty of criticism in the pro-Gorbachev press.²²⁵ In May 1988, *Argumenty i fakty* published an article claiming that the KGB had issued a warning to *Pamiat'*'s Dmitrii Vasil'ev that he risked prosecution under Article 74 of the Soviet Criminal Code for infringing national rights of equality.²²⁶ It was only later in the year that Gorbachev implied any threat of a legal crackdown.²²⁷ However, *Pamiat'* was not hindered by legal action or repression, but by more subtle means - KGB infiltration and 'neutralisation'. There were suspicions that *Pamiat'* had been initiated by the KGB in order to discredit the idea of independent organisations and to discredit Russian nationalism by associating it with anti-Semitism. It is not clear whether there is any truth in the idea that the KGB initiated *Pamiat'*, but it is clear that the KGB manipulated the *Pamiat'* movement to discredit Russian nationalism. Documentation shows that Russian nationalist organisations (and, particularly, *Pamiat'*) were saturated with KGB members who, thereby, influenced and directed the movements' activities.²²⁸ Thus, having infiltrated *Pamiat'*, the KGB fanned the movement's anti-Semitic inclinations and attempted to

discredit Russian nationalism as a whole. Action against *Pamiat'* reached a significant point in July 1990, when the authorities successfully prosecuted Smirnov-Ostashvili of one of the *Pamiat'* splinter groups under Article 74 of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

The centre also contributed to the fractured nature of *Pamiat'*. Having interviewed several former KGB operatives, Valerii Solovei has ascertained that the KGB played a part in provoking the disintegration of the movement into many small splinters, which were, thus, ineffective and incapable of attracting a mass, unified support.²²⁹

A balancing game

Despite the two-pronged attack against *Pamiat'*, Gorbachev continued to play a balancing game with Russian nationalism. In June 1988, Russia celebrated the millennium of baptism of Kiev Rus' (or the millennium of Christianity in Russia), which was widely reported in both the government paper, *Izvestiia* and the Party paper, *Pravda*.²³⁰ Gorbachev, himself, met Patriarch Pimen and the Holy Synod at a Kremlin reception on 19 April 1988 - the first meeting between a Soviet leader and the head of the Russian Orthodox Church for over forty years - and on June 11, President Gromyko gave a reception for guests of the official millennium celebrations and participated in a question and answer session.²³¹ These developments were not only indicative of greater religious freedoms introduced by perestroika, but they served as an olive branch to Russian nationalism - a significant number of people appeared to be linking the Russian national idea with Russian Orthodoxy. A rapprochement between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet centre could only serve the centre well.

However, Gorbachev might have had further reasons for his efforts to placate and satisfy Russian nationalism. There were schisms within the Soviet centre itself, resulting in two wings: the reformers, headed by Gorbachev; and the conservative faction, headed by Egor Ligachev. By 1988, this schism had reached a new high with the publication of Nina Andreeva's infamous letter in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* which launched a major attack against the liberal reform wing of the Party.²³² This letter was

thought to have been backed, if not penned, by Ligachev. Although the letter criticised certain manifestations of Russian nationalism, including religious and (essentially) anti-Marxist-Leninist interpretations, it praised some of the achievements and aims of these Russian nationalists ('traditionalists') and implied that the conservative opposition and the so-called 'traditionalists' had much in common about which they could unite. Gorbachev's courtship of the Russian Orthodox Church might have been an attempt to draw religious Russian nationalist-orientated elements away from the conservative opposition within the Party - he was aware of the possibility of Ligachev attracting Russian nationalist support to his cause.

Ligachev's own relationship with Russian nationalism is a reflection of the relationship between conservative elements and 'patriots' within the establishment. One of the best-informed Russian scholars of Russian nationalism, Valerii Solovei, described Ligachev to me as a 'convinced Marxist', suggesting that he had little sympathy for the principle of Russian nationalism.²³³ However, at the same time, Ligachev had announced that Russian nationalist writers, Iurii Bondarev and Feliks Kuznetsov, were among the authors he read in his leisure time.²³⁴ He made no secret of the fact that he agreed with the opposition of certain Russian nationalist writers to the influence of 'mass culture' - a euphemism for 'Western culture' - and, in July 1989, he made a demonstrative visit to an Il'ia Glazunov art exhibition, highly praising the artist's work.²³⁵ Perhaps, Ligachev manipulated Russian nationalism in order to bolster his concept of the Soviet state and should be considered an advocate of Soviet nationalism. However, this Soviet nationalism was one which relied on the idea of Russia as the 'elder brother' and depended on Russians as the core nationality of the Soviet state. Whilst nationalist-separatist movements were developing in the non-Russian areas, it was, first and foremost, the Russian and Russian-speaking population who were exhorted to maintain the (historical) unitary state.

Realising that he could neither antagonise nor boost Russian nationalism, Gorbachev continued to display a cautious ambivalence towards the phenomenon. In the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the Communist Party was reserved 100 seats to which it

appointed deputies. One of the appointees was the writer, Vasilii Belov, who was not renowned for his service to the Party, but was better known as a supporter of Russian issues. Similarly, a year later, when Gorbachev formed a Presidential Council, two of its seventeen members were outspoken supporters of Russian issues - the writer (and non-Party member), Valentin Rasputin, and *OFT* leader Veniamin Iarin. The inclusion of such figures helped broaden the complexion of political views within Gorbachev's 'cabinet' and demonstrated to the pro-Russian lobby that Gorbachev was sensitive to their views.

However, there were limits to the extent that pro-Russian demands could be accepted. At a Politburo meeting on 14 July 1989, Gorbachev declared that Russian sovereignty could not be granted at the expense of weakening the Union:

Certainly, we need to restore Russia's authority, but not by giving Russia sovereignty. That would mean removing the Union's core.

... We need to work at/study more strongly the idea of a powerful Centre.²³⁶

This powerful centre would be achieved by maintaining the Russians and the RSFSR as the core of the Union:

They [Great Russians] have within them an integrational peculiarity, which has formed through history... We need to say something about the contribution of the Russian nation, about its integrational role... Nevertheless, it is difficult without this to answer the question of how to organise the RSFSR, how to take its specific features into consideration. It is the core of the whole federation of the USSR. And, yet, a question still remains.²³⁷

The 'remaining' question concerned the institutions by which the Russian Federation would be represented. Gorbachev was aware in July of calls within the CPSU for the creation of a Russian Communist Party, although he was not keen on this idea. He reacted more favourably towards the suggestion of creating a Russian Bureau of the CC CPSU, which was subsequently established in December 1989 and headed by Gorbachev, himself.²³⁸

Russian nationalists and conservative elements within the Party were dissatisfied with the Russian Bureau and continued to campaign for an RCP. However, the eventual establishment of the RCP in June must have been precipitated, to some extent, by the declaration of Russian sovereignty.

El'tsin had pushed the case for Russian sovereignty from the beginning of 1990, when he had also drawn attention to Russia's plight:

Great attention must be paid to the Russian population. This is not chauvinism, but a necessary condition for Russia's revival.²³⁹

By linking the idea of democracy with Russian statehood, El'tsin was able to attract the support of democrats and certain Russian nationalists. The result of this was that on 17 May 1990 the People's Deputies of RSFSR included the question of 'Russian Sovereignty, the Union Agreement and democracy [*narodovlastiie*]' on their agenda. Gorbachev responded to this by supporting the RSFSR Deputies in their efforts to strengthen Russia's sovereignty, but only within the framework of the Union.²⁴⁰

Russia declared its sovereignty on 12 June - just one week before the Russian Party Conference opened. In a speech delivered to the Conference, Gorbachev declared that:

There is an active process in forming the structures of a new political system in the [Russian] republic. A certain step in this direction has been made with the creation of the Russian Bureau of the CC CPSU, Russian independent trade unions, a komsomol and the formation of a State Committee of the RSFSR on nationality questions. Other Russian public-political organisations and associations are being created.

The creation of a Russian Communist Party is a logical outcome of this process...²⁴¹

Gorbachev's words indicate that he had no choice but to accept the inevitable formation of an RCP - on its second day, the Conference transformed itself into the Founding Congress of the RCP. Thus, by June 1990, Gorbachev's opposition to both Russian sovereignty and the formation of an RCP had capitulated.

The Centrist Bloc and the KGB

The appearance of the 'Centrist Bloc' in summer 1990 was a curious occurrence. John Dunlop noted that the Bloc had an uncannily close relationship with the KGB,²⁴² suggesting that if the security organs had not just infiltrated, then they had orchestrated the Bloc's formation. The Centrist Bloc claimed to represent democracy and, yet, was very much at odds with the Democratic Russia movement. It was less critical of the centre and the CPSU. Towards the end of 1990, the group proposed to co-

operate with the CPSU and spoke out against the persecution of communists, separatism, and the disintegration of existing state structures - in particular, the army, the KGB, the MVD and the Public Prosecution Office.²⁴³ As noted earlier, the Bloc had been granted audiences with both Ryzhkov and Luk'ianov, but in January 1991, they had also been granted a meeting with KGB boss Kriuchkov.²⁴⁴

Co-operation between the Bloc and the centre went beyond consultation. It was the Centrist Bloc which had suggested the formation of 'national salvation committees' to prevent separatism in the non-Russian republics. Following the attempted crackdown on separatism in the Baltic in January 1991, there was an announcement that 'national salvation committees' were taking control, but no one was able to determine who was on these committees. On 22 Jan 1991, Gorbachev announced that the events in Vilnius and Riga were 'in no way an expression of the line taken by the presidential authorities in whose name they had been perpetrated.'²⁴⁵ However, it was almost certainly the authorities which sanctioned the actions of the security forces. The Centrist Bloc's proposal to establish such committees created the illusion that a 'third force' might be involved.

The sense of co-operation between the Centrist Bloc and the Soviet centre might point to one of three possibilities: the authorities were trying to establish a quasi-multiparty system with the 'democratic' Centrist Bloc under their guidance; the central authorities were attempting to discredit the 'democratic' movement as a whole by associating it with the Centrist Bloc; the authorities were trying to weaken the democratic movement through a principle of 'divide and rule'.

Russian nationalism forgotten?

From late 1990, Gorbachev's dealings with the Russian national question focussed on a personal struggle with El'tsin and the democrats. Gorbachev was determined to prevent any weakening of the centre and the strengthening of Russian republican institutions. This battle had been in progress since Russia declared its sovereignty in summer 1990. By 24 October 1990 the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a law confirming that

USSR laws took precedence over republican laws. In response to this, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet passed a law on the same day confirming the precedence of Russian republican law over Union law.²⁴⁶ The battle gathered pace with the turn of the year. On 15 January 1991, El'tsin suggested that it would be impossible to protect sovereignty without a Russian [*rossiiskaia*] army.²⁴⁷ This was a clear and worrying challenge to the centre.

In February, pro-democratic mass demonstrations in Moscow were countered by an anti-El'tsin rally in which pro-Russian, anti-El'tsin and anti-Semitic slogans were present. One sign read: 'The People and the Army are One!' The participants were obviously trying to portray El'tsin as an anti-Russian figure. Although the rally was organised by conservative and Russian nationalist organisations, Gorbachev's security bosses, Pugov, Iazov and Kriuchkov were in attendance.²⁴⁸ This suggests that the rally was organised with Gorbachev's backing or knowledge.

However, over the course of the year, Gorbachev's relationship with Russian nationalism became somewhat insignificant. Following the failure to remove El'tsin from the post of Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in March, Gorbachev appeared to begin to work with El'tsin and other republican leaders in order to forge a new Union treaty. Co-operation with Russian nationalist elements was continued by conservative members of the establishment, although this was not an organised, co-ordinated effort. When the 'putschists' of the GKChP declared a state of emergency in August, they did not have the unified support of all self-proclaimed 'patriots'. This suggested that even the figures at the centre who were distancing themselves from Gorbachev had failed to maintain a favourable balancing act with Russian nationalism.

Conclusion

Russian nationalism over the Gorbachev period represented a variety of opinions which were never unified under the Russian banner. There were differences in attitudes to Western democracy, communism or alternative political systems and there were differences as to how the state

should be constituted.

The Russian nationalist debate began with figures within the establishment, who, on the whole, supported the maintenance of the Soviet socialist system, but wished to highlight the Russian dimension and revive the fortunes of the Russian nation. There was a feeling that glasnost would allow this to happen and the discussion of Russian culture and values gradually increased.

The appearance of *Pamiat'* marked the beginning of a number of Russian nationalist fringe groups, which began to express the latent Russian nationalist extremism that existed within pockets of the population. It also marked the inclusion of non-establishment figures in the Russian nationalist debate. The initial impact of *Pamiat'* was probably due to the fact that it was such an unexpected development, whilst, at the same time, it appealed to some who needed an outlet to focus on the Russian national question.

Subsequent efforts to form Russian nationalist-orientated organisations reflected the development of 'informal' groups as a whole, but also reflected a response to national movements in the republics. Some of the prime movers behind such organisations were the RSFSR Writers' Union and Russian elements in the non-Russian periphery - these groups were closely associated with conservatives in the establishment.

Encouraged by the KGB, which had infiltrated all new political organisations, the fringe groups fractured into many small splinters insignificant in terms of membership and support. Meanwhile, Russian nationalism connected with conservative elements of the establishment attempted to broaden its powerbase through a series of alliances. From September 1989, with the appearance of *OSR*, to December 1991, with the establishment of *Nashi*, there were various vain attempts to unite support under a Russian 'patriotic' banner, punctuated by periods of disorganisation and inertia.

Russian nationalism was subjected not only to a policy of divide and rule from the centre, but was divided by different conceptions of the Russian nation and Russian state. The democratic movement attracted not only those who were interested in developing Western-style civil society and political democracy, but also those who thought that these values could be

linked with the development of specific Russian values. In 1990, Democratic Russia adopted the aim of strengthening the Russian republic's state identity, thus stealing the ground of imperialist Russian nationalists within the conservative establishment and others who had been calling for the Russian Federation's structural and institutional parity with other republics as a starting point for Russian 'revival'.

Gorbachev was powerless to stop the formation of a Russian Communist Party which formed with the backing of conservative elements in the establishment and considerable efforts from Russian nationalist-orientated groups. Although an RCP hoped to take over the organisational structures of the CPSU and, perhaps, present itself as a modified version of the CPSU, the RCP was still tainted by the negative associations linked with communism. It began to steer a moderately Russian nationalist course in its efforts to unite support, which was illustrated by its participation in the formation of the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia.

The formation of new groups with a Russian nationalist hue continued throughout 1989-91 and reflected the development of new political movements as a whole - many failed to achieve mass support and served as vehicles for the egos of their leaders. The most vocal 'patriots' were those linked to, or allied with, the conservative establishment, although the most successful were those who envisaged Russia's independent development with the structure of liberal democracy. Those who rode on the back of the democratic movement's success witnessed the strengthening of a Russian national identity through the institution of Russian political structures, Russian national symbols and the restoration of historical names, etc. However, not all of the 'liberal Russian nationalists' were satisfied with the democratic movement and, towards the end of the year, some left, fearing that the movement was too orientated towards the West.

- ¹ John Dunlop, 'The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum', *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* Special Edition, 19 December 1988, p.1.
- ² Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and his reforms 1985-1990*, Philip Allan, 1990, p.66.
- ³ Freedom of speech and the press which was embodied by the Law on Press Freedom of 12 June 1990. This was designed to abolish formal censorship and party control, allowing any group or individual citizen to start a newspaper/publishing concern.
- ⁴ V. Rasputin, "Pozhar", *Nash sovremennik*, No.7, 1985; V. Belov, "Vse vpered", *Nash sovremennik*, Nos.7&8, 1986.
- ⁵ Cited in Iu. V. Arutiunian et al. (eds.), *Russkie: etno-sotsiologicheskie ocherki*, Nauka, Moscow, 1992, p.375.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 387-388.
- ⁷ Material from the conference was in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 6, 1987; for further analysis see J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, Princeton UP, 1993, pp.125-127.
- ⁸ Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Kul'tura-khram, a ne strel'bishche", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 22/1/88, p.3.
- ⁹ M. Dunaev, "Rokovaia muzika", *Nash sovremennik*, No. 1, 1988, p. 163.
- ¹⁰ A. Trofimov, "Otechestvo: pamiat' i my", *Nash sovremennik*, No. 2, 1988, p.183
- ¹¹ V. V. Kozhinov, "Pravda i istina", *Nash sovremennik*, No.4, 1988; A. G. Kuz'min, "K kakomu Khramu ishchem my dorogu?", *Nash sovremennik*, No.3, 1988.
- ¹² V. Krasnov, *Beyond Russian Communism: a Chronicle of National Rebirth*, Westview Press, 1991, p.233.
- ¹³ V. V. Kozhinov, "My meniaemsia", *Nash sovremennik*, No. 10, 1987, p.164; V. Rasputin, "Zhertvovat' soboiu dlia pravdy: Protiv bezpamiatstva", *Nash sovremennik*, No. 1, 1988, p.171; Interview with V. Belov, "Ia publichno zashchishchal dvizhenie 'Pamiat' ' ", *almanac panorama*, issue 426, 9 June-16 June 1989, p.15 [SSEES New Political Parties Archive].
- ¹⁴ Interview with G. Kh. Popov, "Pamiat' i 'Pamiat'""", *Znamia*, No. 1, 1988, pp.193&196.
- ¹⁵ Berezovskii, V. N. & N. I. Krotov (eds.), *Neformal'naia Rossiia*, Molodaia gvardiia, Moscow, 1990, pp.370-371.
- ¹⁶ Also see next chapter for role of centre and KGB.
- ¹⁷ Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and his reforms 1985-1990*, op. cit., pp.134-135.
- ¹⁸ *Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov (osnovnye dokumenty)*, typescript dated 17 November 1988, Moscow, pp. 8-10. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹⁹ For details on *Rossiia molodaia*, see V. N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov, V.V. Cherviakov, V. D. Solovei, *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 9. Rau-Press, Moscow, 1992, pp.33-34; see also E. Svetlova, "Prud dlia botika Petra", *Moskovskaia pravda*, 17/12/88, p.4.
- ²⁰ Berezovskii & Krotov (eds.), *Neformal'naia Rossiia*, op. cit., p.367.
- ²¹ A 'historic and patriotic' (*istoriko-patrioticheskoe*) association called *Otechestvo* had also existed in Sverdlovsk since 1986. It became more active in 1988.
- ²² The official name of Apollon Kuzmin's *Otechestvo* was the 'Otechestvo Moscow City Voluntary Society of Russian Culture'.
- ²³ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 9, op. cit., p.152.
- ²⁴ *Obrashchenie k patriotam Rossii*, typescript dated 25/6/88 [IGPI Archive]
- ²⁵ *Zaiavlenie Soiuza patrioticheskikh organisatsii Urala i Sibiri*, typescript dated 8/10/88 [IGPI Archive]
- ²⁶ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 5, op. cit., p.11; Iu. Borisov, "Tsentr sobornosti i edineniia", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No.39, 29/9/89, p.11.

- ²⁷ "Poslanie", *Lit. Rossiia*, *ibid.*
- ²⁸ The draft law was published in *Pravda* 23/10/88 and the Law was adopted on 1 December 1988 (*Pravda* 4/12/88).
- ²⁹ Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and his reforms 1985-1990*, *op. cit.*, p.234.
- ³⁰ B. I. Tsarev, "Silou rossiiskogo bratstva", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No.24, 16/6/89.
- ³¹ N. Andreeva, "Ne mogu postupit'sia printsipami", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 13/3/88.
- ³² The Leningrad branch was formed in June - Moscow, USSR and RSFSR organisations followed shortly afterwards.
- ³³ "Rossey", *Moskovskie novosti*, No. 21, 27/5/90. [Solovei collection]
- ³⁴ *Obrashchenie*, typescript dated 6/9/89 [IGPI Archive]; V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, *op. cit.*, p.38
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37.
- ³⁶ There were a number of attempts to produce All- Russian 'popular fronts', none of which lasted very long. For example, the *Narodnyi Front RSFSR* formed in October 1989 and lasted less than a year. One of the probable reasons for this is disagreement over the priority of nationalism or democracy.
- ³⁷ *Panorama: obsor problem obshchestvenoi zhizni*, No. 2, February 1990, p.1. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.2,
- ³⁹ Berezovskii & Krotov (eds.), *Neformal'naia Rossiia*, *op. cit.*, p.319.
- ⁴⁰ *Rossiiskii narodnyi front: Tezisy programmy Ivanova Vladimira Alekseevicha*, document dated May 1989, Moscow. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive] It should be pointed out that RNF did not stick to these principles. Later, the Front supported the maintenance of the Union and also co-operated to some degree with the CPSU.
- ⁴¹ "Programma Khristianskogo patrioticheskogo soiuza", *Russkii vestnik* (samizdat newspaper), No.1, January, Moscow 1989. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁴² "Obrashchenie Khristiansko-patrioticheskogo soiuza k izbirateliam", *Demokrat* (Rossiiskii ezhemesiachnyi nezavisimyi zhurnal), No.12/23, December 1989, p.17. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁴³ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 4, *op. cit.*, pp.132-133; "Otkrytoe obrashchenie k narodnym deputatam SSSR, RSFSR i mestnykh sovetov", typescript dated 7/10/89, Leningrad. [Solovei collection]
- ⁴⁴ PMKPR was founded in 1924 and, supposedly, existed underground until 1989.
- ⁴⁵ PKMPR announced its formation on 1 November 1989: from V. Pribylovskii, "Monarkhisty", undated typescript. [IGPI Archive]
- ⁴⁶ B. I. Koval', *Rossiia segodnia: Politicheskii portret v dokumentakh 1985-1990*, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, Moscow, 1991, pp. 278-280.
- ⁴⁷ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.
- ⁴⁸ Iu. V. Arutiunian et al. (eds.), *Russkie: etno-sotsiologicheskie ocherki*, *op. cit.*, p. 408.
- ⁴⁹ The list includes: the Association of Russian Artists, Leningrad and Moscow OFT organisations, the Moscow branch of the International Foundation for Slavonic literature and Slavic Cultures, the Public Committee for Saving the Volga, Moscow *Otechestvo*, Moscow SDVO, LRPD *Otechestvo*, the Union of Patriotic Organisations of the Urals and Siberia, the 'Intermovements' from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldavia and other organisations. Source: "Narod - za soglasie!", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 38, 22/9/89, p.5.
- ⁵⁰ "Narod - za soglasie!", *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ *Pravda*, 3/6/89, p.3.
- ⁵² *Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov (osnovnye dokumenty)*, typescript dated 17 November 1988, Moscow, p.10. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁵³ "Radi dukhovnogo ozdorovleniia", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 11/11/89, p.7.

- ⁵⁴ A. Murashev, "Mezhregional'naia gruppа", *Ogonek*, No. 32, 1990, p.8.
- ⁵⁵ "Predvybornaia platforma Rossii", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 50, 15/12/89, p.4.
- ⁵⁶ The *Rossia Club* was set up in October 1989. Source: Vera Tolz, *The USSR's Emerging Multiparty System*, Praeger, New York, 1990, p. 41.
- ⁵⁷ "Za politiku narodnogo soglasii i rossiiskogo vrozhdeniia", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 52, 29/12/89, pp.2-3; "K narodnomu soglasiu", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 30/12/89, p.3.
- ⁵⁸ V. Balakhanov, "Sokhranenie imperii ili samosokhranenie na puti natsional'nogo suvereniteta", *Svobodnoe slovo*, No. 13, 11 April 1989, p. 2. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]
- ⁵⁹ G. Litvinova, "RSFSR - ravnye prava" & A. Gulyga, "O natsional'nom vrozhdenii", *Znaniia - narodu*, No. 8, 1989, pp. 24-25.
- ⁶⁰ *Izvestiia* 24/12/89, p.1.
- ⁶¹ Veber, A. B. et al. (eds.) [Gorbachev-Fond], *Soiuz možno bylo sokhranit': dokumenty i fakty o politike M. S. Gorbacheva po reformirovaniu i sokhraneniu mnogonatsional'nogo gosudarstva*, April', Moscow, 1995, p. 92.
- ⁶² "Predvybornaia programma kandidata... Bondarenko Vladimira Grigor'evicha", undated typescript. [Solovei collection]
- ⁶³ e.g. Evgenii Nekrasov, "V piatom uglu?" *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No.5, 2/2/90; "Miting v Ostankino", *Pravda*, 29/1/90; "'Prazdnik' v Ostankino", *Panorama*, No. 2, February 1990, [Solovei collection]; "Miting 'pravykh' v Ostankino", *Muzhestvo gumanizm* (organ initsiativnoi gruppy taganskogo raionnogo tsentra), No.6, 14/2/90 [Solovei collection]; "Tut vse podniali krik, ugrozhaiut, shumiat,..." *Atmoda*, 5/12/90 [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁶⁴ V. D. Solovei, "Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo natsionalizma (1985-1993)" in Iu. S. Kukushkin et al. (eds.), *Russkii narod: istoricheskaia sud'ba v XX veke*, TO ANKO, Moscow 1993, pp.291-292.
- ⁶⁵ "Zakrytaia konferentsiia pravykh", *Panorama*, No. 3, February 1990, p.8. [Solovei collection]
- ⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ Iu. V. Arutiunian et al. (eds.), *Russkie: etno-sotsiologicheskie ocherki*, op. cit., p. 408.
- ⁶⁸ *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No.8, 23/2/90, p.1.
- ⁶⁹ "Dos'e 'Vybory 90'", *Vybory 90*, Issue No.7, 1990, pp.3-8 [Solovei collection]
- ⁷⁰ For example, the 'rightists' include *OFT* which, according to my study, was an adherent to Russian nationalism.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., p.8.
- ⁷² *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 7, 1990.
- ⁷³ *Moscow News*, No.12, 1990, p.4; V. Pribylovskii, "Demokraticheskie organizatsii na vyborakh v Moskve", *Panorama*, No. 5, April 1990 [Solovei collection]; J. Wishnevsky, "Patriots Urge Annulment of RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies", *RFE/RL Report on the USSR*, No. 14, 1990, p. 19.
- N.B. Wishnevsky and *Moscow News* list two winning candidates (B. Kondrashov and V. Gololobov). Pribylovskii qualified the latter observation by pointing out that Aleksandr Gurov was also a sympathiser of the Bloc of Public Patriotic Movements, although he withdrew his support from the Bloc following the election.
- ⁷⁴ Iu. V. Arutiunian et al. (eds.), *Russkie: etno-sotsiologicheskie ocherki*, op. cit., p. 408.
- ⁷⁵ *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 12, 23/3/90, p.15; see also Julia Wishnevsky, "Patriots Urge Annulment..." op. cit., pp. 18-19.
- ⁷⁶ *Moscow News*, No. 11, March 1990, p.8.
- ⁷⁷ Galina Starovoiteva, "Nationality policies in the period of perestroika", in G. Lapidus, V. Zaslavsky & P. Goldman (eds.), *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics*, CUP, 1992, p. 118.

- ⁷⁸ "Dos'e 'Vybory 90'", *Vybory 90*, op. cit., p. 4.
- ⁷⁹ J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit., p.143.
- ⁸⁰ V. Pribylovskii, "Demokraticheskie organizatsii na vyborakh v Moskve", op. cit.
- ⁸¹ V. Pribylovskii, "Soiuz Venedov", undated typescript. [Solovei collection]
- ⁸² In Leningrad, the democratic forces contested the March 1990 elections under the umbrella of *Vybory-90*.
- ⁸³ Marina Sal'e, "Pochemu russkoe demokraticeskoe dvizhenie 'stydingsia' national'noi idei?", *Leningrdaskii literator*, 9/2/90, p. 4.
- ⁸⁴ Interview with A. Barsenkov, 7/10/96, Moscow.
- ⁸⁵ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossiiia segodnia: politicheskii portret v dokumentakh 1985-91*, Moscow, 1991, p. 184.
- ⁸⁶ The 'centrist' bloc represented a coalition of adherents to Russian nationalism, including members of the LDP, *Pamiat'*, *Otechestvo*, *Patriot* and Skurlatov's RNF. Source: M. Deich & L. Zhuravlev, *Pamiat': kak ona est'*, Moscow, 1991. p.188.
- ⁸⁷ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossiiia segodnia...*, op. cit., p.193.
- ⁸⁸ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 7, op. cit., p. 4.
- ⁸⁹ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *ibid.*, Vol. 6., p. 146.
- ⁹⁰ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossiiia segodnia...*, op. cit., p. 99.
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.* p. 308.
- ⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 311; *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 6, 1990, p. 7.
- ⁹³ It should be noted that from the end of 1990, two constituent members of Democratic Russia, the Social Democratic Party and the RPRF, discussed merging, but this was also rejected. Source: V. N. Berezovskii et al., *ibid.*, Vol. 7., p. 3.
- ⁹⁴ For example, Graeme Gill cites an opinion poll in *Argumenty i fakty*, (No.21, May 1990) which showed 'that the overwhelming majority favoured an expansion of the independence of Russia and a corresponding reduction in central controls' - Graeme Gill, *The collapse of a single-party system: the disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, CUP, 1994, p. 126.
- ⁹⁵ Graeme Gill, *The collapse of a single-party system*, *ibid.*, p. 93. For a fuller account of the formation of the Russian Communist Party, see pages 126-130.
- ⁹⁶ For details of Initiative Committee for the Preparation of a Founding Congress of the Russian Communist Party, see Gill, *ibid.*; *Pravda*, 11/3/90, p.3.; *Leningradskaia pravda*, 20/3/90, p. 2; *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 13/4/90, p.3.
- ⁹⁷ *Smena*, 1/12/89, p. 2.
- ⁹⁸ Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), "Pravaia al'ternativa", *Sostoianie strany*, No. 1/2, 25 Feb 1991, Postfactum, Moscow, p. 18.
- ⁹⁹ This also suited leading members of the Leningrad Party establishment such as Boris Gidasov (First Secretary of the Leningrad *Obkom*), who wished to strengthen his personal power-base.
- ¹⁰⁰ Details of the draft programme *Leningradskaia pravda*, 20/3/90, op. cit.
- ¹⁰¹ *Izvestiia*, 17/5/90, p.1.
- ¹⁰² *Leningradskaia pravda*, 24/4/90, p. 2
- ¹⁰³ G. Gill, *The collapse of a single-party system*, op. cit., p.127.
- ¹⁰⁴ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossiiia segodnia...*, op. cit., p. 51.
- ¹⁰⁵ Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), "Pravaia al'ternativa", op. cit.
- ¹⁰⁶ See, for example, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 9/9/90, pp. 2-3.
- ¹⁰⁷ V. D. Solovei, "Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo natsionalizma...", op. cit., p.293.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 294; Interview with V. Solovei, 18/10/96, Moscow.

- ¹⁰⁹ "Za velikuiu, edinuiu Rossiui!", *Domostroi*, No. 10, 19/3/91, p. 14 [Solovei collection]; "Za edinuiu Rus', za edinyi Soiuz", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 28/2/91, p. 2.
- ¹¹⁰ Veber, A. B. et al. (eds.) [Gorbachev-Fond], *Soiuz možno bylo sokhranit'...*, op. cit., p. 119.
- ¹¹¹ *Soiuz's* leading spokesman, Viktor Alksnis, was a Party member, but he did not believe in a simple return to the situation as it was before perestroika. In principle, Alksnis believed in a multi-party system, a market economy and the rule of law, but he was also concerned about the Russians and Russian-speaking population outside Russia. Although he was bilingual, Alksnis was essentially a Russian-speaking Latvian, schooled in the bastion of Russian/Slavic-dominated institutions - the officer corps of the Soviet Army. Therefore, Alksnis and his kind were, at the very least, Soviet nationalists with a heavy pro-Russian bias.
- ¹¹² Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), "Pravaia al'ternativa", op. cit., p. 16.
- ¹¹³ These 'committees of national salvation' had been suggested by the 'centrist' bloc of Zhirinovskii and Skurlatov.
- ¹¹⁴ *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 22/12/90, p. 1.
- ¹¹⁵ Interview with V. Solovei, 18/10/96.
- ¹¹⁶ "Za edinuiu Rus', za edinyi Soiuz", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 28/2/91, p. 2.
- ¹¹⁷ *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 5/3/91 in B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossiia segodnia...*, op. cit., p. 316.
- ¹¹⁸ S. Smirnov, "Za edinuiu veru!" Source unknown. [Solovei collection]
- ¹¹⁹ "Za velikuiu, edinuiu Rossiui!", *Domostroi*, op. cit.
- ¹²⁰ "Mezhdu nami, patriotami", *Glasnost*, 6-12/3/91, p. 12. [Solovei collection]
- ¹²¹ Ibid.
- ¹²² "Za edinuiu Rus', za edinyi Soiuz", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, op. cit.
- ¹²³ Tat'iana Naumova reported that the Conference was convened on the initiative of the RCP and organised by the RCP. Source: "Za velikuiu, edinuiu Rossiui!", *Domostroi*, op. cit.
- ¹²⁴ See, for example, "Protiv politicheskoi dezorientatsii obshchestva", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 14, 5/4/91, p. 7; "Protiv narusheniia konstitutsii SSSR", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 17, 26/4/91, p. 7.
- ¹²⁵ V. D. Solovei, "Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo natsionalizma...", op. cit., p. 294.
- ¹²⁶ For example, Eduard Volodin, Chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Patriotic Forces of Russia was a prominent participant. Source: K. Glebov, "Ob'edinit li nas 'Otchizna'?", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 25, 21/7/91, p. 7.
- ¹²⁷ The Deputies were from the *Otchizna* group of Deputies which appeared in May 1991 under the leadership of General Tarasov. For announcement of group's formation (named as the *Otechestvo* group of Deputies), see "Rossiiskii S'ezd: pretendenty nachinaiat bor'bu", *Izvestiia*, 27/5/91, p. 2.
- ¹²⁸ K. Glebov, *ibid.*; *Russkii vestnik*, 4/7/91 [Solovei collection]; V. Osipov in *Domostroi*, No. 25, 2/7/91, p. 11 [Solovei collection].
- ¹²⁹ V. Osipov in *Domostroi*, *ibid.*
- ¹³⁰ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 5, op. cit., p. 71.
- ¹³¹ Ibid.
- ¹³² "Zaiavlenie...", *Russkii vestnik*, No. 15, 16/7/91, p. 5. [Solovei collection]
- ¹³³ V. Pribylovskii, "Soiuz Venedov", undated typescript. [Solovei collection]
- ¹³⁴ The Party was a member of all three movements.
- ¹³⁵ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 9, op. cit., p. 148
- ¹³⁶ V. Pribylovskii, *Slovar' novykh politicheskikh partii i organisatsii Rossii*, Moscow, 1991, p.30.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 23.

¹³⁸ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 145.

¹³⁹ "Tret'ia politicheskaiia sila", *Golos Rossii*, No. 1, 1991, p. 1. [Solovei collection]

¹⁴⁰ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 153.

¹⁴¹ A. Smirnov, "Narodnye recnublikantsy - partiia idei Solzhenitsyna", *Nashe vremia*, No. 4, 1990, p. 1. [Solovei collection]

¹⁴² The terms 'legitimists' and popular monarchists (or monarchists 'from the people') were used by Vladimir Pribylovskii and Z. Pyl'd in V. Pribylovskii, "Monarkhisty", undated typescript. [Solovei collection] & Z. Pyl'd, "Monarkhiia - mat' poriadka" unsourced newspaper article dated 13/12/90. [IGPI Archive]

¹⁴³ In spring 1990 a youth wing was formed within PRAMOS called *Vitiaz'*. By autumn 1990, this had become an independent organisation closer to RISO than to PRAMOS.

¹⁴⁴ V. Pribylovskii, "Monarkhisty", op. cit. p. 3.

¹⁴⁵ "Programma Peterburgskogo monarkhicheskogo tsentra", typescript dated 1990, St. Petersburg. [IGPI Archive]

¹⁴⁶ In July 1989, *KhPS* had split into two groups - one under V. Osipov and the other under E. Pashnin. In January 1990, Osipov's group adopted the name the 'Christian Rebirth' Union.

¹⁴⁷ "Obrashchenie k grazhdanam i narodnym deputatam Rossii", typescript dated 31/5/90 [IGPI Archive]

¹⁴⁸ It won two seats in the Moscow Soviet and five seats in the Moscow regional soviets.

¹⁴⁹ V. Pribylovskii, "Monarkhisty", op. cit. p. 4; V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 10, op. cit., p. 66.

¹⁵⁰ *Moskovskii stroitel'*, No. 2, 1990, p. 7. [IGPI Archive]

¹⁵¹ One of RNE's own documents claims that the 'nucleus' of RNE were the most active representatives of NPF *Pamiat'*.

¹⁵² Aleksandr Dreiling, "Dvizhenie 'Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo'", undated typescript, p.1. [IGPI Archive]

¹⁵³ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, op. cit., p. 105-106.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 111.

¹⁵⁵ Moskalenko first formed the Slavic Front in March 1990, which then became the Slavic Party at its Founding Congress on 21-22 October.

¹⁵⁶ In the Popular Front of the RSFSR, Moskalenko had formed a 'patriotic faction' with E. Dergunov and V. Osipov. The split between nationalist ideas and democratic ideas was one of the reasons for the Front's swift demise.

¹⁵⁷ "Ustav Slavianskoi partii", undated typescript, p. 1. [Solovei collection]

¹⁵⁸ "Programma Slavianskoi partii", undated typescript, p. 2. [Solovei collection]

¹⁵⁹ The group dubbed itself the 'Centrist Bloc', although it is not quite clear what 'centrist' means. It might mean that the Bloc claimed to occupy the centre ground between the democrats and the communists. However, the Bloc displayed very right-wing authoritarian views, co-operated with the communist authorities and adhered to imperialist Russian nationalism.

¹⁶⁰ V. Pribylovskii, *Slovar' novykh politicheskikh partii i organisatsii Rossii*, op. cit., p.30.

¹⁶¹ V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov & V. V. Cherviakov, *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Spravochnik*. Vol.1, part 2, Rau-Press, Moscow, p. 238; M. Deich & L. Zhuravlev, *Pamiat': kak ona est'*, op. cit.

¹⁶² V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Slovar' novykh politicheskikh partii*, ibid.

¹⁶³ Deich & Zhuravlev, *Pamiat'*: op. cit.

¹⁶⁴ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Slovar' novykh politicheskikh partii*, op. cit.

¹⁶⁵ The term 'Russian people' appeared to have a somewhat ambiguous meaning - sometimes it referred to the ethnic Russians and sometimes it referred to the fraternal Slavic peoples: the Great, Little and White Russians, i.e. the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Belorussians. See, for example, A. Kalashnikov, "Mnenie russkogo natsionalista", *III Rim*, No. 5, p. 5. [Solovei collection]

¹⁶⁶ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, op. cit., p. 78.

¹⁶⁷ Referendum leaflet dated 5/3/91, Moscow. [Solovei collection]

¹⁶⁸ Moskalenko's Slavic Party and others broke away from the Assembly shortly after its formation and established the *Vseslavianskii Sobor*.

¹⁶⁹ L. Lysenkova, "V nashei strane sozyvaetsia Vseslavianskii Sobor", *Rodnye prostory*, No. 10, 1991, p. 10. [Solovei collection]

¹⁷⁰ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, op. cit., p. 160.

¹⁷¹ *Mezhdunarodnoe obshchestvennoe ob"edinenie 'Slavianskii Sobor'*, (Pamphlet) Moscow 1992, p. 4. [IGPI Archive]; "Slavianskii Sobor", *Domostroi*, No. 5, 12/2/91, p.2. [Solovei collection]

¹⁷² These publications include: *Velikoross, Pul's Tushina, Russkii vestnik, Russkoe voskresenie, Domostroi, Literaturnaia Rossiia, Vozrozhdenie Rossii, Veche* and others.

¹⁷³ Although the Party had earlier incarnations as the miniscule Russian National Democratic Party (December 1990) and the Russian National Party (January 1991).

¹⁷⁴ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, op. cit., p. 40-41.

¹⁷⁵ Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, Routledge, 1993, p. 427.

¹⁷⁶ "Ob uvazhenii k izbirateliam", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 12/5/91, p. 3.

¹⁷⁷ "Ob uchastii v vyborakh presidenta RSFSR", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 18/5/91.

¹⁷⁸ N. Ryzhkov, "Moia positsiia", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 5/6/91, p. 1.

¹⁷⁹ "TSN", Central Television, 26/5/91, in *USSR Today : Soviet Media News and Information Digest*, 26/5/91; "Kto est' kto", Central Television, 31 /5/91, in *USSR Today*, 1/6/91.

¹⁸⁰ He admitted on television that he was a 'conservative'. Report by R. Service, SSEES Soviet Press Study Group, 13/6/91, London.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² V. Iuzhakov, "Russkaia dusha", *Pul's Tushina*, No. 22, 1991, p.1. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection] - This leading article mentions Makashov along with figures such as Belov, Rasputin, Zhirinovskii and Aleksandr Nevzorov.

¹⁸³ *Izvestiia*, 20/6/91.

¹⁸⁴ Veber, A. B. et al. (eds.) [Gorbachev-Fond], *Soiuz možhno bylo sokhranit'...*, op. cit., p. 132.

¹⁸⁵ *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 14/3/91, p. 2.

¹⁸⁶ "Slovo k narodu", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 23/7/91, p. 1.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ "Ot 'Slova' - k delu!", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 16/8/91, p. 2.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Starobudstev and Tiziakov were members of the Emergency Committee (GKChP), whilst Varennikov was amongst those charged with involvement.

¹⁹³ "My russkie, kakoi vostorg!", *Moskovskie vedomosti*, No.18-19, June 1992, p. 6.

¹⁹⁴ V. D. Solovei, "Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo natsionalizma...", op. cit., p. 295.

- ¹⁹⁵ See "Obrashchenie k sovetskomu narodu", TASS, 19/8/91 in *USSR Today: Soviet Media News and Information Digest* (RL Monitoring), No. 687, 19/8/91, pp. 12-17.
- ¹⁹⁶ V. D. Solovei, "Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo natsionalizma...", op. cit.
- ¹⁹⁷ Following the signing of the Belovezhskaia Agreement, Baburin was one of only 7 RSFSR Deputies to vote against ratifying the Agreement.
- ¹⁹⁸ "Obrashchenie k grazhdanam Ukrainy, Belorussii i Rossii", 26/10/91, [Solovei collection]
- ¹⁹⁹ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 7, op. cit., p. 150.
- ²⁰⁰ *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 50, 13/12/91, p.4.
- ²⁰¹ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, pp. 94-95.
- ²⁰² V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 5, op. cit., pp. 144.
- ²⁰³ Ibid., p. 154.
- ²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 151.
- ²⁰⁵ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, p. 48.
- ²⁰⁶ The RPNV also called for the 'creation of the necessary conditions for the restoration of the genetic stock of the [Russian] nation'.
- ²⁰⁷ Vera Tolz, "Is Russia Likely to Turn to Authoritarian Rule?" *RFE/RL Research Report*, 24/1/92, p. 2; Aleksandr Nevzorov, *Panoptikum*, St. Petersburg, 1992, p. 91.
- ²⁰⁸ Cited in J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit., p. 183.
- ²⁰⁹ *Panoptikum*, ibid., p.37
- ²¹⁰ Vera Tolz, "Is Russia Likely...?", op. cit.
- ²¹¹ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 4, p. 96.
- ²¹² Vera Tolz, "Is Russia Likely ...?" op. cit., p. 7.
- ²¹³ Especially in Latvia and Estonia. For example, in Latvia a resolution 'On the restoration of the rights of citizenship of the Latvian republic and basic conditions for naturalisation' passed on 15/10/91, excluded part of the Russian speaking population from parliamentary elections and only those who had lived on the territory since 1940 and their descendants could receive Latvian citizenship.
- ²¹⁴ R. Medvedev (ed.), *Spravochnik: politicheskie partii, dvizheniia i bloki sovremennoi Rossii*, N. Novgorod, 1993, p. 82.
- ²¹⁵ R. Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, op. cit., p. 135.
- ²¹⁶ Veber, A. B. et al. (eds.), *Soiuz možno bylo sokhranit'*: op. cit., p. 11.
- ²¹⁷ B. Nahaylo & V. Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR*, London, 1990, p. 232.
- ²¹⁸ Darrell P. Hammer, "Glasnost' and the 'Russian Idea'", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin: Russian Nationalism Today* (Special Edition), op. cit., p. 15.
- ²¹⁹ V. Rasputin, "Pozhar", op. cit.
- ²²⁰ The decision to defer the scheme was made in March [Bess Brown, "Scheme to Divert Siberian Rivers Seems to Have Been Deferred", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 119/86, 6 March 1986]. However, the official decision to shelve the project was announced in August 1986 [*Pravda* 20/9/86]. See Chapter 4 on Russian nationalist issues.
- ²²¹ "Spustia vosem' vekov", *Kommunist*, No. 10, 1985.
- ²²² B. Nahaylo & V. Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion*, op. cit.
- ²²³ J. B. Dunlop, "The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin: Russian Nationalism Today*, op. cit., p. 3.

- ²²⁴ See Darrell P. Hammer, "Glasnost' and the 'Russian Idea'", op. cit., pp. 22-23.
- ²²⁵ For example, see *Ogonek*, No.1, 1987 for criticism of *Pamiat'*.
- ²²⁶ *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 23, 1988.
- ²²⁷ J. B. Dunlop, "The Return of Russian Nationalism", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.1, No.3, Summer 1990, p.120.
- ²²⁸ V. D. Solovei, "Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo natsionalizma (1985-1993)" op. cit., p. 287.
- ²²⁹ Interview with Valerii Solovei, 18/10/96, Moscow.
- ²³⁰ See Helen Bull and Jane Ellis, "The Millennium Celebrations of 1988 in the USSR", *Religion in Communist Lands*, Volume 16, No. 4, Winter 1988, pp. 300-301.
- ²³¹ Ibid., pp. 294 & 297.
- ²³² N. Andreeva, "Ne mogu postupit'sia printsipami", op. cit.
- ²³³ Interview with Valerii Solovei, op. cit.
- ²³⁴ M. Deich & L. Zhuravlev, *Pamiat': kak ona est'*, op. cit., p.10.
- ²³⁵ J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit., p. 127.
- ²³⁶ Veber, A. B. et al. (eds.), *Soiuz možhno bylo sokhranit': ...*, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
- ²³⁷ Ibid., p. 69.
- ²³⁸ Graeme Gill, *The collapse of a single-party system*; op. cit., p. 93.
- ²³⁹ *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 24/1/90.
- ²⁴⁰ *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 25/5/90.
- ²⁴¹ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossiia segodnia: politicheskii portret v dokumentakh 1985-91*, op. cit., p. 45.
- ²⁴² J. B. Dunlop, "The Leadership of the Centrist Bloc", *RFE/RL Report on the USSR*, 8/2/1991, pp.4-6; J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit., pp. 108-111.
- ²⁴³ V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov & V. V. Cherviakov, *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Spravochnik*. Vol.1, part 2, op. cit., p. 239.
- ²⁴⁴ J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia...*, ibid., p. 109.
- ²⁴⁵ Veber, A. B. et al. (eds.), *Soiuz možhno bylo sokhranit': ...*, op. cit., p. 133.
- ²⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 119.
- ²⁴⁷ *Izvestiia*, 16/1/91.
- ²⁴⁸ J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia...*, ibid., p. 32.

Chapter 4: Russian Nationalist Issues

Introduction

There are many categories under which nationalism is justified. These include divine sanction, nature, freedom, security, sovereignty, majority, birthright, culture, duration, *status quo*, need and revenge.¹ The broad range of justifications reflect the broad range of issues related to nationalism.

Russian nationalism under Gorbachev did not constitute a unified movement, but a collage of different views attempting to define or redefine the Russian nation and state. There is no doubt that all the above justifications for nationalism were evident amongst this collage. For example, some felt the *need* for the revival of a Russian nation and Russian institutions in order to achieve 'parity' with other republics; there was a belief that to maintain the *status quo* would maintain core Russian national values and the 'historical Russian state'; the protection of Russian *nature* was not only a metaphor for the protection of Russian values, but a reflection of the belief that Russians are spiritually connected to the land.

The main issues covered here are: the environment; concern over the destruction of the Russian village and urbanisation; the debate over Russian identity; demography; territory; racism and xenophobia; the question of Russian sovereignty and institutional identity.

Environment

The issues of environmental pollution, ecological engineering and the decay and destruction of historical monuments were not restricted to the RSFSR, but were the concern of all the Soviet nationalities.² Indeed, as Geoffrey Hosking points out, issues concerning the environment and the protection of historical monuments became the main focus of early independent political activity under glasnost.³ In the words of Graham Smith, this was due:

..to the fact that at this early stage the environment was allowed on to the local public agenda, because it was judged not to pose a direct challenge to regime legitimacy.⁴

Many environmentalists in the non-Russian republics regarded that their interests conflicted with official policy from Moscow and, therefore, interpreted their needs in separatist and nationalist terms. In the same way, or perhaps in reaction to the separatism in non-Russian republics, the Russians also linked environmental concerns with nationalism. Besides the fact that the environment was an accessible subject, Russian nationalism was able to associate the environment with the past and the question of national identity:

Like the national consciousness of smaller nations, that of the Russian was centred on a perception of national danger, of the erosion and irreplaceable loss of culture, of a sense of the past. Like Armenian, Estonian, and other national movements, the Russian was deeply concerned with environmental destruction with threats to Russian nature, and with the brutal treatment of cultural and religious monuments.⁵

Those who had protested over environmental issues (albeit often unsuccessfully) even before perestroika, increased their currency as figures of trust:

...protests over such concerns as the pollution of the Volga River, the location of nuclear energy plants in the Ukraine, Lithuania and Armenia, and the apparently unrestrained pollution of the air in most of the Soviet Union's industrial regions did accomplish one important thing - they established the credibility of those who were protesting. The protesters... were identified as critics who could be trusted to speak out. They openly complained about conditions affecting everyone's well-being... What mattered was that they were willing to challenge the calloused authorities...⁶

This credibility provided environmentally-conscious nationalists with a stronger platform to express their views under glasnost.

River diversion

One of the earliest causes of the environmentalists was the controversial river diversion project. This concerned diverting the flow of rivers from the north to the south in order to transform and cultivate the arid southern regions of the Soviet Union. Although this idea had been around for decades, it became topical again in the early 80s and provoked considerable opposition following the advent of Gorbachev in 1985, such

that a decision was made to shelve it as early as March 1986.⁷

The eighties projects planned to divert rivers from northern Russia via the Volga to provide water to the Ukraine and southern regions of Russia; and divert the Siberian Enisei and Ob rivers to fill the Aral Sea which would then provide water via canals to others areas of southern Russia, but more significantly to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Some of the most vocal opponents were the literary figures Valentin Rasputin, Iurii Bondarev, Vasilii Belov, Sergei Zalygin and the journal *Nash sovremennik*. Although some opponents of the schemes had expressed their disagreement in emigré publications before glasnost, they seized their opportunity to express greater concern and opposition openly in the Soviet press in and after 1985.

The nationalist journal *Nash sovremennik* fuelled the debate in the summer of 1985 with the publication of the opinions of twelve specialists on land renewal rejecting the diversion projects and their possible effects.⁸

Valentin Rasputin had addressed the river diversion issue as early as 1976 in his book *Farewell to Mavera*. This story was republished in 1985⁹ - the year which witnessed a recovery of Rasputin's fortunes.¹⁰ Rasputin not only continued his opposition throughout the year to the river diversion project, but also channelled his efforts towards the protection of Lake Baikal. The nationalist angle of this campaigning was illustrated by the constant linking of the environment to culture and history.

At the RSFSR Writers' Conference in December 1985, a number of writers played the nationalist card in their short speeches and spoke with passion about protecting the environment. Rasputin said:

Russia expects us to take Baikal, the Altai pine and the sacred lands of Russian Siberia under our patronage. And this, of course, should not be patronage in the cold and formal sense of the word, but sons [of Russia], active protection, without which we cannot manage.¹¹

V. Belov's speech expressed concern for the protection of Russian villages, but was more of a call for the protection of [Russian] culture and a condemnation of Western influence.¹² Sergei Zalygin was concerned with examining the possible ecological consequences of such projects prior to their implementation. He suggested that the projects cease for a few years in order to reach a more objective decision as to whether to continue or

not. However, his speech did contain emotive words on man and his environment, reflecting his concern for preservation rather than avoidance of ecological disaster:

When we change nature, we extract man from it and strip him of his natural and historical surroundings, in which he grew up, lives and works.

Engineers do not understand this. They decide purely technical problems. Who should answer the question of what will happen to man if he is stripped of his ancient habitat, his own house and home?¹³

The following month Zalygin, Bondarev, Belov and Rasputin were among the signatories of a letter supporting an article in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* condemning the diversion projects.¹⁴ The article, by M. Lemeshev (who became a member of the Council of Moscow *Otechestvo*), suggested that there was no concrete scientific evidence that river diversion would provide the south with the necessary water, for the level of the Caspian Sea had been rising since 1978, and the problem was more a matter of water conservation than water diversion. Lemeshev also suggested that continuation of the schemes was in the interests of ministerial bureaucracy and that the Ministry of Water was irresponsibly carrying out 'unscientifically based projects'. However, despite Lemeshev's accusations of bureaucratic abuse and an unscientific approach, he also mentioned the cultural and historical cost:

We should also bear in mind that the transfer of northern waters will inflict irreparable damage on the historical and cultural property of our people. In the event that even the first stage of the project is carried out, 368 out of 492 historical and cultural monuments might be destroyed or damaged by flooding or warming.¹⁵

This was a theme pursued by the authors of the joint letter. After pointing to the cost and possible failure of such projects, they highlighted the historical and cultural cost:

...the project does not make provision for the preservation of cultural and historical monuments in a fundamental part of Russia, where the inspired national genius created a whole century, where some of the world's spiritual treasures were established.¹⁶

The letter continues with the theme of national damage:

And what about the demolition of villages, settlements, the warming of ancient towns? The irreplaceable losses will, of course, have a negative effect on all life in our society.

It is impossible to save one part of a unitary living organism at the expense of destroying another. Our country is one, there will not be another, and we have to look after it, look after its wealth. Interfering with natural conditions which have formed over millions of

years,... threatens to have serious consequences not only for future generations, but for those living today.¹⁷

The river diversion projects were not the only subjects of interest to nationalists and environmentalists. After all, it was the Chernobyl catastrophe which tested glasnost and alerted people to the serious condition of their environment. This encouraged nuclear power stations and industrial complexes to come under environmentalist scrutiny. There were ample grounds for environmental concern when one considered that Chernobyl was not the first nuclear accident - there had been one year earlier in the Cheliabinsk area when the truth about the event had been silenced by the authorities. Large amounts of effluent and other pollutants were discharged not only into Rasputin's beloved Lake Baikal, but all over the Soviet Union. *Soviet Weekly* reported that between 1986-91 nearly 100 million tonnes of pollutants were expelled annually into the Soviet environment.¹⁸

Lake Baikal had been a subject of ecological concern since the 1960s. Figures such as Rasputin highlighted the polluting effect of the Baikal Pulp-Paper Combine and the Selenga Pulp-Cardboard Combine. However, the ecological threat to the lake was threefold:

First and most directly, it is affected by direct dumping of wastes from industrial plants and urban sewage systems. Second, Baikal suffers from precipitation of large quantities of airborne pollutants passing over the lake. Finally, the lake is affected by erosion and contamination by runoff from lands surrounding the lake that have been disturbed by improper agricultural practices and logging operations.¹⁹

The nationalist reaction to ecological concerns was to link the ecology to the essence of the nation. Iurii Bondarev wrote an article entitled 'The Legacy of Culture' before the 27th Party Congress in 1986. He claimed that:

...tradition and the past are the legacy of the main qualities of the people's spiritual energy.²⁰

Bondarev went on to list features of the Russian national legacy, including architecture, literature, painting, political activism. However, along with the man-made legacy of 'memory and culture', Bondarev lists natural features of the country which were subject to environmental concern:

Never does a year pass, nor the bitter taste of anxiety, when you think about the sacred place and pearl of Siberia - Baikal, whose crystal-clear waters continue steadily and annually to be blocked up with industrial waste, in spite of serious protective resolutions.

When you also remember Lake Onega, which like Baikal is unique in the purity of its fresh water: now you can only drink there safely 40 km from the shore. If you think about the Visimsk Nature Reserve in the Urals, where a reservoir will be constructed 400 hectares of space to provide drinking water for the town of Kirovograd and they have already cut down in advance unique varieties of trees...²¹

Bondarev goes on to curse the river diversion project, its possible unknown ecological damage and the destruction of historical monuments that would result. It is clear that Bondarev has a strong ecological message, but within the context of his article, the environment is treated as a national(ist) subject - the environmental concern is sandwiched between a discussion of Russia's past, its culture and a rallying cry for the Motherland.

Valentin Rasputin spoke of ecology along with such terms as 'morality' and 'spirituality'. He claimed that the land had lost its ecological balance whilst the nation was devoid of spiritual balance. Rasputin also indicated that his story *Pozhar* ('Fire'), published in *Nash sovremennik* in 1985 illustrated that, whilst Siberia's ecology had been ruined, the people were losing their humanity and soul.²²

These ideas were echoed by the author Dmitrii Balashov in *Literaturnaia Rossiia* in 1989. Balashov claimed that among the solutions for overcoming the breakdown of Russia were the restoration of ecological balance and the restoration of Russian national culture. This included the closure of many heavy-industrial concerns and the reforestation of deforested areas.²³ Balashov was continuing a trend that was evident at the very beginning of the Gorbachev era in 1985 when authors such as Rasputin and Belov had urged writers at the RSFSR Writers' Conference to examine the issues of the Russian environment and Russian culture.

The efforts of such figures were acknowledged and supported by the critic Larisa Baranova-Gonchenko when she responded to a criticism by A. Eremenko, who had proposed that writers should adhere to writing and not meddle with such subjects as river diversion:

... it is not only through the 'prayers' of authors, but through the continuous and, for the most part, thankless specific activity of V. Rasputin that what remains of Baikal's clean waters is still alive. We should salute Rasputin for this! ...in the meantime Rasputin, Zalygin, Bondarev, Belov, Astaf'ev, Aitmatov and Krupin, having put their favourite occupation to one side, are concerned with business that is 'not theirs' - the problem of river diversion and preservation of Lake Baikal; they shout, as if in a desert, that the the sin of submerging war graves near Rzhev under water will not part them from those still living; they give up their own publications in favour of Karamzin...²⁴

Her words of support reflected the view of nationalist elements in the Writers' Union that artists were right to pursue and promote the ideas of Russian national culture and that the issue of the environment was closely linked to these ideas. The comment concerning the pre-revolutionary historian, Karamzin, indicates the importance given by such figures to his long-forgotten work on the history of Russia and their willingness to give up space in their journals in favour of the republication of his work.

The river diversion projects and the preservation of Lake Baikal were the *cause célèbre* of nationalist environmentalists. However, these issues were more than a convenient platform for Russian nationalist expression; they were fundamental to a more mystical interpretation of Russia's existence. As Simon Dixon puts it:

Throughout 1986-88, the Soviet press reported spontaneous meetings of workers in various parts of the Russian republic to protest against pollution by chemical plants and the construction of power stations... The injection of a specifically nationalist element into these protests may be detected not only when particular cultural or historical monuments are threatened, but also when a religious view of nature as God's handiwork is offended by man's trespassing beyond boundaries of his place in God's scheme.²⁵

Whilst figures such as Zalygin continued to press the issue of water conservation and Rasputin voiced concern over gas and chemical complexes,²⁶ the population became more aware of environmental dangers. However, they did not necessarily associate the decline of the environment with their own moral and spiritual decline as Balashov and Rasputin, etc. might suggest. A poll carried out by Goskomstat RSFSR in 1989 revealed that there was a significant concern for the environment, whilst there was less worry about the state of Russian morality: 52% of urban dwellers and 33% of rural dwellers considered environmental pollution to be a worrying problem, whilst 18% of the urban population and 10% in rural areas considered morality to be a problem.²⁷

Vasilii Belov illustrated another nationalist angle on concern for the environment. This was one which viewed natural resources and their use as something which should be guarded by Russia and should neither be abused nor sold for use by foreigners:

The President is mistaken when he speaks of inexhaustible natural resources. The country's

wood has been chopped down... Half of the oil has already been extracted. And we are pumping gas past our villages to some far off place.²⁸

Preservation

Besides conservation of the ecology, many voices spoke in favour of preserving historical buildings or even rebuilding those that had been demolished. An officially approved organisation, *VOOPliK* [the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments], had existed before Gorbachev's incumbency and had had limited success in mobilizing youngsters and enthusiasts in participating in restoration programmes. Glasnost allowed for a greater discussion of the subject and greater mobilisation of support.

As previously mentioned, Bondarev, Belov, Rasputin *et al.* had underlined and condemned the possible destruction of 'historical and cultural monuments' in the event of river diversion taking place. Bondarev's article in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* in January 1986 asked the question:

So, just what is our culture? It is the Kremlin, the old Arbat, the wisdom of Pushkin, the Sukharev Tower, the phenomenon of Lomonosov, the architecture of northern villages, great painting, the Decembrists, freedom, the world of Tolstoi, the genius of Lenin, the October Revolution, socialism.²⁹

Bondarev mentions the Kremlin - one of Russia's main architectural symbols; the Sukharev Tower, which had long since been pulled down; and the architecture of the north, which was considered by supporters of the Russian village to be a representation of the 'real Russia'. He proceeded to condemn the needless destruction of 'national monuments', criticising the replacement of the old Arbat by an 'American-style avenue' and lamented the disappearance of old streets and buildings:

They continue to destroy the Moscow river bank, Shkol'naia Street, the whole right side of Tula Street has been destroyed, as well as Andronikov Street, Railway (Voksal'naia) Street, part of Volkhonka, Nizhegorod Railway Station, the Osterman-Tolstoi House, Rakhmaninov's and Belinskii's houses, the 18th century houses on Bakunin Street...³⁰

The list continues before Bondarev quotes Lenin:

Reconstruct the capital, but in a way that not a single monument of ancient craftsmanship or anything of value created by the artistic genius of the Russian people should suffer.³¹

Bondarev's words illustrate the nationalist concern for preservation of

historical monuments, which reflect not only the craftsmanship of the past but symbolise the national ideal. For figures such as Bondarev, the cultural inheritance represents the characterisation of the Russian nation. In an editorial on the front page of *Sovetskaia Rossiia* in November 1985, Russians were urged to pay attention to the restoration and preservation of their cultural inheritance. The article centred on the restoration of buildings, villages and towns. The moral and spiritual link with this legacy is not left to any doubt:

...an active relationship with cultural monuments also assumes spiritual benefits - we should become better, purer, kinder, more conscious...

...Cultural monuments contain not only beauty, but behests to future generations: behests of ideals, morals, technology and economics...

... In the present conditions, when the area of spiritual education is becoming an integral part of our life, it is necessary to very quickly step up all work concerning the preservation and publicity of monuments, and their use in the patriotic education of memory.³²

In 1985/86 Muscovite talk centred on the restoration of buildings which had been destroyed for the sake of 'progress'. Two buildings which were considered to be of significant Russian historical loss in Moscow were the Church of Christ the Saviour, which had been demolished in the 30s to make way for a new Palace of Congresses, but eventually replaced by an open-air swimming pool; and the Sukharev Tower, which was removed in order to make way for a road. There was also evidence of restoration of Russian cultural 'monuments' in progress - I was shown around the Danilevskii Monastery by a member of the Institute of Restoration. The buildings and frescos were scattered with workshops, scaffolding and building materials, for the complex was being restored as part of the celebrations of the millenium of Christianity in Russia.

Although conversation centred around those buildings which had been lost, there was independent political action which sought to protect any further destruction of historical monuments. Geoffrey Hosking cites the example of the Shcherbakov mansion which, like the Sukharev Tower previously, had been earmarked for demolition to make way for a large road:

An action group of students and schoolchildren, led by Kirill Parfenov, occupied the building for two months, whils Parfenov himself appeared on a popular television programme to explain the need to protect the capital city's historical heritage.³³

The debate about the Sukharev Tower, whose fate was portrayed as a callous deed of indifference towards Russian cultural heritage, continued throughout the eighties. The desire to rebuild it was symbolic of the movement to rehabilitate and redefine Russian national culture. By the nineties, a strong lobby still advocated that it should be rebuilt and three options appeared to exist: some thought that it was not necessary to rebuild it whilst there were no materials or qualified workers and also rejected the fact that it would be completely new; another option stressed the necessity to build it later; and a third option suggested that it should be built away from its original site.³⁴

Two other notable incidents concerning the protection and restoration of monuments were the unsuccessful attempts to save the Angleterre hotel in Leningrad³⁵ and the construction of a church on the site of the destroyed Ipat'ev House demanded by nationalists and monarchists.³⁶ The former incident produced a significant amount of indignation, particularly after the local authorities moved in the demolition workmen whilst the lobbyists were temporarily absent. The calls for a monument to replace the Ipat'ev House in Sverdlovsk had a somewhat greater nationalistic flavour in that the Ipat'ev House was the site on which the last Tsar and his family were executed (or, at least, held before execution). The lobbyists were mostly monarchists who lamented the destruction of the original building (razed following the orders of the then Sverdlovsk Party boss, Boris El'tsin) and wanted the site declared a holy shrine, honoured by the construction of a church.

A number of political groups adopted the theme of preservation or conservation within their programmes. Reference to the subject is hardly surprising when one considers the opposition that arose against all forms of mismanagement under the Communist Party regime. However, from a nationalist interpretation, it became 'un-Russian' to violate the environment and Russia's historical and cultural legacy. The Russian Christian Democratic Movement condemned the 'feckless and criminal economic policies' of the communist system for bringing Russia 'to the brink of an ecological catastrophe'.³⁷ The Association of Russian Artists (*Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov*) listed several issues about

which it was concerned, including 'folk culture', 'historical memory', 'nature and economics'.³⁸ These are all concerns which could be related to preservation and environmental issues.

Pamiat' was originally formed around 1980 as a literary and historical society attached to the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR. Many of its members were involved in the restoration of historical and cultural monuments - an activity which no doubt drew the organisation considerable support.³⁹ The concern for national monuments merged with a growing membership who believed in anti-Russian conspiracy theories to synthesise the idea that Jews were to blame for the destruction of national architecture.⁴⁰ This grew out of the belief that a large proportion of Soviet architects and town planners were Jewish. In April 1987, *Pamiat'* members assumed control of the Moscow section of *VOOPliK* and were later successful in expelling members who did not agree with *Pamiat'*'s views.⁴¹

Pamiat' emphasised the loss of architecture over the Soviet period as a substantial loss to Russian culture:

Our centuries-old culture was ruthlessly trampled on and defiled - for example, 40% of all architectural monuments in Russia perished,...⁴²

In August 1988, the organisation listed a number of tasks, the first of which was to:

...Awaken and restore the Russian national consciousness and pride in its great people.⁴³

Other 'tasks' referred to preservation and environmental concern within the context of this 'national awakening':

...to restore and fittingly make use of those monuments of the past which have escaped destruction...

... to change ecological policy, so that the state would fight the plunder and destruction of nature, as well as ruinous, destructive projects, by virtue of deed and not by words...

... the publication of surnames and the bringing to trial of those guilty of:... destroying the country's nature;... killing Russian villages⁴⁴

It should be noted that the latter 'task' called for the publication of surnames, reflecting *Pamiat'*'s belief that many or most of them would be non-Russian.

The manifesto of 12 January 1989 listed a set of sixty-one demands,

amongst which were:

We demand the publication of the names of ALL destroyed churches.

... We demand the publication of names of their destroyers and prosecution of them...

... We demand the restoration of all destroyed churches...

... We demand legislation to stop malicious deeds, designed towards destroying our lands, reservoirs and forests...

... We demand cessation of the destructive pillage of our mineral wealth, forests and reservoirs by international usurious Zionist capital.

... We demand an end to the secret and overt pillage of the country, the export of raw materials, works of art, antiquity and other valuables.⁴⁵

It is clear that *Pamiat*'s preservationist and environmentalist stance is driven by nationalism and nationalist protectionism. Everything is couched in terms of protecting the national cultural and ecological wealth, particularly from the supposed threat of foreign or Zionist (read 'Jewish') capital. One incident in which *Pamiat*' displayed its preservationist credentials received attention and has been referred to subsequently, because the protest was expressed at a private meeting with Boris El'tsin whilst he was Moscow Party boss. *Pamiat*' were campaigning against the redevelopment of Poklonnaia Hill, which involved the construction of a monument. At one *Pamiat*' meeting, M. Lemeshev (the author of the letter opposing the river diversion project in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* 20/12/85) gave an unscheduled speech claiming that the proposed monument incorporated masonic symbols.⁴⁶ The approach for saving Poklonnaia Hill involved forming accusations that the new monument would contain anti-Russian masonic (this implies 'Judeo-masonic') symbols. The subject of preserving the hill was discussed with El'tsin at a meeting in May 1987 when *Pamiat*'s profile had become inflated, not so much for its activities involving the preservation of historical monuments, but for the outspoken anti-Semitic views expressed. In reporting the meeting, *Moscow News* referred to the group's contrasting aims:

On the one hand, it [*Pamiat*'] calls for protection of historical relics, for rooting out drinking and alcoholism and for environmental protection. And, on the other, it disseminates absurd fiction that some sort of a 'mysterious organization' is, allegedly, operating in the whole world and in our country, and that it puts itself the task of annihilating ages-old culture, 'Americanizing' Soviet society and aggravating the socio-economic problems of the USSR by using 'bureaucracy - that monster of world masonry, zionism and imperialism'.⁴⁷

The meeting with El'tsin not only covered the Poklonnaia Hill issue, but

also focussed on the protection of 'architectural relics'. El'tsin informed those present that 9,500 of these 'relics' had already been placed under state protection, including a large number requiring immediate restoration.⁴⁸

There were a host of groups which were set up ostensibly for ecological purposes and which allied themselves with nationalist ideas, for example, the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, the Social Committee for Saving the Volga, and the Foundation for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour.⁴⁹

Other organisations, such as the Salvation Group (*Gruppa spaseniia*), Monument (*Pamiatnik*); *Nevskaia bitva*; *Era*; - all members of Leningrad's Council for the Ecology of Culture (SEK)⁵⁰ - took little part in the development of Russian nationalism, but their concern for the ecology and particularly for protecting historical monuments is indicative of the renewed interest in Russian heritage and the prevailing tendency towards examining the Russian national character which developed under perestroika.

The Russian Village

There was a school of thought which considered the Russian village and Russian rural life to be the embodiment of all that was Russian. The urbanisation which took place under the Soviet regime was viewed as a systematic destruction of a Russian national way of life by an interfering foreign influence. The prime exponents of such ideas were the *derevenshchiki* and *pochvenniki*, variously called in English 'village prose writers', 'ruralists', 'nativists' or 'organicists'. Depictions of rural Russia in literature stretch back throughout the Soviet period, but from the early 70s rural prose tended to present the degeneration of the Russian rural community as the degeneration of morals and the traditional Russian way of life.

This is a view that once again links Russian culture to its environment, with the Russian village symbolising the 'spirituality' of Russian culture. As Vladimir Soloukhin wrote whilst appraising the work of Valentin Rasputin:

The Russian village is not just a social or economic category, it is a spiritual category.⁵¹

[The concept of ‘spirituality’ is very vague and means different things to different people. In the minds of village prose writers it signified old, conservative values and served as an antidote to the materialism of Marxism-Leninism and Western culture.]

The spirituality of country life was contrasted with the upheavals of a soulless urban life. Kathleen Parthé pointed out one Soviet observation of this trend which predated the Gorbachev era:

The Soviet critic Shaitanov observed [in 1981] that village prose had developed its own clichés and that the most frequently used was that of the situation of *pereiezd* (moving) from one’s family home to a larger settlement or city... ..The emphasis in village prose according to this critic, is on the *dukhovnost* (spirituality) of traditional rural culture.⁵²

There can be little doubt that the relationship between urban and rural Russia had changed over the Soviet period - the Russian rural population had been steadily diminishing as the table below indicates⁵³ , but this is not unusual in an industrialised society.

	1959	1975	1987
RSFSR population (in millions)	117.5	133.8	145.3
RSFSR rural population (millions)	55.9	44.5	38.4
Rural population as percentage of overall population	45.57%	33.26%	26.43%

The pattern for the decline of the rural population as a proportion of the overall republican population is repeated in all the Western Soviet republics (the Slavic republics, Baltic republics and Moldavia) whilst the decline is markedly less in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics [in fact, the rural populations in Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia even grew between 1975 and 1987]. Therefore, the decline in the rural population in the RSFSR only reflected the rural populations of the more industrialised Soviet republics.

Moshe Lewin addressed the question of accelerated urbanisation in the

Soviet Union and the social effects upon those who moved from a rural setting to the city. He put forward the idea that moving to the cities challenged and altered the migrant peasant community's sense of values, which were molded by their 'compact social, cultural and economic' life. The peasant communities, in turn, brought their influence to the cities and established a presence of adapted peasant relations within the urban environment.⁵⁴ Lewin's analysis represents two undeniable facts: the Soviet Union underwent a rapid industrialisation and urbanisation; and that this had an effect upon the overall social relations of most people. However, Lewin points out that this phenomenon is not unique to the Soviet Union:

The making of a stable and more self-controlling urban culture and moral world is certainly a difficult task. Once the aftershocks of the previous shattering events begin to subside, the cities begin to reconsider their own identities, and urban problems come to the fore, becoming the subject of public awareness and of political and scholarly treatment. But some of the older tasks remain on the agenda; the diminishing but still important battle between rural and urban worlds, or cultures, continues. This is certainly a universal phenomenon in our time in urban societies in recently urbanized countries.⁵⁵

A nationalist interpretation of these events is to portray the Russian village as the true harbour of Russian culture and, irrespective of the fact that changing urban-rural ratios and their social consequences have occurred in other Soviet republics (as well as in other countries), lament the shrinking of rural culture as the atrophying of Russian national culture. Urban culture represents Westernised/cosmopolitan culture, imposed upon Russia, perhaps, by an alien ideology.

The image of the village was one which was idealised and was frequently conjured up from images of the past. As Geoffrey Hosking remarked, village prose writers in the 60s portrayed the village:

"Not as it was at the time of writing, but as it used to be somewhat earlier."⁵⁶

The tendency under glasnost (and earlier) was to portray the loss of this rural Russian national culture and the idealisation of the village served to accentuate this:

The writers do this [reviving the 'iconic version of the traditional Russian village'] not to paint a naively idyllic picture, but to show that the village, along with its oldest inhabitants, is dying. And since the traditional small villages are being abandoned,

modernized, or absorbed into larger units, everything within them, from people to bast shoes is an image of loss.⁵⁷

Some of the village prose writers who were most vocal or prominent following 1985 include Abramov, Astaf'ev, Belov, Krupin, Lichutin, Likhonosov, Mozhaev, Proskurin, Rasputin, Soloukhin.

The theme of the uprooted peasant and the condemnation of new settlements and cities occurs in a numbers of works such as the previously mentioned *Pozhar* by Rasputin, Belov's *Vse vpered* and Astaf'ev's *Pechal'nyi detektiv*.⁵⁸ Rasputin's work tells of a new settlement which has replaced an old village sacrificed in the cause of progress. The new settlement has replaced the old settlement and with it has gone the old community and its sense of values. The former village of Iegorovka is a metaphor for the old, 'real' Russia. In *Pechaln'yi detektiv*, Astaf'ev seems to mourn the loss of traditional Russian life and bemoan the fact that the link with the Russian historical past has been severed.⁵⁹ All three stories portray Russia as morally corrupt and bereft of traditional (rural) values. These authors and others leave us in little doubt that those who are to blame are the urban intelligentsia and those who wreaked havoc upon the Russian countryside through the tool of the Communist Party.

The theme of destruction is continued in the various condemnations of collectivisation. Glasnost brought more positive appraisals of the NEP period which were expressed in stories such as Sergei Zalygin's *Posle buri* ('After the Storm'), which indicated a compatibility between Russian national traditions and communism.⁶⁰ The guilt was placed at the feet of Stalinism by such authors as Belov (*Nakanune*) and Mozhaev (*Muzhiki i baby*). These works were continuations of works started in the 70s and condemned the process of collectivisation as a crime against the Russian peasantry.⁶¹

In August 1988, Kseniia Mialo wrote an article in *Novy mir* entitled "The Torn Thread: Peasant Culture and the Cultural Revolution". The thrust of the article was to lament the destruction of the Russian peasantry as the destruction of Russian culture. She blames this unnecessary break with the past on the policy of collectivisation and the influence of a replacement culture introduced by the communists. She believes that, although it is

impossible to restore the destroyed peasant culture, the link with the past can be recreated through the birth or rebirth of a Russian cultural idea, which is a prerequisite for rebuilding Russia. In Mialo's eyes, the Russian rural peasant culture was the embodiment of Russian national culture, and, although it has been destroyed, should serve as guidance for recreating this new national culture.⁶²

Echoing the idea that the peasantry embodies something specifically Russian, Fatei Shipunov, writing in the nationalist journal *Nash sovremennik*, described the peasantry as:

the body and soul of the people (*narod*), the very nucleus of its soul and spirit.⁶³

Speaking at a plenum of the governing committee of the RSFSR Writers' Union, S. Danilov suggested that this 'soul and spirit' was still alive and urged those in power to divert greater resources to the rural community in order to save this nest of Russian values:

It is often said that the exodus from the countryside is a natural process, that it happens all over the world. I do not want the best people to leave the village. If they leave, then Russia will be impoverished, the Russian language will grow poor and there will be an impoverishment of the national morality and national conscience....

...I want our plenum to urge the Government and the Central Committee of the Party to support the ideas expressed at the Congress of *kolkhoz*-workers: there is no retreat, greater funds must be given to the rural community immediately.⁶⁴

Focussing on the peasantry gives an idealised image of the Russian at variance with Soviet communism. The peasant is distant from the tainted hand of Soviet communism and the guardian of national values. Vasilii Belov used his public appearances at Writers' Union conferences and the Congress of People's Deputies to voice his concern for the Russian peasantry and rural Russia. During a resignation speech to the Supreme Soviet he linked the saving of the peasantry to the salvation of national culture:

The peasantry is the salvation of the people and state altogether. It is the salvation of language, national traditions, the national culture of every people. I stress - every people. Saving the peasantry means ceasing interethnic struggles, it means a healthy ecology and demography and, finally, the army.⁶⁵

This statement does not so much reflect Belov's concern for the peasantry,

but his concern for Russia and the maintenance of a unitary state. Belov is opposed to the Soviet regime that introduced urbanisation, but he does not advocate the break-up of the Soviet state. Support for the Russian peasantry and condemnation of urbanisation provides a suitable expression of the Russian national ideal without addressing the question of the maintenance of a Russian state whose borders are coterminous with those of the Soviet Union; the idea of Russian national revival and the maintenance of a unitary state are alluded to, but the question of Russian ethnic dominance in a multiethnic state can be conveniently fudged and ignored. Belov's stance is pro-Russian, anti-Soviet, but pro-state - his focus on the peasantry allows him to express his position without raising some of the more complicated consequences of pursuing his ideas.

It is interesting to note that when the RSFSR Supreme Soviet addressed the citizens of Russia in October 1990 on its approval of the Shatalin 500-day plan, it referred to the Russian village. Bearing in mind that Russia had already declared sovereignty by this stage, the Supreme Soviet referred to the programme as one of 'national salvation' and stated that:

The village is to be revived and the strong master returned to the land.⁶⁶

This official comment from the Russian parliament reflects the broad support for the national importance of the Russian village.

The search for national identity and the definition of the Russian character

Nationalism's selective use of its diverse inherited cultural wealth and its tendency to personify the nation leads to a huge discussion about what constitutes or reflects the national identity. To some extent the nation is idealized and subjected to an examination of that which makes it unique. The examination of Russian identity which took place over the perestroika years dredged up ideas from the past by thinkers such as Solov'ev and Berdiaev, as well as producing a plethora of new reflections and opinions: many looked to the pre-Soviet past to provide images of the Russian man; some intimated that the Russian nation was not unduly affected by the Soviet period; whilst others advocated the idea of total national renewal.

One of the most confusing and, perhaps, contentious issues affecting interpretations and portrayals of the Russian character was that of empire and the Russian's relationship with his/her imperial legacy. Whilst some nationalists portrayed the Russian as a superior character whose imperial rôle was a reflection of his strength, other nationalists asserted that the Russian was benevolent, paternalistic and altruistic, an educator and provider. Nationalism is frequently accompanied by personification of the nation and an idealization of the national character. This involves crediting the national character with many virtues. The revelation of failings or faults is kept to a minimum, but certain faults and peccadillos may be highlighted as a feature of the national character if they are somehow appealing.

Russian nationalism frequently asserted its identity with reference to Russia's unique position as a border between the supposedly diverse cultural worlds of Europe and Asia, thus claiming to be neither wholly European nor Asian. Nationalist discussion and the propounding of a Russian 'idea' provided Russia with a philosophy or mission which set it apart from other cultures. Russian nationalists sought to convince their fellow nationals that the Russian was the inheritor of something essential - an exclusivity which expressed itself through behaviour, language, religion and moral values.

Likhachev's evaluation of the Russian character

One of the leading figures who sought to evaluate and establish a notion of the Russian character was Academician Dmitrii Likhachev. Likhachev was widely respected for his scholarship and for his advanced years which both connected him with the prerevolutionary Russian past and endowed him with an aura of wisdom. It was also to his credit that he had survived six years of confinement in the infamous Solovki prison as a victim of Stalin's repression. His credentials enabled him to draw upon a large constituency of interest and, thus, he commanded a great deal of influence as an authority on the subject of Russian culture. Eschewing some of the more extreme and imperialist views expressed by nationalism, Likhachev gravitated towards liberal nationalism and labelled himself a 'patriot'

rather than a 'nationalist'. Others labelled him the 'conscience of Russia'.⁶⁷

A philologist and literary historian, Likhachev drew upon sources of literature in order to construct an image of the Russian. In 1984 the *Sovetskaia Rossiia* publishing house published a bound copy of Likhachev's *Zametki o russkom*, a set of essays reflecting on the nature of the Russian and his culture.⁶⁸ Likhachev referred to the Russian's virtue, his cultural contribution and the effect of his physical environment upon his development. The essays outlined a fairly common account of how the Russian envisaged himself and provided an attractive model description for nationalist-oriented Russians to follow and adopt through the Gorbachev years. Likhachev's opinions and observations led to a number of interviews during the late 80s in journals and newspapers consulting his opinion on Russian culture and morality.

In *Zametki o russkom*, Likhachev discussed the Russian's kindness; his tendency towards close family relationships; his close, essential relationship with his vast territory and environment; the value of his unique national cultural inheritance.

The more negative aspects of Russian history are blamed upon the rulers and the Russian people are absolved:

One should not make the nation responsible for the deeds of its rulers... ..Of course, there are {more} examples of Tsarism's cruel attitude towards other nations {which could be brought up}, but was it not really the Russian people themselves who suffered, and first and foremost the Russian people who suffered from the cruelty of its own government?⁶⁹

Likhachev also discusses the virtues of what he considers to be patriotism as opposed to nationalism:

True patriotism enriches others, enriching them spiritually. However, nationalism, by walling itself off from other cultures, turns its own culture to waste and ruin...

Patriotism is the noblest of feelings. It is not even a feeling - it is the most important aspect of both a personal and social culture of the spirit, when a person and a whole nation (*narod*) somehow rise above themselves and set themselves goals which are beyond their personal aims.

However, nationalism is the severest of human misfortunes. Like all evil, it hides itself, lives in the shadows and only pretends to be generated by love for one's country.⁷⁰

Although Likhachev was propagating a nationalist message, he sought to dissociate himself from the negative and unattractive associations with

nationalism. For instance, he distanced himself from the xenophobia that sometimes results from nationalism and expressed support for cultural freedom and democracy. This made his liberal nationalist message more acceptable to a larger proportion of Russian society as well as to observers outside Russia. As an influential figure in this field, Likhachev's views are significant. His emphasis on national renewal focussed on recognition of mistakes in Russia's recent past⁷¹ and on the re-examination and study of Russian history and culture:

Before us stands the task of restoring the fullness of Russian culture... Russia is not an abstract concept. In developing her culture we must know what it produced in the past and what it is now. However complicated it might be, we must study Russia⁷²

The features of nationalism in Likhachev's ideas are confirmed by his attempt to personify the nation:

...Russian culture and along with it the whole of Russia is a personality, an individual.⁷³

In a fashion which is typical of nationalism, Likhachev seeks to establish an idealised vision of the Russian national character, which reflects virtue rather than fault. He even goes so far as to suggest that national character should only really be judged by its 'positive' traits:

National character is paradoxical. Each positive quality is encountered by its opposite negative characteristic: openness by reserve, generosity by greed, love of freedom by slavish obedience, etc. However, we judge any national type first and foremost by its positive characteristics.⁷⁴

That which is 'positive' is determined by subjective analysis. Glasnost gave Likhachev a greater opportunity to publicise his own interpretation of the national ideal and present his idealised image of Russian man. This idealisation took place amidst a time of guilt and of repentance as unsavoury aspects of Russia's Soviet past were dredged up by glasnost. Likhachev's representation of the Russian might well have been an attempt to encourage and convince the Russian of his worth and potential whilst revelations of the past pointed to shame and ignominy. The idealised Russian man was an attempt by Likhachev to encourage ethical values in what appeared to be a moral void. He even suggested that the Russian character was distinguished by the Russian's moral authority:

The Russian people must never lose their moral authority among other peoples - an

authority deservedly won by Russian art, Russian literature, the struggle of the Russian intelligentsia for a better future for all mankind and the profound internationalism of the Russian people. A great people should be at the height of responsibility in its patriotic feelings and should not slip into crude nationalism. Only by being aware of our global responsibility can we Russians preserve our leading position in our country. We should help all peoples of our country to become morally purer and, of course, not sink to base chauvinism. We Russians do not need chauvinism. It is primarily found in weak peoples - peoples with a weak culture and weak cultural heritage.⁷⁵

Whilst discouraging bigotry, Likhachev tries to inspire pride in the Russian nation. Russia is clearly described as a 'great' and 'strong' nation, where 'great' and 'strong' do not refer to size of the populous:

... a great nation, a nation with its own great culture and own national traditions, is *obliged* to be good, especially if the fate of a lesser nation is tied to it...

A strong nation is not necessarily large in number, a weak one not necessarily small. It is not a matter of the number of people belonging to a given nation, so much as the certainty and stability of its national traditions.⁷⁶

Likhachev links certain virtues with the Russian character which some might not associate with the usual image of the Russian, certainly not with the Russian of the Soviet period. He writes of the Russian's association with industriousness which, he believes, is one aspect of Russian religious consciousness that does not exist in other branches of Christianity:

The Christian ideal acquired a vital virtue in Russia - that of industriousness.⁷⁷

He also stresses the Russian's association with the love of freedom:

Freedom of choice also increased thanks to the openness of Russian culture...

Russian culture, thanks to its mixture of different legacies is full of internal freedom.⁷⁸

Likhachev does not isolate Russian culture from its foreign neighbours. In fact, he declares that Russian culture is basically European and Byzantine:

We are a country of European culture... Along with this we took in Byzantine culture, to a very large degree through Bulgaria.⁷⁹

This 'European' Russian culture is one which is receptive to and can be enriched by foreign influences. However, whilst relating Russian culture to foreign culture, Likhachev presents the nationalist angle by arguing that Russian culture developed its own distinctive, even, 'higher forms' of the foreign styles of culture:

This capacity of Russian culture to enrich itself from foreign cultures and by

transformation of its own earlier culture was [even] more evident in the change of styles. The Russian land created its own artistic styles in the ancient period of its development up until the time of Petrine reforms, and after Peter it was incorporated into the general development of Western artistic life, constantly transforming artistic styles which originated in the West and were then responded to in Russia. But what a response! In Russia each style acquired not only its own forms, but higher forms. Baroque, classicism, sentimentalism, romanticism and realism!⁸⁰

Whilst declaring the Russian people to be 'great' and 'strong' Likhachev is careful to stress that the Russian character is international and is not predisposed to racial prejudice. He justifies this with reference to the multicultural character of the Petersburg of his childhood and to the perceived harmonious relationship between different 'nations' in ancient Russia.

Russian culture has from the very start been a culture of different peoples... Ancient Rus' was distinguished by the complete absence of racial prejudice against those over whom its influence spread... In not one single document is there a trace of racial or chauvinistic motive and a large number of documents have been preserved... Russian culture was open to other peoples and actively incorporated their experience. It is precisely due to this that Russian culture became great.⁸¹

The Russians are attributed with a quality which stresses their tolerance and regard for others:

The multinational [Russian] state cultivated respect between nations. Even when the Russians hated the Tartar warriors as enemies, they did not hate them for their national features - they did not notice them... Not once has the word 'slant-eyed' or anything similar crept up in Russian texts. The 'all-embracing responsiveness' [*vseotzyvchivost'*], about which Dostoevskii wrote, was a feature of the Russian national character... 'all-embracing responsiveness' and national tolerance always existed in Rus'... This very feature constitutes the strength and national peculiarity of the Russian people.⁸²

Likhachev is suggesting that the Russian character possesses a quality which responds to and caters for the needs of others. Thus, in spite of Russia's imperial history, he rejects any Russian national arrogance and, at the same time, provides a justification for the Russians' position as first among equals in a multinational empire: their 'all-embracing responsiveness' credits them with a moral and social authority befitting their position.

Despite his efforts to define and encourage interest in the Russian national identity, Likhachev dissociates himself from the idea that the Russian national character is genetically inherited:

It would be ridiculous to suggest that features of the Russian character were innate in

Russians. In fact, they were cultivated by history and the historical situations in which Russia most often found itself...⁸³

He also distances himself from the idea that there is one definitive Russian type, thus accommodating others within the Russian state:

The character of the people is not uniform. We notice how differences in the Russian character were formed and are forming amongst coastal inhabitants, others in Siberia and yet others along the Volga... It is impossible to separate Russia from the peoples who populate her, who together with the Russians make up her national body. Russia is almost the only country of its kind- due to the wealth of her cultural types and the complexity of the intertwining of different traits within them; by the energy of her various revelations; and, finally, by the intensity of her relationships with other nationalities.⁸⁴

The above words demonstrate a dilemma which all analysts of the Russian national question encounter - Likhachev was trying to establish the Russian [*russkii*] national character, whilst always having to address the phenomenon of a multinational Great Russia [*Rossiia*]. On the one hand, he treats Russia and all of her nationalities as a unitary 'national body', whilst, on the other, he attempts to define something which is specifically Russian [*russkii*], relating to those who are ethnically Russian. This theme, brought about by Russia's imperial legacy, is one which frequently crops up in evaluations of, or observations on the Russian national character and identity. Likhachev's observations tend to obscure the difference between *russkii* and *rossiiskii*, suggesting that the two are different, but inseparable. There is no doubt that he identifies a specific Russian ethnic nation, but this nation cannot be defined outside the context of the multinational state of which it is the senior member. By selective analysis, Likhachev and others attempted to define something which would be both plausible and acceptable to those who considered themselves to be 'Russians'.

Other observations on the Russian national character

Others besides Likhachev attempted to define the Russian character and unite the Russian people about an idealised image of themselves. Many illustrated their evaluations by selecting examples from Russian history. Dmitri Balashov used the example of an early historical hero, St. Sergii of Radonezh:

The best sides of the Russian national character traced throughout our history and today are contained namely by Sergii Radonezhskii. These are an absolute, unalterable adherence to chosen principles, a preparedness to work and as much kindness as circumstances allow, quiet efficiency, a deliberate, principled modesty, an outward meaning in all one's actions, identical treatment of the high and the low and absolute, sacrificial patriotism.⁸⁵

Whilst others resorted to later figures as the embodiment of Russian values such as the Soviet Russian hero Iurii Gagarin:

The first person in space was a Russian, a Soviet chap, clever and modest, with an amazing, unforgettable smile which won over a planet of people. Even today we love him as if he were alive, our Iurii Gagarin, and we will always love him, for he absorbed the best qualities of the Russian, Soviet character - cheerful, courageous, sincere and infinitely devoted to the Motherland. There is an example of a true patriot, there is a genuine son of the Fatherland!⁸⁶

Aleksandr Saltykov, a priest, also related the development of the Russian character to the past, its religious past:

The influence of liturgical life on the Russian people, on the formation of its mental properties, is as evident in its culture as it is in the great moral qualities of the Russian in the past. That which is best in the Russian people, those traits of the Russian person which are rightly lauded in fiction are not something innate. Kindness, gentleness, tolerance, benevolence, sacrifice, fearlessness, disinterestedness, cordiality - these and other characteristics, which are often recognised as the best in the Russian person, particularly in the past, were fostered within him by constant, centuries-long spiritual and moral preaching which he would hear from the church pulpit and through the repentance which would be inculcated into him from childhood.⁸⁷

Aleksandr Kazintsev argued that the Russian national character was unchanging and examined early Russian literature to draw parallels with the present.⁸⁸ This idea of the unchanging nature of nations was also expressed in the journal *Veche* when it printed an extract from a book by the emigré Russian A. V. Kartashev:

...from the historical start to their historical death nations [*narody*] are steady types which cannot be broken down, evidently subject to the law of biological individualisation and self-preservation, analogous to the law of stability of organic forms.
...Thus, Russia is not just like an external, historically changeable fact, but like a stable organic whole, a spiritual type, the living soul of the Russian people with a united, assembly-like consciousness.⁸⁹

A certain interest was shown in the work of Lev Gumilev who claimed that a nationality or 'ethnos' developed according to its ecological environment. This development would proceed over time until an identifiable group emerged:

Human collectives have a rigid link with the landscape that feeds them. This is the Motherland.

But in order to use the landscape's resources one must adapt, and this requires some considerable time. Adaptation comes about over generations; it is not the grandsons, but the great-grandsons of the first newcomers to the country who, with natural conditions unfamiliar to their grandfathers, master the set of traditions necessary for a successful existence. It is then that the Motherland becomes the Fatherland. That is how it was even in paleolithic times.⁹⁰

It is this idea that the national group is somehow organically bound to its physical environment rather than just a product of its social history that attracted people like Balashov and coincided with the views of authors such as Astaf'ev, Rasputin and Belov who considered the image of the hard-working, courageous and honest rural peasant to be the embodiment of the true Russian character.

It was common for those of a Russian nationalist inclination to square the Russian national character with Russia's imperial past. The usual claim was that the Russian character was peace-loving and altruistic and that Russian expansion brought occupied peoples peace and equality rather than subjugation and exploitation. In 1988, V. A. Tvardovskaia pointed to this tendency when referring to the work of writers in the nationalist-orientated journal *Molodaia gvardiia*:

From the point of view of commentators of the youth journal (V. Chalmaev, M. Lobanov), Russia's past witnessed no oppression, no violence, no wars of conquest - only just wars. It is true that historians often promote the same idea of the foreign policy of Russian autocracy - the very word 'conquest' was never used in those days - when they spoke of Central Asia or the Caucasus they only spoke about 'voluntary annexation'.⁹¹

In 1991, Viktor Aksiuchits also rejected the idea that the 'Russian people' were 'imperialists, occupiers, oppressors of all the rest of the peoples in the country' and attempted to refute it by giving the example of the Russians withdrawing from Paris after having defeated Napoleon.⁹²

The image put forward by nationalist-orientated commentators of the Russians in relation to the empire was that they were pioneers who brought protection to those who they subsumed and that the Russian was inclined to treat national minorities benevolently:

The leading force of their [peoples of the USSR] international unity was the working class of Russia, headed by the Communist Party. The Russian working class honourably fulfilled the great international duty bequeathed to it by Lenin, having shown decisive help to earlier oppressed peoples to overcome backwardness...⁹³

The preceding words appeared in *Pravda* in January 1986 reflecting the existing pre-Gorbachev image of the Russian as the benevolent elder brother in the family of Soviet peoples. This idea continued throughout the Gorbachev period particularly amongst those of an imperialist Russian nationalist inclination. It was prevalent amongst some of the *Pamiat'* groups:

All over the course of its history, the Russian people has come to the help of its brothers and neighbours. Even in those centuries when world politics were not based on morality but on force, the Russian people never suppressed smaller peoples, never destroyed them, never Russified them. Kindness, patience and an ability to organize life in a non-aggressive and unparasitic way are primordial Russian qualities.⁹⁴

Igor' Sychev, a *Pamiat'* group leader, referred to the Russian people's 'just' role as guardian of others:

The Russian people was very rightly considered by other peoples to be the elder brother in the great family of nations.⁹⁵

One of the major proponents of imperialist Russian nationalism, Aleksandr Prokhanov, also highlighted the benevolent, sacrificial nature of the Russian character:

The orientation of the Russian individual and collective conscience towards the state, the psychological character of the Russian person, open to international links, the sacrifice of the Russian economy, culture, ethnos, which facilitated the creation of the state.⁹⁶

Russian exclusiveness

The propagation of an idealised Russian national character was occasionally reinforced by reference to the exclusiveness of the Russian. An article by G. Petrov in *Sovetskaia kul'tura* on 24 November 1987 reported an 'academic conference' in which one participant, Mikhail Antonov, had claimed that:

There is and never has been a more talented people on the earth than ours, the Russian people!⁹⁷

The article was critical of some of the opinions expressed at the conference, including those of Antonov and particularly those presented by Dmitrii Vasil'ev of *Pamiat'*. A subsequent letter to the paper, whilst giving no

support to Vasil'ev, questioned whether Petrov was proud of his national origins and pointed out that Antonov was not the first person to have expressed these words, but that they had been used by figures including Pushkin, Tolstoi, Dostoevskii, Chekhov and Maiakovskii.⁹⁸

Another later example of the idea of Russian exclusiveness appeared on the pages of a pro-monarchist independent newspaper:

NO OTHER PEOPLE IN THE WORLD HAS BEEN THROUGH THE SAME TIMES AND TASKS AS THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND NO OTHER PEOPLE HAS DERIVED SUCH STRENGTH, ORIGINALITY AND SPIRITUAL DEPTH FROM SUCH EXPERIENCES AND TORMENTS.⁹⁹

Whilst monarchists and like-minded people rejected socialism and communism, others united the ideas of Russian exclusiveness and socialist exclusiveness. A declaration by the Association of Socialist-Populists claimed:

Russia is a historical phenomenon which has no analogues in world history...

Historical events that occurred in our country, her territorial, climatic and later spiritual, political and economic peculiarities led to Russia receiving its own course in the general development of world civilization, a course which differed from all other countries in the world.

Factors established by the foundation of a particular Russian path continued to have an effect, making Russia more and more unlike the rest of the world...

and this was qualified by the consequential development of Russian social thinking which produced thinkers such as Herzen who espoused 'populist or Russian socialism':

The basis of Russian socialism is the principle of communality brought out of the depths of history by the people themselves.¹⁰⁰

It was not only the likes of a small Russian socialist group which expressed such ideas. Even the 'internationalist' *Edinstvo* group of Nina Andreeva suggested that socialism had its roots in the Russian national past. An address to 'compatriots' listing the historical Russian figures evoked by Stalin (Aleksandr Nevskii, Dmitrii Donskoi, Kuz'ma Minin, Dmitrii Pozharskii, Aleksandr Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov) to inspire a Soviet Victory in the Second World War continued the link between the efforts of these nation-builders and the national character of socialism:

We will defend Lenin from vandalism and lack of historical memory - so that he and those builders of the Russian land whose courageous image shielded and saved the nation in

November 1941 might once again - perhaps for the last time - teach, inspire and save us...
... Socialism is the flesh of the flesh of our historical past, it is the child of our national genius, of our national spirit.¹⁰¹

One of the figures who was most outspoken in this respect was Aleksandr Prokhanov, an undoubted imperialist Russian nationalist who suggested in 1988 that the state had no future in turning to alien Western concepts or by adopting a mystical, intangible 'Russian Idea'. Prokhanov implied that socialism was firmly rooted in Russian history and that it was the only force capable of integrating all tendencies in Russian/Soviet society. In Prokhanov's view, socialism was an integral part of Russia's state identity.¹⁰²

Russian language

Several other issues besides the definition of national character gravitated around the discussion of national identity. One of the central issues was that of the Russian language, which acted as a unifying factor in the Russian/Soviet state and served as a badge of identity to many people in non-Russian republics who did not have a command of the titular language (the 'international' movements in the Baltic republics sometimes referred to the rights of 'Russian-speakers' rather than 'Russians'). One should note that there was a significant number of 'Russian-speakers' (*russkoiazychnye*) both within and outside the Russian Federation whose ancestral lineage was not Russian, but who identified themselves culturally with Russia.¹⁰³

The unifying role of the Russian language was expressed by L. Skvortsov in *Pravda* in January 1986:

There cannot be genuine love for the country, for the Motherland, without a love of one's mother tongue, without a knowledge of its invaluable riches and possibilities.

A great example and unsurpassed model for us to imitate is Lenin's careful and, at the same time, creative relationship with the Russian language...

The cementing role of the Russian language is great in strengthening our multinational state and in developing a common Soviet culture which is socialist in content, varied in its national forms and international in spirit.

Unbiased census data shows a steady growth in the number of non-Russians naming the Russian language as their mother tongue or as a second language which they freely command...

The outstanding role of the Russian language in uniting the great brotherhood of peoples of

the USSR should, in my opinion, receive deserved attention in the new wording of the CPSU Programme.¹⁰⁴

The above words represent the attitude towards the Russian language over the Brezhnev-era - that it served as a suitable *lingua franca* in the multinational Soviet state. However, stressing the importance of the idea of the 'love of one's mother tongue' suggests that those of non-Russian nationality were being required to absorb a Soviet language which was essentially Russian, thus introducing them not only to Soviet culture, but also to a Russian register and understanding. This attitude continued throughout the Gorbachev period and in March 1989 another article appeared in *Pravda* singling out the qualities of the Russian language above others of the USSR.¹⁰⁵ Although the russifying role of the Russian language was supported by people of an imperialist Russian nationalist persuasion, some rejected the idea of using Russian as the 'Soviet' language, claiming that the language was being ruined or 'de-nationalised'. Some objected to the infiltration of foreign words, others objected to the introduction of terms ushered in by communism. An extreme example of this appeared in Igor' Siniavin's (one of several *Pamiat'* group leaders) political programme, which called for the establishment of a commission to protect the Russian language:

We must create a special state commission, possessing the right of direct sanctions, based upon a publishing and research centre consisting of Russian (not only by passport) academics and writers, pursuing the purity of the Russian language. We must cleanse the Russian language of false Party-speak, of the cramming of abbreviations, of lickspittle pro-Westernisms and of thecrippings of Yiddish.¹⁰⁶

Similarly, another *Pamiat'* group called for the establishment of a body to protect the language:

We demand that the purity and wealth of the mother tongue be protected from the pernicious influence on it of newspaper jargon by creating of an Academy of the Russian language...¹⁰⁷

Russian nation as a victim

In addition to claiming that the Russian language had suffered, some observers attempted to portray the Russian person as a victim of the Soviet period, seeking to absolve the nation of any misdeeds during the

unsavoury events of recent history. Undoubtedly, Russian individuals suffered in much the same way as other individuals of other nationalities did, but some commentators expressed the idea that Russians were the greater victims, perhaps in response to the sentiment held by non-Russians that the Russians occupied an imperial role within the Soviet set-up. There was a clear need, particularly by those of an imperialist nationalist persuasion who wished to maintain the unitary Soviet state structure, to establish an image of the Russian nation as a benevolent 'elder brother' who had sacrificed much for its siblings, but also suffered just as much in the process. It was necessary to unite Russians behind the idea that they shared a common national virtue and were in no way responsible as a nation for the misfortunes and atrocities which befell the Soviet Union. Several figures claimed, variously, that Russia was the victim of the revolution and socialism; Russia had suffered a severe moral degradation as a result of Soviet rule; the Russian nation of all the Soviet nationalities had sustained the greatest harm to its national identity and culture.

In a debate with Benedikt Sarnov, Vadim Kozhinov recognised that the revolution was both 'Russian and popular'. However, he also suggested that it was brought about by émigrés who had been outside Russia so long that they could no longer understand the country. Naming such figures as Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Sokol'nikov as well as 'immigrants from Europe' Radek and Rakovskii, Kozhinov subjected Trotskii to the greatest criticism. He indicated his belief of Trotskii's complicity in turning the revolution into an anti-Russian act:

...Trotskii wrote that the Russian life reconstructed by L. Tolstoi 'took its course outside history... similar to the existence of a beehive or an anthill'. How excessively considerately he treats an anthill... The revolution, directed against capitalists and landowners was turned into the most extreme violence against the nation [*narod*].¹⁰⁸

Vladimir Zhirinovskii claimed that whilst other nationalities complained they had lost their natural resources under socialism, it was the Russians who were the real victims:

Today they are beginning to shout and howl: "Where are our riches? They have appropriated everything from us!" It seems that the Tatars had their oil taken away, the Yakuts their diamonds, the Uzbeks their cotton. Everything was taken away from everyone. Now it seems that the Russians are to blame for everything. Yet another blow is

inflicted on the Russians. Now it seems that the Russians brought the revolution on their bayonets and that Russians bought up raw materials and provisions for next to nothing: Moldavian grapes, Georgian mandarines, Uzbek cotton... And yet, we must ask, to whom did we give it away? What, the Russians live better than all the others? Russians are poorer than all the others. They are right in one thing: the resources trickled away and part of the national wealth went abroad to help communist regimes there....

If we take a grand total, then Russia is the one that grew impoverished, it was purely Russian regions and genuinely Russian lands, and in all aspects a blow was inflicted on the main nation... And today the victim once again appears to be the Russian people, but they are already tired and do not want the role of donor foisted upon them.¹⁰⁹

Igor' Shafarevich's formulation of the idea of 'Russophobia' originally published in *Samizdat* in 1982 and republished in various official publications in 1989 (particularly in *Nash sovremennik*) put forward the idea of Russia as a victim, which had been unfairly portrayed as the vanguard of Soviet rule, when it was itself the victim.¹¹⁰ In 1991, Shafarevich updated his idea and summarized the basic points of his first work:

In our writing on current affairs and literature there is a very influential tendency instilling the idea of the inferiority and detrimental nature of Russian history, culture and the national psyche: "Russia is the breeding-ground of totalitarianism, the Russians had no history, the Russians always grovel before strong power." In order to designate this tendency, we use the term 'Russophobia'. It is fatally dangerous to the Russian people, stripping it of its faith in its strengths.¹¹¹

Shafarevich's updated article on Russophobia was written in view of the revelations which had surfaced under glasnost and following the sizeable number of articles which had appeared in response to the broader publication of his original work. Once again Shafarevich was at pains to absolve the Russian people and Russian character of any responsibility for the revolution and its aftermath, blaming the events on a section of society which he named the *Malyi narod* [little nation].

Evgenii Anisimov, writing in *Moscow News*, suggested that it was because of the Russians' very nature that they became such an easy victim to both the Russian empire and the Stalinist empire:

The exploitation of the Russian people's kindness, their readiness to sacrifice themselves, their patience and unpretentiousness, the use of their national wealth in the name of distant imperial aims effected the notorious 'law of colonial ingratitude'. People felt offended by the parent-state which emphasized their role officially, but actually belittled it: people were sacrificed in vain to the Motherland and hopes were dashed.¹¹²

The moral degradation of Russia was a theme which had been salient in the work of the aforementioned village-prose writers, such as in Vasilii

Belov's *Vse vpered!*, which suggested that moral decadence was due to the creeping influence of urban (and, therefore, 'non-Russian') culture. The idea was that the rural community had been able to provide a moral guidance and that the destruction of the community had removed the basis for this guidance. Frequent reference to morality (*nравственность*) appeared in texts putting forward Russian nationalist sentiments, but what this abstract term referred to was not always clear. For some it was simply the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church (to which I will return later):

We must revive our people spiritually and morally with the help of primarily the Orthodox Church.¹¹³

For others, such as Viacheslav Gorbachev, morality entailed the rejection of material values and the acceptance of the idea of the social collective. Moral degradation was signified by the materialistic, consumerist values ushered in by the Brezhnev-era. The criticism of these 'urban' values was clearly an attack on Western values and Gorbachev indicated that these values had appeared at the expense of 'spirituality' and collective social responsibility.¹¹⁴

Mikhail Antonov recognised a moral decline in the Russian nation and indicated that this needed to be remedied before other change could take place:

The truth is that it is not just the economy that is sick,... it is the country and the nation that are sick, the nation's soul is destroyed, its moral foundations have been undermined. Without a renewal of this basis all measures of a purely economic nature are useless. We now need a real break-through in this area of theory, not abstract constructions, but the enrichment of the theory of spiritual and moral values of all peoples of this planet and first and foremost our great Russian nation.¹¹⁵

These words, which addressed a plenum of the RSFSR Writers' Union, followed an earlier article in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* in which Antonov had expressed the same sentiment and stressed the need for moral rearmament.¹¹⁶ In 1990 Antonov suggested that Russia needed the reintroduction of a Russian Orthodox Christian morality to revive the country and its economy.¹¹⁷

Russian National Unity, the party headed by former *Pamiat'* member, Aleksandr Barkashov, referred to the ideas of Russian national and moral

loss incurred as a result of the revolution:

It historically arose that the Russian People, by the strength of its great Spirituality, Morality, developed economic activity, Culture, numerousness, military strength and fairness, became a powerful nucleus of attraction, about which a mighty multinational state was formed. It was the Russian nation and not any celebrated internationalism or general human values, which was the pivot and cement in this state. As a result of the 1917 revolution, of subsequent events and, in particular, of genocide in all its forms, the Russian people were stripped of their role by violent and artificial means...¹¹⁸

This idea of Russian national loss was put forward by all the other *Pamiat'* groups. Vasil'ev's National Patriotic Front *Pamiat'* blamed 'Zionists' for harming the Russian people:

They [Zionists] took away from the Russian people traditions, the national economy and the private property that belonged to them by right...¹¹⁹

Propagating the idea of suffering and loss not only suggested the endurance and nobility of the Russian character, but it served to unite people behind a common sense of loss and mutual sympathy. The idea of Russia as a victim produced a sense of something approaching martyrdom:

The world is hoping that Russia will point out a new way, for a great light is born of great suffering.

No one in the world has suffered more than Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine, no one has sipped more bitterly from the cup, that is why the word is behind them.¹²⁰

Some commentators pointed to the spiritual and ascetic qualities of the Russian people, whilst others emphasised the material injustices which the nation had needlessly suffered. In almost every case, the Russian nation was not responsible for its own suffering and loss.

Re-evaluations of history and Russian historical figures

The examination of character and national loss also required a re-examination, and in some cases, a re-evaluation of history. The focus on Russian history tended to paint more idealised pictures of the pre-revolutionary Russian past and rehabilitated views of history which had existed prior to Soviet power. Although certain figures in history such as Dmitrii Donskoi and Aleksandr Nevskii were portrayed positively over the Soviet period, other figures such as Stolypin, who had been vilified throughout the same period, became a figure of much attention and

respect. In addition, Russian history was examined in relation to Soviet history which was itself subject to great scrutiny and review. The discussion and positive propagation of Russian history, the resurrection of symbols and 'values' from the past became an important factor in the course of uniting Russians around a national ideal that appeared to have some precedent and, therefore, 'legitimacy'.

The re-examination of history focussed to a large extent on the Soviet period, particularly on the Stalinist terror and Brezhnev's stagnation. Russian nationalist interpretation of Soviet history varied. In some instances (as mentioned above), the Russian nation was cast as the victim, whilst other opinions viewed the socialism and events of the period as a necessary and fundamentally characteristic step in the Russian state's history.

Several figures who expressed Russian nationalism, such as Aleksandr Tsipko, Viktor Aksiuchits and Il'ia Glazunov, believed that Russian history and Soviet history bore little direct relation to each other i.e. that Russian history came to a standstill in 1917 and that Soviet history should be viewed separately.¹²¹ Others, who supported socialism and the maintenance of the unitary Soviet state followed a 'single stream' theory of Russian history, which recognised the Soviet state as a continuation of the Russian state. Both tendencies observed fairly positive images of the pre-revolutionary Russian past.

Aleksandr Ageev pointed to the idealisation of history used by nationalist-orientated figures to rally others around a national idea. In a vein similar to Gellner, he suggested that this was part of the myth-building process of nationalism:

The person... ..in searching for an image of another better life inevitably turns to the past. This is the way that Slavophile myths about pre-petrine Holy Russia once arose... This is the way that the modern myth arose about a pre-revolutionary Great Russia, where everything was different and better than in the communist Russia.¹²²

The interest in pre-revolutionary Russian history was one of the most significant developments in shaping the nucleus of a recognisable Russian identity about which Russians (both *russkie* and *rossiiskie*) could congregate and unify. Mikhail Lobanov stressed the importance of knowing one's own history in *Nash sovremennik* in 1988, downplaying

the idea of internationalism by asserting that events and issues in other parts of the world cannot be as important as the products of one's own history.¹²³

Certain adherents to Russian nationalism complained that the education system did not provide an adequate propagation of Russian history. For instance, the Leningrad branch of *Pamiat'* declared that:

In schools in the other republics of the USSR, children learn both the history of the USSR and the history of their republic, which cultivates a love and pride for their native land (*krai*). In RSFSR schools, all they learn is the history of the USSR.¹²⁴

These words were all but reproduced by a member of the Moscow Writers' Union Anatolii Zhukov, who compared Russia with the other republics:

We are an exception. For example, in Russian schools Russian history is not taught, there is only USSR history.¹²⁵

This concern for the teaching of a Russian national history overlooks the fact that the history of the USSR as it was taught in Soviet schools was, more or less, a history of the development of the Russian state charting Russia's history from Kiev Rus' through the Tsars and the October Revolution up to the present. The textbooks may have presented certain (but, by no means, all) events in a negative light from an ideological perspective, but this was no less true of the republican history textbooks.

The *RNPR* was one of several groups which called for a revised (or 'objective', as they preferred to put it) version of Russian history :

The *RNPR* will strive for the objective teaching of Russian history and the removal of distortions, tendentious evaluations and falsifications brought into it.¹²⁶

The desire for a more positive appraisal of Russian history was highlighted by the aforementioned support for the republication of Karamzin's *History of the Russian State*. This account of history was welcomed because it was free from the ideological constraints of communism and because it glorified the feats of Russian history. Many of the heroic figures in distant Russian history (particularly those instrumental in the founding and maintenance of the Russian state) were accepted as such by Soviet history books. However, the closer history approached 1917, the more likely historical establishment figures were to be portrayed in a negative light. The reappraisal of history under glasnost rehabilitated several

figures who were held up as icons in a link with the pre-revolutionary past. Petr Stolypin and Tsar Nicholas II represent just two of these figures. Stolypin became a figure of respect for a broad spectrum of people, ranging from pro-El'tsin democrats to members of *Pamiat'*. It was not so much that Stolypin was admired for his economic policies, but that he became a national figure who represented pre-revolutionary Russian national interest and an alternative programme of reform to that of the communists. Although condemned by pro-communist imperialist nationalists such as Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo* for anti-communism and for liberal economic policies,¹²⁷ Stolypin was celebrated as a Russian patriot by a number of other groups and his speech on agrarian reform appeared in a number of publications, particularly in some of the new independent newspapers. These articles repeated Stolypin's desire for a better future for Russia and often cited his words: 'We need a great Russia!'¹²⁸ One group who used this phrase, the Republican Popular Party of Russia, *RNPR*, held the 'First All-Russian Stolypin readings' on 14-15 December 1991,¹²⁹ after previously announcing its intentions to do so in copies of its paper, *Nashe vremia*. The Party's leader Nikolai Lysenko had previously described Stolypin as 'our great hero'.¹³⁰

Valentin Rasputin, writing before the Russian presidential election in 1991, declared his support for Nikolai Ryzhkov, but added that his ideal candidate would be a figure like Petr Stolypin who was capable of understanding 'Russia's historical fate' and the 'Russian people's character'. Rasputin suggested that Stolypin was an embodiment of the true Russian character, implying that as a leader he understood Russia's role in the world - a 'spiritual' role.¹³¹

Another article entitled 'Reading Stolypin', which appeared in the nationalist-orientated *Moskovskii literator*, urged liberals and members of the left to judge 'patriots' not by such figures as leader of one of the *Pamiat'* groups, Smirnov-Ostashvili, but by the values of Stolypin.¹³² This suggests that Stolypin's pro-Russian rhetoric, his defence of maintaining a strong unitary Russian state, his authoritarian methods and his solutions for the development of agriculture, the peasant community and Russian society in general were supported by the author as an example of acceptable Russian national values. For such people, Stolypin not only understood

the Russian national character, but reflected the Russian national character. A renewed interest in the monarchy was another feature in the search for national identity. The rehabilitation of Tsar Nicholas II and his family was an issue which received some attention. In 1989, *Moscow News* printed an interview with G. Riabov who claimed that he had found the bodies of the Royal Family outside Sverdlovsk and that he wanted to rebury them.¹³³ There was also an outcry over the demolition of the Ipat'ev House in Sverdlovsk where the Tsar and his family were believed to have been murdered. Certain nationalist-orientated people erected a cross on the site, which was declared sacred and demands surfaced for a church to be constructed on the site to commemorate the death of the last Tsar.¹³⁴ Sympathy for the Tsar surfaced in a variety of other ways. Culprits were found for the downfall of the monarchy. The extreme Russian nationalist Vladimir Fomichev blamed Kerenskii and 'almost all of his government' for changing centuries of Tsarist power, claiming that they were masons.¹³⁵ Several groups adopted the Tsar as a national symbol and some supported the restoration of the monarchy. *Pamiat'* groups openly expressed their support for the monarchy. For example, Dmitrii Vasil'ev declared:

THE TSAR IS THE FATHER OF THE NATION.
MONARCHY IS THE HIGHEST DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION OF RULE ON EARTH.¹³⁶

Information about the Tsar and his family appeared in Vasil'ev's newspaper *Pamiat'* and one printed the words and music to the former Russian national anthem 'God Save the Tsar'.¹³⁷

In 1989, the Orthodox Constitutional-Monarchist Party appeared which transformed into *PRAMOS*, the name used by the monarchist party led by General Denikin in the 20s. *PRAMOS* was formed with the direct aim of erecting a church on the site of the former Ipat'ev house, but it also supported the idea of the restoration of the Romanov dynasty.¹³⁸ Similarly, another monarchist group, *RISO*, advocated the idea of restoring the Romanovs to power in the person of Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich:

The ultimate aim of *RISO*'s activity is to restore a Russian Orthodox Kingdom...
RISO takes upon itself the defence and propagation of the RUSSIAN MONARCHIST IDEA in its everyday activity...

The most senior in the Romanov family, His Imperial Highness the Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich is considered by the *impertsy* [*RISO* members] to be the Head of the Russian Imperial House.¹³⁹

RISO stressed that the restoration of the monarchy was the only way to revive the Russian people - in other words, the only way to truly re-establish the Russian national identity:

The spiritual and ecclesiastical reconstitution of the Fatherland WITHOUT THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE MONARCHY is an empty dream and an illusion instilled by godless people. You cannot put the cart before the horses.

The revival, both spiritually and in every other way, of our people and our god-given Fatherland, can only be achieved with the restoration of the monarchy and in the course of organising it...¹⁴⁰

It was not only the more extreme groups that supported the idea of a restored Russian monarchy. Monarchist elements existed in other parties such as Vladimir Karpets in the Russian Christian Democratic Movement (*RKhDD*). Karpets' monarchist and nationalistic views led to some objection in the Movement's executive body, the Duma, but it did not prevent Karpets from himself occupying a place in the Movement's influential Duma.¹⁴¹

Pro-monarchist newspapers appeared such as *RISO's Dvuglavyi orel*, *Monarkhist* of the St. Petersburg Monarchist Centre, *Russkoe Znamia* and *Moskovskie vedomosti*. All included the double-headed eagle on their masthead and *Monarkhist* sometimes had little but a picture of Tsar Nicholas II and his family on the front cover.¹⁴² However, it was not only the publications of recognisable pro-monarchist groups which paid attention to the last tsar and to Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich. For example, the *DPR* newspaper *Demokraticheskaia gazeta* carried an interview with an advisor to Grand Prince Vladimir Kirillovich in late 1991 which portrayed the Grand Prince in a favourable light, suggesting that, although discretion was used by interviewing a third party, there might be sympathy for the idea of the monarchy within elements of the democratic movement (albeit, fairly conservative pro-Union elements in this case).¹⁴³

Russian national symbols

The adoption of Russian and, in particular, pre-revolutionary symbols was another feature of the search for Russian national identity. The Russian flag, the white, blue and red tricolour was adopted by *Demokraticeskii*

soiuz and also by members of the Russian parliament and its supporters following the Russian declaration of sovereignty in June 1990. This eventually led to the tricolour being raised over the Russian parliament building following the failed putsch of August 1991. Other, perhaps more menacing appearances of the tricolour were also in evidence. For example, one independent newspaper reported in 1989 that the tricolour had appeared along with banners of the imperial eagles, standards from the past and tunics from the Petrine era at a rally of soldiers in Gorky Park. The Russian flag was used on an advertising pamphlet attempting to persuade soldiers to subscribe to the army newspaper *Krasnaia zvezda*. The reporter commented that 'not one red flag was to be seen in the park' and one participant in civilian clothing boasted that there were no hammers and sickles. One major, also a People's Deputy, declared that the display of banners were:

"our valour, our history".¹⁴⁴

The Russian press began to explain the meaning of all the old Russian symbols. The small independent newspaper, *Liumpen*, had a front page article on the history of the Russian flag, explaining its origins and those of its predecessors. The symbolism of its colours reflected the qualities that the Russian character should live up to:

...white is for nobleness and candour, blue is for loyalty, honesty, irreproachability, chasteness and red is for courage, bravery, generosity and love.¹⁴⁵

Some of the small nationalist-orientated parties even demanded the restoration of pre-revolutionary Russian national symbols. For example, Vladimir Osipov's Christian Patriotic Union listed as two of its pre-electoral propoals:

The revival of national historical symbols.

The return of original names to cities, towns, villages, streets, squares and territories.¹⁴⁶

Moskovskie vedomosti carried an article explaining the Romanov coat-of-arms, whilst the monarchist papers *Dvuglavyi orel* and *Monarkhist* explained the significance of the Russian double-headed eagle crest which contained within it eight other coats-of-arms representing the eight parts

of the Russian empire.¹⁴⁷ Besides the revival of old symbols, new national symbols were also brought into existence. For instance in December 1991, the newspaper *Rossiiskie vesti* announced that new Russian awards were being planned. The article showed a proposed design for a medal to honour the 'Defender of Free Russia' which had an image of St. George as its centrepiece. The Secretary for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission for State Awards announced that Order of St. George was being revived and that the highest award would be the Order of the 'Revival of Russia' which would include the Russian crest of the two-headed eagle.¹⁴⁸

A large and broad selection of the press continued to portray images which were regarded as Russian national symbols. *Den'* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* frequently printed photographs of Russian churches, birch trees, icons and people in national costume over the course of 1991. *Den''s* pictures were published under the rubric '*Den''s* Album' and tended to focus on one particular theme. For instance, in one edition the camera focussed on Russian churches and the eight pages of the newspaper featured seven photographs of Russian Orthodox churches, whilst on another occasion it focussed on Russian graves and memorials, portraying images of the Russian cross and the imperial eagles.¹⁴⁹

The message conveyed by these images was put less subtly, but similarly, by one of the Russian nationalist independent newspapers *Istoki*, which showed three photographs: a girl in national dress, singers in national dress and a woman icon-painter. Under the rubric 'Corner of Russia' the pictures were accompanied by the words:

Rus' is strong in its history. Do not forget or pervert it. It is in the churches, the books and the people. It is transmitted from the old to the young...¹⁵⁰

Russian nationalist-orientated figures were attempting to unite people around common themes and a common history, which to some extent had been forgotten and were now being reformulated to encapsulate a national ideal.

Summary

Reflecting the views of Gellner and Shafer mentioned in Chapter 1, Russian nationalism used the 'pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultural wealth' very selectively and 'myth and actuality' were mixed to identify the Russian nation.

The Russian public's view of its own identity extended as far as identifying certain characteristics and virtues. For example, a survey conducted in 1987-88 in three cities (Moscow, Tashkent and Tallinn) concluded that Russians considered themselves to be, first and foremost, kind (*dobryi*), hospitable and steadfast. In addition, they frequently chose to describe themselves as industrious and unselfish - however, they rarely recognised themselves to be talented or business-like.¹⁵¹ As far as broader questions of Russian national identity and national values were concerned, Russian nationalism (in its various manifestations) attempted to win the hearts and minds of the people. By drawing upon Russia's historical legacy and reworking myths of the past, Russians were portrayed as kind, benevolent and peace-loving, whilst the ideas of collectivism or conciliarism (*sobornost'*), spirituality (*dukhovnost'*), morality (*nравственность*) and patriotism or nationality (*narodnost'*) seemed to be the values which were most frequently used to portray Russia's exclusive identity.

Demographic problems

In addition to opposition to the urbanisation of the Russian people, demographic issues of concern included the falling birth-rate of Russians in comparison with some of the non-Russian populations and, more notably, the position of Russians in non-Russian areas of the union.

One of a number of people to express concern about the Russian birth and mortality rates was Solzhenitsyn in his pamphlet *Kak nam obustroit' Rossiю?* Solzhenitsyn's concern that the Russian ethnic nation would die out was echoed by the Christian Patriotic Union's slogan calling for the 'biological salvation of the nation'. This group even called for measures to be introduced to remedy the de-population of certain areas:

We must establish state help for young families in areas of de-population (extinction). We

should pay the young family a monthly benefit for each child, from the second child onwards, a sum to the amount of the minimum living wage.¹⁵²

Whereas Solzhenitsyn blamed the empire for the decline of the Russian nation, the Christian Patriotic Union (*KhPS*) wished to maintain the empire and were more concerned about maintaining Russian numerical domination within that empire. *KhPS* leader Vladimir Osipov rejected the accusation that his concern for the falling birthrate and de-population was a sign of fascism,¹⁵³ but his views were reflected by other imperialist nationalist-orientated groups such as *Pamiat'*:

There is a critical demographic situation. "Without any exaggeration it is possible to say that today the Russian nation as a whole is faced with the fact of de-population (extinction)..." The birthrate of Russians is decreasing catastrophically fast and nothing is being done to increase it. In 1940, 59.9% of all children born in the USSR were born in Russia, but in 1985 it was only 44.2%. As one Western sociologist remarked, the Russian people could soon become a 'national minority in their own country'.¹⁵⁴

At the end of 1991, the Russian Party of National Rebirth (*RPNV*) considered one of the Party's aims to be the creation of conditions which would 'restore the genetic stock of the [Russian] nation' following the 'genocide' it had suffered over seven decades of Soviet rule.¹⁵⁵

The other demographic problem which worried imperialist nationalist-orientated Russians, in particular, was the fate of Russians and Russian-speakers in the non-Russian republics.

The *RKhDD*, who up until late 1991 manifested mainly a liberal variety of nationalism, addressed the question of displaced Russian citizens [*rossiiane*] in its programme, showing that it was fully aware of the problem:

Foreseeing the inevitable exit of certain territories from the composition of the USSR, the *RKhDD* considers it necessary to create favourable living conditions for each people in their historical motherland. The Russian state's immigration policy should be based upon this principle. At the same time, the Russian state should work out an effective programme to look after the interests of that part of the Russian [*rossiiskoe*] population left in the partitioned territories.¹⁵⁶

The *RNPR*, which was more isolationist in its Russian nationalist orientation, was more direct in its intention to guarantee displaced Russians the opportunity to resettle in Russia:

The *RNPR* will develop a State immigration programme and set up a special Immigration Fund of the Russian Federal Republic. This state-wide and local (*zemstvo*) immigration

initiatives should completely provide the demands of Russian re-settlers, returning to their historical Motherland from both former territories of the USSR and other countries.¹⁵⁷

However, the imperialist Russian nationalist viewpoint was hostile to the idea of resettling Russian populations, for they considered the USSR to be the Russian home. Shortly before the Russian presidential election in June 1991, Nikolai Ryzhkov condemned the idea of forcibly transferring numbers of the population, declaring that the president should look after Russians living outside the borders of the RSFSR and that refugees should receive both 'moral' and 'material' support.¹⁵⁸ At the same time, Vladimir Zhirinovskii criticised El'tsin's idea to resettle Russians living outside Russia on RSFSR territory. He referred to the Russians as the most humiliated and oppressed nation and vowed to 'protect' them.¹⁵⁹ This was a view typical of imperialist Russian nationalists, who were concerned about the Russian and Russian-speaking populations in all of the non-Russian republics. However, despite the large Russian populations in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, it was the events in the Baltic republics and Moldova which received the most prominent Russian nationalist attention.

Imperialist Russian nationalism in the Baltic and Moldova was represented by the 'international' movements which preached internationalism at first, but soon revealed their larger concern for the Russian and Russian-speaking populations. The Latvian *Interfront* newspaper, *Edinstvo*, printed the claim that:

The Russians have been deprived of their Fatherland and become outcasts.¹⁶⁰

This was a common sentiment from the supporters of the 'international' movements who resorted to the use of the term 'Russophobia' to describe the separatist behaviour of the titular populations of the union republics. It was not surprising that movements developed in the Baltic states protecting the rights of non-titular peoples. Although Russians represented only 9.4% of the population in Lithuania in 1989, the figures were 34% and 30.3% in Latvia and Estonia respectively.¹⁶¹ The advent of the 'international' movements was fuelled by republican proposals for new language and citizenship laws which might put the Russians at a disadvantage. However, despite the fact that the 'international'

movements genuinely defended the interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking populations, they only ever conceived these interests being maintained within a Union framework, whereas other Russians outside the international movements were comfortable with the idea that they might become citizens within a new independent state. Judging by the election results and referenda of 1990-91, there seemed to be a convergence of attitudes between a significant number of Russians and the titular nationalities in the non-Russian republics.¹⁶²

Besides the international movements, Russians were represented by other movements within the Baltic. For instance, in 1990, one newspaper reported that six Baltic cities with Russian majorities had united to solve their social and political problems. The union they formed pledged to defend the rights of Russians.¹⁶³ In addition to groups set up in the Baltic, Russian nationalists in Moscow gave continued backing to the Baltic Russian population. For example, in January 1991, at a very sensitive time - after 'Bloody Sunday' in Vilnius and shortly before the storming of the Interior Ministry in Riga - several figures, including V. Belov and A. Prokhanov, published an open letter to Boris El'tsin, voicing their support for the Russian population.¹⁶⁴

One of the problems accentuating imperialist Russian nationalist feeling was the fact that the Russian populations of the union republics did not really integrate. Large numbers of Russians were industrial workers and concentrated in industrial centres. For example, in Estonia and Moldova (left bank of the Dniester) certain industrial areas were dominated by Russians. The managers of these concerns were directly responsible to Moscow and were reluctant to see that relationship change. The concentrations of Russian workers also meant that they circulated in a Russian environment and there was no need to learn the local language or become informed about local (non-Russian) affairs. For example, Iurii Arutiunian highlighted the isolation of Russians in non-Russian republics with research on Russians in Tallinn and Tashkent. First, there is the matter of close social integration:

...in Tashkent only 4% of recent Russian immigrants, 11% of long-standing residents and 14% of those born in Tashkent have close friends among Uzbeks.¹⁶⁵

Secondly, there is the question of familiarizing oneself with the local language and culture:

Our material shows that most Russians are not acquainted with the culture of the republic they live in. For example, in answer to a question which asked respondents to name prominent people who are respected by the local population, the Russians were only rarely able to name representatives of indigenous nationalities (not more than 1-2% in Tallinn and Tashkent). Russians have a poor command of the languages of the indigenous nationalities: just 14% of Russians in Tallinn and 5-6% in Tashkent speak Estonian or Uzbek fluently. In Tallinn and Tashkent respectively, 38% and 69% of Russians do not know the languages of the indigenous populations.¹⁶⁶

Arutiunian pointed out that very little in a Russian's career or personal life depended on contact with the local population or knowledge of their language and that:

Everywhere the Russians lived they felt as if they were in their 'own' Union rather than in a given republic, at least until perestroika.¹⁶⁷

When there was a knowledge of the local language, there was a greater chance of identification with the local population. In Tallinn, 83% of Russians who spoke Estonian had friends amongst Estonians, whilst around half that figure (42%) of non-Estonian-speaking Russians had Estonian friends. And this phenomenon had an effect on the number of people who supported the Estonian 'international' movement, *Interdvizhenie*:

In Estonia, according to the data for 1990, more Russians who know the Estonian language considered that the Popular Front to a large extent expressed their interests (48%) than thought *Interdvizhenie* did. Those who do not know the Estonian language rarely (18%) sympathize with the Popular Front, and most of them (58%) support *Interdvizhenie*.¹⁶⁸

There were at least two suggested imperialist Russian nationalist solutions aimed at keeping the separatism of the Baltics in check and giving the Russians a greater say in political affairs. One was the suggestion by Latvia's *Interfront* that proportional representation should be introduced into the electoral system.¹⁶⁹ This was designed to significantly reduce any Latvian majority within the republic - the number of Latvians accounted for barely more than fifty per cent of the republic's population in 1989 - and, if extended to the Soviet Union would ensure Russian dominance throughout the Union. Another suggestion was Zhirinovskii's idea that the Russian empire be divided into provinces [*gubernii*] and that the Baltic states' attempts at separatism would be foiled by the creation of a 'Baltic

province' including all three republics, plus the Kaliningrad territory and parts of the Smolensk and Pskov territories. The effect of this would be to create a 'normal balance of the population with the dominance of Russians'.¹⁷⁰

The solution to a demographic problem in Moldova was to create an autonomous Russian-dominated republic. The Transdniester area in Moldova consisted of about fifty per cent Slavs, half of whom were Russian. The Moldovan language law passed in September 1989 was accompanied by the establishment of an 'international' movement representing mainly Russians and Ukrainians. The Moldovan *Edinstvo* movement was vocal in opposing language and citizenship laws which might affect the Slavs, but it was Transdniester which attracted the attention of Russian nationalism.

Although Russians accounted for only one quarter of the population in the Transdniester area (a small territory along the left bank of the Dniester river), they were dominant in the provincial capital, Tiraspol. In response to the manifestations of national autonomy emanating from Chisinau/Kishinev, the Tiraspol authorities declared the formation of the Transdniestran Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic on 2 September 1990. This was later followed by resistance to reincorporation into the Moldovan republic in late 1991 and a declaration of independence as the Transdniester Republic in December 1991. Despite the fact that only a quarter of this area's population was Russian, the Transdniester became an area of interest and concern to Russian nationalist-orientated figures within the Russian Federation. For instance, Skurlatov's *RNF* called for this area (amongst others) to be incorporated into the Russian Federation and, despite the Russian government's refusal to recognise the area's independence, Rutskoi looked upon the separatists favourably.¹⁷¹

Solzhenitsyn had advocated that some of the peripheral areas of Russia with predominantly Russian populations be incorporated into Russia, subject to local referenda on the matter. It is interesting that whilst such an idea was put forward for areas of the Ukraine, Crimea, Kazakhstan, Estonia, etc., where there were sizeable Russian majorities, that the Transdniester area, with twenty-four per cent Russians and no common border with the RSFSR, should be the only area to declare its

independence. It should also be noted that whilst the idea of incorporating Russian-populated areas into a Russian republic was favoured by an isolationist Russian-nationalist thinking, the Transdniesran separatism was very much supported by people of an imperialist Russian nationalist persuasion. For those with Russian nationalist sentiments, the Transdniesr problem became an example of the problems of Russians living outside Russia's existing borders and, to some extent, it became a tool to highlight the indifference of the authorities towards the plight of 'fellow Russians'.

Territorial issues

Very closely linked to the demographic problems were the territorial concerns of Russian nationalism. These differ very slightly from the abovementioned demographic issues in that they focus on the Russian need or right to maintain or acquire territory. Territorial concern is as much a quest for power and prestige as it is for the protection of a resident population's interests.

Liberal nationalism made very little issue of territorial claims and disputes. Most of those who had fought for a Russian national liberal-democratic state in opposition to the centre fully accepted the republican borders as they stood and had no designs on other territories.

Other manifestations of nationalism were uncomfortable with the bilateral agreements drawn up between the RSFSR Government and other republics and some objected to the foreign policy of Andrei Kozyrev who condemned the idea of border disputes resulting from the ethnic overlap of populations.¹⁷²

Expressions of isolationist Russian nationalism were accompanied by a desire to draw Russian-populated lands on the Russian periphery into the Russian state and Slavic populated areas such as Belorussia, Ukraine and (Northern) Kazakhstan into the Russian compass. It was also hostile to ideas to give up or cede any territories already absorbed into the RSFSR or under dispute.

Imperialist Russian nationalism was hostile to the idea of giving up any of the territory constituting the Soviet Union and, in the case of

Zhirinovskii, advocated the idea of irredentism and expansion. The imperialist Russian nationalist attitude held that Russians rightly occupied the territory of the USSR and that peoples wishing to secede had neither the right nor the wherewithal to do so. A letter from Russian writers to Boris El'tsin in January 1991 protesting over his role in allowing the Union/Russian state to fall apart, spoke of:

the historical rootedness of Russians in the Baltic lands.¹⁷³

These words implied that Russia had a historical right to their presence in the Baltic. The writers considered the Russian state to be a 'body', which, presumably, could not function properly with the removal of limbs or vital organs.

The justifications used for claiming territory as Russian were moral, economic and historical. Dmitrii Balashov, writing in Prokhanov's newspaper, *Den'*, put forward his argument against secession:

Those such as Belorussia and Ukraine who must not under any conditions secede from Russia are doing so...

I do not want to hold anyone by force. To be part of Russia is a great honour which must be earned and it is a huge advantage which one must work for. The path is open to those who do not want to be Russians.¹⁷⁴

Balashov says that the path is open for other peoples to leave, but, in reference to Moldova, totally rejects this. He says that the division of the country will lead not to the freedom of peoples, but their submission to another master - he says that Moldova, by Western estimates, is not economically strong enough to function independently and, therefore:

...it is not a matter of Moldavian independence, nor can it be. It might be (and already is) a matter of returning this piece of Russian land to Rumania.¹⁷⁵

Balashov justifies the reference to Moldavia, or Bessarabia, as 'Russian' land by recalling historical victories which secured it for Russia as far back as Rurik. It is referred to as 'land spilt with Russian blood, land recalling the glory of the Russian weapon's victory'.

In another nationalist-orientated newspaper, Iu. Piatnitskii expressed surprise that the Russian people had voted for a president of the RSFSR when Russia was *historically* far larger than that:

A disgusting farce is being played out before us which could turn into a great disaster. Our

time and money has been wasted. What did we receive in return? Yet another President, as they now say, of a sovereign Russia. Excuse me, a sovereign Russia stretches from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic Ocean to the sands of Kushka. It is within these borders that Great Russia, a unitary state with a centuries-old history and traditions, was historically formed.¹⁷⁶

Similar historical, moral and economic arguments were applied to the maintenance of other republics within a Russian state. For instance, Vladimir Zhirinovskii suggested that Georgia had no 'historical perspective' to become an independent state in respect of its geographical location and that the Baltics could not sustain economic independence.¹⁷⁷

The subject of the Kurile islands was, perhaps, one which differed from others in that it involved neither a complex demographic problem nor a dispute between members of the Soviet Union.

In 1991, rumours surfaced that there were plans to sell the Kurile Islands back to Japan. Dmitirii Balashov was amongst those who voiced opposition to the idea, suggesting that it would eventually lead to a drastic reduction of Russia's size.¹⁷⁸ This followed an article the previous year in which G. Piatov reviewed Alexander Yanov's proposal for Russia to sell the islands to Japan in exchange for economic aid. Piatov rejected the idea, forecasting that the Russian public would not support such a move and adding that it might even ignite German demands for the return of their former territories.¹⁷⁹

Balashov, in response to a letter in *Ogonek* which dubbed the Soviets 'invaders' for annexing the territory at the end of the war in 1945, asserted that Russia was only regaining land taken from her during the Russo-Japanese war and suggested that the editorial board of the magazine were reinforcing the results of what was a shameful war for Russia by supporting former territorial losses.¹⁸⁰

An address to El'tsin from professors and Academicians in October 1991 urged El'tsin not to give up sovereignty of the Kurile Islands. They implied that ceding the territory to Japan would have environmental costs by claiming the area was an 'ideal resort and tourist zone' and that it should not be 'exploited for minerals on an industrial scale'. Their solution was for Russia to develop the islands as a resort in conjunction with other countries, including Japan. More significantly, they concluded that the sale Kurile Islands at that moment would be a 'huge material and

moral loss for Russia'. Consequently, they pledged their support to a Russian national solution for the area:

Russian Academicians are prepared to take active part in solving the problem of taking over the region of the Kurile Islands and using its resources for the good of the Fatherland.¹⁸¹

Those who overtly expressed Russian nationalist views would not tolerate giving away an inch of the RSFSR's territory (and, in some instances, USSR territory). The maintenance of territory involved the maintenance of national pride and this is what the Academicians referred to when they spoke of 'moral loss'.

New Times reported in 1991 that the support for maintaining the Kuriles had come from a broad constituency in the Russian parliament, ranging from *Rossia* bloc leader Sergei Baburin to democrat Oleg Rumiantsev. The outspoken Russian nationalist, Baburin, had visited the islands to declare his solidarity with the Russian settlers there. He declared that any politician attempting to sell the islands:

would break his neck, because the people of Russia would never forgive this.¹⁸²

Many of those who had advocated or employed liberal nationalism in their political actions were content to accept the republican borders established under Soviet rule. Isolationist nationalism employed demographic reasons to justify the expansion of these frontiers, whilst imperialist nationalism added historical, moral and economic justifications to lay claim to as many lands of the former Russian empire as possible.

Russian Orthodoxy

The ideological vacuum left by the demise of communism and the frequent reflection on Russian 'spirituality' and 'morality' meant that Russian Orthodoxy could not fail to find a place in the Russian nationalist debate. Dmitriy Pospelovsky commented that when Orthodoxy was adopted by the Slavophiles of the nineteenth century, their 'Russian orientation' was not coloured by an adherence to Russian Orthodoxy or any other kind of christianity as a personal religion, but that:

It was in the course of their intensive study of Russia's cultural heritage and values, that is,

an Orthodox Christian culture and Orthodox Christian values, that the Slavophiles became converted to a personal Christianity.¹⁸³

In Pospelovsky's view, a similar phenomenon occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century when the so-called '*derevenshchiki*' gravitated towards Russian Orthodoxy as an essential component of the national identity. Their works revealed an interest in the Russian nation before Orthodoxy surfaced as an expression of nationalism :

the national element appeared long before a conscious discovery of the Christian 'soul' of the nation as the kernel of its spiritual health.¹⁸⁴

Nevertheless, by the time glasnost allowed people to admit their religious beliefs, certain Russian nationalist-orientated figures had already developed an association between Russian Orthodoxy and the essence of the Russian nation. The changes that were about to follow as a result of glasnost prompted a greater discussion of the role of Russian Orthodoxy in Russian life.

Mikhail Gorbachev had commented in 1986 that Russia was the:

last haven, last reservoir of spirituality.¹⁸⁵

Gorbachev's comment was not directed at the significance of religion in Russia, but signalled a general attitude held by Russians that their national development was guided by spiritual rather than material demands. With the collapse of communism and the absence of an ideological value system, the spiritual dimension of the Russian nation was occupied by an interest in Russian Orthodoxy. This interest was expressed not only by those who had already adopted Orthodoxy as a value system, but by many who were reacting to the discredited communist system. For these people, the adoption of religion became a mark of nationality and a mark of rebellion.

One of the most significant events marking a change in church-state relations was the meeting between Gorbachev and Patriarch Pimen in April 1988, two months before the celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Russia. Gorbachev's speech announced that there would be a revision of the laws on religion and the Orthodox Church's response was to support Gorbachev's perestroika campaign.¹⁸⁶ Although it was, at first,

not clear what a revision of the legislation on religion would entail, the announcement heralded the opportunity for a greater expression of religious freedoms. The occasion of the millennial celebrations was itself a huge opportunity to reflect on the role of Russian Orthodoxy in Russian culture, history and life.

Russian Orthodoxy was, by no means, central to all expressions of Russian nationalism, but it can be identified as an issue of interest within all three tendencies: liberal Russian nationalism supported Orthodoxy as a symbol of renewal, a counterweight to communism; isolationist Russian nationalism viewed it as a central feature of the exclusivity of the Russians; whilst imperialist Russian nationalism not only viewed it as an expression of the national spirit, but used it as a tool in attempting to keep parts of the Union together.

There were manifestations of Russian nationalism which were totally opposed to the role of Orthodoxy or any other religion in re-establishing a Russian state. The so-called 'internationalists', represented by Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo*, were an example of those with imperialist nationalist ambitions who could not countenance the idea of religious influence within a Marxist-Leninist Russian state. There was also a small, but insignificant number of pagans such as the *Pamiat'* group of Emelianov, which believed that Christianity was another branch of an anti-Russian Judaism. In addition, there were elements amongst advocates of liberal Russian nationalism whose quest for an independent Russia paid no attention to Russian Orthodoxy as a central theme in the development of a Russian nation or state.

The general discussion on Orthodoxy focussed on its spiritual, moral, social and cultural roles in Russian life. The rehabilitation of Russian Orthodoxy was accompanied by the portrayal of Orthodox Christian images and Church developments by the media; an increase in the number of active church buildings and religious associations; the adoption of Orthodoxy and its symbols by new political groups.

In the earlier years of glasnost, a number of figures alluded to the importance of the Russian national question and the importance of Christianity in Russia. This number grew as religious freedoms increased.

Likhachev, Rasputin, Soloukhin, Latynina, Mikhail Antonov, Aksiuchits and Solzhenitsyn are just a few of the names who represented the view that Russia needed to be 're-Christianised'. This idea was also echoed by a number of political groups which appeared in the form of a number of Christian groups, including the *RKhDD* (the Russian Christian Democratic Movement); many of the *Pamiat'* groups who specifically called for the ruling influence of Russian Orthodoxy; monarchist groups; *SDVO*, the Christian Patriotic Union; *RNPR*; and others.

Likhachev, who reflects, for the most part, the liberal tendency of Russian nationalism, spoke of the Russian person and his long-standing relationship with Christianity and Christian values. Although he pointed to peculiarities of Russian Orthodoxy, describing Orthodox Christianity as the 'happiest' Christianity (albeit referring to the aesthetic beauty of its material manifestations), Likhachev supported the separation of church and state and also condemned the idea of a national religion focussing on one people. Likhachev maintained that Christianity's strength lay in its 'universal' and 'international' nature.¹⁸⁷ However, one of the ideas central to his thought is the close relationship between religion, morality and culture, suggesting that Russian culture was inextricably linked with Christianity and, therefore, with Russian Orthodoxy. Likhachev's focus on Orthodox Christian morality presented a model upon which the Russian nation should fashion itself, a model of national re-evaluation and renewal based upon something other than the recent events of Soviet history. Likhachev's message placed a greater emphasis on the moral, rather than the cultural values of Orthodoxy, which smacked of exclusivity.

There were elements within all tendencies of Russian nationalism which regarded Russian Orthodoxy as a symbol of national renewal. This was either because they were convinced Russian Orthodox believers or because they accepted it as an embodiment of the Russian national spirit. In 1989, Mikhail Lobanov referred to the revitalisation of Russian 'spiritual culture' and its vital link with the Russian Orthodox Church:

...if the people have culture, they are alive. Today we see Russian spiritual culture being crystallized and it hardly needs a new revolution....

...For 70 years our spiritual fibre has been destroyed, beginning with the cultural supports of the economic set-up all the way to national traditions, to the realization of our national

identity. The main thing is to prevent the Church being trampled down again.¹⁸⁸

Over a year later, Lobanov was still expressing the central idea of Russian Orthodoxy in both Russian spiritual life and in literary art. He stressed that this was even more significant in the prevailing climate of pluralism that had grasped Russia.¹⁸⁹

There is some doubt as to the strength of religious faith as a factor in the activity around Orthodoxy. Vladimir Poresh wrote that the Russian Orthodox Church had been spiritually drained over the years of Soviet rule and was suffering from the rot of official Soviet appointments made within its hierarchy. In Poresh's view, church attendance might have been up and baptisms may have numbered 'over 1000 per day', but the 'spiritual essence' was lacking. If this were the case, it might have indicated that interest in Orthodoxy had grown, because many people associated it more with a national rather than religious revival.¹⁹⁰

Indeed, the Russian Orthodox Church did see a significant increase in active interest over the glasnost period. In 1985, there were 6806 registered Russian Orthodox associations, whilst by 1990 the number had increased to 11 118. In addition, 4100 Russian Orthodox buildings were opened over the same period.¹⁹¹

The Russian Orthodox Church enjoyed a much higher public profile following the millennium celebrations of summer 1988. Although unofficial celebrations met with some obstruction from the authorities,¹⁹² there appeared to be a genuine rapprochement between the Party and the Church. In spring 1989, Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Iurevsk visited the Moscow Higher Party School in which he announced:

Today both the Party and the Church are concerned about peace, culture and human morality. Thus the scope for our co-operation is really vast.¹⁹³

The fact that a prominent religious figure would be able to address a Party body in such a public manner suggested that some sections of the Party sanctioned the idea of the Russian Orthodox Church playing a role in the development of culture and morality. Later that year on 15 October, *Moscow News* reported that Metropolitan Pitirim read a sermon on Central Television following the prime time news programme *Vremia*.¹⁹⁴ This was a significant event in a state which had previously banned any

form of religious propaganda.

In 1990, the Church Act removed the remaining restrictions on the practice of organised religion. The Russian nationalist press played its part in reviving Russian Orthodoxy and its traditions. For instance in January 1991 *Literaturnaia Rossiia* printed an Orthodox calendar for the month,¹⁹⁵ whilst the independent Leningrad paper *Vozrozhdenie Rossii* printed an article about the Russian Orthodox celebration of Christmas, concluding with the words:

God let us return to our great Orthodox holidays and revive the spiritual wealth that we have lost in recent times. It is only in the Lord, only in the Orthodox faith that we will be able to be reborn as a Church, as a nation and simply as people.¹⁹⁶

In the same year *Nash Sovremennik* carried an Easter address to its readership from Patriarch Aleksii.¹⁹⁷ (The Patriarch's association with Russian nationalism did not end there, for in 1990 he joined the All-Russian Association of Patriotic Letters and Culture *Edinenie*, along with many prominent Russian nationalist-orientated writers.) The independent Russian nationalist newspaper *Russkii vestnik* printed an article on the Great Fast, the Russian Lent, explaining that it was a time of repentance and meditation. However, the piece went further than to just describe the religious significance - it encouraged parents to involve their children in the Orthodox traditions and at the same time prevent their children from succumbing to the influence of television. It stressed the importance of the family and suggested that the family should indulge in joint readings and listen to 'spiritual' or classical music together. It seemed that observance of Orthodox traditions were being put forward as an alternative Russian solution to the influence of (Western) mass culture.¹⁹⁸

The rehabilitation of Orthodox holidays and their national significance were emphasised when the Russian Orthodox Christmas Day, 7 January, was declared an RSFSR national holiday in 1991.¹⁹⁹

There were several instances when Russian Orthodoxy was used as a justification for conservative views held by Russian nationalists and when Church figures participated in espousing such views. For instance, the views of a Russian Orthodox archbishop appeared in *Pravda* as early as 1987 criticising pop music and mass culture, and suggesting that such phenomena diverted young people's attention from, in particular, the

Russian classics.²⁰⁰ The imperialist Russian nationalist thick journal *Nash sovremennik* published a number of articles which linked Orthodoxy with a variety of Russian nationalist views. Mikhail Antonov advocated the re-introduction of an Orthodox Christian work ethic in order to revive the economy, thus avoiding what he considered to be the undesirable methods of Western production and technology, whilst another author attempted to show that capitalism was un-Russian in that it was incompatible with Russian Orthodoxy.²⁰¹ One of the ideas behind the latter view was that Orthodoxy enshrined the principle of community or conciliarism [*sobornost'*], a Russian social trait incompatible with the individualism of capitalism.

Orthodoxy as a national force to political movements

The appearance of political organisations inevitably produced a number of religiously-inclined groups. Some of these were formed with an obvious commitment to Christianity, of which Orthodoxy represented only one branch, whilst other groups expressed a specific allegiance to Russian Orthodoxy, which was more symbolic of their adherence to Russian national values. Of the Christian parties which arose, the *RKhDD*, *KhDSR* and *RKhDP* were the most prominent. These organisations were, in principle, in favour of the revival of Christianity in Russia, although some elements within them concentrated on the re-establishment of Orthodoxy as a national force.

The *KhDSR* (Christian Democratic Union of Russia) under Aleksandr Ogorodnikov identified itself with an independent Russia²⁰² and with the ideas of Russian Christian thinkers such as Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Novgorodtsev, Fedotov and Frank.²⁰³ However, its whole emphasis was upon reviving Christianity rather than focussing upon Orthodoxy:

we, Christians, should do everything possible to save the Fatherland. Recognising our share of responsibility for what has happened and relying on more than a thousand years of Christian tradition and culture, we wish to put forward our programme for getting Russia out of its crisis.²⁰⁴

The *RKhDP* under Aleksandr Chuev, which broke away from the *KhDSR*

in spring 1990, apparently over disagreement about the use of funds, also supported the revival of Christianity and the separation of church from state. Although the party opposed the idea that Orthodoxy should become a 'new state ideology', it was suggested that a major difference between the *KhDSR* and the *RKhDP* was that the latter was more willing to co-operate with Patriarch Aleksii.²⁰⁵ The *RKhDP* programme of 1991 also spoke of 'the Church' rather than 'religion' or 'Christianity':

It is impossible to talk about a spiritual and cultural revival of Russia, whatever it might be, without mentioning the foundation, the basis of its whole spiritual essence - the Church.²⁰⁶

This suggested that the party was prepared to focus upon the institution of the (Orthodox) Church when dealing with the 'spiritual and cultural revival of Russia' rather than merely propagating christian ideas in Russian society.

The *RKhDD* also supported the general idea of the adoption of Christian values by Russian society, but there was a slight bias towards a national identification with Russian Orthodoxy. This is summed up by one of the movement's declarations:

It was the Russian Church which taught us the Christian Testaments. Therefore our return to the Lord's house should be a return, first and foremost, to Russian Orthodoxy. We are called upon to return to the nation the stolen treasures of a thousand years of Orthodox wisdom - patristic studies, Russian holiness and piety, the genius of Russian theology and philosophy, socio-political and economic thought...²⁰⁷

Other groups identified themselves firmly with the rehabilitation of Orthodoxy as a national solution to Russia's problems. *Khristiansko-patrioticheskii soiuz* (the Christian Patriotic Union) was unequivocal in its support for the influence of Russian Orthodoxy:

The Christian Patriotic Union believes that the path to saving the Russian people and other fraternal peoples of our Motherland lies in the revival of Orthodoxy... and the national consciousness of the people. Our prime task is the restoration of the Russian Orthodox's authority and role in society. Only the Church should be the spiritual shepherd of the country.²⁰⁸

One of the Patriotic Union's successors, Osipov's 'Christian Rebirth' Union continued this idea:

We support neither 'capitalism' nor 'socialism', i.e. we do not support a totalitarian or democratic system. We are not treading a foreign path, but our own path - we are for an

Orthodox Russia. We have had enough of alien ideas and slogans. Russia does not need ideology, but faith, not politics, but spirituality, not democracy, but conciliarism (*sobornost'*), not a union of republics, but a great power.²⁰⁹

The 'Christian Rebirth' Union suggested, among other things, that there should be an Orthodox broadcasting channel and that all of the main Orthodox holidays should be recognised as national holidays and non-working days. There is absolutely no doubt about the link between Orthodoxy and national revival:

Our strength is in Orthodoxy, Patriotism and Conciliarism [*Sobornost'*].²¹⁰

Some of the *Pamiat'* groups identified themselves closely with Russian Orthodoxy. Vasil'ev's *NPF Pamiat'* adopted the Russian Orthodox cross and a Russian church bell as two of its symbols, whilst the Leningrad group declared:

We must revive our people spiritually and morally with the help of, primarily, the Orthodox Church...²¹¹

One group, under the leadership of Aleksandr Kulakov, even named itself the Orthodox National Patriotic Front "*Pamiat'*". Within its basic principles it declared:

The Orthodox National Patriotic Front "*Pamiat'*", guided only by the authority of the Orthodox Church regards as its tasks:

The fight for the Revival of Russia based on the traditional foundations of her millennial history, culture, national peculiarity and statehood, expressed in the triune concept of 'Orthodoxy, Self-rule and Nationality'.²¹²

The prominence of Orthodoxy amongst new political parties and groups should not be overstated. There were relatively few groups which advocated the idea of Orthodoxy as a core ideology or even as a significant guiding influence. The *RKhDD* was probably the group with the largest following to stress the significance of Christianity and, in the Russian context, Russian Orthodoxy. The Movement advocated that the Church be separate from the state and supported the idea of freedom for all religions. Most of the democratic groups and parties merely advocated the right to practise one's faith and express one's religious beliefs and did not stress the importance of Russian Orthodoxy. However, in some instances, individual members of these groups and parties might have associated

themselves with the Russian Orthodox Church in order to stress their 'Russianness' or their opposition to communism. Boris El'tsin was just one of many figures who used photo-opportunities to exploit the photogenic 'Russianness' of the Russian Orthodox Church.

At this point, one should also note that certain members of the Orthodox clergy openly supported or associated themselves with Russian nationalist groups. Patriarch Aleksii was a member of *Edinenie*, whilst Metropolitan Pitirim was a member of Mikhail Antonov's *Soiuz dukhovnogo vozrozhdeniia Otechestva* and there was clerical support for other 'cultural' organizations such as *Otechestvo*.

The Russian Orthodox Church itself was weakened as a national unifying force by schisms which existed in Russian Orthodoxy. As glasnost gave the Church an opportunity to publicise itself, it also gave an opportunity to others to discredit certain figures within the Moscow Patriarchate for their collaboration with the centre and links to such bodies as the KGB. Glasnost also revealed to the Russian people the work and existence of the underground organisation, the True Orthodox Church of Russia, and the Russian Church Abroad. The latter established a branch in Russia under the name of the Free Russian Orthodox Church.

Some people, who were disgruntled with the Moscow Patriarchate's association with the Soviet authorities through the Soviet Fund for Peace and with the number of appointments within the Church's hierarchy influenced by the Soviet authorities, opted to join the Free Russian Orthodox Church. *Moscow News* reported in 1990 how one parish had transferred its allegiance to the the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad after the Moscow Patriarchate had attempted to transfer the parish priest to another parish. According to the article, the Moscow authorities had taken this decision because they were annoyed by the priest's refusal to provide information on foreign visitors to his church.²¹³ Not surprisingly, attempts to establish parishes in Russia subordinate to the Free Russian Orthodox Church were met by resistance from the Moscow Patriarchate and local authorities.²¹⁴ The hesitation by some to accept the Moscow Patriarchate's authority was not only due to the distrust of its past associations, but also because of its political role: the Church was becoming increasingly

identified with the state, with the Patriarch speaking like a state-church leader; the Moscow Patriarchate also appointed itself as arbiter of which members of the clergy would be allowed to compete in elections; and the Church was instrumental in opposing the development of national churches in Belorussia and Ukraine.

The True Orthodox Church had existed for about seventy years as an underground organisation in opposition to the Moscow Patriarchate, which it condemned for its links and co-operation with the Soviet authorities. The True Orthodox Church was not interested in joining with the Moscow Patriarchate to form a national church, but in maintaining its spiritual duties. The Moscow Patriarchate did not take kindly to a rival Russian Orthodox Church and did its utmost to stop the True Orthodox Church from acquiring church buildings.²¹⁵ The True Orthodox Church responded to the Patriarchate's persecution and obstruction tactics with an open letter to Patriarch Aleksii requesting that the Patriarchate leave them alone.²¹⁶

Certain figures within Russia and from the Russian Church Abroad sought to establish unity in Russian Orthodoxy. The Russian nationalist-orientated Vladimir Soloukhin suggested that a rapprochement between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Church Abroad might begin if the latter were offered an old, possibly ruined monastery on Soviet territory.²¹⁷ Gleb Rar, writing from the exiled Church's point of view, agreed that there should not be two Russian churches, but put forward a cautious approach for unification so that the Church Abroad's achievements would not be wasted.²¹⁸

Despite competition from the Moscow Patriarchate (some even might think that *due* to competition from a Moscow Patriarchate which still generated distrust) and the fact that it was based in the USA, the Russian Church Abroad was given some attention by Russian nationalists. Metropolitan Vitalii expressed his views in the independent Russian nationalist press where the Russian Church Abroad was given broad respect.²¹⁹

The Russian Orthodox Church's imperial role

In addition to the political differences (as opposed to theological differences) between the Moscow Patriarchate and the other branches of Russian Orthodox Church, the Church faced a crisis within the Soviet Union, for its unity was linked to the unity of the Soviet state. The Church had, to some extent, fulfilled an imperialist role uniting the Slav peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia. In 1989, the then Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad and Novgorod commented on the physical and moral destruction suffered by the church under Stalin:

When the church was dynamited it made not only a gap in the street, but also in people's hearts. There are too many of these gaps and blanks. One such blank is the lost heritage of the Slavic written language and culture which for centuries united the Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians.²²⁰

This comment represented a view held by many imperialist Russian nationalists - that the 'fraternal' Slavic peoples were united by common interests and heritage, in this case by Russian Orthodoxy. There were many Russian nationalists who did not wish to see the separation of these so-called 'fraternal' republics and for some time the Russian Orthodox Church had carried out the role of the Soviet state in discouraging religious separatism.²²¹

In 1946, the Ukrainian Uniate Church, which had been a bastion of nationalism, was incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church. The state supported this move in order to suppress incidence of Ukrainian nationalism and separatism and the Russian Orthodox Church was happy to spread its influence to areas it regarded as historically its own.

The rise of republican nationalism in the perestroika years led to heightened activity to restore the Uniate Church. Many Russian nationalists opposed this, fearing the loss of the Russian Orthodox Church's influence and the loss of territory which they considered to be theirs.

In 1989 the Ukrainian Uniates received recognition and were allowed to register, despite the efforts of Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev, a Russified ethnic Ukrainian to resist. The following year an extraordinary bishops' council was convoked by the Moscow Patriarchate to deal with the

disintegration of the Church's influence in Ukraine and Belarus. As a result, they brought into being a Ukrainian Orthodox Church and a Belorussian Orthodox Church. By this action, the Moscow Patriarchate sought to convince Ukrainians and Belorussians that there was no need to join the Uniate churches or form autocephalous churches. According to John Dunlop, these two new churches were not independent, but 'heavily dependent on Moscow'.²²²

It is interesting to note that well into perestroika, over half of all working Russian Orthodox churches in the Soviet Union were in the Ukraine. This was not a reflection of the Ukrainians' religious zeal, but of state and church policy. The prominence of Russian Orthodoxy in the Ukraine was a deliberate policy of Russification and the Russian Orthodox Church was still employed as a tool of Russian imperialist nationalism in Ukraine and Belorussia throughout the perestroika years.

Xenophobia

Nationalism is frequently accompanied by the identification of a common enemy or opponent. Russian and Soviet society was permeated by an 'us and them' mentality in which the West and capitalism had been portrayed as an evil opponent. The enemies singled out by Russian nationalism were frequently the West, sometimes the Orient, Islam and 'russophobic' members of the non-Russian nationalities, but the group which were treated with the most venom were the Jews.

Opposition to the West and 'Zionism' was presented as an ideological issue with the West representing 'un-Russian' values embodied by materialism. Criticisms were variously made of capitalism, Marxism-Leninism as a product of Western thought, Western-style democracy and its implications, mass culture, pop music, consumerism and 'Western' immorality. Reference was made to the imperialistic ambitions of not only the West but also of China and Japan to take over Russian territory and resources. Some expressed the idea that anti-Russian conspiracies existed - these were frequently attributed to the West, but often attributed to the Jews, who were accused, along with the freemasonry (who could be of Western or

Jewish origin), of being involved in a strategic plot to destroy Russia. Attacks on Western values were as much an attempt to define Russian national values as they were an innate hatred of the West. The isolationism of Soviet socialism had led to relatively little contact with the West and Soviet propaganda was very xenophobic towards countries outside its sphere of influence, despite its claims to be internationalist. This must have had a lasting effect on some sections of Soviet society and these attitudes synthesised with visions of Russian nationalism to create an idea of Russia isolated from the outside. The idea of an enemy or opponent was designed to encourage people to unite behind a common national ideal, for people tend to focus on similarities rather than differences in face of an enemy.

Early attacks on the West and Western lifestyle appeared in the journals *Nash sovremennik* and *Molodaia gvardiia*. In 1986, Viktor Astaf'ev made an oblique attack upon Western values by criticising the 'soulless' habits of the Muscovite intelligentsia.²²³ He criticised their bourgeois values which included the worship of Western consumer goods and fashions, a theme which was continued later by Viacheslav Gorbachev in *Molodaia gvardiia* who did not condemn Muscovites, but the whole phenomenon of materialism and consumerism ushered in by the Brezhnev era.²²⁴ There was a suggestion that this consumerist attitude was responsible for the 'stagnation' which blighted Brezhnev's rule. Gorbachev's attack was not merely an attack on materialism, but on the driving forces behind it - Western rationalism and individualism. Iurii Bondarev also made scathing attacks on Western consumerism from the mid-eighties, referring to consumerism as if it were a poor substitute for Russian culture which was rooted in the values of the past. He described 'civilisation' as:

a small part of culture... a unidirectional projection of its energy which often ensnares a person, promising him comfort and convenience. It thrusts upon us the need for things, the thirst for consumerism...²²⁵

Bondarev went on to say that:

The civilisation of consumerism brings about cosmopolitan fashion, feminisation and masculinisation, money, leisure, stage idols, a levelling of talents, a loss of truth, Russian Pepsi-Cola. We cannot avoid a great deal of this, but we ought to be choosy.²²⁶

Bondarev was suggesting that one should be wary of the consumerism

offered by (Western) civilisation, for the pleasures of civilisation should serve rather than control man.

Western culture was subject to various attacks, particularly the phenomena of mass culture and rock/pop music. The condemnation of such phenomena was really a conservative reaction by people who believed that everybody should be educated on a staple diet of the classics and that new styles and influence were superficial and meaningless. This is a feature of the generation gap in many societies. In the Russian context, those of a nationalist persuasion identified the newer influences with the West and deemed them incompatible not only with their personal taste, but with the Russian nation.

In 1987, Iurii Segeev addressed the Plenum of the USSR Writers' Union warning against 'foreign' influences in culture and suggesting that Western mass culture had little to offer but sex and violence.²²⁷ This evaluation was very much the attitude to pop/rock music which was closely identified with the West and received criticism from several quarters. Vasilii Belov described it as:

first and foremost , a narcotic medium²²⁸

whilst Valentin Rasputin warned against the dangers of mass culture, in particular rock music, which could affect people with an illness:

These people, as a rule, become in their later years spiritually empty, with undeveloped tastes and views.²²⁹

Mikhail Dunaev went so far as to write a whole article about the evils of rock music in *Nash sovremennik*. He described rock music's origins and effects:

Rock music, as we know, grew out of negro religious singing...
...the 'beat' characterising rock music summons up in the organism all kinds of physiological pulsations, sexual and nervous excitement, along with a paralysis of the thought process.²³⁰

He leaves no doubt that this foreign influence has no place in Russia:

One of the most important characteristics of Russian culture is its openness... Yes, our culture is open to Mozart... But it is incompatible with rock culture whose code is the 'music' of rock.²³¹

Vadim Kozhinov suggested that Western-style democracy would inevitably bring such evils with it. He expressed the idea that the freedoms

of democracy released more evil than good, promoting the growth of vice and crime.²³²

The greater fear was not of the failure of a Western system applied to Russia, but that the West was plotting to take over Russia and that Russia would fall to the power of Western capital. Aleksandr Prokhanov claimed that the West had planned to destroy not only the Soviet empire, but had planned the destruction of the Tsarist empire.²³³ Eduard Limonov feared that this was still the case with Russia in 1991. He claimed that the 500-day plan for economic recovery put forward by Stanislav Shatalin and others was 'immoral' and an act of capitulation, because it meant that the West could interfere in Soviet internal affairs. Limonov seemed to believe that the West was conspiring to take over the East. He believed that the West would buy Soviet raw materials cheaply and in return sell the USSR consumer goods. Eventually the West would start manufacturing goods on Soviet soil, whereupon they would make demands on Soviet domestic policy, forcing them to give up the Baltic, then perhaps Georgia, Armenia and, eventually, force the USSR to make territorial concessions to the Japanese. Limonov's beliefs were summed up by the statement:

The West is committed to a strategic hate of the USSR.²³⁴

These beliefs and fears were reflected in an article by Anatolii Kuz'mich Tsikunov (who went under the pen name of A. Kuz'mich) in the nationalist-orientated independent newspaper, *Domostroi*. He criticised the USSR law on foreign investments passed in 1991 which 'strengthened the right of foreigners to acquire shares, to reap the profits of enterprises and the harvest of the lands'. A. Kuz'mich objected to the rights of foreigners to use Russia's natural resources and feared that there was nothing safeguarding these resources for the Russian people:

We cannot find one law guaranteeing the right of Russians to their own natural resources.²³⁵

He warned against an imperialist invasion of Western capital:

We need to think with our heads where we should go and how we should make our living: for the Russian people, Russia or the foreign Uncle Sam. To be frank, Russian man [*muzhik*] only lives for today. Who will stand his ground against Western mass consumption? It is like giving glass beads to a native. At least it will be if our dear 'managers' and 'businessmen' sell our mother land.²³⁶

Another woman, worried about the presence of foreign businessmen in her local area of Tiumen' wrote in *Den'* that Russia's connections with foreign business was leading to a free-for-all in which foreigners from all parts of the world would be given the opportunity to carve up Russia for themselves:

In order to destroy the country, it is necessary to loosen the provinces and then Moscow. No fire is required - she will fall on her own. That is why the Chinese are throwing their weight about in Siberia, the Japanese in the Far East and the English in Crimea. In the Northern Tiumen' area we have a big Babylon: they are all here, along with Germans, Italians, Americans and Canadians. Soon the South Koreans will turn up and, possibly, even Turks.²³⁷

The Bloc of Social Patriotic Movements produced an electoral platform before the March 1990 elections condemning 'separatists' and 'left-radicals' of:

selling [of] our national wealth to 'foreign partners'.²³⁸

The Bloc wished to stir up opposition to the West and Westernisers as it pursued its 'fight for the genuine revival of Russia'.

Mikhail Antonov claimed that elements within the Soviet communist hierarchy were responsible for colluding with and selling Russia to the West. Both Soviet communism and the democrats were portrayed as allies of the West. He advocated a Russian system of socialism based on *sobornost'* and Orthodoxy which would protect Russia from the evils of Western capital.²³⁹

Whilst figures such as Prokhanov defended socialism as a system suited to the Russians, others criticised communism and Marxism-Leninism as Western or Jewish concepts alien to Russian society. V. Kozhinov, S. Kuniaev and A. Kuz'min were amongst those who condemned Marxism-Leninism for its anti-Russian nature within the pages of *Nash sovremennik*.²⁴⁰ Those representing a more extreme expression of Russian nationalism such as Dmitrii Vasil'ev were unequivocal in their condemnation of Marxism-Leninism and where the blame for it lay:

...the bacillus of all our ills is Marxist-Leninist ideology, whether you like it or not. It is completely obvious from its fundamental positions that communist doctrine is nothing other than Zionist sectarianism.²⁴¹

Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism is not an inherent feature of Russian nationalism, i.e. it is not characteristic of every manifestation of Russian nationalism. However, Jews have been singled out as the common enemy by certain exponents of Russian nationalism throughout its history and this continued during the Gorbachev period. Indeed, from the moment *Pamiat'* surfaced as a politicised organisation, Russian nationalism appeared to be very closely associated with anti-Semitism, as if the latter were a logical conclusion of the former. According to Valerii Solovei, this resulted from an attempt by the central authorities to discredit Russian nationalism: if the public were to associate Russian nationalism with such ugly images, this would harm the potential popularity of both Russian nationalism and the idea of a pluralist political system which could allow such organisations to develop.²⁴² Therefore, not only was *Pamiat'* allowed to exist without being suppressed by the authorities, but the extremist views of *Pamiat'* and their like initially received a disproportionate amount of coverage in both Soviet and Western media.

Although anti-Semitism was evident in material written by commentators in journals, such as *Nash sovremennik*, and within the ranks of so-called 'internationalist' organisations, such as *Edinstvo* and *OFT*, the harshest condemnations of Jews were made by small, more extreme Russian nationalist-orientated groups, which had very little public appeal. These marginal groups paid an inordinate amount of attention to the presence and alleged roles of Jews in Russian history and society. They frequently used the terms 'Zionism' and 'Zionists' in place of 'Jewry' or 'Jews'. Some sought to make a distinction between Zionists and Jews, whilst others denied accusations of anti-Semitism when making criticisms of Jewish figures, stating, for example, that the Arabs were also a Semitic people. It is difficult to see any reasonable, logical link between a Zionist - a person who supports the idea of a Jewish state - and the 'Russian-nationalist' concept of a Zionist: a person of Jewish origin, hell-bent on destroying Russia and the Soviet Union. The only logical conclusion one can come to is that 'Zionist' was a surrogate term for 'Jew', but a term which allowed the user to (falsely) claim that he/she was not anti-Jewish. When I use the

term 'anti-Semitism' here, it should be read as 'anti-Jewish'.

Jews were blamed for a number of Russia's problems and misfortunes including: the instigation of the Bolshevik revolution; the death of the Tsar; the demise of Russian culture; the destruction of Russian architectural monuments; the spread of alcoholism; and even genocide of Russians. In addition, there were claims that Jewish plotters were conspiring with the West to break up the Soviet Union and its armed forces; attempting to introduce a democracy which would rob the Russian people of its wealth; attempting to control the press and the media.

Accusations and hostility aimed at the Jews were used in an attempt to rally Russians against an identifiable common enemy. This was recognised by some Russian commentators as a familiar device:

the search for the enemies, the plotters and the radicals, especially concrete enemies, and best of all - with non-Russian names - is an attempt to remove the blame from one's own name. This is as old as the hills.²⁴³

Another commentator, D. Gai, claimed that a hatred of the Jews was no substitute for a 'proper diagnosis of Russia's real problems'.²⁴⁴ But why should any Russian nationalist pick on the Jews as their enemy? There is no evidence to suggest that their accusations and allegations are true and most, if not all of them, can be disproved. However, the reasons stem from a number of perceived factors. First, there was an inherent vein of anti-Semitism which had existed during Tsarist times, re-surfaced under Stalin and materialised in the form of anti-Zionist publications during the Brezhnev era. Secondly, it was easy to highlight certain figures of Jewish origin who were prominent political actors during the revolutionary period and leading figures in the Bolshevik Party. Thirdly, many Jews occupied responsible or professional positions in Soviet society, a fact manipulated by the Nazis and in Poland in the 30s to provoke resentment towards the Jews. Fourth, there was a lingering resentment amongst some Russians that Jews had been amongst the few people to have the opportunity to leave the USSR - this could be viewed as a privilege that Russians envied, or as treachery in forsaking Mother Russia. These factors, whether or not they had any foundation, were sufficient to stir up prejudice and reinforce anti-Semitic conviction.

Anti-Semitic views appeared in the nationalist press, particularly in the

thick journals *Nash sovremennik* and *Molodaia gvardiia* throughout the Gorbachev era. At first, the references to Jews were oblique with the substitution of the terms 'Zionist' or 'mason'. Writers such as Karpets and Pikul' referred to 'masons' whose aims were invariably to challenge Russian statehood or conquer the world.²⁴⁵ Igor' Shafarevich referred to them as part of the *Malyi Narod*, a social layer responsible for the ills of Russia and, although he did not directly equate the Jewish people with the *Malyi Narod*, he made specific reference to the influence of Jews in the revolutionary movement at the beginning of the twentieth century.²⁴⁶ Small extremist Russian nationalist groups such as some of the *Pamiat'* groups reflected the view that the Jews had been responsible for the Bolshevik revolution. Aleksandr Shtil'mark of Vasil'ev's *Pamiat'* enumerated a familiar list of names associated with the revolution which he held responsible for the destruction of Russian culture. In the same manner as Shafarevich, he highlighted the Jewish names of pseudonyms with the use of brackets, as if to stress their Jewish nationality:

You cannot call the actions of Leon Trotsky (Bronstein), Lazar' Kaganovich, Emel'ian Iaroslavskii (Gubelman), Iakov Sverdlov, Lev Kamenev (Rosenfeld) and Grigorii Zinoviev (Apfelbaum) anything other than criminal.²⁴⁷

A. Kulakov, of another *Pamiat'* group, wanted to stop Jews from emigrating to Israel so that they could be prosecuted for bringing the 'communist evil' into the world.²⁴⁸ According to *Argumenty i fakty*, he believed that:

The world is already subject to global Jewish capital. It is this same capital which financed the 1917 revolution and which provoked and organised a genocide of the Russian people. Internationalism and communism are philosophies belonging to the Jews.²⁴⁹

The Russian Party of the RSFSR went as far as to include the acknowledgement of 'Zionist' guilt for its participation in the revolution and subsequent events as one of its programmatic aims:

1. We must recognise Marxism-Leninism as a veiled Zionist ideology and Bolshevism as a variety of Zionism. We must remove the teaching of Marxism-Leninism in secondary and higher education.

2. We must strive for a public verdict on Zionism:

That it is GUILTY of a criminal seizure of power during the October Revolution of 1917 and of a Zionist occupation of Russia.

That it is GUILTY of unleashing the red terror, civil war and a genocide of the Russian people.

That it is GUILTY of plundering and destruction Russia and of reducing Russians to the lowest poverty by means of a Zionist yoke.

That it is GUILTY of creating a communist Zionist economy, which, in the interests of the Zionocracy, artificially maintained shortages of basic goods, whilst Russians were forced to stand in disgraceful queues for bare necessities.²⁵⁰

The newspaper of N. Lysenko's *RNPR* suggested that Lenin was serving Jewish interests when he led the revolution. Not only did the text attribute Lenin with the name 'Blank' - the name of his supposedly Jewish maternal grandfather - but it was accompanied by an illustration in which Lenin was receiving thousands of dollars backhandedly from two Jews.²⁵¹

Some Russian nationalist elements also put forward the idea that Jews had been responsible for the demise of the monarchy and the death of the Tsar. Whilst Apollon Kuz'min advocated the idea that Jews had organised the February Revolution which had destroyed the Russian monarchy,²⁵² an edition of Fomichev's newspaper *Pul's Tushina* claimed that the whole of the Royal Family had been 'ritually murdered by Zionists'.²⁵³ However, not all views linked Jews to the destruction of the monarchy. In another instance, an anti-monarchist view was put forward by S. Nosov who claimed that he had uncovered a Zionist-Masonic plot to re-establish the monarchy.²⁵⁴

As the extract from the Russian Party programme showed, some Russian nationalists held the Jews responsible for the destruction of Russian culture. One view in *Nash sovremennik* suggested that the Jews were the architects of a vanguard in the artistic world, formed with the specific aim of usurping and destroying Russian culture.²⁵⁵ One *Pamiat'* document declared:

We must encourage the development of national principles in our culture and science, exposing and fighting anti-Russian and Zionist forces which have formed an influential elite and powerful mafia within these spheres. We want our culture to be Russian not only by name!²⁵⁶

In addition to the destruction of Russian culture, Jews were accused of destroying both the Russian ecology and the Russian architectural and historical monuments. One *Pamiat'* group demanded that the names of those who destroyed Russian churches be published²⁵⁷ - a demand frequently made if they thought that Jewish names might be on the list, whilst one observer blamed the Jews for destroying old Moscow.²⁵⁸

Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili accused the Jews of being a 'nation of destroyers'.²⁵⁹

The Jews were also blamed, in one or two instances, of causing the downfall of the Russian nation by inflicting alcoholism upon them. A *Moscow News* reporter attended a *Pamiat'* meeting and encountered a man with the following words printed on his sweatshirt:

If you smoke, drink wine and beer, you're an accomplice of Tel Aviv.²⁶⁰

Pamiat' made several references to the 'alcoholisation of the people', which they blamed upon the Jews, but this attitude was not confined to *Pamiat'* meetings. An article by F. Uglov which appeared in *Nash sovremennik* suggested that the high level of alcoholism in Russia was a result of the conspiratorial activity of Jews and the West.²⁶¹

The idea of Jewish conspiracy theories was especially popular with *Pamiat'* which made frequent reference to the document *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. The belief in the authenticity of this document was perhaps one of the few ideas which united all the splinters of *Pamiat'*. The *Protocols* which had been used by the Nazis to discredit Judaism, have been dismissed many times by Jewish and Western scholars as a forged document representing a fictitious meeting during the First Zionist Congress at the end of last century. *Pamiat'* believed that the *Protocols* even predated the Congress.²⁶² Extreme Russian nationalists who supported the authenticity of such a document probably did so, because there was no other source claiming any kind of theory of Jewish world domination.

The idea of Jewish conspiracy was held by a number of Russian nationalist-orientated figures who feared the break up of Russia and the USSR. One view claimed that Jews were instrumental in encouraging the aggressive policies of the United States,²⁶³ whilst another view in the independent socialist paper *Bor'ba* (which was sympathetic towards Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo*) claimed that the world was being controlled by a 'Euro-American capitalist conglomerate under the direction of a global Zionist-Masonic centre' whose plans included the break up of the USSR and its 'unified defence system'.²⁶⁴ A. Barkashov, leader of *Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo* held a similar view:

Today as never before it is vitally important to the international financial oligarchy to keep Russia as a kind of appendage for raw materials for the USA... Therefore, in order to raise the degree of control and exploitation in the interests of the USA and, therefore, the Jewish financial oligarchy, they wish to pull down, separate and dismember Russia.²⁶⁵

The conspiracy theories were backed by claims that Jews were attempting to control the press and the media. This was characterised by opposition to journals such as *Ogonek* and to central television. In addition, there were claims that El'tsin and the democrats were in the pockets of Jewish capital. For example, an edition of the independent nationalist newspaper *Russkoe voskresenie* showed a caricature of El'tsin under the Star of David wearing a masonic apron and holding masonic symbols.²⁶⁶ Another Russian nationalist independent newspaper posed the question: "What will the first president of Russia kiss?" The page showed a three pictures of Lech Walesa kissing an object, a Jewish worshipper kissing the wailing wall in Jerusalem and the caricature of a fat man wearing a ring bearing the Star of David. The pictures implied that El'tsin would be kissing the ring on the hand of the rich, fat Jewish man.²⁶⁷

The independent Russian nationalist newspapers were full of ugly caricatures of Jews with hook noses and yarmulkas. *Russkoe voskresenie* even portrayed Jews as animals with animal-like feet and tails. These alarming images were matched by some alarming stories. The first edition of *Narodnoe delo* printed an article entitled: "AIDS is not dangerous to white people". It claimed that South African research had shown that white people could not catch AIDS, but could develop a personal viral immune deficiency. On the other hand, it claimed, 'blacks and half-blacks (mulattoes, Jews and Gypsies)' could catch the disease. The article went on to say that Soviet research in 1925 had shown that Russian blood and Jewish blood were 'biochemically different'.²⁶⁸

It is difficult to estimate the full extent of anti-Semitism in Russian society. There were no, or few, expressions of anti-Semitism amongst democrats or amongst those who expressed or made use of a liberal variety of Russian nationalism. Many of the incidents mentioned above were confined to the extremist fringes, but, from the early days of Gorbachev's reign, anti-Semitic expression was characteristic of both isolationist and imperialist nationalism. In 1990, *Moscow News* reported an opinion poll carried out

in the Moscow area which found that 7.6 per cent of respondents blamed the Jews for the results of Russia's post-revolutionary development and 8.8 per cent agreed that Jews should be punished for 'crucifying Christ'. Whilst the extremists represented a little under 10 per cent, the article concluded from the research that about 25 per cent of Russians (in the Moscow area) were 'rabid anti-Semites'.²⁶⁹ This is a relatively large constituency and it is not surprising that it was sometimes harnessed in the pursuit of Russian nationalism.

Russian national sovereignty and new Russian institutions

Russian nationalism managed to stamp the Russian identity upon the state by establishing new Russian institutions and Russian sovereignty. This process was necessary to liberal and isolationist nationalism, because it served the interests of establishing an identity independent from the Soviet centre. On the other hand, adherents to imperialist Russian nationalism could afford to maintain Soviet state institutions for the practical purpose of securing the existing state structure. However, it was probably adherents to imperialist Russian nationalism who first promoted the idea of new Russian institutions.

The focus on Russian institutions began with calls by Russian nationalists for structural parity with the union republics. The RSFSR did not have its own republican communist party or Academy of Sciences and these facts were used to propagate the idea that Russia was somehow at a disadvantage or discriminated against within the Soviet system. It was a tactic which attempted to illustrate that Russia did not occupy a position of privilege within the Soviet Union, but it also drew attention to Russian national affairs. Although it did not have the same republican structures as the other Union republics, Russia was served by all-Union bodies which (many believe) led to greater Russian central control and influence over the other republican bodies.

Addressing the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, Vasilii Belov was one of the prominent Russian nationalist figures to argue in favour of Russian institutions. He claimed that the Russian republic was at a disadvantage, because it did not have its own Republican institutions

(referring to the lack of a communist party and Academy of Sciences). He pointed out that as the RSFSR was served by the central USSR bodies, these bodies were perceived as being Russian by the other republics and, consequently, Russians were unjustly blamed for the faults of these bodies.²⁷⁰

Whilst some of the communist-inclined imperialist Russian nationalist groups veiled a great deal of their activity in terms of 'internationalism', others sought to inject a recognisably Russian content. *Pamiat'* groups represent the trend within Russian imperialist nationalism which openly declared their support for Russian institutions:

We demand equal rights for Russians with the other peoples of our country. We insist on the creation in Russia of its own Academy of Sciences, Conservatory, Institute of Russian History, Centre for Russian Culture, Russian Theatre, Russian Cinematography and an the publication of a Russian Encyclopædia.²⁷¹

The *Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov* (Association of Russian Artists), which supported the maintenance of the USSR, but claimed to be a Russian cultural group, concentrated its programme (in 1988) on the institution of Russia-wide means of communication:

...this programme examines the preparation and activity.. of the association in creating a brand new, modern information system in Russia. The movement will strive for the creation of a national information bureau called '*Golos Rossii*' ['Voice of Russia'], a national radio and television broadcasting channel, the development and distribution of newspapers, magazines and a Russian publishing business...²⁷²

At the end of 1989, the Bloc of Social and Patriotic Movements called for the creation of a Russian Academy of Sciences, a Russian Communist Party and a Russian broadcasting channel.²⁷³ The Bloc even went as far as to suggest that the RSFSR should have its own capital in Moscow separate from that of the USSR.

An item in *Moscow News* on the subject of Russian empire did not support the re-establishment of Russian empire, but stated:

...Russian people's demands - to restore the traditional Russian flag, the coat-of-arms reflecting Russia's history and the Russian anthem - are reasonable, natural and unrelated to the imperial mentality. Appeals to restore citizenship of the Russian Federation, to establish a Russian Academy of Sciences, to launch a republican TV channel, to make Leningrad, this great city with the fate of a region, Russia's capital - all these are justified.²⁷⁴

The author was, perhaps, wrong when he declared that such things were

unrelated to the imperial mentality. They are certainly not indicative of a imperial mentality, but imperialist nationalists sought to establish and rehabilitate Russian institutions for the following reasons: firstly, because there was a real need to establish or reinforce a Russian identity and Russian institutions to some extent fulfilled this need; secondly, they aimed to harness the sentiments of people such as the author of the abovementioned piece in *Moscow News* ; and, thirdly, the establishment of a Russian communist party (amongst other organisations) could serve as a platform of opposition to the so-called 'left-radicals' within Gorbachev's government.

The *RNPR* were one of the only groups gravitating towards isolationist Russian nationalism before Solzhenitsyn published *Kak nam obustroit' Rossiia?* in 1990, but, it goes without saying, that adherents to the isolationist tendency supported the wholesale introduction of Russian national institutions. The *RNPR* not only supported Russian sovereignty and statehood, advocating the introduction of Russian political institutions such as the *zemstvo* and the *Sobornaia дума*, but it demanded a list of other national bodies, including: a Russian Academy of Sciences, a Russian National Conservatory, Opera and Theatre, an Institute of the Russian People, and a Centre for Russian Culture. In addition, the Party called for the restoration of such things as Russian national state symbols etc.²⁷⁵

The most outstanding reflection of liberal Russian nationalism was the move by democrats to identify themselves with Russia and create Russian national institutions which could serve as a powerbase to challenge existing Soviet structures. Whilst Mikhail Gorbachev resisted the tide of support from within all tendencies of Russian nationalism to create RSFSR republican structures parallel with those in other republics - a Russian communist party, a *komsomol*, Russian trade unions, an Academy of Sciences etc. - 'democrats' within the Russian parliament set about establishing a politically and economically sovereign Russian republic.

It was Boris El'tsin who played the liberal nationalist card and was instrumental in establishing not only Russian sovereignty, but a Russian presidency. The fact of Russian sovereignty can also be attributed with

precipitating the establishment of other Russian republican institutions. El'tsin's speech to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies on the 22 May 1990 signalled his move towards using Russian nationalism to enhance his power. In a bid to become Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, El'tsin declared that Russia needed both political sovereignty and economic sovereignty, including the establishment of a republican state bank separate from the Union State Bank and of a Russian Foreign Trade Bank.²⁷⁶ Earlier that year, El'tsin had already produced an electoral programme for the March elections attracting Russian nationalist support by calling for the institution of a Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian radio and television broadcasting and a Russian press agency.²⁷⁷

El'tsin's election to the chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 29 May 1990 was followed by the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR by the Congress of People's Deputies on 12 June 1990. The Declaration stated that:

The sovereignty of the RSFSR constitutes the natural and necessary condition for the existence of statehood of Russia with its centuries-old history, culture and traditions.²⁷⁸

and that:

Republican citizenship of the RSFSR is established throughout RSFSR territory.²⁷⁹

This laid the basis for the establishment of a Russian [*rossiiskii*] state in which Russian nationality was based on citizenship rather than ethnic origin.

El'tsin strengthened the Russian republican political institutions by his success in winning approval for the introduction of post of President of the RSFSR at the Third Congress of People's Deputies in March-April 1991. Imperialist Russian nationalists within the *Rossia* faction in the Congress were amongst those who resisted the introduction of such a post with such powers, but they were unable to defeat the likes of Democratic Russia who supported the idea of a presidency and backed El'tsin's candidacy.²⁸⁰

El'tsin's subsequent victory as the first directly elected president of Russia on 12 June 1991 was a personal vindication of his tactic to ally himself with aspects of liberal Russian nationalism in order to give himself an effective powerbase.

Conclusion

The focus on Russian nationalist issues was, at first, limited to environmental, conservationist and cultural issues which could be perceived as areas of social interest rather than a challenge to the Soviet regime. However, underlying these issues was a great concern for the future of the Russian nation and the development of Russian national values.

Glasnost led to a bolder discussion of the Russian national identity and various attempts were made to re-define the Russian nation. As intellectuals tried to stimulate Russian national consciousness, they looked increasingly to the pre-revolutionary past to reconstruct the image of the Russian. For some, Russian Orthodoxy became the embodiment of Russian spiritual values and represented something which was unique to the Russian people. Others seemed to believe that there were innate qualities within the Russian people (and/or its communities) which had existed since time immemorial or had developed over Russia's thousand-year history.

As Russian nationalist-orientated movements began to appear, other issues became more prominent. There was a greater focus on demographic and territorial issues, which reflected Russian nationalism's attempt to define its political-territorial unit. Attention was paid to the establishment of Russian national institutions and the issue of Russian sovereignty. With the exception of the universal desire to establish Russia-wide institutions, the other issues became areas of contention which divided those interested in the Russian national revival. The issue of 'displaced' Russians outside the RSFSR became an issue of passionate concern, particularly in view of, what Russian nationalist-orientated organisations perceived to be, the indifference of Western-orientated 'democrats' to their fate. Russia's territorial integrity was another important topic of focus, whether the 'Russian motherland' was perceived to be the RSFSR; the RSFSR and areas outside the republic inhabited predominantly by Russians; a Russia which included a 'triune' Russian people of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians; or the whole of the Soviet Union/former Russian empire.

The attempts to define Russia as a unique entity were frequently accompanied by xenophobia. This was least (or not at all) apparent in liberal Russian nationalism, which propagated the ideas of a unique Russian culture, but displayed a maximum of tolerance and respect towards other nationalities and their cultures. However, imperialist and isolationist Russian nationalism displayed unity in their opposition to the West and sometimes manifested resentment towards the minority nationalities of the Soviet Union and, at times, virulent anti-Semitism.

The issues listed here did not unite all strands of Russian nationalism in agreement, but they represent areas of concern which focussed attention on the development and fate of the Russian people.

¹ These are just some of the twenty-three headings listed by Leonard W. Doob in his book *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations*, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven 1964.

² This widespread view is, for example, expressed in Vera Tolz, *The USSR's Emerging Multiparty System*, Praeger, New York, 1990, p.71.

³ Geoffrey Hosking, "The beginnings of independent political activity", in G. A. Hosking, J. Aves & P. J. S. Duncan, *The Road to Post-Communism*, Pinter, London, 1992, pp.8-9.

⁴ Graham Smith, "The state, nationalism and the nationalities question in the Soviet republics", in C. Merridale & Chris Ward (eds.) *Perestroika: The Historical Perspective*, Arnold, London 1991, p.210.

⁵ Ronald Suny, "State, civil society, and ethnic cultural consolidation in the USSR - roots of the national question", in G. W. Lapidus & V. Zaslavsky with P. Goldman (eds.) *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and separatism in the Soviet republics*, CUP, 1992, p.33.

⁶ Marshall I. Goldman, "Environmentalism and Nationalism: An Unlikely Twist in an Unlikely Direction", Paper presented at ICSEES Conference, Harrogate, 1990, p.8. See this paper for discussion of relationship between nationalism and environmentalists. Goldman claimed that: "Inside the Soviet Union, environmentalists tend to be separatists. They are critical of Moscow and want their republics to secede from the Soviet Union. In contrast, the environmental cause in most of the rest of the world tends to be anti-nationalistic, almost 'one-world' in outlook."

⁷ Bess Brown, "Scheme to Divert Siberian Rivers Seems to Have Been Deferred", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 119/86, 6 March 1986. However, the official decision to shelve the project was announced in August 1986.

⁸ "Zemlia i khleb", *Nash sovremennik*, No.7, July 1985.

⁹ Valentin Rasputin, *Proshchanie s Materoi in Vek zhivi-vek liubi. Povesti, rasskazy* Moscow: Izvestiia, 1985.

¹⁰ Kathleen Parthé, "Village Prose: Chauvinism, Nationalism or Just Nostalgia?" Paper presented ICSEES Conference, Harrogate, 1990, p.4

¹¹ "S'ezd pisatelei RSFSR", in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 18 December 1985, p.6

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., p.12.

¹⁴ V. Astaf'ev, V. Belov, Iu. Bondarev, S. Zalygin, L. Leonov, D. Likhachev, V. Rasputin, "Vyzyvaet trevogu", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 3 January 1986, p.3.

¹⁵ M. Lemeshev, "Protiv techeniia", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 20 December 1985, p.3.

¹⁶ V. Astaf'ev, V. Belov et al., "Vyzyvaet trevogu", op. cit.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ *Soviet Weekly*, 31 October 1991, p.4.

¹⁹ D. J. Peterson, "Baikal: A Status Report", *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, Vol.2, No.2, 12 January 1990, p.1.

²⁰ Iurii Bondarev, "Nasledstvo kul'tury", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, No.26, 31 January 1986, p.2.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Interview with Rasputin, "Poriadok v dushe - poriadok v otechestve", *Izvestiia*, 15 March 1987.

²³ Dmitrii Balashov, "I nuzhna liubov': formirovanie russkoi natsii i sovremennye problemy nashego natsional'nogo byta", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 8, 24 February 1989.

²⁴ L. Baranova-Gonchenko, "Vo blago", *Molodaia gvardiia*, No.9, 1987, p.223.

²⁵ Simon Dixon, "The Russians" in G. Smith (ed.), *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, Longman, London 1990, p.28.

²⁶ See for example both Zalygin (on water) and Rasputin (on complexes in Tiumen region) in *Moscow News*, No. 15, 9 April 89, p.15

- ²⁷ "Zhizn' Rossii", *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 20 1990, p.4.
- ²⁸ *Vozrozhdenie Rossii*, (Leningrad), No.1 (4) 1991, p.6.[SSEES Independent Parties & Movements Archive]
- ²⁹ Iurii Bondarev, "Nasledstvo kul'tury", op. cit.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² "Vospitanie pamiat'iu", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 16 November 1985, p.1.
- ³³ Geoffrey Hosking, "The beginnings of independent political activity", in G. A. Hosking, J. Aves & P. J. S. Duncan, op. cit., p.9.
- ³⁴ *Argumenty i fakty*, No.26, 30 June-6 July 1990, p.8.
- ³⁵ V. N. Berezovskii & N. I. Krotov (eds.), *Neformal'naia Rossiia*, Molodaia gvardiia, 1990, p.370; *Rossiia: Partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby*, Vol.1, part 2, Rau-Press, Moscow, 1991, p.179.
- ³⁶ *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 40 1990 p.8.
- ³⁷ *Rossiiskoe khristianskoe demokraticeskoe dvizhenie: sbornik materialov*, Moscow, 1990, p.41. [SSEES Independent Parties & Movements Archive]
- ³⁸ *Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov: osnovnye dokumenty*, typescript dated 17 November 1988, Moscow. [SSEES Independent Parties & Movements Archive]
- ³⁹ *Ogonek*, No. 21, 1987, pp.4-5.
- ⁴⁰ Julia Wishnevsky, "The Origins of Pamyat", *Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 3, October 1988, pp.79-80.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., p.81.
- ⁴² *Nezavisimyi bibliograf: Spravochnik periodicheskogo samizdata*, No.4, January 1989, Moscow, p.10.
- ⁴³ Ibid., p.11.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., pp.11-12.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.14-17.
- ⁴⁶ "Neoiazychniki?", *Russkaia mysl'*, 27 March 1987, p.7.
- ⁴⁷ A. Kiselev & A. Mostovshchikov, "Let's talk on equal grounds: Boris Yeltsin talks with members of Pamyat Assossociation", *Moscow News*, 17/5/89, p.4.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid.; Julia Wishnevsky, "El'tsin Meets with Members of 'Pamyat'", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* 191/87, 19 May 1987.
- ⁴⁹ *Sostoianie strany': Analiticheskie sborniki informatsionnogo agenstva Postfactum. "Pravaia alternativa"*, No.1/2, 25 February 1991, p.17.
- ⁵⁰ *Rossiia: Partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby*, Vol.1, part 2, Rau-Press, Moscow, 1991, p.177.
- ⁵¹ V. Soloukhin, "Bol' ego i nadezhda", *Ogonek*, No.13, March 1987, p.2.
- ⁵² Kathleen Parthé, "Images of Rural Transformation in Russian Village Prose", *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol.XXIII, no.2, Summer 1990, p.168.
- ⁵³ Data from *Sel'skoe khoziastvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik*, Moscow, Financy i statistika, 1988, pp.476-477.
- ⁵⁴ Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Perspective*, University of California Press, 1985, pp. 31-42.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., pp.38-39.
- ⁵⁶ Geoffrey Hosking, "The Russian Peasant Rediscovered: Village Prose of the 1960s", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 32, No.4, December 1973, p.724, n.26.
- ⁵⁷ K. Parthé, "Images of Rural Transformation in Russian Village Prose", op. cit. p.166.
- ⁵⁸ V. Rasputin, "Pozhar", *Nash sovremennik*, No. 7, 1985; V. Astaf'ev, "Pechal'nyi detektiv", *Oktiabr*, No.1, 1986; V. Belov, "Vse vpered", *Nash sovremennik*, Nos.7&8, 1986.
- ⁵⁹ Astaf'ev, ibid., p.73.
- ⁶⁰ S. Zalygin, "Posle buri", *Druzhba narodov*, Nos. 7,8&9, 1985.

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- ⁶² Kseniia Mialo, "Oborvannaia nit': Krest'ianskaia kul'tura i kul'turnaia revoliutsiia", *Novyi mir*, No. 8, 1988, pp. 245-257.
- ⁶³ F. Shipunov, "Velikaia zamatnia", *Nash sovremennik*, No.3, 1990, p.125.
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- ⁶⁷ Cited in Dimitry Pospelovsky, "Russian Nationalism: An Update", *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 9 February 1990, p.9.
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- ⁷² D.S. Likhachev, "Rossiia", *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 12/10/88, p.6.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.5.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.6.
- ⁷⁵ D.S. Likhachev, "Beden ne tot, u kogo malo, a tot, komu malo", *Druzhba narodov*, No. 6, 1988, p.224.
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- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.6.
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- ⁸¹ D. S. Likhachev, "Pamiat' preodolevaet vremia", *Trud*, 21/8/88, p.4.
- ⁸² D. S. Likhachev, "Beden ne tot,...", op. cit., p.222-223.
- ⁸³ D.S. Likhachev, "Rossiia", op. cit., p.6.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ D. Balashov, "Formirovanie russkoi natsii i problemy natsional'nogo bytiia", *Znaniia-narodu*, No.8, 1989, p.20.
- ⁸⁶ V. Tkachenko, "Rodina dana nam odin raz i do samoi smerti", *Pravda*, 21/8/87, p.4.
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- ⁹⁷ G. Petrov, "Tak vy probyvaetes' k pravde?", *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, 24/11/87.
- ⁹⁸ Letter from V. A. Iudin, "Tak vy probyvaetes' k pravde?", *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, 2/2/88, p.6.

⁹⁹ "O putiakh Rossii", *Dvuglavyi orel*, No.1(7), January 1991, p.2. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹⁰⁰ "Deklaratsiia sotsialistov-narodnikov", *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia: organ tovarishchestva sotsialistov-narodnikov*, No. 6, May 1990, p.1. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹⁰¹ "K cootchestvennikam", *Bor'ba*, No.2, 2/9/91, p.1. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹⁰² A. Prokhanov, "Kul'tura - khram, a ne strel'bishche", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 22/1/88, p.3.

¹⁰³ These might be Russified Slavs of Ukrainian, Belorussian or Polish descent, but could also be people of other nationalities, or 'mixed' nationality. Citing an example from a Latvian newspaper, Pål Kolstø pointed out that "Many Russians dislike the term 'Russian-speakers', preferring to see themselves just as Russians plain and simple. The term 'Russian-speakers', they suspect, signifies a lack of cultural identity rather than any positive content." [in P. Kolstoe, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics*, Hurst & Co., London, 1995, p.109-110.]

¹⁰⁴ L. Skvortsov, "Iazyk velikogo bratstva", *Pravda*, 2/1/86, p.2.

¹⁰⁵ O. Trubachev, "Slaviane. Iazyk i istoriia." *Pravda*, 28/3/89.

¹⁰⁶ I.I. Siniavin, "Spasem sviatuiu Rus'!...", op. cit.

¹⁰⁷ "Manifest natsional'no-patrioticheskogo fronta Pamiat'", *Nezavisimyi bibliograf: Spravochnik periodicheskogo samizdata*, No.4, January 1989, Moscow, p.17. [SSEES Independent Parties & Movements Archive]

¹⁰⁸ V. Kozhinov & B. Sarnov, "Rossiia i revoliutsiia", *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 15/3/88, p.2.

¹⁰⁹ "Pered russkim vzryvom", (Interview with V. V. Zhirinovskii by V. Fomichev), *Pul's Tushina*, No.22, 1990, p.3. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹¹⁰ See I. R. Shafarevich, "Rusofobiia", *Nash sovremennik*, Nos. 6 & 11, 1989; *Kuban'*, Nos. 5,6 & 7, 1989.

¹¹¹ I. R. Shafarevich, "Rusofobiia: desiat' let spustia", *Nash sovremennik*, No.12, 1991, p.124.

¹¹² Yevgeny Anisimov, "Splinters of the Empire", *Moscow News*, No. 51, 17/12/89, p.10.

¹¹³ "Pamiat'", *Nezavisimyi bibliograf: Spravochnik periodicheskogo samizdata*, op. cit., p.11.

¹¹⁴ V. Gorbachev, "Perestroika i podstroika", *Molodaia gvardiia*, No. 7. 1987.

¹¹⁵ "Perestroika i publitsistika", op. cit., p.6.

¹¹⁶ M. Antonov, "Kogda sostoitsia proryv?" *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 7/8/88.

¹¹⁷ M. Antonov, "Nravstvennye uroki i katastrofy", *Nash sovremennik*, No.1, 1990.

¹¹⁸ V. N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov, V.V. Cherviakov, V. D. Solovei, *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8. Rau-Press, Moscow, 1992, p.106.

¹¹⁹ Natsional'no-patrioticheskii front 'Pamiat'', "Obrashchenie", Samizdat leaflet dated 13 October 1989, Moscow.[SSEES Independent Parties & Movements Archive]

¹²⁰ Karem Rash, "Pravorossy", *Russkii vestnik*, No.10, 15/5/91, p.9. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection].

¹²¹ e.g. for Tsipko see *Moskovskie novosti*, 1/7/90; for Aksiuchits see "Sud'ba strany", *Russkaia mysl'*, 1/1/91; for Glazunov see *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, 14/6/90.

¹²² Aleksandr Ageev, "Razmyshleniia patriota", *Znanie*, August 1991, p.197.

¹²³ Mikhail Lobanov, "Posleslovie", *Nash sovremennik*, No.4, 1988, p.159.

¹²⁴ "Krizisnoe sostoianie triednoi Russkoi natsii", *Nezavisimyi bibliograf* op. cit., p.20.

¹²⁵ *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 2/6/89.

¹²⁶ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 6, Rau-Press, Moscow, 1992, p.157.

¹²⁷ For an Andreeva criticism of Stolypin, see "Esli my pridem k vlasti" [Nina Andreeva interviewed by V. Terekhov], *Argument i fakty*, No.22, 1990, p.4.

¹²⁸ e.g. See "Im nuzhny - velikie potreseniia, nam nuzhna - velikaia Rossiia!", *Pamiat'*, (Moscow), No.1, January 1991, p.3; *Pamiat'*, (Novosibirsk), No.4(22), 1991, p.4; "Nuzhna velikaia Rossiia!", *Russkii vestnik*, No.21, 11/9/91, p.6; *Grazhdanskii mir* (nezavisimaia politicheskaia gazeta iuga Rossii), No.3, February 1991, p.15. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]; N. Lysenko, "Tret'ia politicheskaia sila", *Golos Rossii*, [organ of RNPR], No.1(6), 1991; "Im nuzhny - velikie potreseniia, nam nuzhna - velikaia Rossiia!", *Put'*, No. 1(4), January, 1991, p.9.

¹²⁹ V. . N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 6, op. cit., p.146. {Note: the party had by the end of October 1991 been renamed the 'National Republican Party of Russia', NRPR}

¹³⁰ *Golos Rossii*, op. cit.

¹³¹ *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 6/6/91, p.2.

¹³² O. Kochetkov, "Chitaia Stolypina", *Moskovskii literator*, No.23, 1990.

¹³³ *Moscow News*, No.16, 14/4/89, p.16.

¹³⁴ *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 40, 1990, p.8.

¹³⁵ V. T. Fomichev, "Prizraki ili masonry", *Pul's Tushina*, No.20, 1991, p.1. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹³⁶ D. Vasli'ev, "Az" buki v"di glagol' dobro", *Pamiat'*, No.1, Jan. 1991, op. cit.

¹³⁷ *Pamiat'*, (Izdanie natsional'no patrioticheskogo fronta 'Pamiat''), Moscow, No.3, January 1990, p.16. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹³⁸ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 6, op. cit., p.85.

¹³⁹ Tsentr po izucheniiu obshchestvennykh dvizhenii, Arkhiv nezavisimoi pechati, *New Political Parties: Everyday Information*, [Moskovskoe otdelenie Rossiiskogo Imperskogo Soiuza-Ordena (RISO)]. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]

¹⁴⁰ *Dvuglavyi orel*, No.2(8), April, 1991, p.6 [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection].

¹⁴¹ Richard Sakwa, "Christian Democracy in Russia", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 20, No.2, 1992, p.139.

¹⁴² e.g. See *Dvuglavyi orel*, No.3(9), 1991. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]. The front cover has a photograph of Nicholas II crowning his tsarina.

¹⁴³ "Rovesnik oktiabria", *Demokraticheskaiia gazeta*, November 1991.[SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹⁴⁴ Iurii Mitiunov, "Dvuglavyi orel nad Sovetskoi armiei", *Den' za dnem*, No.6, June-October 1989, p.16.[SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹⁴⁵ "Natsional'nyi flag Rossii" *Liumpen*, No.1 February 1990, p.1. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹⁴⁶ "Obrashchenie Khristiansko-patrioticheskogo soiuza k izbirateliam", *Demokrat*, [Russian monthly independent magazine] (Moscow), No. 12/23, December 1989, p.18. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹⁴⁷ *Moskvoskie vedomosti*, No.1(13) January 1991, p.8; *Monarkhist*, No.1, 1991, p.2; *Dvuglavyi orel*, No.1(7), op. cit., pp.5-6. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹⁴⁸ "Po zaslugam - i chest'", *Rossiisskie vesti*, No.32, December, 1991, p.16.

¹⁴⁹ *Den'*, No.19, September, 1991; No.16, August 1991.

¹⁵⁰ *Istoki*, No.5, 1991, p.4. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

¹⁵¹ L. M. Drobizheva, "Etnicheskoe samosoznanie russkikh v sovremennykh usloviakh: ideologiya i praktika", *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, January-February, 1991, p.5. {70-75% of Russians considered their people to be kind, up to 50% considered the nation to be hospitable and the number of respondents who considered the Russians to be steadfast varied from 46% in Moscow to 59% in Tashkent.}

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- ¹⁵³ V. Osipov, "Besnovatye zhazhdut krovi", *Moskovskii stroitel'*, 29/5 - 5/6/90, p.11.
- ¹⁵⁴ "Krizisnoe sostoianie triednoi Russkoi natsii", *Nezavisimyi bibliograf* op. cit., p.20.
- ¹⁵⁵ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
- ¹⁵⁶ *Rossiiskoe khristianskoe demokraticeskoe dvizhenie: Sbornik materialov*, Moscow, 1990, p.45-46. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
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- ¹⁵⁸ N. Ryzhkov, "Moia pozitsiia", op.cit.
- ¹⁵⁹ *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 6/6/91.
- ¹⁶⁰ *Edinstvo*, 18-24 February 1991, p.3.
- ¹⁶¹ Yurii V. Arutyunyan, "The Russians outside Russia", in Marco Buttino (ed.), *In a Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union*, Feltrinelle Editore, Milan, 1992, p.146.
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- ¹⁶³ *Ekonomika i zhizn'*, No. 46, 1990. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹⁶⁴ *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 19/1/91.
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- ¹⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁹ *Edinstvo*, 12-18 November 1990, p.5.
- ¹⁷⁰ "Pered russkim vzryvom", (Interview with V. V. Zhirinovskii by V. Fomichev), *Pul's Tushina*, op. cit.
- ¹⁷¹ The RNF demanded the inclusion of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, Transdnier & Gagauzia. V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol.7, op. cit., p. 148.
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- ¹⁷³ V. Belov, E Volodin et al., "Chto est' chest', a chto beschest'e", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 19/1/91, p.1.
- ¹⁷⁴ Dmitrii Balashov, "Eshche raz o Velikoi Rossii", *Den'*, No.21, 25 Oct. - 8 Nov. 1991, p.4.
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- ¹⁷⁶ *Istoki*, July 1991, p.1.
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Chapter 5: Imperialist Russian Nationalism: Groups and Parties Connected with the Tendency

Introduction

One of the most emotive factors provoking the growth of Russian nationalist sentiment and introspection was that of the loss of empire. Although many Russians would have denied that the Soviet Union was a Russian empire (and during glasnost many Russians vehemently denied that they ever enjoyed imperial status, insisting that they were the major victims of the Soviet ideological empire),¹ there was a great feeling of anger and resentment amongst certain numbers of the Russian population when the populations in non-Russian republics discussed and sought independence from the Soviet Union. Some interpreted this as a betrayal of the Soviet Union and socialism, whilst others openly opposed any break-up of the historical Russian state/empire.

The majority of Russian nationalist groups and parties gravitated towards the imperialist tendency and displayed a broad range of political opinions. To some extent, it is possible to sub-divide this tendency according to the variety of political beliefs expressed, but the idea of the unified Russian imperial/Soviet state was the overwhelming factor which drew these groups together to form joint platforms and alliances. The other common factors between these groups were mistrust of and opposition to the West (and to the Western-influenced 'democrats') and a general concern for ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers throughout the Soviet Union. The majority of the membership of each group consisted of ethnic Russians or Russified Slavs, who were affected by a residual imperial thinking, particularly when the independence movements appeared in the non-Russian republics - even the 'internationalist' groups were very quick to lend their 'internationalist' support to Russian/Russian speaking communities.

All the views which can be classed under the umbrella of imperialist Russian nationalism conceived the Soviet Union/Russia to be a unique entity which had to be preserved at all costs. There seemed to be various

conceptions or justifications of this 'exclusiveness'.

Soviet Nationalism?

Gorbachev and others at the centre could justifiably be labelled 'Soviet nationalists' or Soviet 'patriots' in Soviet parlance. There was, no doubt, a number of people who believed in the unity of the Soviet state and who had no Russian axe to grind. Whilst Gorbachev repeated the idea that Russia was the core of the Union, he defended the Union not historical grounds, nor just on ideological grounds, but also on practical grounds. For instance, he considered it prudent and practical to maintain, rather than destroy, the interdependent economies of the republics²:

No republic can now live without another republic. After all, the whole of Uzbekistan's land is working for the whole of the Union. 75% of the land is employed in cotton production, not only for Uzbekistan, but also for other republics...³

However, in other instances, 'internationalism' and 'Marxism-Leninism' were used to promote Russian nationalist interests, or, conversely, Russian nationalism was used to support Marxism-Leninism.

The 'internationalist' movements promoted a Soviet nationalism, injected with a very heavy Russian nationalist content. This was most noticeable in the Baltic and Moldavian international movements and *OFT*, whose attempts to present themselves as defenders of Marxism-Leninism were undermined by their pro-Russian agenda. Despite their rhetoric, these groups consistently defended the rights of Russian and Russian-speaking populations and condemned manifestations of nationalism or independence within the non-Russian communities.

Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo*, which Dunlop and others have described as 'neo-Stalinist', was perhaps the most Soviet nationalist of all the groups related to imperialist Russian nationalism. During the war and the Brezhnev era, a carefully-controlled Russian nationalism was manipulated in order to bolster the Soviet regime and ethnic Russians were made to feel pride in the fact that they were first among equals in the Soviet Union. *Edinstvo* reflected this trend, promoting Marxism-

Leninism, internationalism and condemning nationalism, but appealing to the imperial pride of the Russians. Therefore, *Edinstvo* became a coalition between an Orthodox Marxism-Leninism and a Russian nationalism, whereby the Russian people were identified with those Marxist-Leninist values and the USSR as a whole.

Russian Idea

Whilst some used Marxism-Leninism or Soviet nationalism as justification for the integration of the greater Russian state, others pointed openly towards the Russian nation and a Russian idea as the glue or integrational factor. Of course, this approach was less satisfactory to the non-Russians, whose role in a unitary state would be automatically reduced to a second-class status.

The Politburo decision in 1988 to sanction the publication of previously forbidden works by Russian thinkers and philosophers led to discussions of the ideas of the Aksakovs, Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Frank, Struve, Fedotov, Leontev, Chaadaev, Solov'ev, Gershenzon, Merezhovsky, etc. This process reintroduced the idea of Russian messianism - a religious idea holding that the Russians were the chosen people and Russia had a mission from God to save the world. It envisaged Moscow as the new spiritual centre of Christianity, or the 'Third Rome'. Although, these ideas did not provoke sudden cries for the establishment of a Third Rome, many of the old ideas coincided with ideas and attitudes already expressed in the Russian nationalist press. For instance, the importance of morality, spirituality and Orthodox Christian values espoused by Solov'ev, Struve and Berdiaev were reflected by some of the ideas of Rasputin, Belov, Bondarev and Viacheslav Gorbachev.

Over the course of 1989-91 people of various political persuasions moved towards the idea of a Russian path. Valentin Rasputin, a sympathiser with imperialist Russian nationalism had joked cynically in 1989 that Russia should leave the Union.⁴ This was not a call for Russian withdrawal, but a jibe against national independence movements in the republics. Later, he prescribed a Russian solution for the greater Russian state (Soviet Union), insisting that Russia should not follow the ways of other countries, but

establish her own path.⁵

Igor' Shafarevich, another convinced imperialist Russian nationalist who advocated a Russian 'third way' for the whole of the Soviet Union, rejected liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism, claiming that they were both stimulated by the same technological and scientific 'utopia' and would both lead to the same disastrous conclusion.⁶

A 'Russian path' did not only describe the political nature of the Russian state and the spiritual/religious complexion of Russian society, it also presumed peculiar social values - many of which reflected conservative family values or religious/moral values.

The majority of ideas about a specific Russian path were relatively vague in detail - some nationalists suggested that the Russian path was guided by a mystical Russian 'national soul':

Russia exists... as a steady, organic whole, a spiritual type, as the living soul of the Russian people with a joint [*sobornyi*] consciousness. Her statehood, her nationality and her culture were born of this soul, as its embodiment. It is impossible to redesign, reinvent and rebuild Russia according to a plan which is foreign to her.⁷

Whether such imperialist Russian nationalists regarded socialism, Orthodoxy and/or monarchy as the guiding principles of the Russian state, the moral authority of the Russian people seemed central to their 'Russian idea'. The extreme Russian nationalist group *RNE* put forward the following view:

Our main aim is the spiritual, moral and physical revival of the Russian People, to return to the Russian People its historical place and role in the state and the world. As a result of history, the Russian People, by force of its high Spirituality, Morality, developed economic activity, Culture, numerousness, military strength and sense of justice, became a powerful nucleus of attraction, about which a more powerful multinational state formed. It was not internationalism or human values, but the Russian People who were the core and cement in this state.⁸

Not everyone stated the case as boldly as *RNE*, because the espousal of a Russian idea for the Soviet Union could antagonise the non-Russian nationalities. Most referred to a Russian 'revival' or the revival of traditional Russian values whilst upholding the integrity of the unitary Soviet/Russian state.

Eurasianism

Eurasianism was a concept which was rarely referred to during the Gorbachev era, although it became more fashionable in 1992 - after the break-up of the Soviet Union.⁹

There are two understandings of the term 'Eurasia'. In the West, it is understood to be the name of the continental landmass of Europe and Asia, whereas, in the Russian tradition, it is understood to be synonymous with 'Greater Russia':

'Eurasia' in the Russian usage happens to be those internal expanses of the continent where there has historically been a symbiosis between Russians and others, mainly - in the eyes of Eurasianists - Altaic, Mongol-Turkic peoples.¹⁰

The philosophy of Eurasianism was originally developed amongst Russian emigrés in the 20s and 30s. One of the leading theorists, N. S. Trubetskoi rejected internationalism and developed the view that nationalism was a 'positive principle of a nation's [*narod*] behaviour'. However, he did not advocate a narrow Russian nationalism, but the nationalism of a new multi-national Eurasian nation (i.e. the peoples of the USSR):

the national substratum of the state, which in the past was called the Russian Empire and is now called the USSR, could only be an aggregate of the peoples populating this state, to be considered as a special multi-national nation, and, in this respect, having its own nationalism. We call this nation the Eurasian nation, its territory is Eurasia and its nationalism is Eurasianism.¹¹

To some extent, this idea was reflected by the Soviet nationalities policy and, particularly, by Brezhnev's 1971 declaration that 'a new historical community of people has arisen - the Soviet people'.¹²

However, Eurasianism never really existed as an elaborated single doctrine and it was largely through the efforts of Lev Gumilev that the concept of Eurasia was 'naturalised on Soviet soil' and came to mean a 'Greater Russia' in the minds of some imperialist Russian nationalists. Gumilev's theory of 'ethnogenesis' had been expounded before glasnost, but received further attention with the publication of his work in 1988-89.¹³ Gumilev's theory held that a nation, or 'ethnos', was not just a product of social history (as Marxism taught), but also a product of biological, geographical

and psychological factors, further determined by the level of *passionarnost* - an innate energy or drive. Gumilev suggested that 'ethnoses' are essentially different and that they should not be merged into a single nation, but exist symbiotically.¹⁴ His ideas linked Eurasianism with the ancient mutual relationship between Rus' and the Steppe, suggesting that a distinct Eurasian civilisation had developed over Russia's thousand year history.

This idea of a Eurasia in which a Russian nation (or, even, Slavic-Orthodox 'superethnos') necessarily existed symbiotically with other (Turkic, Altaic) nations was attractive to the imperialist Russian nationalist mentality. The concept guaranteed the unity of the Soviet state/Russian empire, whilst upholding the identity of the Russian people. Furthermore, the Eurasian concept encapsulated the idea of the exclusiveness of the 'historical Russian state' - Russia/Eurasia constituted a separate entity which could be allied neither to the East nor the West, but lay somewhere in between.

Vadim Kozhinov, one of the Gorbachev era's supporters of a Eurasian idea, asserted that Russia's role in the world was to provide a balance between East and West and that Russians who embraced the West for whatever reasons would be making a grave mistake.¹⁵ This view was reflected by A. Lanshchikov who suggested that the Russian Eurasian role had been the saviour of both Europe and Asia:

For half a millennium Christian Rus' held back a dynamic and aggressive Asia from invading Europe and for the other half of the millennium she held back a dynamic and aggressive Europe from invading Asia. At first we defended Europe from Asia and then Asia from Europe, and who is defending us now when we are ruining ourselves economically and morally?¹⁶

Eurasianism was a relatively obscure idea that failed to capture the Soviet imagination during the Gorbachev period. Many Russian nationalists would have felt uncomfortable with the idea of a Eurasian nation and Eurasian idea subsuming the Russian nation and the Russian idea. In addition, the Russian population was declining in relation to the other nationalities of the USSR - this meant that the dominant Russian presence in Eurasian civilisation would disappear in the future and the balance of influence would shift to the non-Russian peoples. Some of the small, new

Russian nationalist groups tried to remedy the question of a declining Russian population by reviving the idea of pre-revolutionary academics that the Russian nation included Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russians, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians.¹⁷

One party, the Party of Revival, which formed towards the end of 1991, referred to Russia as a 'Eurasian state' and Gumilev's ideas were given ample airing in 1991 in publications such as *Literaturnaia Rossiia* and *Nash sovremennik*.¹⁸ However, it was only with the fall of the Soviet Union that the Eurasian idea began to gain any currency and attract interest. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of Soviet ideology evidently encouraged people to seek different justifications for holding the Russian empire/Soviet Union together.

Sub-dividing groups associated with imperialist Russian nationalism

The groups listed below represent some of the most notable adherents to imperialist Russian nationalism. They also represent the variety of views which existed within the tendency. It should be assumed that all of the groups mentioned here displayed anti-Western tendencies and opposed the 'democrats'. However, they displayed different attitudes towards the significance of Marxism-Leninism or co-operation with the CPSU, the importance of Orthodoxy or other values.

In his analysis of the break-up of the Soviet Union, John Dunlop referred to Russian nationalists within the conservative coalition opposing Gorbachev's reformers and El'tsin's 'democrats' as 'National Bolsheviks' and 'conservative nationalists': those who believed that the Russian state was best maintained through Marxism-Leninism and the structures of the Party; and those who opposed Marxism-Leninism, but were attracted to Russian Orthodoxy and the idea of a monarchy. In addition, there were 'neo-Stalinists', who were not 'Russian nationalists', but were prepared to manipulate Russian nationalism in order to 'firm up the Marxist-Leninist legitimacy of the Soviet state'.¹⁹ These labels were very useful in describing whether a supporter of Russian nationalism was pro- or anti-Marxist-Leninist, but they do not describe adequately the imperialist Russian nationalist-orientated groups which appeared under Gorbachev. The

scheme below takes into account the coalitions which the groups represented and their relationship towards the establishment. I have subdivided this broad tendency into: internationalists, socialists, conservative revivalists, populists, unifiers, *Pamiat'* and anti-communists.

Internationalists

The 'internationalists' represent those groups which upheld the idea of Marxist-Leninist internationalism in order to maintain the unitary state, but had an underlying Russian agenda. They represent a coalition of Dunlop's 'neo-Stalinists' and 'National Bolsheviks'. Whereas Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo* represented a limited association between Marxism-Leninism and Russian nationalism, the 'international movements' in the non-Russian republics and *OFT* represented a much stronger expression of Russian interests: 'international' interests reflected the interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking communities and the condemnation of national independence movements.

***Edinstvo* - for Leninist and Communist Ideals**

Edinstvo formed on 29 May 1989 in Moscow, following the publication of a letter by a Leningrad Institute teacher, Nina Andreeva, in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, entitled "I Cannot Give Up My Principles".²⁰ The article was referred to as a 'manifesto of the forces against perestroika'²¹ and was an expression of communist conservatism, not only resisting the forces of change, but calling for a return to the socialism of Stalin. *Edinstvo* has been described as 'neo-Stalinist' or 'neo-Bolshevik' and analysts such as Dunlop denied that it was Russian nationalist.²² However, discussions of Russian nationalism always seemed to include reference to Nina Andreeva and the *Edinstvo* group, and I believe that there is some justification to include this association in an analysis of imperialist Russian nationalism.

Edinstvo's rhetoric called for a return to socialist principles and resisted

any break-up of the USSR. Its statute opposed nationalism and preached the ideal of internationalism whilst maintaining the 'cultural property of the peoples of the Soviet Union.'²³ However, if we examine the vocabulary which Nina Andreeva used and the alliances which *Edinstvo* subsequently made, we can detect certain similarities with imperialist nationalism which might suggest that this form of conservatism was underpinned by a commitment to the Soviet state *and* its historical predecessor, the Russian empire. This is not a new phenomenon: during the war years, Stalinism employed a very controlled and limited form of Russian nationalism as a means of inspiring the Russian people to victory. *Edinstvo's* Stalinist or neo-Stalinist politics employed this form of Russian nationalism.

The Andreeva letter is an interesting document. Whilst criticising the national pride of the Great Russians and attacking the deviation of Russian nationalist-orientated 'traditionalists' or 'neo-Slavophiles', Andreeva manages to find common ground with this tendency:

Traditionalists have undoubtedly performed a service in: unmasking corruption; the just solution of ecological problems; the fight against alcoholism; the protection of historical monuments; and in countering the domination of mass culture, which is rightly viewed as a psychosis of consumerism.²⁴

Although there is support for some of the views of the 'neo-Slavophiles', there is little, if no support for the 'left-liberal socialists', who, we assume, are the architects of perestroika - Gorbachev and his supporters. Besides this, the letter uses some of the vocabulary frequently used by nationalists in referring negatively to 'cosmopolitanism' and making negative reference to Jews such as Trotsky, Dan, Martov and Anatolii Rybakov. There is undoubtedly an anti-Semitic undercurrent in the letter and this appears to be associated with the 'left-liberal' socialists or 'neo-liberals'.

Finally, Andreeva makes reference to Aleksandr Prokhanov, using his term 'guardians and traditionalists'. Prokhanov was an ardent adherent to imperialist Russian nationalism and only six weeks earlier had published an article in *Literaturnaia Rossiia* proposing that the socialist ideal was the basis for proceeding with Soviet society.²⁵ It is clear that reference to Prokhanov is a mark of respect and support for Prokhanov's views.

Another example of Nina Andreeva's flirtation with nationalist

vocabulary and ideas appeared in a question and answer session in *Smena* in 1990. The newspaper quoted a report which Andreeva had given to the Co-ordinating Council of *Edinstvo* in answer to some of the questions:

...The second group of politicised associations are the patriotic societies, which are surfacing from isolation, where they were driven by Zionists to escape from the 'children's diseases' of growth, false attributes, religious strivings and sound effects. Their contribution to the fight against drunkenness, alcoholism and bourgeois mass culture are undeniable. They have done much to restore Russian material and spiritual culture, to unmask Russophobia, cosmopolitanism and the denigration of Russian national history.²⁶

Edinstvo's programme included both populist and familiar Soviet socialist themes. For instance, documents spoke of the group's aims to 'maintain peace, avert ecological catastrophes, oppose the exploitation and oppression of man by man and oppose the impoverishment of working people'.²⁷ The Stalinist direction of *Edinstvo* is detected not only in the call for pre-Khrushchevian politics, but in the gravitation towards Stalin-style Russian nationalism. In a document entitled 'Address to the Russian People', the following was written:

In the family of Soviet peoples, there was always an elder brother. He was the wisest and the strongest. This is what Stalin meant when he named the Russian people as the 'most outstanding nation of all nations making up the Soviet Union, possessing a clear mind, a steadfast character and patience'. Just as the USSR was always at the vanguard of the world communist movement, Russia was the pivot, about which the unique association of union states rallied and strengthened. Having gone down a difficult and heroic path, this association transformed into a strong superpower (*derzhava*), acknowledged as such by friends and foes in five continents.²⁸

Andreeva regularly shared platforms with figures expressing outspoken Russian imperialist nationalist views. For example, the newspaper of the Russian Popular Front, *Vozrozhdenie Rossii*, reported that Andreeva was present at a concert in Moscow entitled 'Russia - my Motherland'. According to the advertising poster, appearances would be made by Viktor Astaf'ev, Iurii Bondarev, Vladimir Rasputin and Il'ia Glazunov, but in the final event the crowd were addressed by V. Soloukhin, V. Bondarenko, E. Asadov and Nina Andreeva. Some speakers uttered the words, 'We do not need great tremors, give us a great Russia!', echoing the words of Petr Stolypin. Bondarenko claimed that a forthcoming demonstration would be a 'pogrom against Russian nationality and statehood', adding that Russia did not need perestroika, but revival. Nina Andreeva was met by a

'huge ovation' and ended her speech with the words:

The nation and the army are one! Are we not Russians?²⁹

The article added that Andreeva remained on stage to listen not to military-type music, but to 'spiritual' music, including a rendition of the Lord's Prayer.

The test of *Edinstvo's* convictions can be seen in the alliances that they adopted with other nationalist groups:

At the beginning of 1991 four rival Moscow committees of *Edinstvo*: Boris Gun'ko's group, Viktor Prishchepenko's group, Tat'iana Khabalova's group and the group of Andrei Kirsanov. Of these, the Prishchepenko and Kirsanov groups are gravitating towards a union with the national-bolshevik wing of '*Pamiat*', whilst Gun'ko's group is closer to the Moscow United Workers' Front and is even a collective member.³⁰

Edinstvo had links with *Otechestvo*, the All-Russian Patriotic Movement *Otchizna*, the 'International Movements', the United Workers' Front (OFT), the Popular Front of Russia, *Soiuz* and others. It should also be noted that *Edinstvo* participated in the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party in Leningrad in April 1990.³¹

According to the leaders there were several thousand members in over thirty cities across the Soviet Union in 1990. The Moscow branch headed by Boris Gun'ko numbered around 300.³² The group attracted more notoriety than support, but was very active in backing causes concerning Marxism-Leninism and the maintenance of the Union. Its Russian nationalism was constricted and always second in importance to the maintenance of Marxism-Leninism, but nevertheless played a significant role.

Interdvizhenie, Interfront, Edinstvo (Lithuania), OFT.

Like *Edinstvo* for Leninist and Communist Ideals, these groups were formed as a reaction to change and, along with Russian nationalist groups such as *Otechestvo*, the Union for the Spiritual Renaissance of the Fatherland (SDVO) and the Association of Russian Artists, they all entered the 'United Council of Russia' Association.³³ This action alone is enough

to confirm the groups' imperialist Russian nationalist credentials, but I will briefly examine the origins of these groups.

"Venibe-Edinstvo-Ednost"

The '*Inter*' movements and *Edinstvo* in Lithuania arose as a response to the independent groups in the republics. For example, the Founding Conference of *Venibe-Edinstvo-Ednost* on 22 January 1989 followed the Founding Conference of *Sajudis* in October 1988. Indeed, reports claimed that *Edinstvo* was set up in November 1988 to counter *Sajudis*.³⁴ Under its full name, the Socialist Movement for Perestroika in Lithuania "*Venibe-Edinstvo-Ednost*", the movement recognised the leading role of the CPSU; followed Marxist-Leninist ideology; stood for the independence of Lithuania's economy within the limits of a unified economy of the USSR; supported the 'strict observation of equal rights and the guarantees of receiving secondary and higher education in all areas of speciality in Russian, Lithuanian and Polish languages'; and that all Lithuanian state organs had the responsibility of creating guaranteed conditions for the development of all ethnic groups in the republic.³⁵ It was clear that the Russian (and Slavic) population was fearful for its status in a more independent Lithuania.

One of the first political actions of *Edinstvo* was to organise a protest of thousands of Russians and Poles against a decree making Lithuanian the language of business and government in the republic on 12 February 1989. Many of those demonstrating could not speak Lithuanian and complained that the law relegated Russian and Polish speakers in Lithuania to the status of second-rate citizens.³⁶ Slogans reading: 'No to the discriminating decree on languages, which is sowing the seeds of national dissension' and 'No to Lithuania leaving the USSR' accompanied the demonstration.³⁷ Three days later the movement organised protest strikes against the law in more than 60 enterprises in Vilnius.³⁸ Later in the month, members of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences penned an open letter condemning the disruptive activities of *Edinstvo*:

'Edinstvo' is trying to undermine trust in the CC of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Government of Lithuania; it is offending the honour of the Lithuanian people, casting

allegations of being 'fascists' and 'nationalists'...;

'*Edinstvo*'s practical activities openly express ideas of Great Russian chauvinism, Stalinist ideas about the merging of languages and nations, and other ideas from Russifiers and Polonizers denying the right of small peoples to sovereignty and national statehood, etc. The reactions and objections of '*Edinstvo*' to the declaration of Lithuanian as the state language assert that it is an effort to strengthen the position of deformed socialism.³⁹

It is understandable that with a law which would require all non-Lithuanians to learn the Lithuanian language, the Russian population had a grievance and were justified in standing up for their interests. However, by April/May 1989 two wings had developed within the movement: a liberal wing, which sought a form of legal rapprochement with *Sajudis*, and a conservative wing, which posed the major imperialist Russian nationalist opposition to *Sajudis*.⁴⁰ The group's imperialist behaviour was reflected in some of the principles it pursued: to keep Lithuania in the USSR; protect the rights of Slavs; oppose the idea that Slavs/Russians might have to learn the indigenous language; and totally oppose the indigenous national movement. The usual line taken by *Edinstvo* was that it represented the interests of all sections of society, whilst *Sajudis* only represented the ethnic Lithuanian population. An article in the Russian nationalist-orientated Army newspaper *Krasnaia zvezda* quoted a Lithuanian woman who said how happy she was with the Russian presence in Lithuania and that she was disgusted with the nationalism of *Sajudis*.⁴¹ Regardless of the perfectly reasonable grievances the Russian population might have had against the nationalism of the Lithuanians, the subsequent alliances (such as those mentioned above) in which *Edinstvo* participated are indicative of the reactive (predominantly) Russian nationalism of its members. The socialism which *Edinstvo* advocated was a socialism which sought to keep Lithuania tied to the centre and which would allow Russians to remain Russians in a Russian-dominated state and not in a foreign land.

Interfront, Latvia.

The founding conference of the Latvian *Interfront* took place on 7 January 1989. Like *Edinstvo* in Lithuania, *Interfront* claimed that it was represented by 'various social strata of the republic's population' and a

'varied national composition', aiming at first to be an ally of the Latvian Popular Front.⁴² Of all the Baltic republics, Latvia had the largest proportion of Russians (33%) and *Interfront* represented the interests of this largely working class group. At first, *Interfont's* chief concern centred around potential changes in language and citizenship laws. At the Founding Conference concern was voiced to maintain Russian as an official state language:

In particular, it is being claimed that the republic's Supreme Soviet took the decision to make Latvian the state language in haste and it is being proposed that the same status should be also established for the Russian language....

...It is really wrong if one language has an advantage in a multinational republic...
...Having defined the status of Latvian as a state language, we are trying all in all to establish a practical bilingualism, especially in the affairs of Party, Soviet and economic bodies and in service areas. The command of both languages should become the normal professional duty of the employees of the given institutions and departments.⁴³

Later, Tatiana Zhdanok, a member of the Presidium of the Council of the Latvian *Interfront*, said that the most important priorities of the Council included:

continuing the policy of consolidating all healthy forces in Soviet Latvia, taking an active part in the elections of people's deputies of the USSR, struggling to improve the ecological situation in the republic, and discussing the draft laws on language, on citizenship and on ending unregulated population growth.⁴⁴

Interfront presented the main opposition to the resolution passed on 14 February 1989 by the republic's Council of Ministers 'On Measures for the Cessation of Groundless Mechanical Growth of the Population and the Regulation of the Processes of Migration in the Latvian SSR'. *Interfront* attacked the legality of items which sought to deprive migrant workers of the right to improved housing.⁴⁵ The resolution posed a threat to Russians who had been resident in the republic for less than ten years and was an oblique way of reinforcing rules on citizenship.

Interfront's other complaints concerned the fact that they considered they were being censored; that monuments were being removed and streets were being renamed; that they resented the idea that the Soviet Army was an occupational force.

The Chairman of *Interfront's* Republican Council, I. V. Lopatin, claimed that Latvian television, radio and press published only what the Latvian Popular Front considered necessary and that *Interfront's* fifteen-minute

weekly broadcast was subject to censorship by Latvian Gostelradio.⁴⁶ Earlier, another *Interfront* representative, A. G. Alekseev, declared that the movement was seeking access to television, but had been denied this by the republican leadership. However, the movement did have access to television and radio in Leningrad where they had broadcast their views to a Russian audience.⁴⁷ Lopatin claimed that:

...the Union or Russian reader is poorly informed about what is really happening in the Baltic.⁴⁸

This kind of statement sought to convince Russians outside Latvia that Russians were the victims of nationalist discrimination inside Latvia.

The removal of monuments and the changing of place-names were two of the issues which *Interfront* felt the Russian public should know about. The changes which took place involved monuments and place names which had been changed or introduced following the absorption of Latvia and the other Baltic states into the USSR in 1940. An article in the *Interfront* mouthpiece, *Edinstvo*, which expressed anger at the removal of Lenin's statue in the town of Tukums asked:

Where and what are we coming to with such feelings of overflowing hate towards everything Soviet, Leninist and Russian?⁴⁹

Another article in the same issue addressed the subject of street names:

An absolute majority of young and middle-aged inhabitants of Riga would not have known up until recently that somewhere in the city there were Kungu (Gospodskal), Gretsiniēku (Greshnikov) and Bariniu (Sirotkaia) Streets. And almost no one, including the oldest residents, would not have thought of bringing back the old names. What on earth for? What is their attraction?⁵⁰

The author acknowledged that some hasty decisions had been taken in Stalin's time and agreed that names which did not render any specific merit to Riga should disappear. However, the writer was upset that the names of Soviet (and, therefore, mostly Russian) figures should disappear from the streets. Besides mentioning Lenin and Marx, he/she singled out the 'prosaic' name of Iurii Gagarin - a model Soviet and Russian hero. The removal of Gagarin's name was brought up by other Russians, including the aforementioned Lopatin, who enumerated and berated the changing of several other Russian and Soviet names and monuments:

..since 1 January 1990 the newspaper of the CC of the republic's komsomol is no longer called 'Soviet Youth',... but 'Latvian Youth'. The words 'Leninist' and 'Communist' have disappeared from many newspapers. Monuments are being dismantled in the Baltic. Last year in Liepai on the 22 June, the day on which the Great Patriotic War began, the civic authorities removed the monument to the city's defenders under the pretext of restoration, but this is not being carried out. In Kaunas... they dismantled and scrapped the tank which was the first to burst into the town on its liberation from the fascists in 1944: they said it 'spoiled the look of the town'.... In Riga they renamed Lenin Street, Gorky Street, Suvorov Street, Komsomol Embankment. In Eglava the street named after hero of the Soviet Union, Federov, who died liberating the town in 1944, became Zigru Street - 'Equine' Street.⁵¹

In a fashion indicative of an imperialist nationalist mentality, Lopatin cannot comprehend and accept why the Latvians would wish to change Russian and Soviet names imposed on their streets since Latvia's incorporation into the Soviet Union. Lopatin was also indignant at the suggestion that Latvia had been occupied by the Soviet Army in 1940:

The Session [of the Latvian Supreme Soviet] approved the highly tendentious conclusions of the committee studying the conditions of the 1939 agreement between the USSR and Germany [the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact], which found as if Latvia had been occupied by the Red Army as a result of the agreement. This decision drew a storm of indignation from veterans of the Party and the Revolution, and participants of the Great Patriotic War.⁵²

The imperialist Russian nationalist attitude is reflected not only by cries of 'foul' against Russians (and/or things Soviet), but also by ways which belittle the importance of the Latvians. A Russian *Interfront* member from Riga, R. Dudnik, said that there was a 'natural process of assimilation all over the world" and added that the Latvian population constituted 'only one per cent of the country'.⁵³

In a critical examination of *Interfront*, a Russian, A. Zhdanok, summed up the movement's general attitude towards the supremacy of Russian culture:

We have already come across the following logic of IF [*Interfront*]: if someone is against the dominance of the Russian people in Latvia, it means he is against the Russian people; if someone is against the dominance of the Russian language in Latvia, it means he is against the Russian language. And, by the same chalk, if you stand up for the values of Russian culture, then according to *Interfront*'s understanding, you should come out in favour of the unlimited dominance of Russian cultural origins in all multinational regions of the Russian empire.⁵⁴

He added that Russian members of the Latvian Society of Russian Culture, LORK, who supported the 'cultural and spiritual' renaissance of the Latvian people were singled out for vilification by *Interfront* in its newspaper *Edinstvo*.

Zhdanok also gave food for thought as to whether *Interfront* was truly ideologically committed to the CPSU, or regarded it as a tool for maintaining power. He indicated that *Interfront* sought to dominate the Latvian Communist Party and reduce the number of Latvians in the Party. Forty per cent of the Latvian CP were Latvians, whilst the remaining 60% were Russian speakers. Of the Latvian membership, 55% were members of the Latvian Popular Front in 1989. *Interfront* wanted to separate the Latvian Communist Party from the Latvian Popular Front and even supported a multiparty idea, but insisted upon maintaining the leading role of the Party. This idea would reduce the number of Latvians in the Party whilst keeping power in Party hands - the hands of the Russian-speaking population.⁵⁵

Most of *Interfront's* membership consisted of industrial workers who, perhaps, had the greatest fears of unemployment and displacement if Latvia broke away from Russia, but despite their efforts to spread fears amongst the non-Latvian population, the majority of Russians did not support the movement. In fact, more Russians supported the idea of Latvian independence.⁵⁶

Interfront's venom was directed not only at Latvians. Whilst the Latvian authorities put effort into encouraging Latvian language teaching, a number of non-Latvian speaking schools were encouraged to develop.⁵⁷ *Interfront* criticised the groups representing Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, Armenians and others who opened or planned to open 'national' schools. Collectively, these groups were represented by *ANKOL*, the Association of National Cultural Societies of Latvia. Members of *ANKOL* were given practical help by the Latvian Popular Front in setting up the schools and this led to a number of criticisms in the newspaper *Edinstvo* 'accusing the nationals of all sorts of sins'.⁵⁸ Besides opposing other national groups in Latvia, *Interfront* reinforced its imperialist credentials by sending representatives to Belorussia to mobilize non-Belorussians against local nationalism.⁵⁹

It is clear that *Interfront* was Russian-centred and this was reflected in its support for the *OFT*, *OSTK* and the subsequent alliances which they formed, not to mention support for the shadowy 'National Salvation Committee' of 1991. Unsurprisingly, the group was sometimes referred to

by Latvians as 'Imperfront'. At one stage, according to Lopatin, it had 300000 active participants,⁶⁰ a sizeable estimate, but whether or not it was accurate, the number of supporters neither matched the Latvians, nor the Russians who supported Latvian independence from the Soviet Union.

Interdvizhenie, Estonia

Interdvizhenie or the 'Internationalist Movement' in Estonia was analogous to the aforementioned *Edinstvo* and *Interfront* movements in Lithuania and Latvia. Originating in the latter half of 1988, *Interdvizhenie* held its Founding Conference in March 1989 and declared similar principles to the other two movements: internationalism and socialism; to maintain Estonia within the Soviet Union; condemnation of new language and citizenship laws; and opposition to 'discrimination' against the Russian-speaking (or non-Estonian) population of Estonia.

Interdvizhenie's Russian nationalist behaviour was affected to a degree by demographic factors. The proportion of Estonians in Estonia had decreased from 90 per cent in 1940 to around 62 per cent in the 80s. The majority of non-Estonians were Russian migrant workers who were concentrated in the north-eastern area of the republic (where the Estonian-speaking population had dropped below 5 per cent) and in housing estates in the region of Lasnamae on the outskirts of Tallinn.⁶¹ In contrast to *Edinstvo* and *Interfront* in the other Baltic republics, *Interdvizhenie* announced at its Founding Conference that it would consider the idea of setting up an autonomous republic in the north-eastern industrial area where Russians were predominant, if discrimination against the Russian-speaking population continued. This threat later changed to one of secession and incorporation into the USSR. So, although *Interdvizhenie* supported the maintenance of the USSR and of Estonia's position within it, it also flirted with the idea of breaking Estonian territory away from Estonia in favour of Russia. Suspecting backing from Moscow, the Estonians accepted the threats without making an issue of it, but, in response, voiced the republic's claim to lands in the Petseri region of the Russian Federation - an area which had been part of Estonia until it was annexed by Russia in 1945.⁶²

Interdvizhenie opposed legislation that curbed the electoral rights of recent immigrants, mostly Russians, to the republic. The movement helped organise and participated in a strike of 20 000 Russian workers on 9 August 1989 in opposition to a law which gave voting rights only to people who had lived for two years in a particular electoral district, or five years elsewhere in Estonia.⁶³ A series of strikes followed and the law was eventually rescinded under pressure from Moscow, where the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet declared the law unconstitutional.⁶⁴ Therefore, all residents, including Soviet troops stationed in the republic, were guaranteed voting rights.

Interdvizhenie was sensitive to Estonian revisionist statements and demands such as the Estonian parliament's description of the republic's incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940 as an 'annexation' rather than 'liberation'.⁶⁵ It also opposed the introduction of language laws which would make Estonian the state language and, therefore, force Russian-speakers to learn Estonian. This law was condemned by Russians in Moscow who claimed that it would put non-Estonian-speakers at a disadvantage, probably infringing their civil rights.⁶⁶ *Interdvizhenie* made efforts to ally itself with other Russians outside Estonia who had sympathies towards the maintenance of the USSR and the *status quo ante* by joining the OFT or the United Workers' Front.

Other Movements outside the RSFSR

Besides the 'internationalist' movements in the Baltic republics, an International Front *Edinstvo* appeared in Moldavia in 1989. In August, shortly after the founding congress of *Edinstvo* in July 1989, the Moldavian Supreme Soviet approved new language laws making Moldavian the state language. This caused a backlash of strikes by Russian workers throughout the republic.⁶⁷ Most of the organisation was carried out not by *Edinstvo*, but by a United Council of Labour Collectives, OSTK (*Ob"edineenyi sovet trudovykh kollektiv*). It was largely the efforts of these two groups that produced the declaration of a breakaway Russian republic of Transdniester in Moldova (Moldavia) in mid-1991. Therefore, whereas the Estonian Russian-speaking groups had threatened the autonomy of a region of the

Estonian republic whilst pursuing integration of the whole republic in the Soviet Union, the Moldovan Russians actually achieved it.

*OSTK*s existed in Moldavia and the Baltic. According to Geoffrey Hosking, *OSTK* originated in Estonia as:

an economic rather than an ethnic movement and, ironically, it originated in the campaign to create the [Estonian] Popular Front.⁶⁸

OSTK was originally set up as a body of elected representatives of workers in the factories and consisted largely of technical intelligentsia - one might say that it represented the nomenklatura élite of all-Union enterprises. The Founding Congress of the Council took place in December 1988 and, although the movement had been started to pursue largely economic problems, the political dimension became unavoidable. Amidst ethnic and political tensions, the movement split into Russian and Estonian groups: the *OSTK* representing Russian workers and the Estonians forming their own organisation *STKE*.⁶⁹ Along with *Interdvizhenie*, *OSTK* was responsible for organising much of the Russian protest actions against republican legislation.:

In the course of organising various measures - meetings and strikes - a bloc of forces allied to us has formed which includes *Interdvizhenie*, strike committees, a section of war veterans and internationalist servicemen.⁷⁰

In Latvia, *Interfront's* inability to organise impressive mass strikes was met by the formation of an *OSTK*. The declaration announcing the formation of the movement stated:

OSTK stands for the unification of all social forces supporting socialism and Soviet power (the debating club of Party organisation secretaries, *Interfront*, the Association of Industrialists et al.) into a broad democratic movement.⁷¹

It demanded:

...the return of the republic's media of mass information under the control of the Latvian Popular Front and their transfer to the Soviets, the state and the Communist Party.⁷²

It is also interesting to note that whilst talking of a 'one and indivisible Motherland', one of the movement's main tasks was to :

assist in supporting the high preparedness for action of the Soviet Armed Forces.⁷³

The first conference of the Latvian movement took place on 3 February 1990, only weeks before elections for the Supreme Soviet.⁷⁴ An address to Latvian toilers issued before the elections used scare tactics by talking of 'refugees' from other republics and suggesting that the same thing could happen in Latvia.⁷⁵ This could only apply, of course, to the non-Latvian population.

These 'internationalist' movements are rightly termed as adherents to Russian imperialist nationalism, rather than true socialist internationalists, because although most of their rhetoric was couched in internationalist terms, they identified with the Russian centre and fought to uphold the unique position occupied by Russians in the Soviet Union (for instance, the very fact that Russians resident in Estonia did not even have to study the Estonian language would be unimaginable in most parts of the world). Along with their efforts to maintain the *status quo* was an underlying Russian national consciousness which was being goaded into action by the forces of change. Leokadia Drobizheva summed up the situation well when she referred to two factors affecting the growth of Russian national consciousness under perestroika: the first was a reaction to the national movements and interethnic conflicts in non-Russian republics which was initially defensive, but became more belligerent as Russians sought to dissociate themselves from 'accusations directed at the centre'; the second was the 'psychological chain-reaction' as Russians adopted the organizational tactics of the national movements, forming their own representative bodies. Drobizheva added that the developments in the peripheral republics:

not only wounded Russian national feelings in these republics, but also led to the consolidation of Russians in the Russian Federation.⁷⁶

OFT

The United Workers' Front, or OFT (*Ob"edinennyi front trudiashchikhsia*) was a focal point about which the republican 'internationalist' movements could unite and which linked them to Russia and other similar-minded organisations in the USSR. OFT originated as a Leningrad organisation on

13 June 1989.⁷⁷ *Moskovskie novosti* reported that *OFT* planned 'side by side with the Party, komsomol and trade unions' to 'create political power through the working class in union with the collective peasantry and the intelligentsia'.⁷⁸ Even with such a broad social alliance, it is interesting to note that the Leningrad *OFT* included not only Workers' Political Clubs 'For Leninism and Communist Directions in Perestroika and the Scientific Atheism Society', but also the Russian nationalist-orientated *Otechestvo* society.⁷⁹ The leader of the small Russian nationalist group *Patriot*, Aleksandr Romanenko, gave a speech to supporters shortly after the formation of Leningrad *OFT* - he claimed that *OFT* was a 'patriotic organisation' and urged his audience to join it.⁸⁰ The formation of *OFT* was described in *Moskovskie novosti* as 'the very consolidation of anti-perestroika forces',⁸¹ i.e. a grouping of conservative pro-Union supporters, and this would appear to be reinforced by the fact that the guest speaker at the founding conference was Nina Andreeva whose presence 'was greeted by thunderous applause'.⁸²

The Leningrad *OFT* was followed by the formation of the *OFT* USSR. The founding congress took place between 15-16 July 1989 and was represented by 'internationalist-socialist movements and fronts of workers from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldavia, Ukraine, RSFSR, Moscow and Leningrad.' One of the guest speakers was I. V. Lopatin from Latvia's *Interfront*.⁸³ It should be noted that amongst the documents passed by the congress were addresses to the peoples and governments of the Baltic republics and to the intelligentsia.⁸⁴ These were the only groups singled out for an address - it is no coincidence that they were among the most prominent groups posing potential opposition to both Soviet power and Russian nationalism.

Shortly after the *OFT* USSR congress, a Moscow *OFT* was formed on 27 July 1989 and this included Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo* group. Besides other conservative communist groups, Moscow *OFT*, like its Leningrad counterpart, included the Russian nationalist society *Otechestvo* in its membership.⁸⁵

On 8-9 September the *OFT* RSFSR was founded. This group was described by V. Pribylovskii as the *OFT* of the 'largest real significance'.⁸⁶ Amongst the 103 delegates were members of the Estonian and Moldavian strike

committees, as well as the 'internationalist' movements and workers' fronts from the Baltic republics.⁸⁷

Taking *OFT* as a whole, most of its rhetoric is couched in socialist, internationalist terms similar to those of Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo*. When an *OFT* member was asked in January 1990 if *OFT* was linked with Nina Andreeva, he replied that she was not a member of *OFT* and, when pressed further, he would not say whether *OFT* was for or against her. However, another member firmly put Bogdan Gavrilko, a member of *Pamiat'* and The Union of Spiritual Renaissance of the Fatherland, *SDVO* (*Soiuz dukhovnovo vrozozhdeniia Otechestva*) and, therefore, someone of an overt Russian nationalist persuasion, on *OFT*'s blacklist.⁸⁸

OFT's underlying Russian imperialist nationalist sentiment can be detected in a number of things: its refusal to change the Union and the alliances that it entered in order to pursue that goal; its participation in the establishment of a Russian Communist Party; the use of the term 'Russophobia' to describe the behaviour of republican nationalists; elements of xenophobia; and the pursuit of a political structure which would maintain dominance in the power of the central Russian authorities all over the Union.

OFT's commitment to the Union was consistently stated in its documents but perhaps one of the most revealing documents endorsing the Union is the 'declaration of socio-political organisations and movements of socialist choice about the formation of a working conference of representatives for the consolidation of all patriotic and internationalist forces of the country'. The declaration's aims included the maintenance of the USSR as a federation; confirmation of the socialist choice of a multi-national Soviet people and a guarantee of human rights on the territory of the USSR as a whole - this latter point upholding equal rights of Soviet citizens regardless of nationality and language (amongst other things). The interesting point to note is the list of signatories to the declaration. Alongside *OFT* groups were the *Soiuz* group of People's Deputies, the USSR Writers Union, *Interdvizhenie*, the Association of Russian Artists, *Otechestvo*, *OSTK* of Moldavia, Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo*, the *Edinenie* Society, the Public Political Club *Rossiiane*, to name but a few. All the aforementioned groups can be linked with some aspects of Russian

nationalism.⁸⁹

In February-March 1991 *OFT* actively canvassed for people to vote for the maintenance of the Union as a unitary state in the 17 March referendum. *OFT*'s association with other Russian-orientated groups is illustrated by its participation as a founder in the deputies' club *Rossia*. According to *OFT* USSR leader and *OFT* RSFSR co-chairman, Veniamin Iarin, the club was set up as a counterweight to the interregional group of deputies. Other founder members included the RSFSR Writers' Union, the Public Committee for the Salvation of the Volga and the All-Russian Cultural Fund.⁹⁰

OFT was instrumental in setting up the Russian Communist Party. In one platform document it supported:

The reconstitution of a Russian Communist Party as a condition of the integrity and independence of the Motherland, of the perfection of the socialist system and of the strengthening of the communist movement in the country.⁹¹

In fact, the newspaper *Argumenty i fakty* revealed that *OFT* was the main element behind realising such a party:

'the idea of a Russian communist party is becoming more and more evident... and it is already being announced that on 21-22 April there will be an initiative congress of the Russian Communist Party in Leningrad. But who is organising it with such speed and without any preparation? It turns out to be the RSFSR United Workers' Front'⁹²

OFT was displeased with the Russian Communist Party that came into existence and was later instrumental in forming the Russian Communist Workers' Party.⁹³

The Front rarely used the vocabulary employed by Russian nationalist-oriented groups such as *Pamiat'*, but it referred to matters such as 'spiritual revival'. In an open letter from the Novgorod branch of *OFT* to 'members of patriotic and internationalist organisations', the group stated that:

Today the working class and broad strata of labourers, healthy forces of the CPSU, in the trade unions and in amateur organisations are beginning to force back the nationalists, ideological werewolves and 'knights' of capitalist accumulation who have overstepped the mark. The rebuff of cosmopolitans, Russophobes and opportunists is growing in ideology, literature and art. There is no doubt that the weight and influence of healthy forces will grow yet further.⁹⁴

The word 'Russophobe' was one particularly used by indignant Russians who felt a sense of loss and annoyance at the changes in non-Russian

areas. The use of such a term was usually the sign of reactive Russian nationalist sympathies.

Xenophobia was something that was not expressed openly, but surfaced informally from time to time. For instance, *OFT* did not discuss Jewish themes at their conferences, but Sergei Sopov reported that Vladimir Turchenko, an *OFT* conference delegate, had said that:

The Jews are a concentrated expression of everything bourgeois ⁹⁵

Sopov added that nobody had argued with the delegate.

The maintenance of the Soviet Union did not only mean the maintenance of the state and its borders but, to the likes of *OFT*, it also meant the maintenance of a political system which supported the power of the proletariat, but effectively kept power centrally in the hands of Moscow. For example, in Leningrad, *OFT* advocated that soviet elections should be held according to constituencies based on the place of work rather than on territorial considerations.⁹⁶ The idea of this was that it would give the workers a greater say in affairs, but in reality this method of voting had given greater scope to enterprise managers to force officially nominated candidates on the voters. The *OFT* justified their demands by citing Lenin, but others criticised the policy and G. Vasiutochkin described it as 'barrack communism'.⁹⁷

Whilst *OFT* advocated the equality of all peoples and nationalities of the USSR it supported a system that to some extent favoured the Russian population. The Front condemned the 'discriminatory laws' introduced in a number of republics. It concluded that republican nationalism appeared on an economic level:

In an effort towards economic isolation and wounding the interests of the national minorities, including Russians who live in these republics

and, having highlighted the fact that Russians constituted minorities, added:

We demand the proportional representation of national minorities in all organs of power and administration in the union republics.⁹⁸

This sounds a reasonable demand, but when one considers that ethnic

Russians constituted the vast majority in the RSFSR and the largest minorities in all the other Republics, then this system, coupled with the demand for constituencies in the workplace (and many of the Russians in non-Russian republics were industrial workers), worked very much in favour of Russian influence and domination.

Other pro-socialist groups

In addition to the internationalists, there were groups which supported the maintenance of the CPSU and socialism in order to maintain the unity of the Soviet state, but which made a greater reference to the idea of the Russian revival, calling for the establishment of Russian institutions and, in some cases, the rehabilitation of Russian Orthodoxy. These could, to some extent, be compared with Dunlop's 'National Bolsheviks'.

Otechestvo

Otechestvo was not one group, but a number of different groups in different cities. I will briefly describe the two most notable groups which were in Moscow and Leningrad.

The Leningrad group (the Leningrad Russian Patriotic Movement '*Otechestvo*' - LRPD '*Otechestvo*') was formed in March 1989 by a number of local 'patriotic' groups including members of *Pamiat'*, *Patriot* and *Vitiaz'*.⁹⁹ The idea was that the movement would co-ordinate the 'patriotic' activity of these groups. Certain members of *Pamiat'*, who opposed the leading role of the Communist Party, quit the movement on the second day of the Founding Congress, leaving an organisation which was favourably disposed towards the CPSU. Supporting the Party's policy of perestroika, *Otechestvo* upheld the idea of the USSR, but focussed on the well-being of the ethnic Russian [*russkii*] people. The establishment of USSR was regarded as a Russian feat:

The Russian people created and united a huge multinational great power. The brotherhood of the peoples of the USSR is of the highest value, it is one of the most important achievements from the historical legacy of the Russian people, the creator of the great power.¹⁰⁰

Otechestvo associated the Russian ethnic people very closely with the army and backed the reversal of any decline in the army by promoting the idea of military service in co-operation with 'political organs *DOSAAF*, veterans' organisations, military-patriotic societies and the Russian Orthodox Church'. Supposedly, a strong Russian-dominated army would act as a protector of this historical 'great power'.

The 'national revival of the Russian people' implied not only economic, but 'moral' development. This involved the promotion of Russian culture and a rehabilitation of the fortunes of Russian Orthodoxy which, 'in contrast to other religions,... practically never opposed [Russian] national statehood'. The movement proposed a 'patriotic' education programme for youngsters and teenagers which would counter 'mass culture' and develop a closer attachment to the 'traditions, history and culture' of the Motherland. The 'revival' was also seen in demographic, or, even genetic terms: *Otechestvo* advocated a number of political measures to reverse the declining number of Russians in the Soviet population, including a battle against alcoholism and increased state provision for child-care.

Economically, the movement supported 'historical forms of land use', which involved the return of the land to the peasantry. It opposed the 'unjust distribution' of the national income between the republics, suggesting that Russia should receive a greater share or her contribution to the Soviet budget. In addition, *Otechestvo* supported a degree of protectionism over the USSR's natural resources, suggesting that the country should build its economy on technological advance and quality production, rather than 'sell off' its raw materials to the benefit of outsiders.

Otechestvo supported a stable political system based upon the framework of a reformed CPSU - whilst focussing all its energies on the needs of the ethnic Russian people, it seemed to regard the CPSU as the structure capable of holding the great power together. However, the movement was troubled by political discord and a number of activists left over the course of 1989-90, thus weakening any original effort to unite so-called 'patriots'. *LRPD Otechestvo* never commanded a large support and by the time it joined the *Soiuz* group of Deputies at the beginning of 1991 it was almost

as insignificant as some of the *Pamiat'* groups it had once represented.

The Moscow group (the Moscow City Voluntary Society of Russian Culture '*Otechestvo*') held its Founding Congress in May 1989, portraying itself as a cultural group. However, the Congress participants included, among others, members of the Baltic 'international fronts/movements'. The Society was initiated by the editorial boards of the thick journals *Moskva*, *Molodaia gvardiia* and *Nash sovremennik* reflecting an association with members of the literary establishment. Aleksandr Rutskoi, who was later to become vice president of Russia, also joined the society, but left in 1990. Moscow *Otechestvo*'s aim was:

to help with the international education of toilers and the development of their political activeness in the cultural, historical, economic, ecological and demographic revival of the Russian [*ruskii*] people and peoples of Russia... To help actively to strengthen the friendship of the peoples of the USSR...¹⁰¹

The aims of Russian revival and maintenance of the Union would be achieved through supporting socialism and the structures of the CPSU. At first, *Otechestvo* declared that it supported the maintenance of perestroika, but later sided with more conservative forces in the CPSU.

Despite its attachment to Marxism-Leninism and claims of internationalism, *Otechestvo* linked the idea of Russian revival with the maintenance of the Soviet state by claiming that:

it is a feature of the [Russian] national character which makes the Russian people the only means of maintaining the integrity of the multinational state: it has been proven by thousands of years of history.¹⁰²

The society aimed to contribute to the Russian revival by propagating Russian culture, preserving monuments of Russian culture, developing Russian national theatre, music and 'material culture'. Consequently, it conducted lectures and meetings to propagate these ideas and published material in the three aforementioned thick journals. Like many Russian nationalist groups, it called for institutional parity with the other republics, demanding a Russian Academy of Sciences, television and publications on Russian history and culture.

In 1990, it stepped up its political activity by contesting the March elections

and forming an *Otechestvo* group of Deputies in the Moscow City Soviet.¹⁰³ It also took part in all the large 'patriotic' meetings and gatherings. *Otechestvo* was a signatory to most of the major 'patriotic' or pro-Union initiatives and continued to exist beyond the fall of the Soviet Union. However, like most other Russian nationalist-orientated groups, *Otechestvo* was susceptible to splits, the most notable of which occurred in 1990 when two branches emerged under the leaderships of A. Kuz'min and V. Kashuto. The society never emerged with a mass following, but was probably better known for some of its high-profile members than for its level of support.

The Union of the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland (*Soiuz dukhovnogo vrozozhgeniia otechestva* - SDVO).

SDVO presented itself as a cultural interest group, but it had another serious purpose: to keep the Soviet Union intact. This was to be approached by a 'moral and spiritual revival' of the Fatherland, in which the 'Fatherland' represented the Soviet Union and the 'moral and spiritual revival' meant the rejection of anything Western and the adoption of 'spiritual' Russian ideas supposedly inspired by Slavophile thinkers such as Kireevskii and Bulgakov.¹⁰⁴ Basically, SDVO was prescribing a Russian solution for the maintenance of a socialist Soviet Union.

The group supported the 'efforts of the CPSU in strengthening the socialist Fatherland', but believed in the participation of other 'social forces'.¹⁰⁵ Its aim was to unite 'patriotic' organisations and citizens in order to bring about the socialist renewal of society. This was not a complete endorsement of Marxism-Leninism, but a modified version which accepted the principle of internationalism as an integrational feature of the state and sought a different economic and cultural solution for the Soviet Union. The economy would be reformed to the extent that it would reject quantitative output and focus on other 'spiritual' goals such as quality of life and ecological concerns. As far as culture was concerned, the Union opposed the idea of the merging of nations - it aimed to 'overcome the unification of national cultures' and maintain national languages, cultural traditions.

SDVO presented a package of ideas which expressed conservative values, but provided a focus on Russian national issues and concerns: ecological concerns included preventing the 'senseless' sale of the country's natural resources abroad; there was opposition to the 'destructive' influence of 'mass culture'; the Union wished to return women to the home to look after the family; and it aimed to fight alcoholism. It also expressed an interest in the demographic situation, aiming to reverse the high mortality-rate/low birth-rate and increase the life expectancy of peoples 'close to extinction' (i. e. Russians). The Union's Russian focus was further reflected by its interest in Russian Orthodoxy, its aim to 'defend' ethnic Russians living on the whole territory of the USSR and the 'strengthening' of Russian sovereignty.

SDVO's leader, Mikhail Antonov, used highly anti-Western rhetoric, suggesting that the West was trying to colonise Russia, and called not only for economic protectionism, but also for distancing the Soviet Union from the world community, including the reduction of embassies and missions abroad and withdrawal from the UN.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, Antonov believed that the country was occupied by a *malyi narod* (small people) - a stratum of the intelligentsia which had been imposing 'endless social experiments' on the *bol'shoi narod*, the majority of the population. This was a condemnation of the Soviet regime and its application of socialism. The Union considered it had an educational role to propagate the values of Russian culture and history amongst the people, but it also participated in most of the 'patriotic' political alliances. For instance, it was a member of the United Council of Russia (OSR), the Bloc of Patriotic Movements of Russia, the *Soiuz* group of Deputies, *Mezhdunarodnyi Slavianskii Sobor* and the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia. In addition, it worked closely with *Edinenie*, Moscow's *Otechestvo* and a host of other 'patriotic' organisations.

SDVO's influence on political processes was minimal, but it did provide a focus for the synthesis of socialism with a Russian 'third way' as a solution to the Soviet Union's problems. Its priority was not to preserve socialism, but to revive Russia's cultural and spiritual tradition.

Conservative revivalists

These groups supported the unity of a Soviet Union/greater Russian state which featured a revival of Russian culture and values. Many of their members looked towards Russian Orthodoxy rather than Marxism-Leninism as a guiding principle, but there was sometimes a close association with the conservative establishment. Even the Christian Patriotic Union, which declared that it supported neither communism nor democracy and included figures from outside the establishment, suggested that it would support any political system as long as it respected Russian Orthodoxy and the needs of the Russian nation.

The Association of Russian Artists, The Foundation for Slavonic Writing and Slavic Cultures, Movement *Edinstvo*/VAOSK *Edinenie*.

A sizeable proportion of Russian nationalist expression came from writers and critics in the early days of Gorbachev's power. Subsequently, a number of groups representing and propagating Russian culture and Russian ideas developed. These were platforms or fronts for the RSFSR Writers' Union, which was itself vocal at the outset of perestroika on Russian nationalist issues, but opted to become the driving force behind groups which might attract a larger and broader level of support.

The Association of Russian Artists (*Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov*)

The Association was founded in November 1988 and brought together a large group of writers, cultural figures and academics. The Association described itself as:

a union and movement, which will do its utmost to promote the development of the spiritual, cultural and business life of Russia.¹⁰⁷

Its membership included writers and critics such as Vasilii Belov, Valentin Rasputin, Viktor Astaf'ev, Viktor Likhonosov, Iurii Loshchits, Vadim

Kozhinov, Mikhail Lobanov, Apollon Kuz'min. Its initial address appealed to the Russians, and 'brothers in spirit beyond her [Russia's] borders' to put all their efforts into waking and strengthening Russian national consciousness. It mentioned first and foremost Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, referring to the courage of the people and all the sacrifices they had made.¹⁰⁸

The Russian imperialist nationalist stance is illustrated by the equation of Russia and the Soviet Union:

Our ancestors paid a too costly price in creating a stronghold state, bearing the proud name over all time of Russia and the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁹

The programme which the association produced listed seven priorities: national (*narodnoe*) culture; historical memory and a national memory fund; nature and economics; population and brotherhood; the army and the people; national information; and a publishing programme.¹¹⁰

'National (or folk) culture' involved the support of national culture, encouraging the development of traditional music and culture. This also involved 'cleansing' culture of 'harmful' influences. 'Historical memory' involved the maintenance of libraries and archives, and projects such as the restoration of architectural monuments etc. 'Nature and economics' involved the 'salvation of Russia' through ecological measures and through study of the national economy (supposedly to produce an economy which was successful, but suitably 'Russian' in design). 'Population and fraternity/brotherhood' involved propagating the 'histories of mutual relations and joint life experience of peoples populating Russia - the Association advocated the maintenance of cultures within a multinational framework, but did not speak of the right to self-determination for minorities. 'The army and the people' mentions the task of fulfilling the military-patriotic education of young people and the fundamental aim is to 'educate the people in a spirit of respect towards Russian history and traditions of military duty.' 'National information' referred to the establishment of a Russian national information and media system, including an information bureau called the 'Voice of Russia', national radio and television, and the development of the Russian national press. Finally, the 'publishing programme' aimed to propagate

national art.

Rather than being merely a Russian cultural interest group, the Association was offering a vague programme for Russian national renewal, where Russian ethnic demands were at the top of the list, but the national renewal was viewed within the framework of the Soviet Union. There were representative groups all over Russia and the Moscow group had over 500 members.

The Association had links with the All-Russian Cultural Foundation, *Otechestvo* the International Foundation for Slavic Writing and Slavic Culture, *SDVO*, the Fund for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour, the Public Committee for the Salvation of the Volga and others.

In an open letter the Association issued a warning to national movements in the union republics.

We hope that international, national and Russian-speaking movements in the union republics will look for a way of uniting and for a dialogue to oppose extremist groups and unions on the basis of mutual co-operation...¹¹¹

It later stated that:

... the Association of Russian Artists is appealing to all citizens of the Soviet Union irrespective of their denomination and nationality to strengthen the unity in opposing all destructive forces and elements intent upon destroying our historically state-formed brotherhood.¹¹²

The Foundation of Slavic Writing and Slavic Cultures (*Fond slavianskoi pis'mennosti i slavianskikh kul'tur*)

This organisation, founded in March 1989, was closely linked to the Association of Russian Artists. The Foundation expressed a stronger concern than the Association of Russian Artists about the maintenance of the unitary state. Its members included founders of the Association of Russian Artists, such as Valentin Rasputin, and other Russian nationalist writers such as Iurii Bondarev and Vladimir Krupin. The organisation also included members from the Slavic Republics of Ukraine and Belorussia and the Russian Orthodox Church supported its formation. The Foundation was an attempt to draw together cultural luminaries from

the other Slavic republics in order to establish Slavic solidarity and a Slavic core about which great Russian/Soviet statehood might be maintained. As John Dunlop observed, the Foundation gravitated towards the ideas of Pan Slavism and Russian Orthodoxy as unifying factors rather than the "glue" of Marxism-Leninism, which was holding the Soviet Union together.¹¹³

The Movement of Lovers of Russian Literature and Culture *Edinstvo* / *VAOSK Edinenie*

Edinstvo (not to be confused with the movement in Lithuania and Nina Andreeva's group) came together in the latter half of 1989. The movement announced its formation by way of an open letter in the Russian nationalist-oriented newspaper *Literaturnaia Rossiia* under the title 'For Unity and Friendship'. It provoked a great deal of interest and correspondence in the newspaper in September-December 1989. *Edinstvo* sought to maintain the unity of the Soviet Union and sharply criticised destructive processes at work in the Soviet Union, particularly in the Baltic and Moldavia. Like the associations of Russian Artists it aimed to promote 'patriotic' and 'cultural' education of young people. The group spoke of the genius of ancient Rus' and of the genius of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. Like the Foundation for Slavic Writing it wished to unite the three 'fraternal' Slavic peoples as a nucleus about which the Union could be preserved. Its membership included Secretary of the RFSFR Writer's Union, Felix Kuznetsov, the writers Valentin Rasputin, Vasilii Belov, Valentin Pikul', Iurii Bondarev, and economics writer Anatolii Salutskii. Their call for the preservation of the Union showed no respect to independence activists in the republics:

...either we halt the tendency towards heightened national conflict in our Soviet society, or the nationalistic ambition and demagogic anarchy going under the flag of Perestroika and Glasnost will rock the ship of our multinational superstate even more.¹¹⁴

The letters to *Literaturnaia Rossiia* were from sympathisers and people who wished to join the Movement. One reader wrote:

For the third time in the course of the 20th Century Russia is threatened with downfall! It is high time to stand shoulder to shoulder like our forefathers of old in defence of the Motherland and Honour to defend Rus' from desecration. 1. The Association should not

limit itself to cultural problems but should participate in political ones. 2. It would be good to work out a programme for resurrecting the Russian village.¹¹⁵

The editorial decision to print such a letter is revealing - after all, *Literaturnaia Rossiia* sympathised closely with the Movement. The letter might indicate that, although *Edinstvo* sought to portray itself as a cultural group, it was intent on developing its political influence. It is no surprise that this 'cultural' movement became a member of the Bloc of Public-Political Movements of Russia in the March 1990 election campaign.

'The All-Russian Association of Lovers of Patriotic Literature and Culture *Edinenie*' (VAOSK *Edinenie*) held its founding congress on 14 June 1990 in Moscow. This group was a continuation of *Edinstvo*, but had changed its name to avoid confusion with the group headed by Nina Andreeva. *Edinenie*'s president was the writer Iurii Bondarev. The Association included V. Bondarenko, V. Gorbachev (deputy editor of *Molodaia gvardiia*), A. Prokhanov, S. Kuniaev, V. Krupin and Patriarch Aleksii II: it was full of Russian nationalist writers and editors of Russian nationalist publications, but also included the head of the Russian Orthodox Church.¹¹⁶ Most of the participants at the founding congress were of the older generation. They criticised popular culture and the work of writers who had become popular under the new system of 'market relations'. Iurii Prokushev condemned the 'individual and group egotism' which was growing daily in society, whilst speaking of the 'spirituality of the Russian people' - this was an oblique condemnation of the perceived 'Western' influences introduced by perestroika. Iurii Bondarev suggested that there was a battle to be won:

Russia is still no one's country, but Russia should be ours.¹¹⁷

This comment suggests that there was an enemy - an anti-Russian enemy. The composition of the Congress and the comments passed reveal much about *Edinenie*'s direction. The lack of young participants and the opposition to change within the literary world indicate elements of conservatism. The participation of the Russian Orthodox clergy indicates that most of the members had embraced or accepted Russian Orthodoxy,

which, for its part, could fulfil two roles: firstly, it could embody Russian national values, representing 'spirituality' and serving as a possible replacement ideology or even as a buttress to the established order; and, secondly, it could play an imperial role in keeping 'fellow Slavs' together as the essential core of the Union.

In October 1990 *Edinenie* addressed the Ukrainians and Belorussians with a call for Slavic unity. Recalling the achievements of the historical state-makers, Aleksandr Nevskii, Bogdan Khmel'nitskii and the princes of Polotsk, the Association declared:

We, the Slavs, do not claim primacy or superiority, but we cannot forget that our peoples were always the strong shield for the whole of the multi-national state.

These words illustrate *Edinenie's* Slavic Russian pride as first among equals and their desire to hold the Russian empire together.

Edinenie did not form a political party, but retained its identity as a 'cultural' organisation. In this way, it hoped to broaden its appeal and influence the development of Russian national consciousness, whilst promoting the idea of Slavic unity in order to maintain the Great Russian State.

The Christian Patriotic Union (*Khristiansko-patrioticheskii soiuz - KhPS*)

The Christian Patriotic Union was founded in December 1988 and was the forerunner to the 'Christian Revival' Union (Jan. 1990).¹¹⁸ The Union's founders included Evgenii Pashnin and Vladimir Osipov, who like the leaders of *Pamiat'* came from outside the Soviet establishment. *KhPS* did not support Marxism-Leninism and the CPSU, although it declared that it supported the initiative of the Soviet Government and the CC CPSU to democratise Soviet society.¹¹⁹ The organisation's concern was with the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian ethnic people. *KhPS* considered itself to be the inheritor of the Slavophile tradition, supporting the principles of Orthodoxy, patriotism and conciliarism. The Christian Patriotic Union's programme of Russian revival looked to the Russian past, wishing to revive national historical symbols; return former (pre-revolutionary) place-names; introduce the learning of old Slavonic

and Russian folklore in schools; and to return the Russian Orthodox Church, its Saints, buildings and religious holidays etc. to their former position of prominence in Russian society.¹²⁰ *KhPS* considered that the ethnic Russian people shared an unequal place in the Soviet Union and was entitled to equality with the other peoples of the USSR: it should be able to develop its own culture, have its own Academy of Sciences and its own republican capital.

KhPS supported the integrity of the greater Russian state/Soviet Union and sought to 'develop friendly feelings and relations between all peoples'. This would be achieved by, among other things, informing peoples of other republics of the 'true role of Russia and the Russian people in their history'. This unifying core of Orthodox ethnic Russians would be the centre of a unified great power, rather than of a union of republics:

Our salvation can only be found in a return to a religious world outlook. We do not need ideology, but faith; we need no politics, but spirituality; no democracy, but conciliarism; no union of republics, but a Unified, Great Power!¹²¹

KhPS, and a successor organisation, the 'Christian Revival' Union¹²² both supported the reinstitution of a monarchy to rule the 'Great Power'. They rejected socialism and democracy, declaring that Russia would follow its 'own path' as a Russian Orthodox state - Russia's future (and succession to the monarchy) would be decided by the convocation of a *Zemskii Sobor* (Land Assembly).

KhPS/'Christian Revival' Union both supported conservative family values and condemned alcoholism in Russia - themes which became common amongst certain Russian nationalist groups. They believed that the disruption of the family and alcoholism were contributing to the physical extermination of the Russian ethnic people and wished to replenish the biological gene stock of the nation. Other features of Russian revival included the maintenance of historical and cultural monuments, and the re-establishment of the peasantry through return of land and private property.

The establishment of a fundamentally Orthodox Russia would seem to be at odds with the idea of maintaining a re-integrated Russian multinational 'Great Power'. After all, a large percentage of the Soviet Union's population belonged to other religious denominations. *KhPS* believed in

a Eurasian idea, whereby the majority Russian population, guided by Russian Orthodoxy would exist symbiotically with, and lead the fates of, the rest of the peoples of the Russian Great Power. This idea became apparent in October 1991, when the leaders of the 'Christian Revival' Union also became members of the Party of Revival. The new Party declared in its programme that:

We all hope that there is... an awakening of the national consciousness of Russians [*russkie*] which will become the spiritual basis for a possible revival and strengthening of Russian [*rossiiskaia*] Eurasian statehood within its NATURAL GEOPOLITICAL BOUNDARIES.¹²³

KhPS and Osipov's 'Christian Revival' were both marginal groups with a small following, although they were active in organising meetings/lectures and publishing their views. 'Christian Revival' Union had two representatives in the Moscow Soviet and five in the regional Soviets following the March 1990 elections. However, it did not increase its political representation or support. Osipov and others remained in the 'Christian Revival' Union, but also joined the Party of Revival in October 1991, in order, probably, to renew their own political fortunes.

Populists

The 'populists' are represented by Zhirinovskii's LDP and Skurlatov's *RNF*. These two organisations tried at first to mobilise support by posing as democratic alternatives to the CPSU, but as time passed, they revealed a strong interest in the maintenance of the state and Russian nationalism. Curiously, they displayed a certain respect for the CPSU and co-operated with it to some extent - unlike other 'democratic' organisations.

The Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (*Liberal'no-Demokraticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza*)

At its inception, the LDP did not show any signs of inclination towards Russian nationalism. The Party's origins date back to May 1988, but the founding conference did not take place until 31 March 1990. At this stage LDP had around 3,000 members. The Party's activity started before the

founding congress and V. I. Koval' dates the Party's formation from 13 December 1989.¹²⁴ It was around this time that Vladimir Zhirinovskii produced a pre-election programme in which he made the following points about the conduct of deputies, the national question and foreign policy:

...The deputy always opposes cult of personality, the phenomenon of a great leader (*vozhdizm*), idolatry ...

The national question. ...the principles of creating a union state are self-determination right up to secession, confederation, federation, unitary state...

Foreign policy. A principle of neutrality. Withdrawal from blocs. Trade and cultural relations with all countries. The first task of foreign policy is to satisfy the interests of the population of our state.¹²⁵

The contents of the programme were not very striking and put forward ideas reflecting Western liberal democratic values. However, the aforementioned points are interesting in light of Zhirinovskii's subsequent behaviour and the contents of the Party programme passed at the first congress on 31 March 1990. In the latter programme, the clause over self-determination and secession was omitted and, on the subject of foreign policy, Zhirinovskii maintained a principle of neutrality, but aimed to shift the emphasis from 'East-West' relations to 'North-South' relations.¹²⁶ These points indicate Zhirinovskii's opposition to a break-up of the USSR and his desire to spread Russia's sphere of influence to the South. The 1990 programme also ruled out any kind of interference in the affairs of other states, but he was later to suggest expansion into Poland and even Alaska.¹²⁷

The Party aimed to create a state based on the rule of law; a multi-party system; private enterprise and free market relations; various forms of property ownership; and freedom of conscience. Besides this, the Party supported freedom of movement, freedom to travel and emigrate, and freedom to settle wherever one desired (without the '*propiska*' residence permit). In addition, it was decided that the army should be professionalised and that the army and other law enforcing organs should not be attached to a political party.

The LDP of the Soviet Union started to establish links with liberal democratic parties in other countries. By its own admission, the LDP was a centrist party espousing a number of Western liberal democratic values. At the end of 1990 - beginning of 1991, the LDP was participating within the

Centrist bloc of political parties and movements. However, this bloc was also represented by Chairman, V. Voronin, Skurlatov's Russian Popular Front and various other tiny groups, some of which were of a Russian nationalist orientation, and most of which supported the maintenance of the Union and opposition to separatist movements.

In a 1990 article in *Argumenty i Fakty*, Zhirinovskii declared that he was against political organisations which based their deeds or ideas of changing the state and social system by way of violence and national hatred. He also declared that he supported presidential power. In a slight change on the nationality issue he stated that nationality was only to be shown on documents if one wished, whereas earlier it was not to be shown at all. However, 1990 marked the point when much of what Zhirinovskii said did not coincide with the Party programme or liberal democracy.

Zhirinovskii's participation in the Centrist bloc marked the Party's fundamental move to a pro-Union stance. The Party called for the creation of national salvation committees to keep order in the republics and even advocated the abolition of all political parties.¹²⁸

The Party programme passed in March 1990, and amended in October of that year, said that:

There will be as much centralisation as is necessary.¹²⁹

The attempt to integrate potentially separatist republics and regions from the Union were countered by the establishment of union-wide branches of the Party:

The formation of regional organisations is taking place all over the country - from the Baltic to the Pacific, from Moldova to Chukotka, from Murmansk to Kushka - almost in every union republic, but most actively in the Russian Federation. In the union republics the Party support is basically the Russian-speaking population creating, on the basis of the LDP, regional organisations of an all union political party.¹³⁰

Although the Party attracted the support of Russians and Russian speakers, it did not officially discriminate against other nations. Under the heading 'Development of Nations and Peoples', the Party programme declared in tones reminiscent of CPSU rhetoric:

All representatives of different nationalities living on USSR Territory are citizens of the Union state without any discrimination on national grounds.¹³¹

According to the programme, the 'development of nations' were subject to the USSR Constitution and the Union. The programme also listed principles of reform which included the 'maintenance of the state within the framework of the presently functioning constitution' and 'a strong presidential regime' with 'direct presidential rule on the whole territory of the USSR'.

A section of the programme entitled 'Political Organisation as a Sub-System of Soviet Society' reflected Zhirinovskii's ambitions to establish a Russian state:

The state is the most important institution of the political system. Its historical name - Russia - must be returned. In the current union formation the RSFSR will be a single (unitary) state. The union republics will be joined to it on the legal basis of federation or confederation... In this way the union and a territorial integrity of a great power will be maintained.¹³²

The promise of a federal or confederate structure for the Union seems a concession from someone with 'imperialist Russian nationalist' ambitions, but one must bear in mind the principles of a strong presidency and direct rule advocated by Zhirinovskii. In addition, Zhirinovskii suggested to the newspaper *Krasnaia zvezda* that a swift and effective solution to the national question would be to give up national-territorial divisions and set up provinces (*gubernii*) run by governors. He also stressed the necessity of strictly centralised power in order to see through reforms.¹³³

The conclusion to the LDP's 1990 Party programme was unambiguous about the identification of Russia with the Soviet Union. Not only had the text already called for the return of the name Russia, but the conclusion expressed the idea of the Soviet Union as the inheritor of an historically formed Russian Empire:

The threat of the demise of the Fatherland - the break-up of the Union - should unite all of us, give a second breath to the re-birth of a great power. Together we can maintain our state, created by our forefathers a thousand years ago. It is time to extinguish the first fires of civil war. We must calm the population of all regions by proclaiming a moratorium on destructive acts in the country ...

...we must submit to one central government headed by the President.¹³⁴

Naturally, the LDP supported the motion to maintain the Union in the

1991 referendum. One LDP representative, Khalitov, had very strong views on what should be done if any republic did not observe the successful approval of the Union:

We support the Communist Party in conducting the referendum... I think that 70-75 per cent will vote for the Union... I have no doubts: the Union will not be destroyed. As for the Baltic, for example, I stress the following. If, according to the referendum, there is one person, let us say, in Vilnius, who declares: I live here. This is my flat, but I consider myself to be a citizen of the Soviet Union - it is our moral, material and military duty to provide him with a guarantee. We must defend this person's rights with the full might of the state.¹³⁵

In June 1991 Zhirinovskii ran for the presidency of Russia, after he was nominated as a candidate by the LDP. His electoral programme contained very few points: he promised to slash the price of vodka and return the name 'Russia' to the USSR, thus restoring Russia it to a position of greatness and pride. He also supported the idea of keeping Soviet troops stationed in Europe until a time that Russia felt fit to bring them back. Boris El'tsin won the election with 57.3% of the vote and Zhirinovskii came a creditable third with 7.81% of the vote - a surprisingly large vote for someone with his particular nationalist agenda. This election result appeared to boost Zhirinovskii's confidence and precipitated a series of even more alarming statements. In August he supported the putsch, (although he later ridiculed it as a non-event) and in October 1991 Zhirinovskii reiterated the idea expressed earlier that year that all political parties should be suspended.¹³⁶ He constantly referred to the primacy and qualities of Russians and was always prepared to put their interests first. For example, when he was asked about the correlation between politicians and morality, he replied with a populist and nationalist slant:

Morality occupies first place in the interest of Russia and Russians and then in the interest of other peoples.¹³⁷

Up to and beyond the end of 1991, Zhirinovskii continued this Russian imperialist nationalist stance. Over the course of his political career Zhirinovskii has threatened not only to re-absorb the Baltic republics, but also to take back Finland, Poland, Alaska, as well as invade every country as far as the Indian Ocean.

The changes in the LDP's values were dramatic. The 1990 Party

programme called for foreign investment and free market relations - by 1993, even these vestiges of (relatively) 'liberal democratic' values had disappeared from the LDP's programme, illustrating that the 'liberal democratic' values of 1989-91 were probably always very shallow and that the demands of opportunism and the underlying Russian nationalism were much stronger:

(1993 'programme' from '*Liberal*')
(1993 'programme' from '*Liberal*')
(1993 'programme' from '*Liberal*')

The Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia is addressing you, the Russian, with its programme:
...No to foreign capital and speculators. 'No' to the mafia robbing the country. 'No' to the policy of free prices¹³⁸

It should be noted that there were suspicions concerning the origins and finances of the LDP. In 1991 the LDP met with the USSR President, M. Gorbachev, as well as the Chairman of the KGB, V. Kriuchkov. It was rumoured that the LDP had been set up and sponsored by the KGB, partly due to the huge amount of publicity and apparent funds that the LDP seemed to have - rumours which the LDP denied.¹³⁹ Valerii Solovei has interviewed many KGB operatives who admit that the KGB infiltrated all the new political groups, but there is no proof that the LDP is a special case, or that it received any funding from the centre.¹⁴⁰

Zhirinovskii's approach to both politics and Russian nationalism was characterised by populism and opportunism. At first, the LDP put forward a democratic programme, appealing to those disillusioned with Marxism-Leninism - one might even assume that the LDP was trying to appeal to the intelligentsia. Zhirinovskii stressed the fact that he had never been a member of the Communist Party, but also co-operated with the establishment. Later, the Party tried to appeal to the Russian population, stressing the need for the maintenance of the Union, but within the framework of a state called 'Russia'. Zhirinovskii's brand of nationalism sought to appeal to the common Russian man: who was disaffected with the system, but even more afraid of change; whose national pride had been wounded; who could identify with a Russian *muzhik*; who would feel safe under the stability and paternalism offered by Zhirinovskii. There is no doubt that Zhirinovskii was, himself, a convinced believer in the unique virtues of the Russian people and the Russian state - however, the degree to which his Party exploited Russian nationalism seemed linked to

his quest for popular support.

Rossiiskii narodnyi front (RNF)

RNF (the Russian Popular Front) was founded on 15 December 1988 and lasted until around October 1991.¹⁴¹ It originally modelled itself on the Baltic popular fronts, but did not succeed in attracting the same republic-wide support. Vladimir Pribylovskii reported that:

RNF grew to a workable political size - not as a Russian-wide formation, of course, but as one of the most noticeable phenomena on the Moscow political stage.¹⁴²

The party's December formation was announced on 14 February 1989 by the Russian nationalist-orientated *Sovetskaia Rossiia* which revealed that RNF would support the CPSU's line of revolutionary perestroika and seek to 'strengthen the integrity of the country'.

The Front's leader was Valerii Skurlatov, who had been the author of a document in the 60s entitled 'A Statute of Morals', designed to militarise the country's youth through the 'military-patriotic education' of the *komsomol*. It was also revealed that Skurlatov had links with the early *Pamiat'* movement.¹⁴³

The main aims of the Front's first programme were the 'material, spiritual, national, democratic revival of Russia'. This involved the privatisation of state property, the encouragement of enterprise, a free market and the introduction of foreign capital under the control of Councils.¹⁴⁴

In June 1989, Skurlatov told a group of students and workers in the oil industry that he wanted the people to live a normal life such as in 'developed, civilised countries'. He declared that he was an internationalist and wished to maintain and strengthen the Soviet Union and, expressing approval of the Estonian Popular Front, he suggested that there would be no 'Finlandisation' of Estonia.¹⁴⁵

In May 1989, Secretary of the Front, V. Ivanov, produced a programme which totally rejected communism. The programme called for:

The maximum independence of union republics, including Russia - the biggest, most ungovernable republic, the one most deprived of its rights.¹⁴⁶

Besides the oblique focus in this comment, there was very little to suggest that Ivanov had any kind of nationalist agenda. In the same month the Secretariat distanced itself from 'Russian patriots', members of *Pamiat'* and its supporters, as well as a group of *RNF* members headed by E. Dergunov who tried to take over the leadership of the Front and introduce a programme based on 'democracy and patriotism'. The Secretariat's attack on *Pamiat'* and other Russian nationalists declared that Russia did not need to pursue a 'special' path and it defended itself against nationalist allegations of 'Zionism', whilst upholding the rights of the Jewish people and condemning *Pamiat'* for 'Satanising' the Jews. The newsletter which contained all this information also criticised the views of Skurlatov as expressed in his 'Statute of Morals' from the 1960s. The Secretariat made it clear that they did not wish to be associated with Skurlatov's 'right-wing extremist views'.¹⁴⁷

In autumn 1989, the Front splintered into two fractions - the 'centrists' under Skurlatov and the 'radicals' under Ivanov. The centrists opposed Marxism-Leninism, but found the communist ideal acceptable and were willing to work with 'healthy forces' within the CPSU. The radicals were convinced anti-communists and were prepared to work only with 'healthy forces' outside the CPSU.¹⁴⁸ At the beginning of 1990, Ivanov was expelled from the Secretariat and in March of the same year he was expelled from the Front. Ivanov reacted by expelling Skurlatov and another member, S. Gorbachev, from the *RNF* and set up his own organisation under the same name.¹⁴⁹

Skurlatov's *RNF* subsequently displayed its imperialist Russian nationalist credentials, most notably during the final year of the Front's existence. In December 1990, the newly named newspaper *Rossiiskoe Vozrozhdenie* carried an editorial article which stated:

The overriding task of the *RNF* is the resurrection of Russia, the birth of a new young-Russian [*mladorosskii*] nation from the dust and wreckage of what remains of the great old-Russian people...¹⁵⁰

Skurlatov penned an article in the same issue which outlined a number of his Russian nationalist positions. First, he opposed the right to self-determination of nations:

... the 'Bantustanisation' of the USSR, which is based upon 'the right of nations to self-determination', is a fateful error.¹⁵¹

Skurlatov went on to say that the destabilising factor causing interethnic feuds in the USSR was the disappearance of the 'old Russian' nation and that there was no such thing as:

a new Russian battle-worthy nation of owners and proprietors which can take the defence of life, property and the honour of their fellow tribesmen into their own brutal hands.¹⁵²

He suggested that the Jews and Turks were not capable of saving Russia and that:

the least death-dealing integrational domestic force would be a new Russian-speaking nation, which Stolypin tried to create in his day.¹⁵³

One of the proposed measures for solving the 'Russian question' and creating a 'new Russian' nation was to defend the Russian population from 'armed detachments of other nationalities' by creating 'Russian National Armed Formations'. Once again, Skurlatov was echoing his old idea of militarising the nation.

In addition to the idea of forging a 'new Russian' nation, the *RNF* allied itself with the LDP when it joined the Centrist Bloc of Political Parties and Movements in August 1990. The Centrist Bloc firmly believed in the maintenance of the Union and the *RNF* remained a member until the end of March 1991. However, this did not end its alliance with the LDP. Vladimir Zhirinovskii received a warm welcome as a guest at the Front's First Congress on 1-2 June 1991. Iurii Blokhin of the Soiuz group of deputies and Sergei Baburin of the Russian parliamentary group 'Rossiia' were also present.

The Congress discussed the subject of the Union:

The Congress spoke decisively in favour of the unconditional territorial integrity of the country and rejected the efforts of left-radicals and separatists to divide it into a kind of 'union of sovereign states'.¹⁵⁴

Furthermore, the Congress supported a proposal to create a voluntary military force of Cossack regiments.

At a meeting of the Front's ruling body, one member, Mikhail Gus'kov, likened the organisation to the LDP, concluding that the main difference between the two groups' positions was that the LDP programme was aimed at the intelligentsia and the elite, whilst the *RNF* aimed to make all toilers

private owners. During the same meeting, Iurii Riso paid attention to the 'peculiarities of the traditions and psychology of the Russian person' which, in his opinion, ought to be harnessed for the 'cultural and moral revival of Russia'. The emphasis was upon examining characteristics related to the development of the Russian state. The moral revival entailed the revival of a feeling of honour, respect for the law, the priority of honesty and the 'ability to recognise what is best'.¹⁵⁵

Following the June Congress, the Front rapidly began to lose its support. By October 1991, there were only 40 members and another 100 sympathisers. The Front had started as a popular front, had expressed values of democratic reform, but under the influence of Skurlatov's leadership revealed an obsession for a new Russian nation. The Front would not tolerate the secession of any part of the USSR or of its envisaged new Russian state and threatened the use of military force and discipline to keep it that way. Although it never achieved huge support, the Front faded away like many of the small *Pamiat'* groups it began to reflect.

In October 1991, the leadership of the RNF became founder members of the *Vozrozhdenie* Party (the Party of Revival). This party, which included such figures as Vladimir Osipov who came from the imperialist Russian nationalist-orientated *Khristianskii patrioticheskii soiuz* (Christian Patriotic Union),¹⁵⁶ also claimed that it was a 'centrist' party and had a similar programme and outlook to that of the RNF.¹⁵⁷

Unifiers

Otchizna and ROS appeared in 1991 and represent efforts to attract imperialist Russian nationalists of all political persuasions to unite behind a Russian flag in the interests of maintaining the Union. ROS did not make any effort to appeal to communist-orientated nationalists, but the Communist Party had been suspended by the time ROS formed. However, its style of imperialist Russian nationalism was designed to catch the imagination of a broad range of Russian nationalists.

Otchizna

Otchizna ('Homeland') formed in June 1991, when the joint 'patriotic' forces appeared to have lost direction and momentum. It formed from a group of 145 People's Deputies and considered itself to be an 'independent public movement uniting the patriotic forces of Russia in the interests of maintaining the integrity of the RSFSR within the structure of the Soviet Union'. Its aims included the 'economic, political and spiritual revival of the Russian [*rossiiskie*] peoples, based on the values of traditional Russian and Soviet statehood'. The movement was an attempt to draw together all 'patriots of Russia' irrespective of their party affiliations and ideological convictions.

Seeking a 'broad patriotic movement', *Otchizna* focussed most of its attention on the revival of the 'peoples of Russia'. However, it was not consistent in promoting the interests of all the peoples of Russia and frequently lapsed into supporting the interests of the ethnic Russian [*russkii*] people. *Otchizna* announced that it opposed nationalism and national sovereignty, but believed in the maintenance and revival of cultural heritage and the 'development of unique national cultures'. However, *Otchizna's* leader, General B. Tarasov, suggested that the Russian ethnic nation required more than the development of its unique national culture - he declared that whilst protecting Russian statehood, it was necessary to 'defend the sovereignty and national dignity of the Russian [*russkii*] people'.¹⁵⁸ In addition, the movement gave support to the rights and freedoms the Russian-speaking population outside the RSFSR.

Otchizna promoted certain conservative values, calling for the strengthening of the family and the 'protection of motherhood'. It showed a particular concern for the scourge of alcoholism and its negative effects upon the growth of the Russian population. However, its biggest concern was to prevent national-separatism 'decisively', 'maintain the traditions of patriotism and revive the national consciousness and culture of the peoples of Russia'. This would be achieved by strengthening the country's defence capability, strengthening Russia's sovereignty and heightening its role in the consolidation of the union state.

Otchizna referred to other familiar Russian nationalist themes,

condemning manifestations of 'Russophobia' and opposing the 'mass culture' of the West, berating it for its lack of spirituality [*bezdukhovnost'*]. It appears that the movement combined the ideas of Russian statehood, Russian [both *rossiiskii* and *russskii*] national revival, conservative values, anti-Western feeling and the strengthening of the army to draw people together to maintain the Union. It was a further effort by Russian nationalist forces to forge a Union based upon the strength and unity of a revived Russian Federation and the Russian speaking population outside the Federation.

Otchizna's attempt to become a magnet for all imperialist Russian nationalist-orientated forces was foiled by the attempted coup of August 1991. *Otchizna* condemned the GKChP's actions, but the movement's association with the idea of maintaining the unitary state hindered its progress. However, it continued to exist and towards the end of the year attempted to revive its fortunes.

The Russian Popular Union (*Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz* - ROS)

ROS appeared following the August coup attempt and represents another attempt to rally 'patriotic' forces. It was formed on 26 August under the leadership of Sergei Baburin, who was leader of the *Rossia* group of Deputies in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. ROS was opposed to the Western-orientation of the democrats and did not support the reinstitution of a socialist fatherland under the guidance of the CPSU (which had, by this time, been suspended), but introduced a Russian state ideology, based upon the principles of 'democracy, patriotism and justice' [*narodovlastiie, patriotizm, spravedlivost'*].¹⁵⁹ This formula opened the way for 'atheists and believers, people affiliated or unaffiliated to parties' to join ROS under a Russian national banner.

The Union called for national reconciliation and called off any 'witch hunts' or searches for the 'enemy within'. It also advocated political pluralism which would not allow a monopoly of power such as that enjoyed by the CPSU.

The revival of Russia was considered to be a task 'concerning all the Russian people' [*obshchenarodnyi*], which should be fulfilled by a new

force of 'civic patriotic unity'.¹⁶⁰ This force included ethnic Russians and all the other minority peoples of the Russian Federation - the main criterion was that the movement's members felt 'love towards... mother Russia'.

One of the movement's main political aims was to maintain the territorial integrity and 'state unity of the country'. This meant maintaining not only Russia, but also the USSR.

ROS displayed a certain mistrust of the West - it called for a review of Russia's 'one-way orientation towards the West' in the area of international relations and called for 'mutually beneficial relations with all countries'. It also called for a fight against political forces and figures who were 'bringing about the break-up of Russia'. These points were criticism of the policies of the democrats, who supported liberal democracy and national separatism of the republics.

In the area of economics, ROS supported the immediate restoration of central control over the state sector economy until new structures could be introduced. The centrally-planned economy would be replaced by a market economy which would be gradually phased in by annually reducing the number of state orders. ROS supported the development of 'traditions of Russian enterprise'. Special measures would be taken to ensure that the country would not be 'pushed into the ranks of poorly developed states which serve the USA, Japan and Western Europe'.

In the cultural sphere, ROS supported the restoration of the traditions of Russian [*rossiiskaia*] 'spirituality' and the promotion of culture as one of the priorities of state policy.

The Union revealed that it regarded the unity of the Eastern Slavs to be the basis of Russian [*bothrusskaia* and *rossiiskaia*] statehood, indicating that it aimed to establish a union of Slavic states as a basis for renewing the Union. At the same time, it supported the 'unconditional defence of rights of the Russian-speaking population living outside the RSFSR'. This included providing them with 'close links to their historical motherland' and 'democratic self-determination' in areas outside the RSFSR where they constituted the majority of the local population.

On the whole, ROS promoted a *rossiiskii* nationalism - this served the purpose of restoring the historical (multinational) Russian state. However, it produced an 'Address to the Peoples of the Former Russian

State' justifying the ethnic Russians' role in that state:

Russian people have grounds to assert that belonging to Russia was beneficial to its non-Russian periphery economically, politically and culturally.¹⁶¹

ROS asked the 'peoples of the former empire' to unite, because a splintered state would be of advantage to the West. ROS 's anti-Western stance is not unlike that expressed by Soviet nationalists. There is much in common between ROS's *rossiiskii* nationalism and Soviet nationalism. However, in contrast to Soviet nationalism, this *rossiiskii* nationalism did not use Marxism-Leninism as the legitimising cement, but used a national ideology of *narodovlastiie*, *patriotizm*, *spravedlivost'* : *narodovlastiie* represented a form of Russian democracy, distinct from Western democracy; *patriotizm* assumed a devotion to the idea of the greater Russian state; and *spravedlivost'* represented the values by which all of the multinational population would live.

Pamiat'

Pamiat' is a fairly unique phenomenon and merits an analysis of its own. It was not a single, unified organisation, but a movement which splintered into several smaller groups expressing different views on the questions socialism, Russian Orthodoxy, etc. Some of the splinters retained the name *Pamiat'* in their title.

There is some reason to suggest that certain members of *Pamiat'* gravitated towards isolationist nationalism, but a larger body of evidence suggests that *Pamiat'* was mainly imperialist nationalist in its orientation.

*Pamiat''*s origins can be traced back to cultural societies in the 70s, but the movement did not come to prominence until the second half of the 80s. In the latter half of 1985 a politicised organisation emerged under the leadership of Dmitrii Vasil'ev and Kim Andreev. During 1986 *Pamiat'* became one of the first mass movements in Russia with representative organisations in dozens of Russian towns. *Pamiat''*s main concerns were with the preservation of Russian culture but as early as 1985 had become

obsessed with the idea of a Zionist-masonic plot being responsible for all the ills of Russia and the Russian people.¹⁶² In 1987, *Pamiat'* staged a number of demonstrations which raised their public profile, particularly after they met Boris El'tsin, the then first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee.¹⁶³ Thereafter, *Pamiat'* split, re-split and reformed into a number of factions nearly all claiming to be the main proponent of the *Pamiat'* movement.¹⁶⁴ The most notable of these groups included: the National-Patriotic Front "*Pamiat'*" led by Vasil'ev; the National-Patriotic Front "*Pamiat'*" led by Filimonov; the All-World Anti-Zionist and Anti-Masonic Front "*Pamiat'*" led by Emel'ianov; the Patriotic Union "*Rossia*" led by Sychev, which later became the Russian Popular Front "*Pamiat'*" and then the Russian Popular Democratic Front "*Pamiat'*"; the Russian Popular Patriotic Movement "*Pamiat'*" led by Igor' Siniavin¹⁶⁵; the Coordinating Council of the Patriotic Movement "*Pamiat'*" led by the Popov Brothers; the Union for National Proportional Representation "*Pamiat'*" led by Smirnov-Ostashvili, which allied itself with Kulakov's splinter group from the National-Patriotic Front "*Pamiat'*" (under Filimonov) to form the Orthodox National Patriotic Front "*Pamiat'*"; the Leningrad branch of the National Patriotic Front "*Pamiat'*" led by Zherbin and Demidov; and various other regional branches throughout Russia, e.g. Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, etc.

Although, due to their notoriety, *Pamiat'* achieved a publicity in the West disproportionate to their popularity, none of the splinter groups succeeded in gaining mass support. At its inception as a political movement, *Pamiat'* did achieve a mass interest, if not following, but was unable to consolidate upon its initial popularity. There are a number of issues which unite the *Pamiat'* groups, namely the re-establishment of a Russian state, concern for the Russian heritage, anti-Semitism and anti-Westernism. They disagreed on a number of things, including differences in religion (e.g. some advocated Russian Orthodoxy, others opted for paganism)¹⁶⁶ and their relationships with communism.

In 1988 John Dunlop published an article in a special edition of a Radio Liberty Research Bulletin describing *Pamiat'* as 'emotional fellow travellers of the centrist nationalists'.¹⁶⁷ By 'centrism' Dunlop did not mean liberal nationalism nor did he refer to Russian nationalists who subscribe to some

form of Marxism-Leninism to achieve their political aims (National Bolshevik). The 'centrists' were anti-communist and sought a Russian, anti-Western solution for Russia. Dunlop suggests that *Pamiat'* was both anti-communist and, to some extent, isolationist, in that the maintenance of the Soviet Union was not one of their prime objectives. It is my belief that *Pamiat'* were more inclined to an imperialist form of Russian nationalism.

Although there were many *Pamiat'* groups, most had only a very small following and are consequently insignificant. I shall briefly focus on some of the groups in order to establish *Pamiat''*'s imperial Russian nationalist orientation.

The National-Patriotic Front (NPF) "*Pamiat''*" of Dmitrii Vasil'ev was the largest of the *Pamiat'* groups and was based in Moscow. In its early days, the whole *Pamiat'* movement was said to have 'hundreds, if not thousands of supporters'¹⁶⁸ and Darrell Hammer pointed out in 1988:

'Pamyat'' is, or threatens to become, a mass organization.¹⁶⁹

However, by the beginning of 1989, Vasil'ev's Moscow organisation had an estimated 400 members with divisions in a further 30 towns.¹⁷⁰ Over fifty of these members departed in 1990¹⁷¹ and the last estimate in 1991 gave the Moscow group less than 200 members.¹⁷²

Of all the major *Pamiat'* groups, Vasil'ev's NPF "*Pamiat''*" was, perhaps, the least imperialist in its orientation. There were features which suggested that it support a 'third way': it opposed the CPSU, the democrats and supported a renaissance of the Russian Orthodox Church, adopting a church bell as its symbol. The group advocated the return of the land to the peasants and 'those who wish to work it'.¹⁷³ From 1989, the NPF confirmed their monarchist position, having earlier quoted the slogan, 'For Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland!'¹⁷⁴

The Front's conception of the Russian state was not always clear. Throughout its addresses and interviews it spoke of the 'Motherland' (*Rodina*), the 'Fatherland' (*Otechestvo*), Russia (*Rossiia*), Rus', the 'Russian Empire' (*Rossiiskaia imperiia*) and 'great Russian Power' (*velikaia Rossiiskaia Derzhava*). In one interview, Vasil'ev mentions

three different terms to describe Russia:

We should turn our attention to the legendary heroes of our Fatherland, who created the great Russian Power and whose efforts built up the glory of the Motherland.¹⁷⁵

The NPF put a great deal of emphasis on Russian ethnic issues - it claimed that it supported each nation's right to follow its own culture. One member, Aleksandr Shtil'mark, rejected accusations of Russian supremacy and stated that, besides Russians, the NPF had members who were 'Ukrainians and Belorussians, ... Armenians and Azeris, Moldavians and Tartars, Kalmyks and Swedes, Germans and Jews'.¹⁷⁶ However, whilst championing the causes of the Russian ethnic nation and claiming respect for the national aspirations of others, NPF also supported the Russian imperial State:

WE WILL FINALLY LIFT THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL BANNER OF REVIVAL. LET THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE ENTER THE THIRD MILLENNIUM with all her state foundations, laws and bases of spirituality and morality!¹⁷⁷

Earlier, in 1986, the *Pamiat'* movement had made an address to 'the brothers and sisters of Latvia and all peoples of the Homeland (*Otchizna*)',¹⁷⁸ where 'Homeland' and 'Fatherland' were read to mean 'the USSR'. The association that Vasil'ev's NPF made between Russia and the USSR can be seen in the following lines from June 1990:

Today we are addressing the Russian People, for the awakened national forces in many republics are stubbornly and selflessly asserting their independence, and it is only the voice of the Russian people that cannot be heard amidst the discord of peoples populating the Great Russian Empire. The demands of nationalist forces in the republics, in spite of prohibitive measures from the central powers, ... are being fulfilled in the main at the expense of the interests of the Russian People. The fact that the Fatherland created by Our Ancestors practically no longer belongs to us today provokes an extreme degree of indignation. The historical name Russia is being substituted by the term 'non-black earth'.¹⁷⁹ If we refer to Russians (*Rossiane*), then we mostly mean people of non-Russian descent...

It is clear from this that Vasilev's group considered 'Russia' to be the former Russian empire and was uncomfortable with the prospect of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, it can also be detected in this address that the NPF was beginning to distance itself from non-Russians, referring to them as foreigners (*chuzhestrantsy*), foreign guests (*zarubezhnie gosti*) and 'representatives of other nationalities'. There is other evidence to suggest that this group associated Russia with

the Soviet Union. In June 1989, a photograph of a bearded Aleksandr Shtil'mark sporting a *Pamiat'* t-shirt bearing an imperial crown accompanied an article which supported and justified the NPF *Pamiat'*. Shtil'mark rejected allegations that the NPF were chauvinistic, anti-Soviet, anti-Semitic, lacked internationalism and that they were searching for enemies. Shtil'mark acknowledged that allegations of anti-Sovietism were rare, but, nevertheless, found it necessary to point out that the NPF had never carried out any actions against Soviet power. The credibility of this comment may be devalued by the fact that Shtil'mark also denied that NPF *Pamiat'* was anti-Semitic, but it is interesting that Shtil'mark should emphasise that he identifies with both Russia and the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁰

In one 1989 political address, there is a suggestion that the 'Fatherland' (*Otechestvo*) is, at least, a union of the Eastern Slavs:

We are Slavs.

The heroic deeds of the Slavs and their great history is today divided into Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian nations, hereby bringing together a Slavic people between them. This trick will not work. We are one and will stand up together for the ideals of our Fatherland.

We will not allow our Motherland to be desecrated.¹⁸¹

To a large extent Vasil'ev's group's idea of what constituted Russia remains vague. Most of their rhetoric focussed on the threat of a Judeo-masonic conspiracy and the fate of ethnic Russians, but it is also clear that the group's members had a fondness for the idea of the Tsar and a Russian imperial state. I can only assume that 'Fatherland', 'Motherland', 'Homeland', etc. meant the 'whole of the Russian Empire', but this is obscured by frequent reference to the vague term '*Rossia*' and supported no further by the frequent use of the term 'ethnic Russians' (*russkie*) as opposed to *rossiane*. However, the most lucid revelation of Vasil'ev's imperialist nationalism came about in September 1991 in an interview in the Moscow publication, *Panorama*. In the aftermath of the attempted coup, he commented on the possibility of El'tsin reviewing the USSR's borders:

If El'tsin is pursuing the aim of occupying the borders within the lands of the Russian empire, then he is acting correctly and wisely.¹⁸²

One of the first splits in the Moscow *Pamiat'* group arose in 1986 when

founder members, the Popov brothers, were expelled by Vasil'ev for their 'national-communist' convictions. In 1988 they operated under the name the Patriotic Movement "*Pamiat*", which became the Co-ordinating Council of the Patriotic Movement "*Pamiat*" at the beginning of 1989.¹⁸³ The Popovs were very anti-Semitic, supported the idea of a Soviet communist regime and the maintenance a Soviet/Russian state. This stance continued through 1991, when the television news programme *Vremia* reported that activists of the Co-ordinating Council participated in proceedings at a meeting held by the pro-Soviet, pro-Russian United Workers' Front (OFT) which condemned deviations from socialism in the country. There were anti-Zionist posters at the meeting and, according to the commentary, the slogans of the Co-ordinating Council:

Did not sound out of place with the calls of others at the meeting.¹⁸⁴

This group remained quite insignificant, with the number of activists oscillating between 2-5 people and supporters numbering around 20.¹⁸⁵

A more significant split occurred in November 1987 when Igor' Sychev and Tamara Ponomareva broke away from Vasil'ev's NPF. Sychev, a little known artist, claimed after a disagreement with Vasil'ev that his group was:

The other "*Pamiat*", neither anti-Semitic, nor anti-Soviet.¹⁸⁶

The group called itself the *Pamiat'* Movement, which included the Patriotic Union "*Rossia*". Sychev's group was later to become the Russian Popular Front Movement "*Pamiat'*" (from summer 1989 to May 1990) and finally the Russian Popular-Democratic Front Movement "*Pamiat'*" (RNDF DP). Ponomareva's group became the Russian Cultural Centre.¹⁸⁷

Sychev's group differed from Vasil'ev's in that it was more socialist (possibly, even, 'Stalinist') in its orientation. The RNDF DP (and its previous incarnations) was manifestly imperialist nationalist in its orientation. A 1989 manifesto (while it was still the 'Russian Popular Front') declared:

The *RNF DP* puts its main task to be the struggle for the salvation of the Russian people and Russian national Renaissance...

The *RNF DP*, on a position of genuine socialism, considers it necessary that our Soviet state changes from a situation of state socialism, having forgotten the individual, to a situation of popular socialism....

...The Russian people is understood to consist of a triune people: Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians...

The *RNF DP* demands the creation of a full state structure in the RSFSR, as takes place in other republics. It is necessary to create a Russian bureau of the CPSU, a Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, a Russian Komsomol, a Russian KGB, Russian academies for Agriculture, Medicine and Pedagogy; a Russian Foreign Ministry, A Russian Ministry for External-Economic Links, Russian radio and television channels, the introduction of RSFSR citizenship. GIVE US RUSSIAN STATEHOOD.

The *RNF DP* demands recognition of the historical white, red and blue flag as the flag of the RSFSR.

The *RNF DP* demands the renewal of a state ideology, taking into account Russian national values from the Christian and pre-Christian periods... GIVE US A RUSSIAN NATIONAL IDEOLOGY!

The *RNF DP* demands the strict observation of proportionally-classed representation in the higher echelons of central power.

...OUR STRENGTH IS IN THE UNITY OF ALL PEOPLES OF THE USSR!¹⁸⁸

It is clear from the above extracts that Sychev's group supported RSFSR-wide institutions and something similar to statehood, but at the same time it supported the maintenance of the Soviet Union and Russian domination of that Union through national-proportional representation (Russians were described as 'Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians' who together constituted a significant majority). The *RNDF DP*' commitment to socialism, Russian nationalism and the maintenance of the Soviet Union was highlighted by Marina Katys in an *Ogonek* article in 1990. She quoted a speech by Sychev, in which he claimed:

The Russian Popular Front Movement (*RNF DP*) is the vanguard of Russia's socialist Marxist-Leninist patriotic forces.... Lenin's word is sacred to us... As sons and daughters of our fatherland Russia, we should think first and foremost about Russia, about the Russian people.¹⁸⁹

Sychev then went on to justify some of the actions of Stalin, putting the blame for past atrocities on Jewish figures such as Kaganovich and Ginzburg.

Katys than quotes from a tribute made by Sychev at the grave of Stalin on 5 March 1989:

The role of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin and his services to our Fatherland and Motherland are invaluable....

which continues:

Anti-Soviet, anti-state formations such as Democratic Union and the national fronts are the outcome of all [these] anti-popular forces...

...we relate to the Baltic republics in two ways. On the one hand, the national interests of each people are sacred. In the Baltic we are observing the fight for national rights escalating into nationalism. It is ushering in all sorts of anti-Soviet and anti-socialist forces which want to break up our Great Power. We are for the national revival and unity of all the peoples of our Great Power. It would be much better if we fought for our national rights together. The Baltic peoples should not leave the great Russian people in trouble. The Russian people was very rightly considered by other peoples to be the elder brother in the great family of nations.¹⁹⁰

This imperialist-nationalist view changed somewhat after 1990. According to Pribylovskii, Sychev's group:

Evolved from Stalinism towards an Orthodox-monarchist ideology. In summer 1990 the *RNDF DP* distanced itself from other national-patriotic groups and made efforts to draw itself closer to the democrats (in particular, Democratic Union). Membership fell sharply in 1990: no more than twenty people.¹⁹¹

And from mid-1990, the group preferred to be called the Russian Popular Home Guard for the Defence of Democracy and Culture (*Rossiiskoe Narodnoe opolchenie {RNO} za zashchitu demokratii i kul'tury*).

The alliance with democracy seemed to severely affect this group's following, although it is quite remarkable that a group with such extreme views on Stalinism and Russian nationalism should make such a *volte-face* - as it had formerly opposed the break-up of a Russian-dominated empire and called for the introduction of a Russian ideology, one must seriously question the motives and sincerity behind the change from Stalinist Marxism-Leninism to democracy.

In summer 1988, it was the Leningrad branch of the NPF which became the centre of activity, staging demonstrations and attracting the attention of the press. This led to a split from Vasil'ev's group in October 1988, after the latter accused the Leningraders of 'extremism, conducting pogroms and hooliganism.'¹⁹² In fact, the Leningrad group itself splintered into three groups: two opposing Vasil'ev and one supporting him.¹⁹³

Shortly before their final split from Vasil'ev, Demidov and Zherbin, who would lead one of the opposing groups, issued a document explaining the Leningrad *Pamiat'*'s aims and objectives. They called for a national

renaissance of not only the Russian people, but also Ukrainians and Belorussians. Referring to the USSR, they claimed that over the present century:

Our country has lost 60 million people, most of whom were from the Slavic peoples.¹⁹⁴

The group called for RSFSR-wide bodies such as a Russian Academy of Science and for the introduction of a history textbook specifically on Russian history. They voiced concern over the low Russian birth-rate and the high mortality rate caused by alcoholism. Besides these concerns the group supported: the guiding influence of the the Russian Orthodox Church and the separation of atheism from the state; social and economic reforms, including the return of land to the peasants and of enterprises to the workers; the possibility for 'women to return to the family' with sufficient social security to bring up children; the re-establishment of Russian symbols and restoration of historical place names; the establishment of an independent Russian national press. In essence their programme did not differ from that of Vasil'ev's Moscow group and, indeed, according to Valerii Solovei, it was not programmatic differences that divided the group, but Vasil'ev's overbearing and dictatorial character.¹⁹⁵

Although the Leningrad group(s) recognised the structure of the Soviet Union and spoke of Russia as a "Great Power" (*Derzhava*)¹⁹⁶, there is a suggestion that, like Vasil'ev's group, it might have had isolationist leanings. For example, besides the call for RSFSR-wide institutions, some thought was focussed on the status of RSFSR within the Union, resulting in concern for Russia's economic independence and its right to run its economy independently :

...we suggest:

that starting from the new financial year the basis for economic life and future economic politics in the USSR will be the principle of self-financing in the republics and ability to pay one's way without subsidy in the autonomous republics and territories.¹⁹⁷

This attitude suggests that members within *Pamiat'* were quite happy to relinquish influence over economic responsibility in the non-Russian areas in order to focus the fruits of the Russian economy on the Russian people. In all probability, such a model would have provided Russian

control over the other economies and it would have also given the Russians the right to withdraw subsidy when and wherever they liked.

In autumn 1988, another group broke away from Vasil'ev's Moscow group. Confusingly, this group also named itself the National-Patriotic Front "*Pamiat'*". Based in Moscow, it was headed by A. Filomonov, K. Sivolapov and S. Vorontytsev.¹⁹⁸ On 12 January 1989, Filomonov's group produced a manifesto which was subsequently published in the newspaper *Sovetskii tsirk* with, according to 'Garem Razh'¹⁹⁹ :

a commentary showing textual similarities between the 'Manifesto' and Hitler's party programme.²⁰⁰

The Manifesto listed 62 points, some of which resembled the principles listed by other *Pamiat'* groups. For example, it called for the restoration of worship in all churches and the return of all property formerly belonging to the Orthodox Church; the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan; the strengthening of the Army; protection of the environment; action against female and child labour which causes the destruction of the family; land reform which would give the land to 'those who work it'; legal measures against those who carried out 'falsification of the history of the Fatherland'; and participation of the toilers in sharing the profits from industrial enterprises and natural resources.²⁰¹

Some of the Russian-centred items include the following:

We demand that the Great Power is led out of its status as a colony...

... Great Russia is eternal.

... School should teach children the history of our Great Power at the very beginning of conscious life. Study of the Fatherland should become a main subject.

... We demand equal rights for the Russian people with the other peoples of our country. We insist on the creation in Russia of our own Academy of Science, Conservatory, Institute of Russian History, Centre of Russian Culture, Russian Theatre, Russian Cinematography, edition of a Russian Encyclopædia.

... We demand that the purity and wealth of the Mother tongue is protected from the pernicious influence of newspaper jargon by the creation of an Academy of the Russian Language which has informative rights and similar establishments in other republics.

... We demand the recognition of the traditional Russian national Flag and Coat of Arms.²⁰²

On the question of the nature of the Filimonov NPF's Russian nationalist orientation, it is undoubtedly imperialist nationalist. However, within its principles it does present a somewhat ambiguous picture. On the one

hand it acknowledges:

the legal right of each people to develop on its own primeval land within the framework of the historically formed community and the right to defend one's national dignity²⁰³

On the other hand it does not tolerate any threat to the Union:

We consider all instances of separatism and hostility between nations in the country to be a dirty Zionist-masonic provocation and demand the revelation of all the real names of the initiators and their punishment.

... We demand the true autonomy of republics within the framework of a One and Indivisible Great Power.²⁰⁴

Like the Leningrad NPF, this group calls for the 'economic autonomy of all republics', whilst also demanding:

...proportional representation in the ruling apparatus, and also in the fields of art, science and education.²⁰⁵

When Filimonov's NPF talks about 'our country' in the above-mentioned Point 42, it is clearly the 'One and 'Indivisible Great Power' dominated by the greater (national-) proportional representation of the Russian people. This idea is supported by an address from the Front which appeared in September 1989:

BROTHERS AND SISTERS, COMPATRIOTS!

Taking into account the dangerous moods in our Russian [*Rossiiskii*] home, "*Pamiat*" does not consider it possible to keep silent any longer.

This is not the first year that Russia has suffered. We are convinced that the reason for the grave situation in which the Great Russian Power finds itself is the apostasy of the Russian intelligentsia and the deeds of evil intent from hostile forces - talmudic atheism (Marxism) and cosmopolitan usury....

But we believe that RUSSIA LIVES! Let our Homeland be renamed, but let the territory of the Russian Empire remain basically untouched. There are healthy forces amongst the Russian(*russkie*) peoples. They are rising from the yoke and returning to the Faith of our fathers. The Russian Army is also alive.

However, the enemies of Russia have set themselves the task of finishing off the Great Power. Using so-called 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' they have deployed a widespread propaganda of separatism and Russophobia.²⁰⁶

This attack on separatism is aimed at the independence parties in the republics who were threatening the integrity of the USSR and, thus, as the address states, the integrity of the Russian empire. In 1990, Filimonov's group confirmed the strength of its imperialist nationalist convictions by allying itself with several other imperialist nationalist groups to form a 'Co-ordinating Council of Patriotic Movements'. Present at the founding

conference, organised by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Moscow City Committee of the Komsomol, were several self-proclaimed 'internationalist socialists' such as Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo* and the *Edinstvo* movement of Latvia, as well as the Moscow branch of *Otechestvo*, Filimonov's *Pamiat'* and the Anti-Zionist Front.²⁰⁷

The Union for National-Proportional Representation "*Pamiat'*" gained notoriety mainly for the activities of its leader, Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili who was the first member of a nationalist-oriented group to be convicted for infringing national rights of equality.

The group was formed in late 1989 after it broke away from Sychev's group. Several months later (February 1990) it joined the umbrella group, the Popular Orthodox Movement, along with Kulakov's Orthodox National-Patriotic Front "*Pamiat'*". Smirnov-Ostashvili led 20-30 activists and a further 100 or so followers, despite his claim that his group was:

...a serious movement with many thousands of people.²⁰⁸

In September 1990, the UNPR produced a programme with the name of Smirnov-Ostashvili attached to it, but Valerii Solovei believes that it was written by a journalist who went under the name 'Aleksei B'.²⁰⁹ This 'programme' is mostly an anti-Semitic document and resembles the anti-Jewish ramblings of Hitler in *Mein Kampf*. It supported the maintenance of the USSR and called for national-proportional representation, particularly of Jews, in all areas of public and social life.²¹⁰ This would mean that Jews would occupy positions of responsibility in a number proportional to their (miniscule) percentage of the population. Russians would, likewise, dominate all institutions.

In a newspaper interview in May 1990, Smirnov-Ostashvili declared that he supported the communists and was prepared to form a bloc with them; was 'in solidarity with healthy patriotic forces in the CPSU, the army, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the militia'; supported Nina Andreeva; and was studying the question of a monarchy.²¹¹ The Union for Proportional Representation's views were little different from a mixture of those of Filimonov's and Sychev's groups, but, as the criminal conviction of

Smirnov-Ostashvili demonstrated, the group was really a vehicle for the dissemination of anti-Semitic propaganda. Such was the extent of this anti-Semitism, that the Secretariat of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public felt it necessary to issue a declaration in *Literaturnaia gazeta* condemning the group's programme.²¹²

The final *Pamiat'* group to be covered in this section is by no means the most significant, but the words of its leader demonstrate clearly the imperialist Russian nationalist nature of *Pamiat'*. Igor' Siniavin's group *Pamiat'*, which became the Popular Patriotic Movement "*Pamiat'*"²¹³, compiled a document outlining the ideology and programme of the 'Russian Popular-Patriotic Movement'. Under the heading 'We will save sacred Rus'', the document listed its fundamental principles:

The Russian Popular-Patriotic Movement is being developed on the basis of ideals accumulated by the Russian [*rusaskaia*] nation over the course of all its history. It is a manifestation of the faith of the people in the Great Historical Mission of Russia...

Our main task is:

The rebirth of the vitality and spiritual strength of the Russian people. We understand the Russian people to be a triune people: the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Belorussians.

The fight for the unity and indivisibility of Russia (officially called the USSR at the present level of her development) on the basis of a fraternal union of indigenous nations all enjoying equal rights.²¹⁴

Later on in the document, Siniavin outlined the Russian state structure that he envisaged. He wished to:

Change the name of the state from the USSR to RUSSIA. The Union Republics will be named: Estonia, Ukraine, Kirgizia etc. The RSFSR will be named only by territories. All the higher organs of power in the RSFSR should be abolished. In the republics we should eliminate all supreme soviets, national parties, councils of ministers.... Republican borders should serve only as ethical and cultural lines of demarcation...

There should be no economic borders within the state.²¹⁵

Besides the establishment of a Russian state, Siniavin was concerned with a social renaissance of the Russian people. This involved the elimination of bad (sometimes perceived to be 'Western') influences. He provided a spectrum of alarming answers to social problems such as the banning of rock music, sterilisation of alcoholics and isolation zones for AIDS-sufferers. Later in the year, when proposing a draft statute for the creation of a Russian National Party, Siniavin repeated the idea of eliminating alcoholics and also called for a ban on 'mixed marriages'.

Siniavin's solution is fairly typical of *Pamiat'*'s attitude - whilst supporting the rights of each people to flourish, it stresses the importance of Russian national renaissance, providing an ethnic Russian national solution for Russia.

Summary of *Pamiat'*

Pamiat' started as a Russian cultural movement promoting Russian history, culture, ecology and the preservation of historical monuments. The politicisation of the movement revealed a common belief in the need to resurrect Russia, which had fallen victim to a Zionist-masonic plot, but it also revealed a broad spectrum of political views. All the groups shared the view that the resurrection of Russia meant the reconstitution of the Soviet state as a Russian state. At first, *Pamiat'*'s Russian focus attracted a degree of sympathy, if not support - not least from some of the leading Russian nationalist figures in the literary world. However, it was tarnished by its concentrated anti-Semitism and by the discord amongst its leaders. As the movement splintered throughout the Gorbachev period, its chances of becoming a mass Russian movement faded away.

Pamiat''s contribution to the development of Russian nationalism was that it provided an early focus for the Russian national question. It also alerted people to the fact that there *was* a Russian national question which could be discussed openly. However, it also created the view that Russian nationalism was necessarily anti-Semitic and extreme. It might well have distanced some people from the idea of extreme Russian nationalism.

Pamiat''s lasting contribution was that it served as a nursery for subsequent Russian nationalist parties such as the National Republican Party of Russia (RNPR/NRPR) and Russian National Unity (*Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo*) whose leaders, Nikolai Lysenko and Aleksandr Barkashov, had both been members of *Pamiat'*.²¹⁶

Anti-communist fringe

Although I have already listed a number of *Pamiat'* groups which were opposed to communism and mentioned the fact that there were Russian

'revivalists' within the cultural establishment who opposed Marxism-Leninism, there were others outside the establishment who took a principled stand against communism as an anti-Russian ideology. The extreme right-wing *RNE* represents such a movement.

Russian National Unity (*Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo* - *RNE*)

RNE was one of the organisations which grew out of the *Pamiat'* movement and managed to achieve renown or notoriety in its own right. Founded in October 1990, *RNE* consisted of, what were claimed to be, the 'most active representatives of *NPP Pamiat'*'. The movement was led by Aleksandr Barkashov, a thirty-seven year old former bodyguard of Dmitrii Vasil'ev.

During its formative days, the movement was known as the 'National Unity' Movement for a Free Strong and Just Russia! This group decided that action should be taken to determine Russia's 'national and state priorities' and came up with four important areas of action: utmost support for the Russian Orthodox Church; the creation of an ideology capable of building statehood and maintaining structures which guarantee state sovereignty; to organise a national system of business relations; to educate the youth in the spirit of the nation.²¹⁷

When renamed *RNE*, the movement stated that its main aim was the 'spiritual, moral and physical revival of the Russian [*Russkii*] People and to return to the Russian People its historical place and role in the state and the world'.²¹⁸ The movement declared that any political system or religious and philosophical outlook adopted to achieve this aim constituted means to this end and that those means might change or transform themselves depending on circumstances. Therefore, *RNE* made it quite clear that it had a policy of 'Russian nation first'.²¹⁹ This was closely bound with the idea of the maintenance of the greater Russian state.

Barkashov's movement opposed Communism, which it described as 'a method of destroying the best national forces', adding that it had destroyed the 'clergy, the army and the peasantry' in Russia.²²⁰ *RNE* also opposed the 'democratic movement' which, it believed, could 'bring nothing positive to the Russian People, nor to any other indigenous people of our country'.

It criticised the democratic movement for being a narrow, class-based movement which poorly represented Russian people. It also disapproved of what it considered to be the democrats' pro-American orientation in foreign policy.

RNE was both anti-Western and anti-Semitic, believing that there was a Jewish 'financial oligarchy' planning world domination. The movement believed that this oligarchy, using the USA as its base, was bent upon dismembering the Russian state in the interests of world domination and of obtaining Russian raw materials.²²¹

Barkashov espoused right-wing ideas, calling for order and placing an emphasis upon the importance of the Russian Army. In an address published in November 1990, Barkashov declared that:

All of Russia's most dramatic and tragic times have ended in victory for the Russian Army and, thus, the Russian People.²²²

He went on to say that the Army was the only force which could put a decisive end to the break-up of the Russian state (Soviet Union) and called for the Army's prestige to be restored. He suggested that 'if 70% of the Russian national income had not been wasted on parasitical peoples (non-Russians)... but spent on the Army... then our Army... would have long ago established order within the country and then in the world'.²²³

This authoritarian tone was further highlighted in February 1991, when RNE produced an address suggesting that Russians were suffering genocide as a result of national-separatism. Barkashov declared that there was no other way to stop this 'genocide' than to turn to the Armed Forces and demand that they fulfil their 'constitutional duty' and act to maintain the territorial integrity of the (Russian) state. He also demanded that a temporary state organ including Afghan veterans, KGB members and members of the Armed Forces be formed to restore the state's defence capability and also to take 'measures to stabilise domestic politics and the economy'.²²⁴

RNE only had marginal support, but it took part in many 'patriotic' meetings and became a leading member of *Slavianskii Sobor*. Its membership numbered around 500 at the end of 1991 and most of these were young people in their twenties. They represented disaffected young

Russians who sought an authoritarian solution to the break-up of the greater Russian state. They had no fixed ideology, other than 'that which serves the Russian nation serves us best'.

Umbrella Organizations and Blocs

A number of organizations appeared between the end of 1989 and the end of 1991, seeking to unite and co-ordinate the efforts of groups inclined towards imperialist Russian nationalism. The first of these was the United Council of Russia (*Ob"edinennyi sovet Rossii*), which was founded on 9 September 1989. The United Council embraced the Association of Russian Artists, *Interdvizhenie*, *Interfront*, the 'international' *Edinstvo* movements of Lithuania and Moldavia, the Moscow and Leningrad branches of the *OFT*, *Otechestvo* groups, the All-Russian Cultural Foundation, the Public Committee for the Salvation of the Volga, the Union for the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland (*SDVO*), the Union of the Struggle for Popular Sobriety as well as a number of other organizations. The Council aimed to maintain the state sovereignty of the USSR whilst developing the sovereignty of the RSFSR and establishing international status for the RSFSR within the UN. Other aims included the prevention of the 'barbaric' looting of Russia's natural resources; the revival of the 'spiritual origins' of the Russian people and other peoples of the USSR; the adoption of a state programme for the maintenance of Russian culture in the non-Russian republics. The Council also expressed a desire to develop an education system based upon 'Russian national traditions'.²²⁵

One of the declared intentions was to defend the rights and interests of Russians and non-titular language speakers in union republics and this intention was backed up by subsequent efforts in the summer and autumn of 1990 to develop 'charitable action', to offer help to Russian refugees and to create fora for discussing problems surrounding the revival of Russia and the Russian people.²²⁶

The United Council of Russia also participated in the Bloc of Public and Patriotic Movements of Russia. This bloc consisted of several

organizations which sought to pool their collective efforts before the elections to the local soviets and for the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in spring 1990: OSR, the *Edinstvo* Association for Lovers of Russian Writing and Art, the *Rossiiia* Club of USSR People's Deputies and Electors, the All-Russian Cultural Foundation, the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments, *OFT* of Russia, the Public Committee for Saving the Volga, the Association of Russian Artists, the Russian Branch of the International Foundation for Slavonic Literature and Slavic Cultures, the Union for the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland, the RSFSR Voluntary Society of Book-Lovers, the Foundation for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Saviour (some of these already came under the umbrella of, or were connected with the United Council of Russia). Their united platform was published in *Literaturnaia Rossiia* on the 29 December 1989 and in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* the following day.²²⁷

The Bloc supported the idea of developing a Russian political system (i.e. creating a Russian Communist Party), establishing a Russian Academy of Sciences (including an Institute for the Ecology of Russia, an Institute for the Economy of Russia, an Institute for Russian History and Culture), Russian state radio and television. On fiscal matters, the Bloc stated that the Russian republic's contribution to the Union budget should not be used for the 'artificial raising of living standards' in other Union republics and suggested that it should be used 'for the sake of the peoples of Russia'. The Bloc proposed the establishment of RSFSR representative bodies in all the Union republics to serve Russian peoples resident there. In the event of any 'discrimination' against them, Russia would take appropriate measures according to the 'international practice of defending human rights'.

Significantly, the pre-election programme stated that, in the event of a republic seceding from the Union, Russia would strive to ensure that the republic's sovereignty 'extended to all lands genuinely belonging to its numerous peoples.' This suggested that the Bloc would respect the sovereignty of other republics, but that the sovereignty of certain territories with non-titular (i.e. Russian-speaking) majorities in those republics might be reviewed. However, as the rallying election call indicated, the

Bloc was certain that Russia should remain intact as the Soviet Union:

... WE NEED A GREAT SOVIET RUSSIA!
RUSSIA ALWAYS WAS, AND SHALL REMAIN, A GREAT WORLD POWER!
SHE WILL DO EVERYTHING TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS AND SHALL REMAIN THE
SOVIET UNION!
NO TO SEPARATISM, CHAOS, NATIONAL ENMITY AND CIVIL STRIFE!²²⁸

This message failed to secure significant support in the 1990 elections.

Perhaps the most significant bloc advocating imperialist Russian nationalism over the Gorbachev period was the parliamentary faction within the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the *Soiuz* Group of Deputies. *Soiuz* announced its formation on 14 February 1990. At that moment it claimed the support of 110 People's Deputies, but by 1 December of that year the number had risen to 472.²²⁹

Key figures in *Soiuz* were Colonel Viktor Alksnis from Latvia, Iurii Blokhin from Moldavia, Colonel Nikolai Petrushenko from Kazakhstan and Evgenii Kogan from Estonia. These men were all from the Russian periphery and considered *Soiuz's* task to be the maintenance and strengthening of the Soviet federal state. The support for a united Soviet Union reflected conservative resistance to change and suggested that the deputies' group was following an 'internationalist' line - it included a number of non-Russians. However, like *OFT* and the 'intermovements' in the Baltic, *Soiuz* displayed imperialist Russian nationalist leanings, which were to grow as time past.

Many supporters of *Soiuz* were Russians in the periphery, including members from the Baltic and Moldavian 'international' movements. The group also had links with Russian nationalist orientated publications: in July 1990 the Russian nationalist-orientated journal, *Molodaia gvardiia*, published an article in support of *Soiuz*. The author, a *Soiuz* deputy, was critical of developments in Lithuania and suggested that there was discrimination against members of the Russian-speaking populations in Lithuania and Moldavia. He mentioned that the group sought to combat such problems through 'dialogue', but suggested that the situation was more acute than that: he revealed that *Soiuz* proposed to set up a foundation for refugees from areas of interethnic conflict.²³⁰

By the end of 1990, *Soiuz* had increased its contacts with Russian

nationalist-orientated groups and increased its support significantly.²³¹ At the group's second congress in April 1991, delegates voted to transform *Soiuz* into a mass movement. The congress also produced a draft declaration aimed at creating a 'third way' based upon developing 'all-Russian patriotism'.²³² Some of the participants of the congress were representing groups of a Russian nationalist inclination, including: the RSFSR Union of Writers, *Interdvizhenie*, the Union of Patriotic Forces, the *Otechestvo* Russian Cultural Society, the Union for the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland, the Russian Popular front, the Association of Russian Artists, the Union of Russian Refugees, the Russian Centre, the All-Russian Association of Lovers of Patriotic Culture *Edinenie*, *OFT*, the All-Union *Edinstvo* Society, the Committee for the Salvation of the Volga.²³³

Soiuz became a sizeable group with a growing influence. One of its leaders claimed in May 1991 that it had more than 740 out of the 2250 members of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, i.e more than a third of all the deputies.²³⁴ Around this time, *Soiuz's* size in the USSR Congress was similar to that of the Communist Party and larger than the Interregional Group which represented the 'liberal' voice in the legislature. It also expanded its ranks beyond the USSR Congress to encompass republican and regional people's deputies. However, when the Soviet Union faltered after the August coup attempt, *Soiuz* effectively ceased to exist and members joined other organisations.

Slavianskii Sobor formed in January 1991 with the aim of 'maintaining and strengthening Slavic values, protecting the rights and interests of the Slavic peoples and developing Slavic cultures'.²³⁵ The organisation ostensibly supported all the Slavic peoples, but displayed a certain focus upon the Russian people, which is reminiscent of the Russian attitude to Pan-Slavism following the Moscow Pan-Slavic Congress of 1867.²³⁶ The leadership and the Duma of *Slavianskii Sobor* were to meet in Moscow and the official language was Russian. Most of its members either viewed the brotherhood of the Eastern Slavs as the essential core of Russian statehood, or regarded the Russian people to consist of 'Great Russians', Ukrainians and Belorussians.

Members included Russian National Unity, the Slavic Party, the United

Council of Russia, Leningrad's *Otechestvo*, Moscow's *Otechestvo*, *Soiuz Venedov*, the Public Committee for the Salvation of the Volga, *Edinenie* and others. *Slavianskii Sobor*'s umbrella covered both pro-socialist and anti-CPSU groups, and groups which originated both from within and outside establishment circles. The two unifying features appeared to be the desire for a Russian national revival and the maintenance of the historical Russian state. The Founding Congress did include representatives from Ukraine, Belorussia and Poland, but the vast majority of delegates were Russians. The Congress discussed not only themes of Slavic co-operation, but also themes such as 'the Modern Position of Russians in the Country and Abroad'.²³⁷

At the organisation's Second Congress in May 1991, *Slavianskii Sobor* passed resolutions which paid attention to 'anti-Russian extremism' and 'the war of sovereignties'. The former resolution expressed demands: for the Russian people to be given the 'elementary right to life'; to pass a separate law against 'anti-Russian extremism'; to consider publications such as *Ogonek* and *Moskovskie novosti* guilty of fanning anti-Russian extremism; to enforce Article 74 of the RSFSR Criminal Code for provocation of anti-Russian feeling up until the establishment of a law against 'anti-Russian extremism'; to ban the activity of all organisations advocating 'anti-Russian extremism'.²³⁸ The latter resolution criticised the idea of state sovereignty in the Union republics, referring to it as a return to 'feudal times'. It declared that the existing borders between the republics were 'unfair' and a 'particular blow... inflicted on the Great Russian people'.²³⁹ These resolutions were passed in response to the growing calls for national-separatism in the non-Russian republics.

At the end of August, the organisation held a conference on the theme of the 'Russian Idea and the Revival of Russia'. The conference concentrated on two particular issues: the events connected with the attempts to confiscate the RSFSR Writers' Union building; and the position of Russians in the Union republics. The conference centred on the most pressing Russian nationalist issues of the moment - one reporter commented that there were very few suggestions concerning the conference's theme: how to revive Russia.²⁴⁰

It is clear that, although it attempted to address some Slavic issues and

invited representatives of other Slavic countries to its Congresses and meetings, *Slavianskii Sobor* was very much concerned with Russian issues. As a forum of discussion, it brought together a broad range of imperialist Russian nationalist groups from the Baltic 'international movements' to Russian National Unity and members of the Russian Orthodox Church.²⁴¹

Shortly after its formation, *Slavianskii Sobor* suffered a split, with some of the members leaving to form an alternative *Vseslavianskii sobor*. This early split was indicative of the organisation's failure to become a real focal point of 'patriotic forces'. Although *Slavianskii sobor* commanded the support of members of its constituent organisations totalling several thousands, the idea of developing Russian [*rusaskaia* and *rossiiskaia*] great power themes brought little appeal to the Russian public, let alone to organisations from Ukraine and Belorussia.

Conclusion

Imperialist Russian nationalism represented a broad range of views, but the alliances and coalitions which existed suggest that these differences could be laid aside in the interests of preserving the greater Russian state. To some extent, the imperialist Russian nationalists were allied with Soviet statist (or Soviet 'nationalists') who were also concerned with maintaining the unitary state, but, in many instances, the understanding of the terms 'Soviet' and 'Russian' became interchangeable²⁴² - for most Russians, the 'Motherland' was regarded to be the USSR rather than the Russian Federation (for example, a poll of Muscovites in 1987 revealed that 68.6% considered their Motherland to be the whole of the Soviet Union, while only 14.2% named the RSFSR).²⁴³

There seemed to be three ways in which imperialist Russian nationalists referred to Russia and the Soviet Union: in many instances, they supported the maintenance of the Union, whilst strengthening the state identity of the Russian republic and the Russian people; in some instances, they failed to draw a direct distinction between Russia and the Soviet Union, suggesting that they were one and the same, or that one was a

direct continuation of the other; in other instances, the organisations were bold enough to state that the Soviet Union should be regarded as, or renamed, 'Russia' (e.g. LDP, the Popular Patriotic Movement "*Pamiat*"). Certain organisations attempted to portray themselves as something other than groups representing Russian interests. The Russian nationalist-orientated movements in the Baltic claimed to be 'international', but they consisted mainly of Russians and Russian-speakers who feared the winds of change. In 1991 in Estonia, there appeared to be a correlation between the number of Russians who expressed support for *Interdvizheniie* and *OSTK* and the number of them who could not speak Estonian: 37% of Russians expressed an interest in the two organisations, whilst 36% of Russians knew no Estonian language at all.²⁴⁴ In addition 31% of Russians thought that they would lose their jobs if Estonia gained state independence [*samostoiatel'nost'*].²⁴⁵ These figures suggest that the movements drew support from Russians looking out for their own interests. The 'international' movements revealed the extent of their 'international' intentions by participating in the founding of Moscow's *Otechestvo* and by joining the United Council of Russia - organisations with an open pro-Russian agenda.

Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo* stated quite clearly that it supported internationalism and condemned manifestations of nationalism, whilst, at the same time, pursuing a limited form of Russian nationalism. *Edinstvo*'s neo-Stalinist formulation of Russian nationalism was unsatisfactory to many, but Nina Andreeva still won the respect of many self-styled Russian 'patriots'.

Throughout the Gorbachev period, various imperialist Russian nationalist groups expressed support for each other or joined in coalitions, for example: early on, *Pamiat* were shown a degree of sympathy by members of the creative intelligentsia; later, 'international' movements and 'cultural' movements came together under the umbrella of the United Council of Russia and the Bloc of Public-Patriotic Movements; communist and non-communist imperialist Russian nationalists (and Soviet statist) united within the *Soiuz* group of deputies; *Slavianskii Sobor* united imperialist Russian nationalist groups from communist and anti-communist backgrounds and from within and outside the establishment.

However, despite these efforts, there were personal and political differences which hindered the formation of a unified movement dedicated to the formation of a Russian-dominated Soviet state/Russian empire. Those who tried to unite were not sufficiently organised and many were discredited through the eyes of the public for their association with the Communist Party, the conservative establishment. or anti-Semitism.

Otchizna represented an attempt to draw imperialist Russian nationalists (including 'neo-Stalinists' such as Nina Andreeva) from across the spectrum. It condemned neither communism, nor Russian Orthodoxy, nor the idea of monarchy, but attempted to appeal to the common denominators which might unite the different strands of imperialist Russian nationalist feeling. Unfortunately for *Otchizna*, this approach was adopted too late: the confidence and support which the organisation were trying to build were dealt an early and severe blow by the attempted coup of August.

It would have been a very difficult task to accommodate all the aforementioned groups under one political umbrella - a great deal of compromise would have been required. Perhaps, some of the less flexible 'internationalist' members of Andreeva's *Edinstvo* would have been unwilling to compromise, but others had already showed a willingness to adapt: non-communist organisations co-operated with the Communist Party; others suggested that the political system was not important as long as certain Russian priorities were fulfilled; and the Russian Communist Party showed a much greater sympathy towards Russian issues and even Russian Orthodoxy than the CPSU had ever done.

It is feasible that, given time, imperialist Russian nationalism would have achieved a greater degree of unity, although it is doubtful whether it would have lasted very long. I imagine that a Eurasian solution to the greater Russian state would have satisfied most adherents to imperialist Russian nationalism, but even this would have caused disagreement.

¹ For example, Viktor Aksiuchits said: 'The USSR is not the inheritor of the of the Russian [rossiiskaia] empire, it is not a Russian [rusaskaia] empire, and the Russian people are not the bearers of imperial strength and the imperial idea. The Soviet Union is not a traditional national empire, but an ideological, international empire.' Source: Viktor Aksiuchits, "Sud'ba strany", *Rusaskaia mysl'*, 1 January 1991.

² Although, it should be pointed out that these economies were so interdependent because of Soviet economic policy which had denied each republic the chance of establishing its own microeconomic infrastructure. The economic interdependence established by Soviet central planning acted as another method of integrating the peoples of the Soviet Union.

³ Veber, A. B. et al. (eds.) [Gorbachev-Fond], *Soiuz možno bylo sokhranit': dokumenty i fakty o politike M. S. Gorbacheva po reformirovaniu i sokhraneniui mnogonatsional'nogo gosudarstva*, April', Moscow, 1995, p. 82.

⁴ *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 14/6/89.

⁵ *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 26/1/91, pp.3-4.

⁶ I. Shafarevich, "Rusofobiia", *Nash sovremennik*, No.6, 1989, p.166.

⁷ *Veche*, July 1990, p.3.

⁸ V. N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov, V.V. Cherviakov, V. D. Solovei, *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8. Rau-Press, Moscow, 1992, p. 106.

⁹ V. V. Karlov, "Ob osnovakh etnicheskogo vosproizvodstva russkogo naroda" in in Iu. S. Kukushkin et al. (eds), *Russkii narod: istoricheskaia sud'ba v XX veke*, TO ANKO, Moscow 1993, p. 88.

¹⁰ V.I. Tsymburskii, " 'Novye pravye' v Rossii: natsional'nye predposylki zaimstvovannoi ideologii" in T. I. Zaslavskaiia & L. A. Arutiunian (eds.), *Kuda idet Rossiia?... Al'ternativa obshchestvennogo razvitiia*, No. 2, Moscow, Interpraks, 1995, p. 473.

¹¹ Cited in A. I. Vdovin, *Rossiiskaia natsiia: Natsional'no-politicheskie problemy XX veka i obshchenatsional'naia rossiiskaia ideia*, 2nd ed., Klub "Realisty", Moscow, 1996, p.22.

¹² L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Moscow, 1972; see Chapter 1.

¹³ For example, L. N. Gumilev, "Biografiia nauchnoi teorii, ili avtonekrolog", *Znamia*, No. 4, 1988, pp. 203-216; and his major works *Drevniaia Rus' i Velikaia Step'*, Moscow, 1989 and *Etnogenez i biosfera Zemli*, Moscow, 1989. [N. B. much of Gumilev's work was published or republished after 1991]

¹⁴ His theory in *Etnogenez i biosfera Zemli* suggested that symbiosis was desirable, whilst 'chimera' - a hybrid caused by (genetic) mixing of 'superethnoses' - would lead not only to genetic deformity, but cultural and political deformities.

¹⁵ e.g. see *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No.2, 1991, p.2; for Gumilev's views see *Nash sovremennik*, No.1, 1991.

¹⁶ *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 28/10/88, p.5.

¹⁷ See, for example, the Russian Party of National Revival (RPNV) in Chapter 3.

¹⁸ e.g. see interview with Gumilev in *Nash sovremennik*, No. 1, 1990.

¹⁹ J. B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, Princeton UP, 1993, pp.128- 129.

²⁰ N. Andreeva, "Ne mogu postupit'sia printsipami", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 13 March 1988.

²¹ Centre for the studies of the New Political and Social Movements of the USSR. *New Political Parties Everyday Information*, Moscow, 1991.

²² John B. Dunlop, "The Contemporary..." *RL Research*, op.cit., p.8.

²³ "Ustav Vsesoiuznogo samodeiatel'nogo obshchestva 'Edinstvo' - za leninizma i kommunisticheskie idealy", Typescript, Moscow, 19 May 1989. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]

²⁴ N. Andreeva, "Ne mogu..", op. cit.

²⁵ A. Prokhanov, "Kul'tura - khram, a ne strel'bishche", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 22/1/88, p.3.

- ²⁶ N. Andreeva, "Nas gorazdo bol'she chem vy dumaete!", *Smena*, No.34.[19484], 9/2/90, p.2. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ²⁷ V. N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov, V.V. Cherviakov, V. D. Solovei, *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 2. Rau-Press, Moscow, 1992, p.109
- ²⁸ Ibid., p.110.
- ²⁹ A. Simakov, "Ha kontserte Niny Andreevoi", *Vozrozhdenie Rossii*, No.2(6), 1990, p.2.
- ³⁰ *New Political Parties Everyday Information*, op. cit.
- ³¹ V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov & V. V. Cherviakov, *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Spravochnik*. op. cit., p.48.
- ³² Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), "Pravaia al'ternativa", *Sostoianie strany*, No. 1/2, 25 Feb 1991, Postfactum, Moscow, p.12.
- ³³ V. Pribylovskii, *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit., p.3.
- ³⁴ *Vesti iz SSSR*, No.21, 1988, (15/11/88), pp.6-7.
- ³⁵ Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit., p.14.
- ³⁶ 'Backlash in Soviet Lithuania against new Language Law', *Reuter*, FF077, 13/2/89. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ³⁷ Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit.
- ³⁸ *Vesti iz SSSR*, no.4, 1989, (28/2/89), pp.7-8.
- ³⁹ Otkrytoe pis'mo, *Vozrozhdenie*, no.11, 17/3/89.
- ⁴⁰ Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit.
- ⁴¹ Iu. Rubtsov, "'Sajudis' i 'Edinstvo': vmesto ili vmeste?", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 3/12/88, p.6.
- ⁴² "Uchreditel'nyi s'ezd internatsional'nogo fronta trudiashchikhsia Latviiskoi SSR", *Sovetskaia Latviia*, 8/1/89. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ *Sovetskaia Latviia*, 27/1/89 [Quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 18/2/89]
- ⁴⁵ See, for example, "Po zaprosu interfronta", *Sovetskaia Latviia*, 14 June 1988.
- ⁴⁶ "Chas vybora", *Sovetskaia Rossia*, 24/2/90, p.3.
- ⁴⁷ "Interfront - kurs na s'ezd", *Sovetskaia Latviia*, 17/11/89.
- ⁴⁸ "Chas vybora", op. cit.
- ⁴⁹ B. Sinitsyn, "Tukums bez Lenina", *Edinstvo*, 9-15 July 1990, p.4. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁵⁰ "Chem provinilsia Iurii Gagarin?", Ibid., p.5.
- ⁵¹ "Chas vybora", op. cit.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 19/7/89.
- ⁵⁴ A. Zhdanok, "Mezhnatsional'nyi konflikt ili ideologicheskaja bor'ba?", *Daugava*, No.11, 1989, p.62. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁵⁵ Ibid, pp.68-71; *Edinstvo*, 21/6/89.
- ⁵⁶ Eric Rudenshiold, "Ethnic Dimensions in Contemporary Latvian Politics: Focusing Forces For Change", *Soviet Studies*, Vol.44, No.4, 1992, p.609; A. Zhdanok, op. cit., p.64.
- ⁵⁷ *Soviet Weekly*, 19/9/91, p.4.
- ⁵⁸ A. Zhdanok, op. cit., p.63.
- ⁵⁹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *The End of the Soviet Empire: the Triumph of the Nations*, Basic Books, New York, 1993, p.126.
- ⁶⁰ "Chas vybora", op. cit.
- ⁶¹ Julian Borger, "Independence brings ethnic fears to surface in Estonia", *The Guardian*, 10/9/91, p.7.
- ⁶² Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *The End of the Soviet Empire...*, op. cit., p.163

- ⁶³ Rupert Cornwell, "Russians go on strike in Estonia", *The Independent*, 10/8/89.
- ⁶⁴ John Rettie, "Estonian MPs rescind curbs on Russians' voting rights", *The Guardian*, 6/10/89.
- ⁶⁵ *Sovetskaia Estoniia*, 14/11/89, p.1.
- ⁶⁶ *Pravda*, 7/1/89, p.3.
- ⁶⁷ Jonathan Steele, "Moldavia's strikes may be quietly condoned", *The Guardian*, 1/9/89.
- ⁶⁸ Geoffrey A. Hosking, "Popular movements in Estonia", in G. A. Hosking, J. Aves & P. J. S. Duncan, *The Road to Post-Communism: Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union, 1985-1991*, Pinter, London, 1992, p.188.
- ⁶⁹ See G. A. Hosking, *ibid.*
- ⁷⁰ V. Iarovoi, "Est' on, 'russkii vopros'", *Rabochaia tribuna*, 23/2/90, p.2.
- ⁷¹ *Sovetskaia molodezh'*, 3/1/90, p.2.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁴ *Sovetskaia molodezh'*, 6/2/90.
- ⁷⁵ *Sovetskaia Latviia*, 11/3/90.
- ⁷⁶ Leokadia Drobizheva, "Perestroika and the ethnic consciousness of Russians", in Gail W. Lapidus, Victor Zaslavsky with Philip Goldman (eds.), *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics*, CUP, 1992, p.102.
- ⁷⁷ "Ob'edinennyi front trudiashchikhsia", *Leningradskaia pravda*, no.138, 14/6/89, p.3.
- ⁷⁸ Sergei Nenashev, "Ob'edinennyi front trudiashchikhsia", *Moskovskie novosti*, No.26, 25/6/89.
- ⁷⁹ Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit., p.15.
- ⁸⁰ *Rech' rukovoditel'ia obshchestva 'PATRIOTY' Aleksandra Zakhar'evicha ROMANENKO...*, undated typescript. [IGPI Archive]
- ⁸¹ Aleksandr Levikov, "Chem leningradtsy khuzhe?", *Moskovskie novosti*, No.32, 1989.
- ⁸² *Ibid.*
- ⁸³ *Leningradskaia pravda*, 18/7/89, p.3.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit., p.15.
- ⁸⁶ V. Pribylovskii, *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit., p.24.
- ⁸⁷ Undated typescript on 1st/founding congress. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁸⁸ Sergei Sopov, "Eto bylo, bylo, bylo!", *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, No.3, 22/1/90. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁸⁹ *Volia*, No. 2, March 1991, Moscow; V. N. Berezovskii et al (eds.), *Rossiiia: partii...*, Vol. 5, op. cit., p. 58.
- ⁹⁰ B. Urban, "Rossia dolzhna omolodit'sia..." (interview with V. Iarin), *Krasnaia zvezda*, December 1989.
- ⁹¹ V. N. Berezovskii et al (eds.), *Rossiiia: partii...*, Vol. 5. op. cit., p.43.
- ⁹² *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 16, 21-27 April 1990, p.3.
- ⁹³ In fact OFT's activity all but ceased and dissolved first into the Movement of Communist Initiatives and then into the Russian Communist Workers' Party. See V. N. Berezovskii et al (eds.), *Rossiiia: partii...*, Vol. 5, p. 21.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.32.
- ⁹⁵ Sergei Sopov, "Eto bylo...", op. cit.
- ⁹⁶ G. Vasiutochkin, "Zachem obmanyvat' rabochikh?", *Smena*, No. 256, 7/11/89, p.2; S. Razin, "Oboidemsia bez eksperimentov s demokratiei", *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 2/12/89.
- ⁹⁷ G. Vasiutochkin, *ibid.*
- ⁹⁸ V. N. Berezovskii et al (eds.), *Rossiiia: partii...*, op. cit., p.30.

- ⁹⁹ V. N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov, V.V. Cherviakov, V. D. Solovei, *Rossii: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 5. op. cit., p. 65.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 69.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 59.
- ¹⁰² Ibid., p. 63.
- ¹⁰³ *Otechestvo* had nine representatives in the Moscow Soviet.
- ¹⁰⁴ See Mikhail Shkatov, "Soiuz nachal rabotu", *Moskovskii literator*, 2/6/89, p. 2.
- ¹⁰⁵ "Printsipal'nye osnovy deiatel'nosti i ustav Soiuza dukhovnogo vrozozhdeniia Otechestva" typescript dated 16-17 March 1989, Moscow. [IGPI Archive]
- ¹⁰⁶ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossii: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 9. op. cit., p. 153.
- ¹⁰⁷ B. I. Tsarev, "Silou rossiiskogo bratstva", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No.24, 16/6/89.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Tovarishchestvo russkikh khudozhnikov (osnovnye dokumenty)*, typescript dated 17 November 1988, Moscow. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
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- ¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp.8-10.
- ¹¹¹ B. I. Tsarev, op.cit.,
- ¹¹² Ibid.
- ¹¹³ John B. Dunlop, "Two Noteworthy Russian Nationalists initiatives", *RL Report on the USSR*, 26/5/89, pp.2-3; J. B. Dunlop, "Russian Nationalism Today: Organizations and Programs", *Nationalities Papers* (Special Issue), Vol. XIX, No. 2, Autumn 1991, p.152.
- ¹¹⁴ "Za edinstvo i sodruzhestvo", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 28/7/89, pp 8-9; *Molodaia gvardiia*, No.10, 1989, pp11-17.
- ¹¹⁵ M. Malysheva, "Golos 'Edinstvo'", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 51, 22/12/89, p.4.
- ¹¹⁶ Berezovskii et al (eds.), *Rossii: partii,...* Vol. No. 2. Rau Press, Moscow 1992. p.98.
- ¹¹⁷ G. Rezanov & T. Khoroshilova, "Raz'edinenie'?" article dated 1/7/90 [IGPI Archive]
- ¹¹⁸ The leaders of 'Christian Revival' Union also became founder members of the Party of Revival in October 1991.
- ¹¹⁹ V. Osipov et al., "Protest", *Russkii vestnik*, (samizdat journal), No. 1, January 1989, Moscow. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹²⁰ "Obrashchenie Khristiansko-patrioticheskogo soiuz a k izbirateliam", *Demokrat*, No. 12/23, December 1989, pp.17-18.
- ¹²¹ Ibid., p. 17.
- ¹²² *KhPS* split in July 1989 to form two organisations bearing the same name: one under the leadership of V. Osipov; the other under the leadership of E. Pashnin. In January 1990, Osipov renamed his group the 'Christian Revival' Union.
- ¹²³ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossii: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 5, op. cit., p.151.
- ¹²⁴ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossii segodnia: politicheskii portret v dokumentakh 1985-91*, MO, Moscow 1991, p.184.
- ¹²⁵ *Predvybornaia programma*, Typescript, Moscow, December 1989. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹²⁶ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossii segodnia...*, op. cit. p.185.
- ¹²⁷ *Rossii*, No.26, July 1992, p.3.
- ¹²⁸ Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit., p.19.
- ¹²⁹ *Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuz a: Dokumenty i materialy*, Moscow 1991. p.18.
- ¹³⁰ Ibid. p.23.
- ¹³¹ Ibid., p. 40.
- ¹³² Ibid. pp.40-41.

- ¹³³ *Krasnaia zvezda*, 1/5/91.
- ¹³⁴ *Liberal'no-demok...: Dokumenty ...*, op. cit. p.51.
- ¹³⁵ A. Khalitov, "Besy khotiat razrushit' nash dom", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, No.53, 15/3/91, p.3.
- ¹³⁶ Interview with V. Zhirinovskii, "Ia za avtoritarnyi rezhim...", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 2/10/91.
- ¹³⁷ Iu. I. Ryzhov (ed.), *Fenomen ...*, op. cit., p.15.
- ¹³⁸ *Liberal: Izdanie Liberal'no-Demokraticeskoi Partii*, No1 (11), 1993, p.5.
- ¹³⁹ Iu. I. Ryzhov (ed.), *Fenomen Zhirinovskogo*, Moscow 1992.
- ¹⁴⁰ Interview with V. Solovei 18/10/96.
- ¹⁴¹ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, ...Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol.7., op. cit.p.123.
- ¹⁴² V. Pribylovskii, "Tainaia istoriia Rossiiskogo NF", *Panorama*, No.2, February 1990, p.1.
- ¹⁴³ Ibid.; *Tainaia istoriia RNF*, undated typescript [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹⁴⁴ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, ...Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol.7., op. cit.p.123
- ¹⁴⁵ V. Skurlatov, "Nash deviz - 'k narodnomu bogatstvu!'", *Za kadry neftianikov*, 5/6/89, p.2. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹⁴⁶ *Rossiiskii narodnyi front: Tezisy programmy Ivanova Vladimira Alekseevicha*, typescript dated May 1989, Moscow. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹⁴⁷ *Rossiiskii narodnyi front b poderzhky perestroiki: Informatsionnoe pis'mo*, No.2, 15/6/89. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹⁴⁸ *Argumenty i fakty*, No.7, 1990, p.8.
- ¹⁴⁹ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, ...Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol.7., op. cit.p.123
- ¹⁵⁰ "Demokratizm, Patriotizm, Intellektualizm - vot nashi tri 'izma'", *Rossiiskoe Vozrozhdenie*, No.1.December 1990.
- ¹⁵¹ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, ...Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol.7., op. cit.p.137
- ¹⁵² Ibid.
- ¹⁵³ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁴ *Soobshchenie o 1 s"ezde Rossiiskogo narodnogo fronta*, typescript document dated 1-2 June 1991, Moscow. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹⁵⁵ *Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o zasedanii prableniia Rossiiskogo narodnogo fronta*, typescript dated 24/6/91. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹⁵⁶ The Christian Patriotic Union's (*KhPS*) leaders were Evgenii Pashnin and Vladimir Osipov, who had been imprisoned for political & nationalist activities in the 60s and 70s. For information about founding congress of *KhPS* see *Russkii vestnik*, [monthly information bulletin], No.1, January 1989. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ¹⁵⁷ For information concerning the formation of the *Vozrozhdenie* party see the newspaper of Moscow construction workers *Domostroi*, No. 43, November 1991.
- ¹⁵⁸ V. N. Berezovskii et al (eds.), *"Rossiia: partii,..."* Vol. 5, op. cit., p. 77.
- ¹⁵⁹ "Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz (ROS)", undated typescript. [Solovei collection]
- ¹⁶⁰ "K vozrozhdeniiu Rossii: programmnoe zaiavleniie obshchestvennogo dvizheniia Rossiiskii Obshchenarodnyi Soiuz" typescript document, dated 26 October 1991. [IGPI Archive]
- ¹⁶¹ "Obrashchenie k narodam byvshego Rossiiskogo Gosudarstva", typescript, dated 21/12/91. [IGPI Archive]
- ¹⁶² V. N. Berezovskii & N. I. Krotov (eds.), *Neformal'naia Rossiia*, Molodaia gvardiia, Moscow, 1990, pp.312-3.
- ¹⁶³ "Yeltsin meets with Members of Pamyat" *Radio Liberty Research* RL191/87, 17 May 1987; "Let's Talk on Equal Grounds: Boris Yeltsin talks with members of the Pamyat Association", *Moscow News*, 17/5/89, p.4.

¹⁶⁴ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossiiia segodnia: politicheskii portret v dokumentakh 1985-91*, Moscow, 1991, p.291.

¹⁶⁵ Siniavin's group is called the Popular Patriotic Movement "*Pamiat'*" in Berezovskii, Krotov & Cherviakov (eds.), *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby*, vol.1, part 1, Rau Press, Moscow 1991, p.70. However, according to a programme written by Siniavin in January-March 1989 the group is called The Russian Patriotic Movement. Furthermore, Siniavin's group is referred to merely as the group "*Pamiat'*" in both Koval', *Rossiiia segodnia*, op. cit., p.291 and Berezovskii & Krotov (eds.), *Neformal'naia Rossiia*, op. cit., p.315.

¹⁶⁶ Such as Valerii Iemelianov and his VASAMF "*Pamiat'*", a pagan wing of *Pamiat'* which number 40-50 followers.

¹⁶⁷ John B. Dunlop, "The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, Special Edition 19 Dec 88, p.6.

¹⁶⁸ Julia Wishnevsky, "The origins of Pamyat", *Survey*, Vol. 30, no.3, October 1988, p.79.

¹⁶⁹ D. P. Hammer, "*Glasnost'* and 'The Russian Idea'", *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, Special Edition 19 Dec 88, p.19.

¹⁷⁰ 'Garem Razh', "Metastazy", *Sobesednik*, No.49, December, 1990, p.6 [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]; V. Pribylovskii, "Slovar' oppozitsii: novye politicheskie partii i organizatsii Rossii", *Sostoianie strany*, No.4/5, April 1991, p.26.

¹⁷¹ V. Pribylovskii, *Sostoianie strany*, ibid.

¹⁷² V. D. Solovei & I. A. Ierunov, *Russkoe delo segodnia*, Vol.1 "*Pamiat'*", Moscow, 1991, p.157.

¹⁷³ "Za dukhovnoe vrozozhdenie Rossii", Interview with D. Vasiliev, *Znamia kommunnizma*, No. 146, 12 Sept. 1989, p.3. [This is the continuation of the same article "Za dukhovnoe vrozozhdenie Rossii", *Znamia kommunnizma*, No. 145, 9 Sept. 1989, p.3.]

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. (No.145, p.3.)

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Aleksandr Shtil'mark, " 'Pamiat': my - za dukhovnoe vrozozhdenie Otechestva", *Sobesednik*, No.23, June 1989, p.12. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]

¹⁷⁷ V. N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov, V.V. Cherviakov, V. D. Solovei, *Rossiiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 5. Rau-Press, Moscow, 1992, p.111.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. p.91

¹⁷⁹ "Obrashchenie", *Pamiat'* - gazeta NPF "*Pamiat'*", No.3 (Supplement), 1990, pp.1-2; B. N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov, V.V. Cherviakov, V. D. Solovei, *Rossiiia: partii, ..., op. cit.*, p.112.

¹⁸⁰ Aleksandr Shtil'mark, " 'Pamiat', op.cit.

¹⁸¹ Natsional'no-patrioticheskii front "*Pamiat'*", "Obrashchenie", Samizdat copy, Moscow 13 October 1989.

¹⁸² "El'tsin postupaet mudro" (Interview with Vasil'ev), *Panorama*, No.2 (29), September 1991, p.8. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]

¹⁸³ V. D. Solovei & I. A. Ierunov, *Russkoe delo*, op. cit., p.24.

¹⁸⁴ Tsentral'noe Televidenie, porprogramma "Vremia", 21.00, 19/1/91.

¹⁸⁵ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiiia: partii, ..., op. cit.*, p.81.

¹⁸⁶ 'Garem Razh', "Metastazy", op. cit.

¹⁸⁷ Berezovskii & Krotov (eds.), *Neformal'naia Rossiia*, op. cit., p.314; V. Pribylovskii, *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit., p.27.

¹⁸⁸ V. D. Solovei & I. A. Ierunov, *Russkoe delo*, op. cit., p.229-231.

¹⁸⁹ Marina Katys, "Toska po Stalinu ili 'novyi avangard marksizma", *Ogonek*, No.13, 1990, p.26.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ V. Pribylovskii, *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit., p.27.

- ¹⁹² Berezovskii & Krotov (eds.), *Neformal'naia Rossiia*, op. cit., p.314
- ¹⁹³ V. D. Solovei & I. A. Ierunov, *Russkoe delo*, op. cit., p.47.
- ¹⁹⁴ "Pamiat'", *Nezavisimyi bibliograf: spravochnik periodicheskogo samizdata*, No.4, Moscow, August 1989, p.10.
- ¹⁹⁵ V. D. Solovei & I. A. Ierunov, *Russkoe delo*, op. cit., p.48.
- ¹⁹⁶ "Pamiat'", *Hezavisinyi bibliograf*, op. cit., p.11.
- ¹⁹⁷ "Obrashchenie k XIX Vsesoiuznyi partiinoi konferentsii i Sovetskomu pravitel'stvu", in V. D. Solovei & I. A. Ierunov, *ibid.*, p.146.
- ¹⁹⁸ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossiia segodnia*, p.291.
- ¹⁹⁹ The name 'Garem Razh' is a pseudonym, a play on words mimicking the name of the nationalist-oriented Karem Rash, but meaning 'harem rage'. The article was written by Vladimir Pribylovskii.
- ²⁰⁰ 'Garem Razh', "Metastazy", op. cit.
- ²⁰¹ "Manifest natsional'no-patrioticheskogo fronta Pamiat'", *Nezavisinyi bibliograf*, op. cit., pp.14-16.
- ²⁰² *Ibid.*, pp.14-17.
- ²⁰³ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰⁶ "Za veru, tsaria i otechestvo", Obrashchenie NPF "Pamiat'" po natsional'nomu voprosu, Samizdat, 21 September 1989.
- ²⁰⁷ *Atmoda: gazeta NFL "Probuzhdenie"*, No.9(66), 26 February 1990. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ²⁰⁸ "Ostorozhno: Znakomyi tsvet: Interv'iu s odnim iz liderov dvizheniia "Pamiat'" Konsantinom Smirnovym-Ostashvili", *Megopolis-Express*, 24 May 1990, p.6. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ²⁰⁹ V. D. Solovei & I. A. Ierunov, *Russkoe delo*, op. cit., p.72.
- ²¹⁰ "Programma Soiuza za natsional'no -proportsional'noe pravitel'stvo "Pamiat'" in B. N. Berezovskii & co., *Rossiia: partii, ..., op. cit.*, p.132-40.
- ²¹¹ "Ostorozhno: ..", *Megopolis-Express*, op. cit.
- ²¹² "Zaiavlenie sekretariata Antisionistskogo komiteta sovetskoi obshchestvennosti", *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 2 February 1990.
- ²¹³ V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov & V. V. Cherviakov, *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Spravochnik*. Vol.1, part 1, Rau-Press, Moscow, p.70.
- ²¹⁴ I.I. Siniavin, "Spasem sviatuiu Rus'! Ideologii i programma russkogo narodno-patrioticheskogo dvizheniia", Typescript dated January- 9 March 1989, Moscow, p.1. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.8.
- ²¹⁶ V. N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov, V.V. Cherviakov, V. D. Solovei, *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 5, op. cit., p.87; R. Medvedev (ed.), *Spravochnik: politicheskoe partii, dvizheniia i bloki sovremennoi Rossii*, Leta, Novgorod, 1993, p.18.
- ²¹⁷ "Deklaratsiia dvizheniia 'Natsional'noe edinstvo' za svobodnuiu, sil'nuiu, spravedlivuiu Rossiiu!", undated typescript, p. 4. [IGPI Archive]
- ²¹⁸ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, op. cit., p.106.
- ²¹⁹ Barkashov revealed that the 'Russian [Russkii] People' was a triune people, consisting of 'Great Russians', Ukrainians and Belorussians, thus reflecting the opinion of several other Russian nationalist groups.
- ²²⁰ "Deklaratsiia dvizheniia 'Natsional'noe edinstvo'...", op. cit., p. 1.

- ²²¹ "Chto den' griadushchii nam gotovit?" in pamphlet by A. Barkashov, *Era Rossii*, 1991, p. 17. [IGPI Archive]
- ²²² A. P. Barkashov, "Obrashchenie rukovoditel'ia dvizheniia 'Natsional'noe edinstvo za svobodnuiu sil'nuiu spravedlivuiu Rossiiu': Armia - nadezhda Rossii!", *Rodnye prostory*, No. 8 (8), November 1990, p. 1. This 'Address' was republished in the independent nationalist newspaper *Narodny novosti*, No. 1, March 1991, p. 3.
- ²²³ Ibid.
- ²²⁴ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8, op. cit., p.112.
- ²²⁵ Berezovskii, Krotov & Cherviakov (eds.), *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby*, vol.1, part 1, op.cit., p.98; *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 22/9/89, p.5.
- ²²⁶ Berezovskii, Krotov & Cherviakov (eds.), *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby*, vol.1, part 2, op. cit., p.230.
- ²²⁷ "Za politiku narodnogo soglasii i rossiiskogo vrozozhdeniia", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No.52, 29/12/889, pp.2-3. [Solovei collection]
- ²²⁸ Ibid., p.3.
- ²²⁹ Gleb Pavlovskii (ed.), *Sostoianie strany*, op. cit., p.17.
- ²³⁰ Sergei Shuvalov, "'Soiuz' pomogaet Soiuзу", *Molodaia gvardiia*, No.7, 1990, pp.135-137.
- ²³¹ Elizabeth Teague, "The 'Soiuz' Group", *RFE/RL Report on the USSR*, 190/91, 17/5/91, p.19.
- ²³² Jonathon Steele, "Soviet hardliners want ban on parties", *The Guardian*, Monday 22/4/91.
- ²³³ *Edinstvo* (Moldova), No.9 (27), 12/7/91, p.1.[SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]
- ²³⁴ Cited in E. Teague, "The 'Soiuz' Group", op. cit., p.17.
- ²³⁵ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, ...Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8., op. cit.p.160.
- ²³⁶ See Chapter 2.
- ²³⁷ V. Pechenikin, "Ot razobshcheniia k sobornosti", *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, No. 21, 24/5/91, p. 6.
- ²³⁸ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, ...Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. 8., op. cit., p.162.
- ²³⁹ Ibid.; *Russkii vestnik*, No. 17, 31/7/91, p. 3.
- ²⁴⁰ V. Petrov, "Kak vse-taki vrozodit' Rossiiu?", *Russkii vestnik*, No. 24, September 1991, p. 2. [Solovei collection]
- ²⁴¹ *Mezhdunarodnoe ob"edinenie 'Slavianskii Sobor'*, [Pamphlet], 1991-92, Moscow, p. 5. [IGPI Archive]
- ²⁴² For a view on this see "What is 'Soviet' - What is 'Russian'?" A Conversation with Adam B. Ulam in G. R. Urban, *End of Empire: the Demise of the Soviet Union*, American University Press, 1991, pp. 155-177.
- ²⁴³ Iu. V. Arutiunian, *Rossiane: stolichnyie zhiteli*, Moscow, 1994, p. 138.
- ²⁴⁴ Iu. V. Arutiunian, *Estoniia: stolichnye zhiteli*, Mosocw, 1995, pp. 165 & 231.
- ²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 167.

Chapter 6: Liberal Russian Nationalism: Groups and Parties Connected with the Tendency

Introduction

Liberal Russian nationalism was concerned with the maintenance and development of Russian culture, but within the framework of political democracy and a market economy. It was opposed to Marxism-Leninism and allied itself with liberal democracy, accepting certain Western values whilst promoting Russian national traditions and usually displaying an attachment to Russian Orthodoxy. Adherents to this tendency joined and encouraged the democrats to fight for the institution of a sovereign or independent Russia. In principle, it supported the self-determination of the non-Russian republics, although it did not rule out the institution of a voluntary union, federation or confederation of republics. It promised a democratic system in which everyone was guaranteed nationality based upon citizenship rather than ethnicity and expected the Russian [ethnic] nation, its traditions and values to flourish through the freedoms and opportunities of a pluralistic society.

During the earlier Gorbachev years, liberal Russian nationalism was represented by influential figures such as, for example, Dmitrii Likhachev and Alla Latynina. Likhachev established himself as an authority on Russian culture and whilst analysing and stressing the importance of Russia's cultural heritage, he also highlighted the greater need for democracy and identified Russia as part of European civilisation, rather than as a land apart. The literary critic, Latynina, stressed the 'creative' importance of national self-awareness, whilst supporting the 'Western' values of 'liberalism' - liberty, human rights and freedom of conscience.¹

Besides the pronouncements of figures from within the establishment, liberal Russian nationalism found expression within the democratic movement, most notably through the umbrella of the Democratic Russia movement. This was responsible for championing not only the principles of liberal democracy, but also the aims of liberal Russian nationalism in

establishing Russia's sovereignty and independence. The most pronounced example of liberal Russian nationalism came from one of Democratic Russia's constituent members, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, which sought the establishment of a Russian democratic state guided by an 'enlightened patriotism'.

Balakhonov

Liberal Russian nationalists believed that the only way of saving the Russian nation was through the institution of democracy as an antidote to Marxism-Leninism. One of the earliest proposals for a democratic system designed in the interests of saving the 'Russian nation' was that proposed by Vladimir Balakhonov, which formulated a plan to re-establish Russia as a democratic nation-state/states separate from the other union republics. It appeared in the Democratic Union newspaper, *Svobodnoe slovo*, in April 1989 and qualified the organisation's support of national independence movements.² The same issue of the newspaper printed a resolution from a Democratic Union congress supporting the 'disintegration of the totalitarian empire'; the rights of the republics to self-determination and secession from the USSR; the rights of peoples deported in the past to return to their 'traditional places of residence'; and the strengthened status of the languages of the titular peoples in the republics and regions.³

Balakhonov focussed on the plight of the Russian nation and the possible options it faced in view of changes. He claimed that the Bolshevik regime had reconstituted the Russian state system and referred to the 'imperial instinct of Russians' which had survived as a result. Criticising both *Pamiat'* and the RSFSR Writers' Union for their imperialist outbursts, Balakhonov suggested that the Russians' choice was between 'empire or freedom, great power or democracy'. He recommended that Russians 'reconstruct' their consciousness in order to survive as a nation and that they should understand the necessity of not only seceding from the USSR, but also dividing the large territory of the RSFSR into three or four separate Russian states.⁴ He made a negative reference to Russian 'messianism' and to the Russian paranoia of living in a 'fortress under siege', thus condemning any idea of isolationism. Asserting that Russians

were the empire's 'main instrument for enslaving other peoples', Balakhonov summed up the Russians' stark choice:

...either the division of an overpowering colossal empire, the self-preservation and free national development of Russians and other peoples within the framework of sovereign democratic states, or a military, national-political, social and economic catastrophe with the physical destruction of the Russians (the disappearance of the Russians as a nation).⁵

This scheme was not very attractive to most Russian nationalists, for whom the integrity of the Russian state would be paramount. In fact, Balakhonov's idea about dividing the Russian Federation into four different states contradicts all trends in modern nationalism which seeks to unite a nation and its territory, rather than divide it.

El'tsin and Russian Sovereignty/Independence

Whereas Balakhonov focussed on the survival of ethnic Russians [*russkie*] at the core of an independent Russian state (or states), Boris El'tsin played the Russian nationalist card to focus upon the creation of a Russian state inhabited by all the peoples within her territory [*rossiiane*]- El'tsin used the instrument of civic nationalism to unite Russia against the centre.

El'tsin did not ignore the ethnic Russian factor - he acknowledged that he was an ethnic Russian and said at the beginning of 1990 that more attention should be paid to the ethnic Russian population, arguing that it was not a matter of nationalism [chauvinism], but a necessary condition for national revival.⁶ He voiced concern for Russians and Russian-speakers living in non-Russian republics and offered to extend help to them. He suggested that discrimination against Russians in these republics might be punishable by the use of sanctions and promised those who wished to return to Russia the opportunity to do so.⁷ In addition to this, El'tsin enhanced his image as a national figure by appearing (and being photographed by the press) at Russian Orthodox church services and called for a restoration of the moral role of the Church.⁸ However, these issues are peripheral to El'tsin's real use of nationalism - the attempt to forge an independent Russian state as a powerbase for opposition to the

centre.

El'tsin's practical and opportunist use of the politics of Russian nationalism did not materialise until the beginning of 1990. His election platform of 5 February 1990 aimed to establish a Russian Communist Party (to compete within a multiparty system), a Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia-wide media of communication, a new Russian Constitution, Russian territorial militias, but more significantly pledged to adopt a law on Russian citizenship and spoke of Russian 'economic sovereignty'.⁹

The proposal to bolster Russia's institutional independence was a direct challenge to the centre. On the 22 May 1990, one week before he was voted Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, El'tsin addressed the Congress of People's Deputies and criticised the centre for its imperial policy, speaking of the uncertainties that it had produced, particularly within Russia, which:

suffered the greatest damage from the command-administrative system¹⁰

El'tsin stressed that:

The problems of the republic cannot be solved without full-blooded political sovereignty.¹¹

With this in mind, he enumerated a number of principles which would serve as the basis for a new republican Constitution:

The Russian republic is a sovereign, democratic, law-based state of peoples enjoying equal rights who have voluntarily joined together within it...

Today it is not the centre, but Russia which must think about which functions to transfer [to] the centre, and which to keep for itself...

...the republic implements its domestic and foreign policy independently...

A single republican citizenship is established in Russia...

A review of Russia's symbols, envisaging, in particular, the creation of an anthem for the republic.

The economic sovereignty of Russia is possible only on condition that republican ownership is formed... It is necessary to guarantee in law that they are used exclusively in the interests of Russia.¹²

Enshrined within these principles was the foundation for an independent Russian state where the nation was determined by Russian citizenship rather than by ethnicity. Towards the end of his speech, El'tsin added:

national and patriotic forces must rally in the struggle for the construction of a democratic and civil society in Russia.¹³

El'tsin was appealing primarily to adherents to liberal Russian nationalism, for whom the establishment of a democratic *rossiiskoe* state was an important building block in the revival of both *rossiiane* and the *russkii* people.

With the backing of Democratic Russia and others, Russia declared its sovereignty on 12 June 1990. El'tsin continued to identify the Russian Federation as a separate national entity and spoke in terms of national renewal:

The Russian federation is experiencing one of the most complex and dramatic moments in its history. We still have to work out... why a people numbering many millions, with a great culture and the richest traditions, today feels a spiritual crisis and a shortage of belief. And, yet, Russia's potential for renewal is far from exhausted.¹⁴

Throughout 1991, El'tsin and his backers continued to strengthen Russia's political independence. The creation of a presidency was accompanied by a strengthening of executive presidential powers, a fact which helped to reinforce Russia's image and status as an independent actor. Following the attempted coup, Russia took responsibility for economic and natural resources located on Russian territory and gradually took over USSR Ministries, financial, economic and other organisations. The re-identification of Russia as a political unit for *rossiiane*, served as an effective platform for El'tsin and the democrats in their challenge against the established centre. He did not ally himself with the more imperialist or isolationist expressions of Russian nationalism, although he did choose Aleksandr Rutskoi, who had earlier participated in the Russian nationalist-orientated group *Otechestvo*, as his presidential running mate. This move reflected El'tsin's highly pragmatic approach towards the question of Russian nationalism. He realised that he needed to harness not only the support of the democratic movement, but needed to pay attention to Russian nationalist sentiments both within and outside the movement.

Groups and Parties connected with liberal Russian nationalism

The organisations related to this tendency are represented by members of the Democratic Russia movement and by the Rossy Association.

The majority of the Democratic Russia movement were democrats, who wished to see the removal of the communist system and the institution of a pluralist system guaranteeing civil rights, freedom of conscience, the rule of law, a market economy, etc. However, within the Democratic Russia movement was a minority of members for whom the revival of Russia and the promotion of 'patriotism' and perceived ethnic Russian values were also of great significance. The groups which placed a greater emphasis on 'patriotism' were the Russian Christian Democratic Movement and the Constitutional Democratic Party. Others, such as the Democratic Party of Russia and the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, had members within their ranks who were concerned about ethnic Russian issues, but the parties focussed their Russian concerns on establishing a Russian [*rossiiskii*] state identity. The latter approach fulfilled two criteria: on the one hand, it pursued the parties' aims of establishing democratic principles and structures; whilst, on the other hand, it pursued the development of a Russian [*rossiiskii*] national identity and Russian [*rossiiskii*] institutions, which Russian nationalist spokesmen had for a long time considered a pre-requisite for the revival not only of the peoples of the RSFSR, but also of the ethnic Russian [*ruskii*] people. In this way, the parties satisfied both the majority of their members, whose primary concern was the institution of a democratic political system, and the minority of members who were also concerned with Russian national issues. The Democratic Russia movement as a whole represents this trend - it appealed to both supporters of democracy and adherents to liberal Russian nationalism.

The *Rossy* Association represents an attempt by Russian intellectuals in Leningrad to focus on the revival of the Russian nation through the establishment of a Russian state on the territory of the RSFSR. Although the Association's priority was to revive a Russian nation, which was based upon subjective affiliation (to Russian language and culture, etc.) rather than ancestry, it eschewed the idea of Russian fundamentalism and opted for the idea of a multiparty, democratic presidential republic. *Rossy* distinguished themselves from Democratic Russia in that they displayed a more fervent attachment to the plight of ethnic Russians and criticised 'democratic' organisations for their indifference to the Russian nation.

Dvizhenie '*Demokraticheskaiia Rossiia*' (Democratic Russia movement)

The banner of Democratic Russia first appeared at the beginning of 1990 as an electoral alliance under which the March 1990 elections were successfully contested. The decision to form the Democratic Russia movement was taken in June 1990 chiefly by the Moscow Voters' Association (*Moskovskoe ob"edinenie izbiratelei*). The Founding Conference followed on 20-21 October 1990 when the Russian Christian Democratic Movement were joined by the Democratic Party of Russia, Democratic Platform (later the Republican Party of the Russian Federation), and the Social-Democratic Party of Russia.¹⁵ The latter three parties made a joint declaration at the conference announcing their intention to form a political coalition which aimed to support the economic programme of the Russian Government; called for the resignation of the Union Government; and pledged to support the Democratic Russia movement.¹⁶ Other conference participants and movement members included the Voters' Movement and a few members of the CPSU, as well as representatives of a number of other organizations including *Memorial*, *Shchit*, the Peasant Party of Russia, the Anti-fascist Centre, the *Aprél'* Society, the Constitutional-Democratic Party and the USSR Academy of Sciences Voters' Club. The movement was to represent an association of parties, individuals, social movements and organizations committed to introducing:

progressive, radical, political and socio-economic reforms in Russia aimed at creating a civil society.¹⁷

Democratic Russia represents one manifestation of Russian nationalism in that it pursued the idea of Russian statehood (*gosudarstvennost'*) for the RSFSR and provided Boris El'tsin with support in his opposition to Gorbachev and the Soviet centre. Indeed, it was largely due to Democratic Russia's efforts that El'tsin was voted Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 29 May 1990 and that the Russian Congress of People's Deputies adopted a declaration of Russian sovereignty two weeks later on 12 June

1990. One of the movement's aims established at the Founding Conference was to bring about secession from the USSR 'in the event that the USSR President or the USSR Supreme Soviet takes action detrimental to Russia's sovereignty'.¹⁸ This was neither a Russian nationalism which sought a 'return' to fundamental 'Russian' values, nor a nationalism which advocated the maintenance of a Russian/Russian-dominated empire. Democratic Russia's manifestation of Russian nationalism is born out of pragmatism, opportunism and the movement's political values - its quest for Russian sovereignty and self-determination was one which addressed the changing situation within the Union; provided a readily acceptable and identifiable platform of opposition to the Soviet centre; and did not contradict the ideas of democracy which members of the movement advocated. Democratic Russia sought to establish a political entity distinct from the USSR which could develop its own Russian/RSFSR institutions, including administrative and governmental bodies. This included backing the idea of creating a Russian presidency which would wield greater executive powers than the existing Russian institutions. Democratic Russia's aims were made clear by the words of Orgcommittee Chairman A. N. Murashev in November 1990:

The Movement's most important tasks in the immediate future are: first, to facilitate the earliest implementation of a national referendum on a new Russian Constitution, which would put an end to the Soviet socialist period of Russian history and which would serve as a legal basis for the revival of Russian statehood; and, second, to participate in the direct national election of a Russian president in accordance with this new Constitution, which would be able to settle the problem of Russian power in Russia's favour and to neutralise the destructive activities of the communist imperial centre.¹⁹

Democratic Russia's direction was rewarded not only with the introduction of a Russian presidency, but also with the victory of its presidential candidate, Boris El'tsin, in the June 1991 election.²⁰

The move to strengthen Russian political institutions encouraged the development of a Russian identity. The movement set up working committees on the cultural renaissance of Russia and on links with Russian citizens living in other republics and 'compatriots' living overseas. This was all part of Democratic Russia's contribution to Russian 'revival'.

Democratic Russia represented a Russia-wide movement promoting

democratic ideas throughout the country in opposition to the CPSU, conservative forces and more extreme Russian nationalist-orientated groups. However, Democratic Russia was handicapped in that it was not a single political party, but an umbrella group representing a range of different views and egos. One of the issues which split the movement was the composition of the Russian state. All members of Democratic Russia supported the idea of Russia-wide institutions and were unified in their opposition to the communist-controlled centre. All had, in principle, accepted the rights of other nations (Union republics) to self-determination and secession - and that any union of states should be formed on a voluntary basis. However, whilst the majority of the movement continued to uphold these principles, others took a more imperialist-nationalist view, insisting that the historically-formed Russian state was indivisible and that the Union should be preserved. On 19 April 1991, a group named *Narodnoe soglasie* (Popular Accord) was formed within Democratic Russia by the *RKhDD*, *DPR* and the Constitutional Democratic Party.²¹ This group stood for the maintenance of the 'state unity of the Union of republics'²² and supported other ethnic Russian issues:

In contrast to the leaders of Democratic Russia (Iu. Afanas'ev, L. Ponomarev, G. Iakunin, V. Bokser) *Narodnoe soglasie* supported the Novo-Ogarevo project on the Union Treaty and openly favoured the side of the Dniester republic against the Moldovan leadership.²³

In the aftermath of the coup attempt, the differences within Democratic Russia began to broaden, particularly over the re-constitution of the Union, the identity/integrity of Russia and the fate of ethnic Russians outside the borders of the RSFSR. By November 1991, the minority *Narodnoe soglasie* bloc, increased its imperialist-nationalist stance and left the movement. *Narodnoe soglasie* considered the break-up of the USSR to be the disintegration of a historical Russian political and social community, whilst others in Democratic Russia happily accepted the event as the delayed dismantling of the old Russian empire.

Democracy and 'enlightened patriotism'

RKhDD and *KDP* were the two groups in the Democratic Russia movement which supported the introduction of liberal values, but displayed an obvious Russian-nationalist orientation. Both supported the idea of 'enlightened patriotism' as a necessary accompaniment to democratic values. *RKhDD* supported the state, spiritual and cultural revival of Russia, whilst *KDP*'s orientation was described as 'a platform of European conservatism with Russian specific characteristics [*spetsifika Rossii*]'.²⁴

The Russian Christian Democratic Movement, *RKhDD* (*Rossiiskoe khristianskoe demokraticeskoe dvizhenie*)

The *RKhDD*'s inclusion under the liberal nationalist tendency is governed by three factors. Firstly, it intended to recreate and establish a Russian state with national values and recognisably 'Russian' characteristics. Secondly, it did not prescribe a greater Russian state for all the republics of the Soviet Union - it guaranteed other nationalities the right to decide their own status and secede if they so wished.²⁵ Thirdly, the Movement was committed to a pluralist, liberal civil society in which individuals were guaranteed equality before the law and basic human rights, irrespective of their nationality.

The *RKhDD* was of some significance, because it was one of the bigger parties in 1990-91. For example, in early 1991, *Sovetskaia Rossiia* reported that only four parties in Russia had the minimum number of members to be officially registered - the CPSU, Travkin's DPR, the Social Democratic Party and the *RKhDD* - and by December 1991 it had 16 500 members.²⁶

The Founding Conference of the *RKhDD* took place on 8-9 April 1990 in Moscow, although the movement's origins can be traced back to 1987 with the publication of *Vybor*. One of the aims of the movement's work was the 'state, spiritual and cultural renaissance of Russia on a civilised basis'.²⁷ The *RKhDD*'s Russian nationalism focusses on these dimensions, where 'de-ideologisation' of the Marxist-Leninist structure is a priority along with

the establishment of a civil society, albeit one in which Christianity is encouraged to play a guiding role.

The *RKhDD* proposed to create a peculiarly Russian government and state, supporting the convocation of an All-Russian *Zemskii Sobor* (Assembly of the Land) to guide Russia towards a suitable form of government:

The *RKhDD* considers that only an All-Russian *Zemskii Sobor* is competent to resolve the problem of which form of state structure suits Russia.²⁸

In the interim period before convoking a *Zemskii Sobor*, the *RKhDD* supported a presidential republic where the president is elected by a universal and secret ballot, and his power is limited by the principle of a separation of powers (legislative, executive and judicial) and also by local and public government.

Besides resurrection of a *Zemskii Sobor*, the *RKhDD* also called for the 're-establishment of Russian national state symbols' and the 'return of historical place- and street-names'.²⁹

Russian national values

Identification with Russia was encouraged by promoting the idea of patriotism:

Patriotism is love of the Motherland... Patriotism of the true Christian lies in the fact that the culture of his people is dear to him, that it is based on a higher truth - Christian ideals...

...The renaissance of true patriotism is the renaissance of world-wide responsiveness, of the open nature of the Russian people.

Enlightened patriotism is the recognition of responsibility for one's history, culture, habitat and spiritual inheritance... It is a vision of a new Russia...

Patriotism is faith in one's Motherland. Faith in her calling, in the creative force of her spirit, in the future heyday that awaits her. Simply we - Russian patriots - believe that our Motherland, undergoing a cleansing repentance, will be able through the feat of work and prayer step out onto that path from which she was led by 'earthly evil spirits'.³⁰

Here we witness the evocative language of nationalism - it is an attempt to encourage Russians to identify positively with the national group. The emphasis on history, culture and religion is a rallying call to a new national ideal, albeit one which has a continuity/connection with the pre-revolutionary past. The language has a positive, optimistic note to it - any criticism is directed against the (communist) diversion from Russia's true

path - this contrasts from the negative anti-Baltic or anti-Semitic overtones evident in much imperialist Russian nationalism.

Like other movements,³¹ the *RKhDD* considered Christianity to be the basis for overcoming the legacy of communist rule. However, the movement's specific propagation of Russian Orthodoxy and its images must be regarded as part of the process of national renewal. The *RKhDD* newspaper *Put'* was headed by an image of St. George - Russia's patron saint - and the word '*Put'*' was written in pre-revolutionary/ecclesiastical letters. Each copy of *Put'* had a 'prayer for the salvation of Russia' on the front which was also printed in an ecclesiastic-styled font. The newspaper addressed political, religious and social issues, but it also addressed the subject of national renaissance. Just to take the example of one issue - the Christmas issue of January 1991- there was a reprint of a speech by Petr Stolypin and an article by Vladimir Karpets discussing the 'Russian idea'.³²

The nationalities question

Addressing the 'national question', the *RKhDD* programme supported the principle that:

nations (*narody*) are guaranteed the right to national autonomy.³³

Further down, the document speaks of 'full and mutually beneficial national self-determination' and, most importantly, it lists the right to secede:

The *RKhDD* supports the 'de-imperialisation' of an ideocratic monster - the USSR. The *RKhDD* will try to work out how to balance this de-imperialisation taking into account world experience. Nations (*narody*) wishing to secede from the metropolis, should be given the possibility to do so. On the other hand, the process of separation should not degenerate into a mindless and irresponsible break-up of the country. The *RKhDD* believes that, under the conditions of the Russian state, the question of complete secession should have deep historical, cultural and economic foundations.³⁴

Although the principle of secession is qualified by a proviso, it nevertheless provides a basis from which secession can be approached, which completely differs from the attitude expressed by imperialist Russian nationalists. Other nationalities are given the opportunity to secede should they so wish, but, equally, they would not be forced to

separate.

As for Russians affected by potential secession, the movement also declared that the Russian state should work out an effective programme to defend the interests of those Russians (*rossiiane*) who are left in territories which have seceded from the centre (the term *rossiiane* indicates the movement's 'civic' rather than 'ethnic' interpretation of the new Russian nationality, although most displaced *rossiiane* would be ethnic Russians - *russskie*).

The *RKhDD*'s leader, Viktor Aksiuchits, revealed his Russian nationalist orientation in 1989 when he expressed caution over the effects that 'Westernizers' and imperialist Russian nationalists might have on the renewal of Russian society. He was particularly worried about indifference to the fate of Russians, whilst voicing his opposition to the maintenance of empire:

If Russian patriots fight for the preservation of the Soviet empire... it is just a demonstration of very anti-Russian forces. One can understand that, due to their mind-set, Westernizers would not be particularly worried by the fate of Russians. But it is completely ridiculous that Russian patriots in an imperialist rage should ignore the Russian nation's primary interests.³⁵

In 1990, Aksiuchits addressed the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, after which he was posed several questions. In answer to a question as to how he would resolve national conflicts in the Soviet Union, he replied:

I am deeply convinced that the border peoples of our country will flee from this political regime, not from Russia. No-one can be held by force. The more force is displayed, the stronger will be the demarcation in the national border areas. It is essential now to let go those who wish to leave. Only this will open the way to constructive consolidation...³⁶

These words indicate not only the view that communism was the enemy, but they also provide a clear distinction between the idea of a Russian nation and a Russian empire.

Aksiuchits went on to say that national problems would not be resolved until Russia became democratic. However, he indicated that he envisaged a state system which would involve federation or confederation. Although the *RKhDD* operated in the Russian Federation, it did have groups in non-Russian republics such as Ukraine and Latvia.³⁷

Interestingly, when the break-up of the Union became a real prospect certain elements in the *RKhDD* revised their principles and the movement shifted towards a more imperialist viewpoint. This led to disagreement and certain members left the movement.³⁸

Despite the *RKhDD*'s intentions to produce a renewed Russian state structure with a national character, the movement was not unresponsive to outside influences - the programme was not one of radical Russian fundamentalism, but expressed a tolerance of views, rights, faiths and beliefs. The programme supported freedom of conscience and freedom to practise one's faith. It guaranteed freedom of speech and assembly, although it proscribed the propagation of racist or misanthropic views which would lead to acts of violence. Whilst Aksiuchits had called for 'spiritual regeneration, in particular religious and national regeneration',³⁹ this did not prevent the propagation of 'un-Russian' views imported from other parts of the globe. The freedoms stated in the party programme guaranteed this.

Of all the members of Democratic Russia, *RKhDD* had the most Russian nationalist programme - it combined liberal democratic values with perceived Russian national values, whilst at the same time promoting 'enlightened patriotism'. The ultimate shift towards a more imperialist Russian nationalist position at the end of 1991 is, perhaps, not all that surprising. Those who disagreed with this view left the Movement, but those who backed Aksiuchits had probably united behind the 'democratic' banner more out of opposition to communism than their desire to introduce liberal democracy. The alliance with democrats in the Democratic Russia movement became shaky once communism faced defeat - *RKhDD* was able to focus upon its differences with people in the democratic movement. As a result, its concerns centred on issues such as the fate of ethnic Russians outside the RSFSR and the fear of possible wholesale adoption of foreign, 'Western' influences by the democratic movement. The evolution of Aksiuchits' own political views progressed to the point that, by the end of 1991, he had turned against his former democratic allies and with the turn of the year had allied himself with Democratic Russia's former Russian nationalist opponents.

**The Constitutional Democratic Party (the Party of Popular Freedom)
{*Konstitutsionno-demkraticheskaiia partiia (Partiia narodnoi svobody) -
KDP/PNS*)**

KDP held a session which was recognised as its *de facto* founding conference in September 1990, but was only officially formed at a 'Congress of Restoration' in June 1991. It described itself as a 'conservative-liberal' party supporting freedom of the individual, civil rights and the 'widest possible form of self-rule'.⁴⁰

In its 1990 programme, the Party expressed its loathing for the communist system and a desire for the introduction of democracy - it declared that only a transfer from totalitarianism to democracy could open the way to the revival of all the peoples of Russia. The Party later reinforced this idea of opposition to totalitarianism:

the state authorities do not have the right to declare any faith, conviction, or political and religious teaching harmful or dangerous unless they are recognised as such by international law.⁴¹

The national question was regarded as 'one of the most difficult in the country' and the Party paid particular attention to the fact that the ethnic Russian [*ruskii*] people had suffered along with all the other peoples. It also suggested that the lack of state structures for the Russian Federation and the consequent identification of Russia with all-Union structures complicated relations between the Russian peoples and the peoples of other republics. As a result, one of the Party's goals was to achieve sovereignty for the Russian Federation.

Like the *RKhDD*, the *KDP* encouraged a significant role for 'patriotism' declaring that it was a party of 'strong statehood and enlightened patriotism'. It was fairly obvious that this 'patriotism' had a Russian dimension. The Party declared that its activity was based upon the 'general heritage, cultural traditions and religious values of the peoples of Russia'. In addition, the *KDP* supported the cultural revival of Russia, its religious traditions and its cultural environment, including monuments of architecture and historical names. It also called for the 'return of Russia to the history of mankind and the return of Russia's history to her peoples'.

However, this idea of Russian revival was not stuck wholly in the past. *KDP* believed that:

politics are an evolutionary process, developing with historical experience in mind and maintaining everything of value which is in it, but, at the same time, being receptive to everything new and progressive.⁴²

The above words indicate that, whilst supporting a Russian revival and observing 'historical experience', the *KDP* would be prepared to accept progressive, possibly 'foreign' ideas. This was illustrated by the Party's proposal to join the European Democratic Union, in order to co-operate with 'foreign parties and public organisations of a liberal-conservative orientation'.⁴³

In principle, the Party supported the maintenance of a multi-national union and even proposed the creation of a European-Asian Commonwealth of States for the Union republics. Membership of this Commonwealth was voluntary and members maintained the right to leave.⁴⁴ A Party resolution on a new Union Treaty declared that it would recognise the legal governments of the republics who did not enter the federation (Union). However, it also called for areas outside the 'federation' which were densely populated by its constituent core nationalities to be granted citizenship of the federation and, likewise, for their territories to be incorporated into the federation. This was a reference chiefly to areas in non-Russian republics densely populated by ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers.

KDP was one of the constituent members of *Narodnoe soglasie* and, like *RKhDD*, ended 1991 supporting the ideas of Russian state integrity, a re-constituted union and focussing on ethnic Russians in the non-Russian periphery. *KDP*'s leader, Mikhail Astaf'ev adopted a similar position to that of Viktor Aksiuchits and later worked in alliance with former opponents. The Party's self-professed 'conservatism' eventually drew it towards imperialist Russian nationalism rather than towards liberal democracy and its perceived Western values.

Democracy and the *rossiiskoe* state

The *DPR* and *RPRF* represent organisations which concentrated their efforts on introducing democratic values, but also reviving the idea of Russian [*rossiiskaia*] statehood. There were elements within these organisations which focussed on specific ethnic Russian values and issues - there was a 'Russian faction' within the *DPR*, which later left to join the *RNPR*, and the *RPRF* contained members who believed in pursuing a Russian path - however, the main aim of these two groups was to create a democratic Russian state and develop a sense of *rossiiskii* national identity. With the collapse of communism and the prospective fall of the Soviet Union, *DPR* leader, Nikolai Travkin, paid particular attention to the plight of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers living outside the RSFSR and joined his *Narodnoe soglasie* allies in calling for the maintenance of the unitary state - however, he did not go as far as Mikhail Astaf'ev or Viktor Aksiuchits in identifying himself with an alliance of re-grouped 'patriotic' forces in opposition to Democratic Russia.

Demokraticheskaiia partiia Rossiia, DPR (The Democratic Party of Russia).

The *DPR*'s founding conference took place between 26-27 May 1990. On the second day of its founding congress, the *DPR* suffered its very first split. Marina Sal'e, Garri Kasparov, Lev Ponomarev and others clashed with Nikolai Travkin, labelling him 'authoritarian'.⁴⁵ Although Travkin prevailed and others came back to the fold, the Leningrad group of Sal'e and Il'ia Konstantinov broke away to form the Free Democratic Party of Russia. However, they would remain allies for a while within the framework of the Democratic Russia movement. The *DPR* was a significant party with many notable political figures and at the end of 1990 it had almost 29 000 members, second only to the CPSU in size.

In 1991, A. Novikov described the *DPR* as an 'anti-communist CPSU' and that in relation to the Russian national question:

it is formally trying to combine democratic and patriotic approaches. It is in favour of the state integrity of the RSFSR as desperately as the central apparatus of the CPSU is to maintain the Union.⁴⁶

A supplement to the party's first edition of its newspaper *Demokraticheskaia Rossiia* carried a declaration passed at the founding conference which claimed:

Our aim is the political, economic and spiritual revival of the [Russian] republic's peoples. Our principal task is the revival of Russian statehood in the form of a sovereign democratic federal republic with a multiparty system.⁴⁷

And the slogan which accompanied each section of the supplement read:

Towards a flourishing Russia through rights of the individual, a civil society, economic freedom and state sovereignty.⁴⁸

Therefore, Russia's national renewal was understood in terms of a new social and political system within the framework of a Russian state. The democratic principles espoused were extended to the non-Russian republics, with a guarantee of self-determination. The proposed party programme recognised:

the unconditional right of every republic in the Union to self-determination, including the right to secession.⁴⁹

The DPR's commitment to a Russian national state seemed to be confirmed by its inclusion in the Democratic Russia movement, thus allying itself with other forces opposing the Soviet centre and supporting the idea of a democratic political system within a Russia which would have a strengthened identity and strengthened national institutions. The DPR even adopted the Russian tricolour and the Russian imperial coat of arms (the two-headed eagle, but without the crown and sceptre) as its symbols.⁵⁰

A draft project on the Union Treaty and the future of the USSR produced by the DPR in Sverdlovsk on 6 April 1991 rejected the idea of maintaining the Union:

the effort is being made to destroy a sovereign Russian Federation and to maintain a unitary 'Union' state with a so-called strong centre...

We believe that no Union treaty, no referenda with tangled questions will be able to maintain that which has become obsolete - the Soviet Union...

It is obvious that the republics should be free to realise their rights to self-determination, while state property situated on republican territory should be handed over to the republics free of charge...

We are not against a union of sovereign states, but to keep the USSR for the sake of maintaining the CPSU and today's ruling nomenklatura class is criminal. We are for the

sovereignty of individuals and nations.⁵¹

However, this only reflected the *DPR* opposition to a USSR governed and influenced by the CPSU etc. At the Second Congress of the *DPR* at the end of April 1991, the party ratified a declaration on creating the *Narodnoe soglasie* bloc and firmly committed itself to the maintenance of a union state on the territory of the Soviet Union. Therefore, whilst pursuing the establishment of Russian statehood with its symbols and institutions, the *DPR* also denied the other union republics their right to independent statehood. The overwhelming majority of the Party's membership accepted this stance and in November 1991, the *DPR* left the Democratic Russia movement. Several regional organisations of the Party did not agree with this position and split from the *DPR*, opting to stay within Democratic Russia.⁵²

Like the other members of *Narodnoe soglasie*, the core of the *DPR* reneged on its previously-stated policy of respecting the right of every republic to secede from the Union. Although the *DPR* had fought for Russian state sovereignty and to create a Russian state identity, it ultimately viewed this within the framework of a larger Union. This could be for a number of reasons: the *DPR* could not envisage the feasibility of the Soviet Union existing as a number of independent states; the Party was still affected by the thinking that the Soviet Union constituted a historically indivisible (therefore, Russian) state; it was concerned that the break-up of the Union would weaken Russia defensively and economically (in relation to the West, perhaps); there was an overwhelming concern for the ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers who would become 'displaced' minorities in a foreign land. Whatever, the reason(s) were, there were elements within what was left of the Party who put Russia's concerns first. The *DPR* may not have had an ethnic Russian nationalist agenda, but it was sensitive to Russian nationalist sentiment within the Party.

Respublikanskoe partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, RPRF (the Republican Party of the Russian Federation)

The *RPRF* held its founding conference on 17-18 November 1990. Based

on the 'Democratic Platform in the CPSU' which later (July 1990) became the 'Democratic Platform Outside the CPSU', the nine hundred delegates to its founding conference represented more than 20 000 people.⁵³ However, at the beginning of 1992 there were officially five thousand actual party members.⁵⁴ The party's main political task was:

...to support the sovereignty of the Russian republic, the renaissance of Russia based upon values common to all mankind, the provision of social guarantees and political rights for each citizen.⁵⁵

One source reveals that, at its inception, the *RPRF* represented a spectrum of opinion on Russia's future course:

There is no unity amongst the membership concerning Russia's historical perspective. According to sociological surveys conducted by 'Monitoring' at the *RPRF*'s founding conference, 67% of the delegates questioned drew parallels between Russia's future and the development of countries such as the USA, Western Europe and Japan; 24% considered that Russia should have its own peculiar path, differing from the rest of progressive mankind; 5% suggested that each of the peoples of the RSFSR should have their own fates and various paths of development. More than 90% supported the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, whilst 40% of the members of *RPRF* supported the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.⁵⁶

These surveys indicate that a significant minority of the Party's delegates were in favour of a specific 'Russian path', representing a constituency which had to be satisfied not only by the *RPRF*, but also by the Democratic Russia movement. Therefore, whilst the Party was concerned primarily with the development of a democratic system, it had to accommodate a strong lobby concerned with Russian national issues. To a large extent, this lobby would be satisfied by Democratic Russia's success in establishing a Russian state identity and Russia-wide institutions.

RPRF's 'democratic' values advocated a multiparty parliamentary system, privatisation of property, a market system and the provision of social security for all citizens. These values would be applied to a sovereign Russian state distinct from the USSR:

We support the real fulfilment and defence of Russia's sovereignty, the reconstruction of her statehood in the form of a democratic republic...

We are convinced that the friendship of peoples inhabiting Russia can be revived only when a free union of sovereign national-governmental bodies is formed, on the basis of an All-Russian goods, capital and labour market.⁵⁷

The nationality policy towards the other peoples of the USSR was one

which supported their rights to self-determination and separation:

All peoples of the USSR were victims of a system which totally destroyed personality, nature culture. It is with great tact and understanding that we should treat the growth of peoples' national consciousness and their striving for self-determination, right up to the possibility of secession... It is better to have neighbours as friends outside the state borders than enemy nations within a single and indivisible state.⁵⁸

However, the independence of these states was envisaged within the framework of a federation, confederation or international community:

The economic and political interests of Russia's peoples, and her geographical position, dictate the necessity to conclude an economic and military-political union with other sovereign states, former republics of the USSR. We see this union as a commonwealth of sovereign states delegating certain executive functions to a central co-ordinating organ to solve common problems.⁵⁹

By June 1991, the Party's position more clearly favoured maintaining the Union. A proposal on the problems of the Union and Federation to be aired at the second congress stated:

The first and main thing that we believe all Russian democrats should recognise is how necessary and inevitable it is for the fate of democracy in Russia to maintain the state which is today called the USSR. Moreover, the disintegration of the Union will be the death sentence of Russian democracy.⁶⁰

The document went on to highlight the problems of ethnically-displaced people and the prospect of refugees flooding into Russia. Repeating that a Union was 'inevitable', the proposal suggested that Russia faced a situation similar to Ulster 'in many parts of the country'. Particular attention was paid to Russian-speaking people all over the Union. It appears that the *RPRF* considered the Union necessary for the security of Russians and Russian-speaking people:

The distribution of democratic ideas in the Russian-speaking environment of all republics is the most important task for Russian democracy, but it can only be resolved if the national democrats understand the worries and fears of their Russian-speaking neighbours. Make no mistake, the republics will not be able to solve their problems unless they face the concerns of their national minorities, including Russians.⁶¹

RPFR's aim was to strengthen Russia's identity as an independent actor within the Union. It advocated a Russian federal state as an independent political unit, governing its own industry and not answerable to the existing central Soviet organs. Some of the relevant views were contained

in a document on the party's tasks passed at the Second Congress under the section on 'international and inter-state relations':

Acknowledging the right of nations to self-determination, we recognise the right of each republic to freely choose interrelations with other republics.

We support the initiative... ..to prepare an Agreement on a Commonwealth of Sovereign States. The Commonwealth here is understood to be a voluntary association of sovereign states...

In view of the priority of Russian sovereignty in all matters concerned with a union agreement, we think it feasible and necessary that it should be signed according to the following conditions:

guaranteeing the state integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation;... placing industry on the RSFSR's territory, including the MIC [military-industrial complex] industries, under Russia's jurisdiction; for the formation of union organs of power to be carried out solely by the republics; the abolition of the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet six months from the signing of the new Union Agreement.⁶²

It is clear from the above that the *RPRF* expected the continuation of some form of union or commonwealth and could not envisage a complete break-up of the union. However, the congress document did stress the autonomy of actors within that Union and that each party was free to determine its relations with others within the Union.

Following the putsch of August 1991, the party welcomed the fall of totalitarianism and declared that the 'empire had collapsed'. However, it still called for the renewal of some kind of Union Agreement, albeit based on democratic lines.⁶³

Like fellow members of Democratic Russia, the *RPRF* supported the idea of strengthening Russian [*rossiiskii*] sovereignty and identity, and it supported the presidential candidacy of El'tsin as a Russian focus of opposition against the communist-dominated centre. It was uneasy with the idea of a break-up of the Union and the consequences which that might have posed to Russian-speaking populations (and others) outside the Russian federation, but the Party did not join *Narodnoe soglasie*;⁶⁴ did not leave Democratic Russia; and did not subsequently side with other 'patriotic' Russian-nationalist groups against the democrats.

The *RPRF* was not a 'Russian nationalist' organisation, but defined itself as a 'party of the centre, a party of reform, a party of civic peace and accord'.⁶⁵ However, in its pursuit of Russian republican structures, it did manage to accommodate the supporters of liberal Russian nationalism within its ranks.

Rossy - grazhdanskoe ob"edinenie 'Rossy' (The Rossy Civil Association)

The *Rossy* described themselves as a 'civic (and from summer 1990, socio-political) association for a sovereign republic of Rus'. This small group called for a presidential Russian republic with a multiparty system, whilst placing a significant emphasis upon the plight of the Russian person and Russian culture. Indeed, the *Rossy's* emphasis on Russian statehood and culture even displayed elements of isolationist Russian nationalism. However, like the democrats, the Association was opposed to the existing political regime (the CPSU, etc.), the reconstitution of an imperial Russian state and advocated a democratic solution to Russia's problems.

The Association formed at the end of 1988 in Leningrad and its aims were:

to facilitate the national self-determination of Russians [*ruskikh*]; to develop their national consciousness; the spiritual, moral and political revival of Russia; the creation of a presidential Rus' republic; Russian national autonomies within the structure of Russia; and Russian cultural autonomies within the union republics.⁶⁶

In a conversation with *Sovetskaia molodezh'*, Vladimir Bogomolov, a member of the association's Duma expressed *Rossy's* position:

The RSFSR should in fact become an independent sovereign republic and not an ownerless union appendage. When Russia finds sovereignty, we will be able to hold a conference of all peoples of the USSR and conclude a new union treaty. *Rossy* support the idea that no one will be forced into it. If any republic stands up for secession, then that is their right.⁶⁷

Rossy had already demonstrated its anti-imperialist position in a general address to the public in 1989 when it accused the Soviet establishment of being the common enemy and claimed that it was attempting to 'stir up imperial feelings' in Russians against non-Russian brothers.⁶⁸

Like Democratic Russia, *Rossy* called for Russian 'sovereignty' and 'self-determination' and 'statehood' (*gosudarstvennost'*). The leader of *Rossy*, Ekaterina Miasnikova, stated that:

Before we can solve economic, cultural and other problems... ..we must solve the main problem - to create Russian statehood⁶⁹

However, the subject of Russian culture and the Russian national interest was more of a burning issue for the members of *Rossy* than it was for

Democratic Russia. The *Rossy* publication *Rus'* lamented the absence of Russian national culture:

After 70 years of barbaric cultural politics, Leningrad... ...has almost totally lost its national spirit! 'Neither a Russian theatre, nor a Russian newspaper' - to paraphrase a great poet. Where are the institutes of Russian culture, newspapers, a national television channel?...

Today many people simple-heartedly think that our television, newspapers and radio are Russian. But have you really seen articles, programmes and films which address the national feelings of Russians or calling out to the revival of our national honour?⁷⁰

Rossy proposed the idea of national schools, national centres of culture, conservatories, museums. Vladimir Bogomolov proposed that Russians in other republics should be given cultural autonomy, but not political autonomy.⁷¹

Despite their vigorous utterances in favour of propagating Russian culture, *Rossy* did not play the racial card and opposed anti-Semitic groups such as *Pamiat'*. V. Dobrovolskii asserted that national membership was according to one's language and one's association with culture rather than by blood. The 1989 programme described a 'Russian' [*russkii*] as anyone who lives in the RSFSR and who 'genuinely considers himself to be Russian'.⁷²

The Association proposed a political alternative to the 'totalitarian regime' of the CPSU. It supported a presidency elected by universal suffrage. Nominations for the presidency would be made by parties, which would also contest seats in a national legislature. The government would be formed by the president from members of his party and other allies. The non-Russian nationalities in the Russian federation would be represented by national autonomies, whose leaders would come from locally elected deputies and be appointed by the president.

The *Rossy* Association represented an attempt to design a democratic system for Russia which would take into account the development of the Russian nation *and* the development of other Russian peoples. National minorities living within their own territories would not only have political autonomy, but cultural autonomy, with the right to form independent cultural associations, open national schools, classes and other forms of community connected with the national culture. Those minority

nationalities without their own territory would have their rights broaden to create national theatres, secondary schools, etc.

Rossy opposed the activity of anti-Semitic or imperialist Russian nationalist organisations such as *Pamiat'*, *OFT* and *Edinstvo* and represented a tendency which sought a Russian state with a civil society and a strong Russian national identity. At the same time, it was critical of the Leningrad Popular Front (*LNF*) and other 'democratic' organisations for failing to demonstrate an appreciation of 'Russian problems' [*problemy russkikh*]. The Association's concern for Russian problems stretched beyond the borders of the RSFSR - it declared that it would offer help to Russians outside the RSFSR who were subject to discrimination on grounds of nationality.

At times, the Association attracted members who had links with other, less 'democratic' organisations - it was even accused of 'chauvinism' in the newspaper *Vechernii Leningrad* after picketting the newspaper *Smena* with members of the National Democratic Party and others, accusing the editorial board of publishing anti-Russian articles.⁷³ However, *Rossy* had limited connections with other so-called 'patriotic' organisations.

Despite being the very first group to advocate the idea of an independent Russian state within the territory of the RSFSR, championing the cause of ethnic Russians, *Rossy* was a fairly insignificant force with around 30-40 activists and several hundred supporters - its activity was limited mostly to the city of Leningrad. It had little success when it contested the March 1990 elections and in the middle of 1990, the rump of the *Rossy* association became the Humanist Party.

Conclusion

Liberal Russian nationalism was the force which succeeded most in fulfilling Russian nationalist aims. It combined the development of Russian national institutions and values with the introduction of liberal democracy, regarding the latter as an ally rather than as a 'Western' enemy. At first, Liberal Russian nationalism was represented by scholars such as the aforementioned Dmitrii Likhachev, who welcomed the changes

brought about by perestroika and identified with a European democratic culture, but also focussed on aspects of Russian culture and the importance of Orthodox Christianity. Igor' Vinogradov, who supported the idea of democracy as an alternative to communism, believed that democracy should observe Russian specific characteristics. He suggested that some of the answers lay in the legacy of past Russian thinkers and philosophers:

In our present desperate search for a genuine and stable foundation for our social being and historical evolution, we cannot ignore the great spiritual and philosophical achievements we have inherited from those who to this day remain our closest allies or adversaries, supporters or opponents.⁷⁴

This reflected Vinogradov's view that democracy could exist in tandem with a 'Russian idea'.

If the abovementioned organisations did not champion a *rusaskaia* idea, then they championed a *rossiaskaia* idea. The appearance of *Rossy* represented one of the first attempts to define a state which would nurture the cultural and political identity of 'Russians'. The Association did not prescribe a fundamental Russian ideology, but advocated the idea of a *rossiiskoe* pluralist state (although the Association referred to it as a *rusaskoe* state) in which those who considered themselves to be Russians could thrive - this would be achieved by the establishment of Russian and other national autonomies within the state.

The Democratic Russia movement was fundamental in establishing Russian sovereignty, a Russian presidency and promoting the idea of Russia-wide institutions. Of Democratic Russia's constituent members, the *DPR* and the *RPRF* represent two organisations which were committed to the idea of establishing Russian [*rossiiskii*] state sovereignty. They did not promote ethnic Russian 'values', but the establishment of Russian state structures provided a focus for the development of both *rossiikie* and *rusaskie* national values.

The movement which paid the most attention to Russian 'specific characteristics/values' was the Russian Christian Democratic Movement. Like its smaller ally, the *KDP*, it promoted the idea of 'enlightened patriotism'. This approach was not without success, for *RKhDD* became one of the biggest Russia-wide political movements/parties in 1991. It appears that the synthesis of liberal democratic values with Russian

characteristics was of interest to a certain section of the population. However, Democratic Russia's priority was to introduce 'progressive, radical, political and socio-economic reforms' with the aim of creating a 'civil society'. It was liberal democratic values and opposition to communism/the centre which drew Democratic Russia support. Liberal Russian nationalism was a beneficiary of the democratic movement rather than a significant contributor to it.

- ¹ See, for example, A. Latynina, "Kolokol'nyi zvon - ne molitva", *Novyi mir*, No. 8, 1988, pp. 232-234.
- ² V. Balakhonov, "Sokhranenie imperii ili samosokhranenie na puti natsional'nogo suvereniteta - glavnaia natsional'naia problema russkogo naroda segodnia", *Svobodnoe slovo*, No.13, 11/4/89, pp.2 & 4. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]
- ³ "Natsional'nyi vopros i natsional'nyi dvizheniia v SSSR na sovremennom etape", *Svobodnoe slovo*, *ibid.*, p.1.
- ⁴ The states were: Russia, based around Moscow and uniting Russian lands from the West to the Urals; (Russian)Western Siberia& (Russian)Eastern Siberia, or possibly a unitary Siberia; the (Russian) Far East.
- ⁵ Balakhonov, *Svobodnoe slovo*, *ibid.*, p.4.
- ⁶ *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 24/1/90.
- ⁷ *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 14/3/91. p.2; Charles F. Furtado Jr. & Andrea Chandler (eds.), *Perestroika in the Soviet Republics: Documents on the National Question*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p.319.
- ⁸ *Moskovskie novosti*, No26, 1990, p.2.
- ⁹ Furtado & Chandler, *op. cit.*, p.317-319.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.322.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² *Ibid.*, pp.322-3.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p.324.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.349.
- ¹⁵ The DPR did not join as a whole at first, but was represented by a majority of its regional organisations. Under pressure from Garri Kasparov and others, the leadership acknowledged the party's full participation in January 1991 by sending representatives to the Council of Representatives and to the Coordinating Committee of the Democratic Russia movement.
- ¹⁶ Koval' (ed.), *Rossiiia segodnia...*, *op. cit.*, p.306; *Demokraticheskaia Rossiia*, No.3, October, 1990.
- ¹⁷ Koval', *ibid.*, p.309.
- ¹⁸ V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov, V. V. Cherviakov, *Rossiiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, Spravochnik*, Vol.1, part 2, Rau Press, Moscow, 1991, p.229.
- ¹⁹ *Argumenty i fakty*, No.46, 1990.
- ²⁰ The election of El'tsin did not significantly increase the movement's long-term political fortunes. El'tsin did not consult Democratic Russia over the formation of his government.
- ²¹ *Deklaratsiia konstruktivno-demokraticheskogo bloka 'Narodnoe soglasie'*, document dated 19/4/91, Moscow. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ²² R. Medvedev (ed.), *Spravochnik: politicheskii partii, dvizheniia i bloki sovremennoi Rossii*, *op. cit.*, p.43.
- ²³ *Ibid.*
- ²⁴ V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov, V. V. Cherviakov, *Rossiiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, Spravochnik*, Vol.1, part 2, *op. cit.*, p. 299.
- ²⁵ This was true up until April 1991, when the RKhDD joined the newly-formed bloc Popular Accord (*Narodnoe soglasie*). Popular Accord declared that it supported the development of a new voluntary union for the USSR, but the opposition within the movement to the secession of republics grew, particularly after the August events of 1991.
- ²⁶ *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 15/2/91.
- ²⁷ Berezovskii et al (eds.), *Rossiiia: partii,...*, Vol. No. 8. Rau Press, Moscow 1992. p.7.
- ²⁸ *Rossiiskoe khristianskoe demokraticheskoe dvizhenie: Sbornik materialov*, Moscow, 1990, p.35.[SSEES New Political Parties Archive]

- ²⁹ Ibid., p.37.
- ³⁰ Ibid., p.32; *Vestnik khristianskogo informatsionnogo tsentra*, No.29(87), 10/4/90, pp. 16-17. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ³¹ For example, Alexander Ogorodnikov's Christian Democratic Union of Russia (*KhDSR*).
- ³² *Put'*, No.1(4), January 1991, pp.7&9.[SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ³³ *RKhDD: Sbornik materialov*, op. cit., p.44.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p.45.
- ³⁵ *Russkaia mysl'*, 10/11/89, pp.7-8.
- ³⁶ Undated typescript translation of Russian stenographic record (however, the speech was delivered on 27 May 1990). [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ³⁷ Tsentr po izucheniiu obshchestvennykh dvizhenii, Arkhiv nezavimoi pechati, *New Political Parties: Everyday Information*, (RKhDD), No.6.[SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ³⁸ This is one of the issues which precipitated the departure of Fr. Gleb Iakunin, one of the RKhDD's founder members, in August 1991. Iakunin went on to form the Russian Christian Democratic Union and remained a member of the Democratic Russia movement. Other major figures -Aksiuchits, Gleb Anishchenko and Fr. Viacheslav Polosin - remained in the RKhDD .
- ³⁹ Typescript of Aksiuchts' speech 27/5/90, op. cit.
- ⁴⁰ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii,...*, Vol. No. 3, op. cit., p. 42.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., p. 43.
- ⁴² Ibid., p. 42.
- ⁴³ Ibid., p. 50.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 48.
- ⁴⁵ Tsentr po izucheniiu obshchestvennykh dvizhenii, Arkhiv nezavisimoi pechati, *New Political Parties: Everyday Information (Demokraticheskaia partiia Rossii)*, Moscow, 1991.[SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ *Demokraticheskaia Rossiia: izdanie Demokraticheskoi partii Rossii i ee storonnikov*, Supplement to edition No.1, p.2.[SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.2, 3 & 4.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., p.4.
- ⁵⁰ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossia segodnia...*, op. cit. p.192.
- ⁵¹ *O soiuznom dogovore i budushchem SSSR: proekt*. Typescript from Sverdlovsk DPR conference, 6/4/91.[SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁵² R. Medvedev (ed.), *Spravochnik*., op. cit., p.12.
- ⁵³ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossia segodnia...*, op. cit. p.99.; Berezovskii et al (eds.), "*Rossia: partii,...*" Vol. No. 7. Rau Press, Moscow 1992. p.3.
- ⁵⁴ Berezovskii et al (eds.), "*Rossia: partii,...*" ibid.
- ⁵⁵ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossia segodnia...*, op. cit. p.99.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ *Sbornik No.1: Materialy uchreditel'nogo s"ezda respublikanskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, Moscow, 17-18 November 1990, p.8.[SSEES New Political Parties Archive]
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., p.23.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., p.35.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., p.36.
- ⁶² Berezovskii et al (eds.), "*Rossia: partii,...*" Vol. No. 7, op. cit., p.40.
- ⁶³ Ibid., p.44.

⁶⁴ *Norodnoe soglasie* disintegrated in December 1991 after disagreements over how the CIS should be formed.

⁶⁵ V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, Spravochnik*, Vol.1, part 2, op. cit., p. 244.

⁶⁶ Berezovskii et al (eds.), *Rossia: partii,...*, Vol. No. 8, op. cit., p.35.

⁶⁷ A. Khokhlov, "Tri vstrechi v Leningrade", *Sovetskaia molodezh'*, 10/1/90, p.3.

⁶⁸ *Nezavisimyi bibliograf*, No.4, op. cit., p.22.

⁶⁹ G. Lobkovich, "S dumoi o Rossii", *Leningradskaia panorama*, 2/2/90, p.2.[SSEES New Political Parties Archive]

⁷⁰ Cited by Lobkovich, *ibid*.

⁷¹ A. Khokhlov, op. cit.

⁷² V. N. Berezovskii et al., *Rossia: partii,...*, Vol. No. 8, op. cit., p. 35.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, .35.

⁷⁴ Igor Vinogradov, "Rehabilitating the Names", *Moscow News*, No.24, 11/6/89, p.11.

Chapter 7: Isolationist Russian Nationalism: Groups and Parties

Connected with the Tendency

I resolutely disagree with those who seek the salvation of Russia in isolation, seclusion, and even withdrawal from the USSR. Could it be that someone thinks Russia will develop more successfully outside the Union? This is nothing more than an illusion.¹

M. Gorbachev at Russian party conference of CPSU.

Introduction

Isolationist Russian nationalism was a relatively small tendency marginalised by imperialist Russian nationalism and liberal Russian nationalism. It represented a Russian nationalism which was not only anti-Western, but also opposed the potentially 'harmful' influences of the non-Russian periphery.

I have already pointed out that those who supported imperialist nationalism represented an extraordinarily broad range of political views, but seemed to be overwhelmed by the urgency to identify the Russian [both *rossiiskii* and *russkii*] nation with the greater Russian state/Soviet Union. Many of the imperialist Russian nationalist groups and figures supported the development of Russian institutions within the framework of the Russian Federation, whilst at the same time supporting Russian dominance within the USSR. They also alluded to the possibility of a 'Russian idea', whether based on socialism, Orthodoxy or monarchy. There is little doubt that imperialist Russian nationalism sought to isolate the Soviet Union/Russian imperial state from the West, if not the rest of the world. However, they did not wish to isolate Russia from the rest of the non-Russian Soviet periphery.

There were two notable occasions when supporters of imperialist Russian nationalism passed comment suggesting that Russia might itself secede from the Soviet Union. The first was made by Valentin Rasputin in a speech to the Congress of People's Deputies in spring 1989 when he suggested that Russia should, perhaps, leave the Union in order to sort out its own affairs.² The comment was made in response to nationalist

sentiments and, what Rasputin perceived to be, outbreaks of 'Russophobia' in the periphery. It was not a serious proposal, but more of an attempt to ridicule those who pursued separatism in the periphery.³ The sentiment of this comment was echoed by the words of Aleksandr Prokhanov the following year, when he suggested that Russia should stand on its own and cast off its 'thankless neighbours'.⁴ Throughout the Gorbachev period, Prokhanov was one of the strongest advocates of Soviet unity, which was justified in Marxist-Leninist terms at the beginning of 1988, but very clearly became associated with a 'Russian idea' by 1990. There is little doubt that Prokhanov's comment was written in anger against the national independence movements in the periphery, although it should be noted that both his comment and Rasputin's outburst drew attention to the fact that Russians were focussing on their own needs.

The democrats, aided and abetted by liberal Russian nationalists, began to focus on issues concerning Russia's independent development. Liberal Russian nationalism envisaged Russian national values flourishing within a pluralist, liberal democratic environment. Russia's sovereign and independent development was the first step towards developing Russia's cultural and national identity. Liberal Russian nationalism was concerned with nation-building, but not to a specific Russian recipe - it was responsive to the West and Europe in its development.

Isolationist Russian nationalism, on the other hand, was closer to the Slavophile tradition, believing that Russia's development lay in values which were completely different from those of the West. Isolationism provided an opportunity for Russia and the Russian nation to develop without the 'poison' of foreign influence and without the burden of empire.

A 'Russian path' entailed the rejection of both communism and Western democracy:

Have you ever had to answer the question: "Who are you inclined to trust more - the 'democrats' or the CPSU?"

...Tell me, is there a difference between them? They and others worship ideals alien to the Russian people, completely ignoring the national peculiarities of the Slavs. These and others are ready to use the people like experimental rabbits for their own interests...

After all, for a thousand years, Russian history was familiar with neither these nor other systems... ...Russia can only continue on its own unique path.⁵

This was a view shared with some imperialist Russian nationalists, but isolationist Russian nationalism tried to present a fundamental Russian way for the Russian people - it was not concerned with the complications of maintaining a vast non-Russian periphery, to which it would have to justify its 'Russian path'.

Igor' Shafarevich's vision of a Russian future reflected values advocated by the Slavophiles of the 19th Century, including spirituality, communality and conciliarism [*sobornost'*]. His Russian path paints a somewhat authoritarian picture of Russian society, rejecting the idea of democracy and advocating that state structures are subject to the moral guidance of a spiritual authority.⁶

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's programme in 1990 aimed to build a 'democratic' Russia, but rejected the existing Western political models. His solution also advocated the existence of a 'higher moral' body consisting of 'the most authoritative voices' to guide the activity of state structures. This system would also require the observation of the principle of conciliarism, which Solzhenitsyn described as a 'system of trust' - others might describe it as a replacement for political pluralism.

Solzhenitsyn's programme, which drew interest from across the Russian nationalist spectrum, was the most detailed manifesto of isolationist Russian nationalism, providing a distinct Russian solution for the Russian/Slavic nation.

Solzhenitsyn

Solzhenitsyn's proposal was laid out in a pamphlet entitled *Kak nam obustroit' Rossiю?* (How Are We to Rebuild Russia?), which appeared in the Soviet press in September 1990.⁷ The proposal outlines a structural organization of a democratic Russian political system, designed to suit the national peculiarities of Russian society. Solzhenitsyn stresses that his ideas are not meant to be an ultimate solution, but a starting point for discussion. He adds that the foundation of his work contains the ideas of many Russian figures and that they might serve as a basis for 'fruitful' beginnings.

Solzhenitsyn's programme covered Russia's future outside the Soviet empire; the composition of a new Russian state; economic and agrarian reform; social reform; a discussion of the existing models of democracy in the world; and the political structures which might be put in place to achieve a democracy which suits the Russian national identity.

The document began by declaring that there was no future for a 'monstrous' USSR whose activities would always be attributed to 'Russians' by others all around the world. Solzhenitsyn suggested that the Union should break up and qualified the idea by saying that this had to happen for the Russian nation to survive:

We now need to make a hard choice: between the Empire which is destroying, first and foremost, us - or the spiritual and physical salvation of our people. It is well known that our mortality rate is rising and our birth rate is falling - such that we will disappear from the Earth. The maintenance of a great Empire entails killing off our own people! Why do we need this multicoloured fusion? - so that the Russians lose their unique face?⁸

Solzhenitsyn's overriding concern for the Russian people supports the simple secession of eleven of the fifteen union republics: the three Baltic republics, three Caucasian republics, four Central Asian republics and Moldavia. However, on the question of the other republics, he suggested that Kazakhstan be divided into a southern part which was the deep-rooted 'home' of the Kazakhs and the northern part which was inhabited largely by Russians: the southern part should secede if it so wished, but the northern part would be joined to Russia, which along with Ukraine and Belorussia would form a new Russian Union [*Rossiiskii Soiuz*]. Solzhenitsyn wrote that through the secession of the twelve (including Southern Kazakhstan) republics, Russia would be freeing itself for its own 'valuable *internal* development' and that:

If it is true that Russia gave away its vital juices to the republics over these decades - then we will not suffer any economic losses, just a saving of manpower.⁹

The Ukrainians and Belorussians were considered to be part of the greater Russian brotherhood and Solzhenitsyn could not separate them from Russia. He viewed the three peoples as a close family, which was particularly influenced by his own Ukrainian connections and the time he spent in Belorussia during the war. However, despite his view that these three peoples formed a Great Russian people [*velikorossy*], he could not

deny both the Ukrainians and the Belorussians the right to secede 'if they really wanted to' - Russia would not hold them by force. He also qualified this statement by saying that Ukrainians (and Belorussians) should be able to vote on a territorial [*oblast'*] basis to decide whether their local population should be incorporated into the Russian Union. He recommended that the minority peoples of the Russian Federation be incorporated into the Russian Union - the national features of their cultural, religious and economic needs would be respected, but it would be in their interests to remain part of Russia.

On the subject of displaced peoples following a partition of the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn did not recommend mass resettlement, but said that that commissions of experts and state compensation would have a responsibility. In addition, new states would have to guarantee minority rights.

On an economic level, Russia would cancel all foreign aid to former satellites such as Cuba, the defence budget would be curtailed and Eastern Europe would have to buy Russian raw materials at non-subsidized world prices.

Solzhenitsyn referred to the ideas of Stolypin when addressing the issues of land reform and the national economy. Stolypin was the pre-revolutionary prime minister (1906-11) who advocated liberal economic reforms, including the distribution of land to create small family farms - all of which was expressed amidst calls to make the Russian state great. Solzhenitsyn's economic set-up advocates a market with individual initiative, but rejects the establishment of monopolies and 'unrestrained concentrations of capital'.

In the social sphere, Solzhenitsyn focusses upon the falling birth-rate, on the family and on school. He believes that women should be given the opportunity to stay at home to bring up the children, whilst men bear the chief responsibility for earning. He also warns against harmful influences from the West, claiming that whilst the Iron Curtain had cut Russia off from all that was good in Western society - civic confidence, respect for the individual, variety of individual activity, general welfare and charitable organizations - it had let the bad influences such as 'popular culture' and 'vulgar fashion' creep under it. Here Solzhenitsyn is revealing his colours

by claiming that undesirable youth culture is from the West and therefore un-Russian.

Solzhenitsyn sums up his attitude towards developing a Russian state structure with the following words:

We need to find our *own* path. At present there is the auto-suggestion that we do not need to find our own path, that there is nothing to ponder - just quickly copy 'how they do it in the West'.

However, in the West they do it in so many different ways - each country has its own tradition.¹⁰

Solzhenitsyn's Russian path advocates a presidency and supports the idea of a strong executive president in the interim between the genesis of the new Russian state and the effective functioning of its new democratic institutions. Rejecting existing models of democracy, he revives the names of old Russian institutions to give nomenclature to his vision of Russian democracy. These include the *zemstva*, elected bodies existing on four levels - local, regional (*uiezd*), territorial and nation-wide; *Vsezemskoe Sobranie*, a body of delegates from the *zemstva*; and a *Duma*, consisting of people from the professions whose task it is to monitor and decide society's moral questions, somewhat like the *Zemskii Sobor* of former Russian times. Therefore, Solzhenitsyn's view of Russian democracy involves an element of indirect election/nomination of decision-makers.

The suggestion of a *Duma* highlights one of Solzhenitsyn's leading assumptions - that Russian society will recognise high moral responsibilities. Solzhenitsyn mentions morality several times and says that the 'possibility of improving society purely by political means is slim'. The concepts of morality and spirituality are vague and undefined, and are frequently used by Russian nationalism to evoke something unique. Solzhenitsyn's references suggest that the Russian people have a unique, inherent sense of morality which can be harnessed to make Russian democracy function successfully.

There are other features in Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet which highlight isolationist Russian nationalism. He wants to build a Russia which: owes nothing to the periphery; enjoys its own economic fruits; will resist the power of 'concentrated' (and, therefore, foreign) capital; will keep out the

'bad' influences of mass culture from the West; rejects any other model of democracy as foreign to the Russian spirit.

One might accuse Solzhenitsyn of having imperialistic designs on Kazakhstan and the two Slavic republics. This may well be interpreted in such a way, but one should observe that Solzhenitsyn is trying to address a demographic problem based upon the belief that borders were incorrectly determined by the communist regime. This is a problem addressed by many who give expression to isolationist Russian nationalism. Solzhenitsyn's main aim appears to be to physically unite the Russian (and/or Eastern Slavic) people and cultivate them under a unique national development.

Organizations

Although Solzhenitsyn's programme aroused interest among several Russian nationalist figures, there were very few movements committed solely to an isolationist programme. Some of the smaller, insignificant groups advocating a fundamental 'Russian way', (governed, perhaps, by the influence of Russian Orthodoxy) were tending towards isolationism, but were troubled by unease about the future of a divided Union. Several groups viewed the Russians as a triune people of the Eastern Slavs, but few opted for a unique Russian political solution for either this 'triune' Russian people or a narrower concept of the Russian nation.

The following are three examples of parties which, to some degree, reflected isolationist Russian nationalist values.

Respublikanskaia narodnaia partiia Rossii, RNPR (The Republican Popular Party of Russia)/Natsional'no-respublikanskaia partiia Rossii, NRPR

This party numbering 2500 members in the summer of 1990 grew out of the Russian National Patriotic Centre (RNPTs)¹¹ led by former *Pamiat'* member Viktor Antonov. It held its founding conference on 8 April 1990 in Leningrad with delegates coming from several regions of Russia. By the end 1991 its membership had risen to around 3500 activists and

supporters.

The *RNPR* represented one of the first organised efforts to create a Russian party which could:

provide the genuine revival of national Russian statehood on the basis of 'a sensible combination of democracy and patriotism' and the establishment of a new national Russian democracy. To develop a genuinely free popular national life for Russians in Russia as the core ethnic group of the Russian peoples.¹²

The establishment of a state and democracy with Russian national characteristics would be achieved by isolating Russia from its periphery. *RNPR* believed that the imperial thinking of Russian nationalists who held that the USSR was the successor to the Russian empire was a mistake. Russia's revival required an approach which would take 'economic, cultural and demographic' factors into account. According to the party programme, one of the first tasks of the party was to:

...separate Russia from the three Baltic republics, the three Caucasian republics, the four Central Asian republics and Moldavia.¹³

However, the Party wished to join with Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan in a federation or confederation of sovereign republics known as 'the Russian [*Rossiiskii*] Union'. This was similar to Solzhenitsyn's proposal in *Kak nam obustroit' Rossiia?* to create a union of Slavic republics.

The party programme drafted in October 1990 gave its reasons for separation from the aforementioned non-Slavic republics:

existing political realities and the economic and demographic problems of the country allow us to declare very openly that the presence of Russia within the USSR is the direct and quickest route to the liquidation of Russia as a state and as an important geopolitical factor; as well as to bringing about the erosion and imminent disappearance of the Russian [*rusaskaia*] nation and other Russian [*Rossiiskie*] peoples.¹⁴

A strategic aim was to prevent the return of communist fundamentalism. The party rejected socialism as an official ruling ideology with Antonov claiming that the Western model introduced in 1917 was an ideology 'alien to our national traditions'.¹⁵ *Literaturnaia gazeta* reported that Antonov's party:

...opposes left-radicals and social extremists and upholds the idea of maintaining the

moral and religious values of the Russian Orthodox Church.¹⁶

Antonov called for a restoration of centuries-old statehood and of its traditions, vowing to fight anti-national forces.¹⁷

The party platform in 1990 claimed that the reforms of perestroika were being carried out without a clear plan:

without taking into account Russia's national peculiarities and the historical experience of her statehood.¹⁸

The suggestion was that the reforms were inappropriate, governed by an alien influence:

These poorly thought-out reforms are in essence only a superficial copy of Western models for solving particular state problems. To a large extent this relates to the development of democracy - to the formation of new power structures which often mechanically copy Western forms, while they are by far not the best examples.¹⁹

At the Founding Congress, Antonov vowed that the party would:

...fight for the institution of new state structures which would first of all respect the people's traditional way of life and culture.²⁰

In June 1990, Antonov resigned as temporary chairman of the party's Central Council and Nikolai Lysenko, another former Leningrad *Pamiat'* member, automatically took his place. The new party programme which was produced under Lysenko removed all remarks about Zionism and included many of the points made in Solzhenitsyn's *Kak nam obustroit' Rossiю?* At the First Congress, the Party approved the new programme and declared itself 'the party of Solzhenitsyn's ideas.'²¹

The new programme favoured the convocation of an All-Russian National Assembly to establish the legal forms of Russia's state structure. It also suggested that the RSFSR be renamed the Russian Federal Republic and, yet, divided into territories on a geographical rather than nationality basis. Like Solzhenitsyn, the *RNPR* favoured the revival of the *zemstvo* system of local government.

Besides the establishment of a national media, the *RNPR* sought to shape Russian identity by restoring Russia's national state symbols as well as establishing a professional Russian army with the restoration of 'the military ranks, awards and fighting traditions of the Russian Army.'²²

On an economic level the party advocated immediate withdrawal from imbalanced trade with foreign countries, the cessation of aid to foreign governments and the suspension of trade with debtor-countries. A government commission would keep tight control on exports with licences and quotas kept to a minimum. Although the Party wished to encourage foreign investment in joint ventures and ailing state industries, it advocated a policy of protectionism which would prevent foreigners from buying up 'businesses, valuable papers and inventions'.²³

The programme declared that the *RNPR* considered religion to be the core and an essential side of national life. On the subject of Russian Orthodoxy the programme stated that:

Recognising and respecting the rights of other Christian and non-Christian denominations, the *RNPR* nevertheless stresses that over the course of centuries, the majority of Russian peoples practised Orthodoxy which in many ways defined their spiritual and psychological peculiarities, the character of the culture and everyday life. Therefore one of the *RNPR*'s most important tasks is to restore the canonical freedom of the Russian Orthodox Church.²⁴

It was also suggested that Russian Orthodox religious holidays be observed as national holidays and that representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and 'other Russian denominations' be allocated a quota of places on the local *zemstvo* bodies. However, despite the special status given to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Party supported Church separation from the state and the following year Lysenko was careful to point out that Russia did not need a state ideology based on religion or any idea other than the principle of Russian statehood itself.²⁵

Having recognised the inalienable right of the Russian [*russkii*] people to independent statehood within the Russian federal Republic, the Party expressed support for those Russians and Russian speakers in non-Russian republics who might want to emigrate to Russia. A resolution passed later in the year at the First Congress called on the authorities to create conditions suitable for the return of Russians from other republics and to facilitate the return of 'non-indigenous settlers' in Russia to their 'historical motherland'.²⁶

One would expect 'isolationist nationalists' to follow a 'third way' or national ideology. The *RNPR*'s third way is very vague - it amounts to

little more than the renaissance of a non-imperialist Russian state, based first and foremost on the Russian people. In an article in the Party's newspaper, *Golos Rossii*, Lysenko declared that the *RNPR*'s state ideology should be 'the idea of the salvation of Russia, the resurrection of the Russian [*russkie*] and other Russian [*rossiiskie*] peoples, the idea of removing the threat of the dismemberment of Russia, the idea of building a genuinely independent national state. He rejected communist, 'democratic', imperialist, monarchist and Orthodox Christian ideologies, claiming that such ideologies were responsible for all Russia's past and present problems.²⁷ However, this did not rule out acknowledging the significance of Russian Orthodoxy's historical, cultural contribution to the development of the Russian people and state.

The Party's brand of Russian nationalism displays certain features which are, arguably, 'imperialist' - one might argue that there was a Pan-Slavist dimension to this 'isolationist' Russian nationalism, because the *RNPR* wished to form a loose union with the Slavic republics and Kazakhstan. In addition, it should be noted that the party programme claimed that the borders between republics had been established by communist power and, therefore, were invalid and subject to review. An appeal from the *RNPR*'s Central Council to the Russian officer corps and the army in 1991 took a much harder imperialist line. It stated that:

...this government must... fulfil its main historical mission - to tear Russia from the criminal Leninist system [*set'*] destroying her - to wipe out the artificial 'state' borders between the present 'sovereign' republics. State sovereignty is one and indivisible, there can be no other 'sovereignties' within a sovereign state..., besides cultural and national autonomy...

The revival of national Russian statehood in no way means that the right to secession which peoples in the periphery fiercely seek will be encroached upon. Acting first and foremost in the interests of Russia, the Russians [*russkie*] and other Russian [*rossiiskie*] peoples, we can and must review the external borders of our country.

...We will grant our 'sovereignty' to a 'sovereign' Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, we will create an independent Moldovan state, protecting the genuinely Russian left bank of the Dniester owed to us. Finally, we will fulfil the long-standing dream of Sajudis of a 'Great Lithuania' in Kaunas, of course, minus the Vilensk area, Palanga and Memel'. We will give everyone what he wants [if it is in Russian interests], but the recipe, the sizes, the period and cost will be decided by us!²⁸

The 'dismemberment' of the RSFSR or Russian state was also out of the question. As already mentioned, the party wished to re-arrange Russia on territorial-administrative lines - the First Congress even passed a

resolution on the territorial integrity of Russia, opposing the potential disintegration of the Russian Federation into independent states. Action was even taken to this effect when the party was instrumental in setting up the Russian national legion (which was later sent to fight in South Ossetia).²⁹

In October 1991 the *RNPR* was renamed *Natsional'no-respublikanskia partiia Rossii, NRPR* (the National-Republican Party of Russia), marking its 'national' rather than 'popular' orientation. As the year approached its end and the break-up of the Soviet Union became more likely, *NRPR's* ideas of a Russian solution for an isolated Russia became more conceivable. However, this did not increase the Party's appeal to any significant degree.

The Russian General National Union (*Russkii obshchenatsional'nyi soiuz - RONS*)

RONS was formed in December 1990 in Moscow, but the Founding Conference was attended by representatives from several cities. It consisted of around 15 organisations and had around 70 activists. One of its closest allies around the end of 1991 was *NRPR*.

RONS declared that it was necessary to create a political organisation which would stand up for the rights of the Russian [*russkii*] people, which, in its opinion, consisted of 'Great Russians', Ukrainians and Belorussians.³⁰

RONS stated that neither the communists nor the 'democrats' were able to lead the country out of its crisis and that the most pressing question was the 'national' [*natsional'nyi*] question. Communist politics were described as 'Soviet', whilst the policies of the democrats were described as the 'politics of the common European home'. *RONS* aimed to introduce Russian politics for the national salvation of Russian people.

The Union's aims included the 'spiritual and political unification of the Russian people' and to restore to the Russian people its 'national dignity and way of life'. The unification and revival of Russians was only possible if based on the 'traditional Russian values' of 'God, the Fatherland, the

Family and the Individual [*Lichnost'*].

RONs's vision of the Russian state was one which included Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and areas of other republics where there was an overwhelming Russian/Slavic population: North Kazakhstan, Northern Kirgiziia, Transdniester. The latter territories would only be included subject to referenda. The Union programme stated that it supported the voluntary self-determination of the peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Baltic and Moldavia, but that conditions should be created to help all Russians to return to their historical motherland, should they so desire.³¹

When the referendum was held on 17 March 1991 on the maintenance of the USSR, RONS stuck to the idea of an independent Russian Union [*Rossiiskii Soiuz*] comprising the abovementioned Slavic areas. Its referendum leaflet urged the people to boycott the referendum, because a vote either way would be a vote for maintaining the Union as it was, or for a Russia separated from its blood brothers of Ukraine and Belorussia.³²

The form of Russia's state structures would be decided by national referendum or by specially chosen representatives in the 'highest organs of power', which might be a Land Assembly [*Zemskii Sobor*] or a State Duma. The suggestion of a *Zemskii Sobor* brings to mind Solzhenitsyn's somewhat authoritarian concept of a unique 'Russian' democracy.

The Union supported the establishment of a strong, independent national economy which would conduct business with the world market. The national income would be spent on the needs of Russians rather than maintaining the 'fraternal republics' of the USSR.³³ RONS aimed to establish a mixed economy, combining various forms of ownership. However, it added that economic problems would not be solved without 'moral' solutions. The Union believed that the economy should be independent/self-sufficient and not subject to the mercy of Western capital.

RONs declared that it aimed to establish a Russian army for the territory of the Russian Union. National minorities would be able to form national sub-units within the army. Although RONS had stressed that it aimed to protect the rights of Russians outside Russia (and had passed a resolution to such effect at a regional conference in March 1991), it rejected the use of the Russian Army in solving 'international' conflicts outside the Russian

Union. It added that the Army would be used to protect the Slavic population in such instances only when all diplomatic measures had failed.

Despite *RONs*'s support for the independence of the non-Slavic republics, it was unwilling to give up any territory which belonged to the Russian republic. To this end, it supported the integrity of the RSFSR and took part in a protest against transferring the Kurile Islands to Japan.³⁴

RONs was due to hold a Congress in September/October 1991, but this was delayed until the following year. The programme ratified at this Congress says much about *RONs*'s belief in a unique Russian path. It declared that the organisation's values were influenced by the Orthodox faith and historical Russian statehood. In a section on 'Spirituality and Culture', the programme referred to the uniqueness of the Russian person:

The historical existence of an Orthodox Russia between Catholic Europe and Islamic Asia and the unique nature of the country, with its relatively thin population inhabiting huge expanses, have helped bring about a single cultural-historical type of Russian [*ruskii*] person amongst the ethnic variety of Russians [*rossiiane*]³⁵

It also suggested that the Russian people needed to devise a society in which its national characteristics would flourish:

The restoration of Russian cultural and historical tradition requires the unification of all the national forces of the Russian people, in order to work out those forms of public and state life in which historical tradition will develop naturally under modern conditions.³⁶

The section of the programme concluded that the Russian Orthodox Church had maintained the truthful essence of the Russian tradition during times of trouble and that it had been the 'bulwark of the faith and strength of the national spirit'.

RONs's 'third way' clearly rejects both Western democracy and communism. It believed that the Russian/Slavic unique development could be guaranteed by shedding the non-Slavic periphery. In many ways it was trying to re-invent the Russian nation and looked to the past for its answers. This included the revival of the 'national-cultural peculiarities and traditions of Russian towns, villages and localities', as well as the return of historical names and symbols. The revival of Russian 'spirituality' had as much to do with the essence of the Russian nation as it

did with Christianity.

Although it was only a relatively small group, RONS was active in participating in conferences, meetings and distributing printed matter. This activity continued after 1991, when the organisation continued to develop its ideas.

The Russian Party (*Russkaia partiia*)

The Russian Party, or the Russian Party of the RSFSR, was formed on 17 May 1991. It was not a large party, but had a following of around five thousand supporters by spring 1992.³⁷ Its leader was Viktor Korchagin who described himself as a 'Russian' [*russkii*] from a 'family of exiled, repressed peasants'.³⁸

The Party's draft programme was re-worded a number of times, but the document that resulted from the Founding Congress listed the 'revival of the Russian state, Russia' as its priority. The programme accepted that this would not be a simple reconstitution of the USSR, but demanded the incorporation of 'places where Russians have historically lived' and listed the following areas: the RSFSR, Northern Kazakhstan including Alma Ata, Northern Kirgizia including Frunze, the left bank of the Dnieper, Crimea and other territories subject to the choice of the people.³⁹ Therefore, whilst pursuing the institution of a Russian state separate from non-Russian republics, the party had territorial designs on areas inhabited largely by Russians (this situation was somewhat alarming when one considers that a large number of its support was from officers and retired servicemen).⁴⁰ Despite this desire for a greater Russia, it is still fair to say that the Russian Party displayed an isolationist nationalist tendency - it did not wish to reconstitute the whole of the Soviet Union, it merely wished to encompass areas in which ethnic Russians constituted the vast majority of the population.

The Russian Party opposed Marxism-Leninism and dubbed the 1917 Revolution a 'criminal' act perpetrated by 'Bolshevik-Zionists'. It accused the Bolsheviks of 'dismembering Russian lands' and transforming Russians into 'slaves in their own land'. The CPSU was called an 'anti-

Russian party and a tool of Zionism'. At the same time, the Party opposed the 'democrats', accusing them also of 'Zionism' and of attempting to destroy the protector of the Russian peoples - the Army.⁴¹ The Party appeared to blame most of Russia's ills on 'Zionism' and offered to 'repatriate Jews if they should so choose'.⁴²

The Party programme focussed on a *russskoe* rather than *rossiiskoe* state, declaring that it stood for the:

revival of the greatness of the Russian nation⁴³

In addition to this, the Party aimed to protect the 'lives, honour, dignity and rights of Russians in union republics', using economic or other sanctions if necessary; facilitate the revival of the Russian nation's national consciousness, its culture, traditions and customs; to form Russian national cadres; and introduce a law against 'Russophobia'.

The administrative structure of the country would be based not on national autonomy, but on the basis of provinces [*gubernii*] (this form of territorial administration was also advocated by Vladimir Zhirinovskii, but his 'Russia' would include all the union republics). The Party proposed the establishment of a national legislature chosen on the basis of multi-party elections. It also suggested that a Russian national government would be formed 'in accordance with quota, taking into consideration Russia's multinational composition'.

The Party rejected the idea of privatisation and supported the re-nationalisation of property already sold, without granting compensation. The sale of property was described as 'robbery of the Russian people'. However, the Party did support the principle of private property - it preferred the free transfer of equal shares [*pai*] to each worker in every state enterprise. It also declared that state-owned housing should become the private property of the occupants. The Party supported a 'mixed economy' similar to the system 'before the 1917 October Revolution' and the idea of returning land into private hands to create small family farms.

In the area of social policy, the Party aimed to stop the 'demographic genocide' of Russians by allowing women (who so wished) to return to the home to raise children (and provide them with extra financial assistance

for second and third children). It also aimed to fight alcoholism by using what it claimed to be the best method: to remove the state monopoly on alcohol sales and allowing the free sale of alcohol. On the question of religion, the Party supported freedom to practise one's faith. However, it also demanded that Christianity, which 'propagated the idea of the Jews as the chosen people', be recognised as a 'religion of slaves, originating from Judaism' and added that Orthodoxy was a 'branch of Christianity'.

Clearly, Korchagin's Party wished to create a Russian state based upon ethnic Russians [*russkie*] and what it envisaged to be 'Russian' traditional values. However, these values were not based upon Russian Orthodoxy, but upon the unique innate qualities of the Russian ethnic nation.

Despite advocating a multi-party system and a mixed economy, the Party displayed an authoritarian tendency. By the end of December 1991, it was calling for the introduction of a state of emergency for the period of one year to overcome the 'general crisis' in the USSR. This involved: the suspension of all political parties; the suspension of soviets at all levels; and the transfer of executive power to representatives of a Russian [*ruskii*] national government and to officers of the armed forces, who would both have the right to intern people.

The Russian Party's vague 'third way' was based upon the regeneration of ethnic Russians and a struggle against 'Zionism'. Appealing to the army for support, it appeared to present a quasi-Nazi programme for Russian ethnic statehood.

Conclusion

Despite the enthusiastic response which Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet received, there was only one group, *RNPR*, which adopted (or claimed to adopt) his ideas. It appeared that Solzhenitsyn's programme became just what he had declared it was - a starting point for discussion. Some imperialist Russian nationalists warmed to the idea of a Russian path, while more liberal Russian nationalist figures were intrigued by the marriage of the 'Russian idea' with a concept of democracy. Liberal Russian nationalists were also responsive to the idea of national-separatism for the republics. The three aforementioned parties arose at a time when the imperial idea

was strong among Russian nationalists and when democracy was the force identified with the idea of national-separatism. The parties have four things in common: a loathing for the West; a rejection of the 'alien' ideologies of communism and liberal democracy; a belief in the innate virtues of the Russian people; and a desire to unshackle themselves from the financial, political and cultural burden of the non-Russian republics.

RNPR wished to enter into a federation or confederation with the other Slavic republics, whilst *RONs* viewed the Russians as a triune people. The Russian Party placed its beliefs firmly in the virtues of ethnic Russians. One might argue that the former two organisations were advocating a 'pan-Slavic', rather than 'Russian' nationalism, because they wished to bring the Eastern Slavs together. However, *RNPR's* priority was to establish a sovereign Russian Federal Republic with Russian institutions - Russia would merely 'propose' to the Slavic republics and Kazakhstan that they enter into the 'Russian Union' favoured by the Party. *RONs* firmly believed that the Eastern Slavs *were* the Russian people: '*veliko, -malo,- and belo-russy*'. This idea of a broader, 'triune' Russian [*ruskii*] people was common to one or two other groups.

The idea of a fundamental Russian way for an isolated Russian state was relatively unpopular for the following reasons: many Russian nationalists could only identify the Russian state with the whole of the USSR's territory; it was difficult to imagine an isolated Russia with its own peculiar path solving economic problems; although they might have referred to the institution of democracy (or *narodovlastie*), the aforementioned parties all contained authoritarian elements in their programmes for development.

The obvious appeal of isolationist Russian nationalism was that, although Russia would still be a multi-ethnic state, the vast majority of the population of a reconstituted Russia would be ethnic Russians. This would allow the state to pursue and develop the interests of ethnic Russians. In addition, the Russian state would, supposedly, be able to spend most (if not all) of its national income/resources on itself, rather than subsidising the economies of the non-Russian republics.

The idea of a fundamental way for a Russian people largely isolated from the non-Russian influence of the periphery did not have great appeal.

However, I suspect that many of those who favour both a Russian 'third way' and an imperialist Russian nationalism will gradually adopt an isolationist Russian nationalism when the idea of non-Russian nation-states in the 'near-abroad' has become established sufficiently in the minds of the Russian people to be accepted as the norm.

¹ *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 20/6/90, p. 1.

² *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 7/6/89, p. 2.

³ This is proven by Rasputin's continued support for imperialist Russian nationalist-orientated organisations.

⁴ A. Prokhanov, "Zapiski konservatora", *Nash sovremennik*, No. 5, 1990, pp. 90-91.

⁵ Oleg Skorin, "Nash put'", *Velikoross*, No.2, 1991, p.1.[SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

⁶ See I. Shafarevich, "Russofobiia", *Nash sovremennik*, No. 6, 1989.

⁷ See, for example, A. I. Solzhenitsyn, "Kak nam obustroit' Rossiiu", *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No.38, 18/9/90, pp. 3, 4, 5 & 6.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ The RNPTs was an offshoot of a Leningrad *Pamiat'* group.

¹² Ibid., p.145.

¹³ B. I. Koval' (ed.), *Rossia segodnia...*, op. cit. p.285.

¹⁴ Berezovskii et al (eds.), "Rossia: partii,..." Vol. No. 6, op. cit., p.150.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.156.

¹⁶ *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 25/4/90.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.146.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, SU/0738, 13/4/90.

²¹ R. Medvedev (ed.), *Spravochnik*., op. cit., p.19.

²² Berezovskii et al (eds.), "Rossia: partii,..." Vol. No. 6, op. cit., p.151.

²³ Ibid., p.154.

²⁴ Ibid., p.155.

²⁵ Ibid., p.164.

²⁶ Ibid., p.160.

²⁷ N. Lysenko, "Tret'ia politicheskaia sila" in Berezovskii, *ibid.*, pp.163-164.

²⁸ "Tol'ko my ot dadim prikaz, kotoryi zhdet vsia strana!", *Nashe vremia*, [The newspaper of the RNPR] No.6, 1991, Petrograd, pp.1-1. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

²⁹ R. Medvedev (ed.), *Spravochnik*., op. cit., p.19; *Natsional'no-respublikanskaia partiia Rossii: programmnye dokumenty*, 1992, p.6. [IGPI Archive]

³⁰ "Uchreditel'naia konferentsiia Russkogo Obshchenatsional'nogo Soiuz", *III Rim*, No. 5, p. 1. [Solovei collection]

³¹ V. Berezovskii et al (eds.), "Rossia: partii,..." Vol. No. 8, op. cit., p.78.

³² "Russkii obshchenatsional'nyi soiuz: k referendumu 17 marta 1991 g.", leaflet dated 5 March 1991, Moscow. [Solovei collection]

³³ I. Kopylov, "Russkie -protiv SSSR", *III Rim*, No. 5, p. 7. [Solovei collection]

³⁴ *Russkii vestnik*, No. 27, 19/11/91, p. 5.

³⁵ "Russkii Obshchenatsional'nyi Soiuz: programmnye dokumenty", undated pamphlet, Moscow, p. 7.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ V. Berezovskii et al (eds.), "Rossia: partii,..." Vol. No. 8, op. cit., p. 40.

³⁸ *Russkie vedomosti*, No.2, 1991, p.1. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

³⁹ Ibid., p.4.

⁴⁰ Berezovskii et al (eds.), "Rossia: partii,..." Vol. No. 8, op. cit., p.40.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² In fact, the predecessor to the Russian Party, the Russian National Party, proposed that the Jewish Autonomous Territory in the RSFSR should be abolished and that Jews should be resettled permanently in a newly-created Jewish autonomy in the Ukraine.

⁴³ *Russkie vedomosti*, op. cit., p.4.

Conclusion

Until the advent of Gorbachev, Russian nationalism existed on two major distinguishable levels: within the establishment and outside the establishment. It was difficult for those within both camps to articulate their views to a broad audience and subject them to discussion. The establishment figures were restricted to writing fiction or veiling their beliefs in Marxist-Leninist or internationalist terms, whilst the dissidents were restricted to the low circulation of *samizdat* and subject to harassment by the authorities. The expressions of Russian nationalism available for mass consumption during the seventies and early eighties dealt with issues which were isolated from a broader picture of the author's beliefs and did not necessarily indicate how the author viewed the Russian state or how that state should be run.

During the first years of Gorbachev's rule many of the nationalist-orientated writers stuck to safe topics such as the state of rural Russia, the environment and discussions of the Russian character. However, glasnost released a stream of views which revealed not only what people thought characteristic of the Russian national identity, but how they envisaged the continuation of the Russian state.

The three tendencies which I have named in this work aim to show the relationship between ideas of what constitutes a Russian and the type of state in which that Russian would live. Imperialist Russian nationalism views the ethnic Russian as a leader, an elder brother in a vast state which embraces many nationalities. It views the Russian nation as the backbone of a greater power which must be maintained in order to maintain the very essence of the Russian nation. Isolationist nationalism believes that the Russian nation must be isolated from foreign influences in order to survive. It advocates the establishment of a Russian state which is prepared to cast off the periphery and concentrate on a social and political system where Russian values have primacy. Liberal nationalism concentrates on the establishment of a Russian state independent of those republics which wish to secede. It accepts the viability of foreign ideas, but aims to establish a Russian identity based mainly upon citizenship, but

also paying lip-service to the ethnic Russian dimension.

The majority of Russians were not Russian nationalists. Many felt themselves to be Soviet nationals and the desire to assert their Russianness or fight for the special place of Russians in Soviet society was unimportant (e.g. M. Gorbachev). Others were more concerned with the democratic changes taking place in Soviet/Russian society and were concerned primarily with instituting a system which would guarantee their civil rights, introduce pluralist politics and allow them to express their beliefs and ideas freely. The complexion of the economy and property relations were also matters of interest which were not necessarily connected with the national question. However, Russian nationalism became a phenomenon which touched many political organisations, particularly between 1990-1991 and, to a certain extent, aspects of Russian nationalism became central to the struggle against the Soviet centre from both conservative quarters and democratic forces.

Of all the tendencies, imperialist Russian nationalism was at first the strongest, expressing itself through the influential RSFSR Writers' Union and then through 'cultural' organisations such as *Pamiat'* and *Otechestvo*. The Writers' Union sponsored its own 'cultural' organizations, which, like *Pamiat'*, spoke with an increasingly political voice. The likes of *Edinenie* and the Association of Russian Artists simultaneously supported the stimulation of Russian culture and the maintenance of a Russian state coterminous with the Soviet borders. Russian writers were prominent advocates of imperialist Russian nationalism right up until the end of the Soviet Union. They were constant signatories to appeals to maintain the Union and many of them joined or formed parties or groups of an imperialist Russian nationalist persuasion. Representatives of the creative arts, Iurii Bondarev, Eduard Volodin, Aleksandr Prokhanov and Valentin Rasputin, were amongst the twelve signatories to the *Slovo k narodu* letter which served as a warning of possible action by statists shortly before the attempted coup of August 1991.¹

Imperialist Russian nationalism, was in some cases, allied to central government in Moscow. For instance, the 'international' movements which arose in the non-Russian republics were supported by the centre, whilst Nina Andreeva's *Edinstvo* was backed by patrons in the CPSU such

as Egor Ligachev.

It might seem that there were large political differences between groups such as *Edinstvo* and Mikhail Antonov's *Soiuz dukhovnogo vrozhdeniia Otechestva*, or even *Pamiat'*, but the uniting factor was their adherence to imperialist nationalism and their political differences were secondary to this. This is reflected in an item in the independent Russian nationalist newspaper, *Nashi*, in 1991. It was describing a conference of imperialist Russian nationalist-orientated groups and figures (including writers Belov, Prokhanov, Kozhinov, Balashov, M. Antonov) who discussed the 'Russian idea and modernity':

They discussed the contradictory problem of reviving Russian statehood. Fundamentally different points of view were expressed. However, the participants agreed that the interests of saving the Fatherland were higher than individual, or narrow-minded party and group interests.²

Imperialist Russian nationalism was the strongest of the tendencies at first, probably because of the strong Soviet patriotism which had been promoted prior to the mid-eighties. This had developed a pride in the unitary state and, to some extent, must have reassured Russians of their security as first among equals in a multinational state. Some objected to the idea that Russians had benefitted as a nation from the Soviet state, pointing to perceived inequalities and disadvantages, but imperial thinking prevailed. Imperialist Russian nationalism also surfaced in reaction to republican national fronts. Russian populations in the republics felt insecure and some Russians, perhaps, resented the 'ingratitude' of the non-Russian populations for wishing to break away from Russia and the Soviet Union. This was ingratitude for what Russians perceived to be the physical security and subsidies that Russia had given to the republics.

Gorbachev supported the maintenance of the Union, but there appeared to be very little Russian nationalist content in this. He did say:

I cannot imagine the Union without Russia. Without her it simply cannot exist. But in exactly the same way, Russia needs the Union. It is worth saying this over and over again.³

These are the words of a Soviet leader who was used to the idea of a Soviet Union, who had not contemplated the disintegration of the Union and certainly did not want to go down in history as the man responsible for

that break-up. He did make concessions to Russian nationalist-orientated figures and tried to involve them in the overall process of perestroika. At the beginning of his reforms, he did try to harness some of the positive energies of Russian nationalism through such figures as Dmitrii Likhachev and Sergei Zalygin and a little later, he included the more imperialist nationalist-orientated Rasputin and Veniamin Iarin in his advisory body, the Presidential Council. However, in the final analysis, Gorbachev did not harness Russian nationalism to the degree and effect that his political rival, Boris El'tsin did.

Isolationism and separatism were trends which appeared in Russia in 1990. The idea of separatism appeared to be a platform of both liberal and isolationist Russian nationalism. Marina Sal'e at the beginning of the year had spoken of the idea of creating a democratic Russian national party, based on a 'healthy national idea', suggesting that it was a good idea for Russia to focus on its own affairs, but at the same time upholding democratic values - Russia could pursue politics within a Russian national framework, but did not need to institute a special Russian idea. Solzhenitsyn's programme surfaced in 1990 and attracted plenty of interest, but there did not seem to be a large number of people forming political parties based on Solzhenitsyn's ideas. Isolationist Russian nationalism was to sit on the sidelines to a large extent, but it could be detected within the ideas and expressions of those who adhered to the other two tendencies. Nevertheless, there were a handful of parties which probed the remote possibility of creating an isolated Russian fundamentalist state. Isolationist nationalism was probably the tendency to benefit most from the break-up of the USSR. As the democratic Russian state becomes the norm and the idea of a Russia independent from the other republics becomes commonplace, people might look to a fundamental Russian way for the Russian Federation as an alternative in the future.

The break-up of the Soviet Union was met with the biggest outcry by imperialist nationalists within groups such as *Nashi* (late 1991) and the National Salvation Front (which appeared in early 1992). For a while after the August putsch, supporters of imperialist nationalism such as Viktor Alksnis and Aleksandr Nevzorov, who had been prominent in 1991,

raised their profiles. However, it is difficult to imagine that Russian imperialist nationalism will rally the nation to reincorporate the former Soviet republics into a Russian state.

Liberal Russian nationalism came into its own as a force in 1990-91. It had existed within the ranks of a few intellectuals up until then, but received a boost with the rise of the democratic movement. To a large extent, liberal Russian nationalism was a fellow-traveller of the democratic movement, supporting the institution of democratic values and a civil society, but paying attention to 'specific Russian characteristics' [*rusaskaia spetsifika*] and the institution of Russia-wide structures. In some instances, there was additional concern for the future of ethnic Russians outside the Russian state (RSFSR).

The reasons for the rise of Russian nationalism

There was a certain amount of Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union before Gorbachev came to power. Glasnost released much of the latent or subdued nationalism as it stimulated intellectual thought and allowed broader, in-depth discussions of the Russian national identity and Russian national issues. The initial discussion took place within certain thick journals, the RSFSR Writers' Union and the established press. However, by 1988-1989, material was beginning to appear in the form of *samizdat* publications and leaflets.

The discussions sparked by glasnost and the questions posed in the pursuit of perestroika led to the relaxation of certain ideological taboos, including questioning the principle of internationalism. As Popular Fronts appeared in non-Russian republics, Russians responded with their own representative organisations, some of which claimed to be 'internationalist' in their orientation, but clearly represented the interests of Russians or Russian-speakers. These organisations were not supported by all Russians in the non-Russian republics and they did not receive overwhelming support from the Russian population in the Russian republic. Russians, themselves, questioned the principles of internationalism and some (e.g. *KhPS*) decided that it was time to focus on a Russian spiritual and physical 'revival'. Certain Russians (e.g. V. Belov)

were sensitive to suggestions that they were associated with the 'internationalist' Soviet centre and sought refuge in Russian nationalism as a way of deflecting from the Russian nation the blame for the ills of the Soviet peoples.

The appearance of national-separatist movements and declarations of sovereignty in the Union republics provoked Russian nationalist activity from both imperialist Russian nationalist groups opposed to the break-up of the unitary (Soviet) state and other Russian nationalist organisations which perceived an opportunity to follow suit. However, it was not only the break-up of the USSR which cast a focus on Russian national issues - the possible break-up of the RSFSR was of concern to practically all Russian nationalists, who could not conceive the dismemberment of the Russian republic. Some accepted the principle of political and cultural autonomy of the minority nationalities in the Russian republic, but none of the Russian nationalist-orientated organisations advocated secession of territories situated within RSFSR borders.

Some manifestations of Russian nationalism reflected resistance to the changes instituted by Gorbachev, many of which were regarded as the introduction of 'Western' influence. Members of the USSR/RSFSR Writers' Unions objected to the influence of 'mass culture' which was regarded as an alien, Western import. This condemnation of 'mass culture' was repeated by members of the Russian Orthodox Church and by organisations such as, for example, *Otechestvo*, *SDVO*, *Otchizna* and even the 'neo-Stalinist' *Edinstvo*.

In 1990-1991, the gradual collapse of communism led to the search for alternative ideologies. Some resorted to Russian nationalism as an alternative to liberal democracy - even the Russian Communist Party adopted a Russian nationalist, rather than an orthodox Marxist-Leninist position and members were seen to embrace not only ethnic Russian issues, but also Russian Orthodoxy, which had earlier been taboo. As the democrats tightened their grip on the levers of power, groups such as *Otchizna* and *ROS* adopted Russian nationalism as the ideological glue to unite people against the democrats and support the maintenance of the unitary greater Russian/Soviet state.

The reform process had significant effects upon the growth of Russian

nationalism. Gorbachev and the central authorities realised that Russian nationalism had potential and attempted to develop a *modus vivendi* with some of its leading adherents before the appearance of 'informal' movements. However, the consequences of Gorbachev's reforms meant that Russian nationalism became the force behind opposition to the Soviet leader.

The successes and failures of Russian nationalism over the Gorbachev period

It is difficult to assess the success of Russian nationalism over this period, but according to Lev Gudkov of the opinion-monitoring organisation, *VTsIOM*, the level of Russian national consciousness reached a high in 1991.⁴ However, he added that the Russian people had the lowest level of national consolidation of all the peoples of the USSR. Certainly, there was reason to suggest that Russians had a dual, if not indifferent approach to the idea of the Russian nation. In 1991, 78% of Russians [*rossiiane*] considered themselves to be citizens of the Soviet Union,⁵ whereas, in 1990, a poll had revealed that 'the overwhelming majority favoured an expansion of the independence of Russia and a corresponding reduction in central controls'.⁶ This suggests that the democratic message and opposition to central control was stronger than the Russian nationalist message, for whilst Russians identified with the Soviet Union, they still wanted political independence from the centre. This is reflected by the support which Russian nationalist-orientated groups enjoyed.

The democratic movement did not take up the national idea as a 'weapon' until 1990. From this point on, liberal Russian nationalism, as a fellow traveller of the democratic movement, appeared to be the most successful tendency in Russian nationalism. The failure of other 'patriotic' groups, which had broadcast a much more overt Russian [*russskii*] nationalist message at the beginning of the year, had been demonstrated by their failure in the March 1990 elections. However, it was not only the democrats' ability to occupy the middle ground and to identify itself with the Russian [*rossiiskaia*] national idea which contributed to the downfall of other Russian nationalist groups. Self-proclaimed 'patriotic' groups

were plagued by: bad organisation; irreconcilable political differences; the inability to create a broad platform through the narrow personal ambitions of leaders; and lack of public support through the negative images of groups such as *Pamiat'*.

A poll in 1990 suggested that the larger and more organised parties/movements drew bigger support.⁷ Thus, the *DPR* the CPSU and the Social Democratic Party fared relatively well. The poll also revealed that 'it is not what, but who', suggesting that personalities drew significant support. The organisational structures of imperialist and isolationist Russian nationalist forces did not compare with those of Democratic Russia (or the CPSU) and there was no recognisable political leader representing a 'patriotic bloc'. Imperialist Russian nationalism represented a diverse range of political views and was unable to organise itself as a unified umbrella movement dedicated to preserving the Soviet Union as a unitary state in which Russians held a dominant position. Despite the alliances and coalitions which existed, there were political differences between the groups in this tendency which, sooner or later, would have led to disunity.

The political ambitions of party leaders also contributed to the inability of imperialist Russian nationalism to create a broad platform. This phenomenon was not confined to imperialist Russian nationalism, but reflected Russian politics as a whole. The style of leaders such as Travkin, Skurlatov, Zhirinovskii, Vasil'ev and Osipov led to splits in, and defections from their organisations which would never heal. The principle of 'divide and rule' operated by the KGB also had a detrimental effect upon the unity of Russian nationalist-orientated organisations, especially *Pamiat'*.

The image of organisations such as *Pamiat'* was another factor which discredited Russian nationalism. The virulent anti-Semitism displayed by the movement was fanned by the KGB and created a lasting association between Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism.

The central authorities tried various tactics to either control, or harness the co-operation of Russian nationalism. They may well have tried to discredit the democratic movement by infiltrating or supporting groups such as LDP and *RNF* which, at first, referred to themselves as 'democratic'

movements, but soon developed imperialist Russian nationalist agenda. However, the central authorities were eventually powerless in preventing a partnership between the democratic movement and the Russian national idea. It was the democratic movement's development of a Russian [*rossiiskii*] national identity and state structures which enabled it to challenge the centre successfully.

¹ "Slovo k narodu", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 23/7/91, p.1.

² E. Troitskii, "Russkim nuzhna gosudarstvennost'", *Nashi*, No.1(3), 1991, p.3. [SSEES Informal Newspaper Collection]

³ "Radi mir i soglasii" (Interview with M. S. Gorbachev by Soviet journalists), *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 13/6/91, p.1.

⁴ L. D. Gudkov, "Russkoe natsional'noe soznanie: potentsial i tipy konsolidatsiia" in T. I. Zaslavskaia & L. A. Arutiunian (eds.), *Kuda idet Rossiia?... Al'ternativa oshchestvennogo razvitiia*, No.1, Moscow, Interpraks, 1994, p. 176.

⁵ Ibid., p. 179.

⁶ Cited in Graeme Gill, *The collapse of a single-party system: the disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, CUP, 1994, p. 126.

⁷ *Gospodin narod*, No. 1, 1990. [SSEES New Political Parties Archive]

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